A REFUTATION

RECENTLY DISCOVERED OF

SPINOZA BY LEIBNITZ.
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Gottfried Wilhelm

SPINOZA BY LEIBNITZ.

WITH PREFATORY REMARKS AND INTRODUCTION

BY THE

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TRANSLATED AT HIS REQUEST BY THE

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TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION.

Individuality is never restored. You may procure from many, the varied elements which are contained in one, and perhaps each severally in greater strength, but the combination of the whole, once destroyed, is irrevocable. The present is the prolific day of little minds, when a myriad of Lilliputian statesmen, (we disparage the word,) generals, pseudo-scholars, novelists, philosophers, struggle to exhibit a questionable equilibrium, against "the great of old," the Gullivers of a former age. Inestimable, therefore, must be the discovery of any mental relic from such a man as Leibnitz, whose influence upon his own time, as mathe-
matician, moralist, and philosopher, still affects those succeeding; whose investigations and arguments, generally unaugmented, upon ethical and scientific questions, are still put forth, with diminished lustre, by the most self-complacent of our "original" (?) thinkers, who, with common ingratitude, ignore the aid they borrow, and throw down the ladder he placed, upon which they mount to fame:—"miserum est alienæ incumbere famæ!"

As to the practical utility, indeed, of such investigations as the following, we admit, that so long as human intellect is incompetent to reconcile the apparent paradox of predestination and free will, or to define accurately, the nature of matter and spirit, such inquiries may safely, nay, wisely be suspended, and the subjects themselves regarded as the rocks of truth, set up by unerring wisdom, to bar the pride of thought, "by which sin fell the angels." Yet as a refutation, upon philosophical ground, of materialism, enunciated by Spinoza, as it were the leader of those modern sceptics, who,
rejecting revelation, confine their belief, if they have any at all, to the very narrow limits of their own augmentative perception, the recent discovery, by M. de Careil, of Leibnitz' treatise is extremely valuable. For here we have two consummate intellects—Greek meeting Greek—upon the same plain of thought, drawing their weapons from the same armoury of argument: the free-thinker, therefore, or the rationalist, cannot disown his chief, nor advance the favourite objection made to the divine or the theologian, of reasoning from revelation to which the sceptic refuses assent, but the whole plea for materialism is weighed in the balance of reason alone, and found utterly wanting. Adam Clarke confuted Spinoza a hundred years ago; the merest tyro in logic can expose his fallacy upon fallacy, above all, the Christian finds the instability of such dogmas in every page of Scripture—that sole irrefutable antagonist of error; but we have now placed before us, their subversion by metaphysical argument singly, and this
stitutes the especial value of the present work.

Leibnitz himself, however, it must be remembered, was suspected of Spinozism, and was said to have become a secret convert to Roman Catholicism; hence this treatise, with the other found by M. de Careil, which we hope shortly to present to our readers,* will be regarded with interest, as containing an exposition of his real sentiments. To understand the refutation, it will be useful to state, as briefly as we may, the doctrines of Spinoza, premising that Leibnitz' suspected concurrence with them, arose from his entertaining a species of fatalism, but that his abnegation clearly appears in those points of difference we shall endeavour to point out. We notice also the peculiarities of the Kabbalistic doctrine, with some observations upon which, the refutation itself commences.

If persecution be a test of conscientious

sincerity, Benedict Spinoza earned well his high reputation for the possession of that quality, by his endurance, amongst the Portuguese Jews with whom he was connected. He early established his fame for ability in prosecuting heterodoxical opinions, with singular analytical investigation into the traditions of his people, as well as into philosophy generally. Following Descartes in physics, he carried out the latter's system by applying it to metaphysics, maintained the unity of substance, and inferentially the impossibility of creation. He attributes to God, extent and thought, which, though heterogeneous, he is compelled by the nature of substance to identify. The Divinity with him, is of an indeterminate character, and possessing no will in thought or act, has, consequently, neither wisdom nor goodness, intelligence nor virtue. The world springing from necessity, ignores all pre-conceived ideas of the good and the beautiful, as well as of intended harmony and order; its mechanism follows the rule of its origin, matter
and spirit are identical, and the unity of substance forms the basis both of ethics and physics.

Confounding species, and endeavouring to evade the direct reference of motive laws to final causes, he advocates the infinity of nature, and the stoic doctrine of a soul of the world, by endless repetition of untenable contradictions, so that personal individuality and consciousness are annihilated, and corporeal as well as spiritual activity destroyed. All spirit and also matter being homogeneous, the virtues are banished from God and man, Pantheism and materialism evolve into quasi-Atheistic theory, and though the Deity has with him, no independent action nor will, He still influences things, into the nature of which He enters with a force superior to every other. This He does by means of ideas, enabling the soul by them to obtain extraneous knowledge, to perceive and imagine according as He exercises Himself in it. This is the action of an attribute of His Divinity, thought; by the
exercise of the other, extent, He enters into the nature of matter.

Moreover God makes Himself perceptible by assuming a corporeal form—becoming the substance of the soul's perceptions. He is at once the object and subject of knowledge, and being in matter by extent, and in spirit by thought, the perception of matter by the soul, is the result of God, in extent, making himself known to God in thought. It has been truly said that this theory, which recognises two phases, yet nevertheless the same, and indivisible, of the Deity, contradicts all order and harmony; but Spinoza preferred to attribute these to a philosophical necessity, or took refuge in any contradiction, sooner than admit God, as the Author of His own work!

Against these speculations, Leibnitz endeavours to prove a pre-established harmony; and having already attacked Spinoza's definition of substance, and his attempts to prove its unity, proceeds to shew that the idea of God, does not necessarily include that of extent,
neither in which last, therefore, nor in matter, are we to seek for the origin of things. Employing monadology to demonstrate the reality and individuality of beings, he confutes Spinoza by proving the superiority of spirit to matter; whilst the will, power, goodness, and wisdom of God, as the one great Infinite, are shewn in the wonders of creation, and in the series of intelligence dependent upon Him. In fact, his theory of pre-established harmony opposes Spinoza's entire system, though it is a most striking circumstance, that in prosecuting his attacks upon his antagonist, Leibnitz confutes his own doctrine of an immutable necessity. A God of infinite attributes, if an immutable chain of events be admitted, can only act upon Himself, supposing that the will of the one had nothing to do with the issues of the other, so that, as here, Leibnitz and Spinoza would concur, both would have to reconcile the endless proofs of design in creation, with the total inactivity and indifference of the Creator.

Indeed, the Necessitarian scheme propounded
by Leibnitz, must be ever paradoxical in its attempt to reconcile God’s predestination with man’s free will, since Scripture alone establishes the responsibility of the one, and the supreme omniscience of the other. The superintendence of the Almighty, free to act according to His own will, precludes the admission of an immutable chain of events, for God can suspend laws He has Himself instituted, whether directly or indirectly, matters little. Moreover, the very recommendation and command to pray, recognised by every human being, under different phases of religious belief, presupposes that God “heareth prayer,” “governs all things in heaven and earth,” “knoweth the way that we take,” and will, by His own controlling fiat, “make all things work together for good to those who love Him.” Although therefore human intellect, in its pride, rebel against the doctrine, it is certain that the whole truth of revelation attests the free agency of man, open to accept or reject the Divine law; at the same time as
it establishes the care, wisdom, superintendence and beneficent control of God, over the minutest of His works.

Upon the theory of the Kabbalists, we observe that it was veiled, as usual with Eastern philosophers, under allegory or fable, given in the following tradition:—“The sin of Adam was the cutting off Malcuth from the other plants; now Malcuth or kingdom, is the last of the Sephires, and signifies that all things are irresistibly governed by the will of God, so that men imagine they are following their own, while they are carrying out the will of God. They say that Adam had attributed to himself an independent liberty, and that he learned by his fall, that he could not stand by himself, but must be raised up again by God through the Messiah. Thus Adam cut off the ramification of the Sephires at the summit.” Generally, the doctrine of the Kabbalists is shewn to have been, that all things are included in the one first cause, from whom the world proceeds; separate existences
being separate emanations from Him, which emanations ceasing, the things die, and merge their individuality in God. Besides, they taught that, the same amount of beings was always in the universe, which last was God, so far as the Divinity was manifested in it, and being made out of His substance, partook of a divine nature. Dependence, however, upon the primal cause, did not prevent separate intelligences having distinct existence, and acting upon others, but such separation from God rendered them finite in attributes, and liable to declination, since perfection consists only in consonance with the Divine will, and an entire concurrence with the laws laid down for our government. Hence Adam being unable, as finite, to maintain his position, fell as soon as he received "independent liberty," and the hand of the Infinite was withdrawn. Recovery, nevertheless, and restoration, through the Messiah, are provided by God; the creature is taught his weakness, that without God he can do no good thing, but that his happi-
ness entirely depends upon intimate connexion with his Maker; felicity is ensured by the permanent establishment of such holy and harmonious union, and eternal joy in the presence of God and His Son results, whilst universal praise and uniform worship arise from all creation.

Such was the doctrine of the Kabbala, and it is to be regretted that a pursuance of the plan adopted by Plato, Pythagoras, the Epicureans, and Academics, should have induced the concealment of these truths from the masses of the people. The discussion of the subject by Leibnitz evinces consummate knowledge; and though friendship might render me a partial judge, yet it is impossible to peruse the dissertation by M. Careil without acknowledging that it seldom happens to any author to obtain such an able commentator, as he has proved himself. Thorough acquaintance with his subject, extraordinary shrewdness in detecting fallacy, and accurate analytical power in condensing conclusions, characterize the Count's
dissertation, and the work will be eminently useful, not merely as a text-book for establishing truth against vague speculation, but as an aid to logical practice itself. Debarred by the incompatibility of my benefice, with the health of my family, from pursuing my clerical career, the devotion of my time to the contemplation of such unusual learning, and mental vigour in exercise upon grave questions, has been productive of great satisfaction, uniting as it does, the offices of friendship, with the promulgation of important truths; and I sincerely trust the reader may derive the same benefit as myself, from this endeavour to fill up leisure, with the grateful exercise of literary occupation.

O. F. O.

London, January 1855.
PREFACE.

Criticism, in Germany, has been much occupied with the question as to the connexion of Leibnitz with Spinoza, one of difficulty, and which involves also that of ascertaining whether Leibnitz was a Spinozist. The names of Trendelenburg, Erdmann, Guhrauer, and Schulze have resounded in this discussion. Mr. Schulze, professor at Göttingen, in answer to a wish often expressed by Herbart, had published in 1830, in the "Revue Savante" of Göttingen, the marginal notes of a copy of Spinoza, preserved at Hanover, with annotations in the hand of Leibnitz; and as these notes do not extend beyond the first part, he concluded that Leibnitz did not know of, or at all events, had not studied, the other parts. Mr. Trendelenburg, however, mentioned in 1845, extracts from the Ethics in the hand of Leibnitz, from the third to the fifth part.
Mr. Erdmann, in the preface to the Philosophical Works of Leibnitz, also alluded to extracts from the Ethics made with so much care, that of the first and fourth parts, not a single proposition has been omitted. Lastly, Mr. Guhrauer informed us, that during his stay at Paris, Leibnitz, who frequently saw Antoine Arnauld, communicated to him a Latin dialogue on Predestination and Grace, in which he stated, with regard to his studies on the question, that he had not failed to read all the authors who had written on the subject, and that he had specially devoted himself to those who had most extended the necessity of things, as for instance, Hobbs and Spinoza.

If we sum up this state of criticism in Germany, we shall find that some errors had crept into these various statements, and that we might even discover some remarkable contradictions. Mr. Schulze had only seen the marginal notes to the first part of the Ethics, and yet Mr. Trendelenburg quoted the third, fourth, and fifth parts. On his side Mr. Guhrauer found fault with Mr. Erdmann, for two rather important errors. In fact, Mr. Erdmann, in
order to shew the influence of Spinoza over Leibnitz, had laid stress on the fact, that the small treatise of Leibnitz, "De Vitâ Beatâ," written, according to him, about 1669, contains several phrases, word for word, borrowed from the Ethics, and from the treatise "De Emendatione Intellectûs." In support of this he quoted the expressions which Leibnitz had used in praising the love of God, and referred to Spinoza, who has some similar expressions. But he had forgotten to consult Descartes, where they are to be found in full, and whence Leibnitz as well as Spinoza might have taken them. Lastly, he has, above all, forgotten that the Ethics being of later date than that which he has fixed, it was impossible that Leibnitz could have borrowed these expressions from Spinoza.

But, putting aside these errors of detail, the conclusion which clearly follows, concerning the state of criticism in Germany, on this difficult question, is, that they only knew of, and that but vaguely, the extracts from the Ethics made by Leibnitz, but not a refutation of the propositions of the Ethics, or, at all
events, of a great number, equally from the hand of Leibnitz, and stamped with a sure mark of authenticity.

The manuscript now published is intended to supply this void. Hidden under a name which did not attract curiosity like that of Spinoza, mixed up with a bundle of papers which bears the name of Wachter, it has hitherto escaped research. It is now offered to the friends of philosophical study* in France.

This manuscript contains the refutation of propositions taken, not from this or that part of the Ethics, but from all; therefore Leibnitz knew them all.

In the Theologico-political treatise, that on the Improvement of the Understanding, even the very letters of Spinoza are quoted; therefore Leibnitz was acquainted with the entire work of the Dutch philosopher.

He only quotes it for refutation; therefore Leibnitz was a Spinozist neither in a great nor in a slight degree.

If it be asked, what is the approximate

* See Remarks on Wachter's book, and the manuscript by Leibnitz which follows it.
date of this manuscript, it may be fixed with sufficient certainty between 1706 and 1710. In fact the Theodicæa only appeared in 1710, and it contains a whole page evidently taken from this manuscript, whence also Leibnitz appears to have drawn all that he says of Spinoza. But as Wachter’s book appeared but in 1706, it was most assuredly between 1706 and 1710 that Leibnitz wrote his criticism on it. The text alone proves that Leibnitz was in possession of the Monadology, and the Pre-established Harmony.

One objection arises from fixing this date. This manuscript, it may be said, is by Leibnitz, when in full possession of his philosophy, and could not diminish the effect, which the doctrine of Spinoza must have produced on him, when younger and less master of his conceptions. Such an assertion, void of proof, falls before this very simple fact.

The Ethics were published in 1677.

Now, in 1672, Leibnitz separated from Descartes on the fundamental idea of substance. He is ready to contend with Spinoza, and assuredly has not shaken off the yoke of the
master to bear that of a disciple inferior to the master. In 1673 we see him entertaining another fundamental idea, that from which the Theodicea subsequently sprung. He teaches a God free in his will, at the time when Spinoza was teaching a God subject to necessity.

Lastly, the Ethics appeared in 1677: Leibnitz obtains the book, and reads it. What does he write to Hugens on the 1st of December 1679? "I should like to know if you have read attentively the book of the late Mr. Spinoza. It appears to me that his pretended proofs are not very exact, as for instance, when he says that God alone is a substance, and that all other things are modes of the divine nature. He seems to me not to explain what substance is."

In another of his writings, we find the shortest, but at the same time the most forcible opinion that was ever expressed by a contemporary, comprised in this sentence,—"The Ethics, or 'De Deo,' that work, so full of imperfections, that I am astonished at it."

Hanover, 25th October 1853.
REMARKS

ON THE

UNPUBLISHED REFUTATION OF SPINOZA
BY LEIBNITZ.
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UNPUBLISHED REFUTATION OF SPINOZA
BY LEIBNITZ.

In the influence of Spinoza over Leibnitz I do not believe. My reasons I have given in the Preface. I think, on the contrary, that there may be found in the principal philosophical opinions of Leibnitz, and in the systematic connexion which binds them, traces of a powerful reaction against Spinoza. Hence I arrive at the refutation of Spinoza by Leibnitz in the terms conveyed in the manuscript.*

A refutation of Spinoza may appear radical, and yet be but partial; his primary position is disputed, and, as according to hypothesis, the whole of his system is included in the first defi-

* See the manuscript and translation at the end of these remarks.
nition of the commencing portion of the Ethics, if you overthrow the first proposition, you subvert all the others. This is what I may well term a lazy refutation of Spinozism. It appears the most profound, and is the easiest. The second method, though less showy, is in reality more solid, but requires more study and argument. Every proposition, or at all events, every apparently worthy one must be analyzed and reviewed; contradictions especially must be noticed. This is the method which Leibnitz adopts. But to prevent error, Leibnitz is not content with subverting, he erects; to one system he opposes another radically contrary, which he applies to refute Spinoza: herein consists the original, unforeseen character of his work, and that which should be restored.

In fact, although he analyzes minutely and in detail, yet he characterizes the whole combined theory which he attacks, in a manner totally different from our modern one. Does he come nearer the truth by the severity of his criticism, than we do now-a-days by the excess of our praise? Does he fall short of
the truth when he makes Spinozism a less formidable theory, than it is generally supposed to be? Every one can judge for himself between Leibnitz and his modern fellow-countrymen; this is neither the time nor the place to oppose him with Hegel or Jacobi.

I add that this refutation appears to me sincere; they are, in fact, but simple notes which comprise it. Leibnitz evidently did not intend them to see the light,—nor was it the desire to shelter his doctrine, or to renounce his faulty opinions, which led him to take up his pen. He impugns the propositions of Spinoza because he thinks they are false. His sincerity cannot be suspected.

It is a generally received opinion that the Theodicæa of Spinoza, or his treatise “De Deo,” in a word, the first portion of the Ethics, comprises his whole doctrine. Leibnitz quotes in his Refutation nine propositions taken from this first part, and proves their fallacy. The first proposition he mentions is the thirteenth of the Ethics; the commencing twelve he omits altogether; not that he agrees with them, but he considers the
proofs attached to them either contemptible or unintelligible.*

Their object is to prove: 1st, That there is only one substance. 2d, That existence belongs to its nature. 3d, That it is necessarily infinite. 4th, That one substance cannot of itself produce another.

Leibnitz, in a letter to Hugens, applies to them the very general and just reproach of teaching us nothing as to the nature of substance which they ought to explain; and he denies that a serious mind can be satisfied with the nominal definition with which the first book of the Ethics opens.

After having laid down the unity of substance, Spinoza proceeds to deduce from it its attributes. The attributes of a substance are such as the mind lays hold of, as constituting its essence. The substance of God comprises an infinity of such attributes. (Prop. XI.) The greater number it has, the more being it has. (Prop. IX.) They are its definite, but still its entire nature. (Prop. V.) We might imagine that Spinoza was about to unfold all

* See Leibnitz, Ed. Erdmann, p. 179.
the riches of these infinite attributes in a marvelous variety, but by an abrupt return to the simplicity of the ways and means which Descartes taught, in the Coroll. to the fourteenth Proposition, he limits the entire progress of his deductions to two, which are, thought and space.

This seeming simplicity conceals much confusion and obscurity. Of these two attributes there is one too many; for they are heterogeneous, and to place in God, that is, in an absolute and perfect Being, things heterogeneous, as thought and space, would be at once to destroy His perfection and to alter His simplicity; and this, too, as Leibnitz observes, by a coarse conception, the dangerous consequences of which he points out. The very definition of thought is a negation of space, and this in its turn implies the negation of thought. We conceive space in the character of imperfection, and as stripped of reason. "True," answers Spinoza, "but this does not prevent the mind from being compelled, if it raises itself above divisible and finite quantity, imaginary quantity, to grant to space the qualities of Eternity and Infinity. As to the
imperfection, which you impute to it, it results from its nature, and therefore cannot be altered."

Here it is that, with wonderful originality, Leibnitz opposes to him the most subtle elaboration of his metaphysics upon matter and space. Spinoza places space in God. "It is not," says Leibnitz, "that he wishes to make his God material. By no means. He only maintains that God comprises extended substance, which last he makes an infinite attribute of God.* But, then, space is not a substance; space by itself is something incomplete, a simple power, what Aristotle calls δυναμικὸν πρῶτον, παθητικὸν πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον, and what I call primary matter."

Is this, then, what Spinoza understands to constitute an infinite attribute of God? "I answer, that space, or if you like, primary matter, is only a certain indefinite repetition of things, in so far as they are similar to each other, or undistinguishable."

But as number implies things numbered, so

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* See scholi um to fifteenth Proposition and Letter 72, where he admits that he has not yet arranged his thoughts on the subject, and that, too, in 1670, a year before his death.
space implies things which repeat themselves, and which, besides common features, have some peculiar characteristics. The accidents, which are peculiar to each, render the limits of magnitude and form, which were before only possible, now real. Matter purely passive is something worthless, deficient in all virtue, but such a thing exists only in an incomplete state or in the abstract.

Those who pretend that this is a substance, overthrow the order of words as well as of thoughts. Besides space, we must have a subject for extension, that is, a substance to which it belongs to be repeated and continued. The notion, therefore, of substance diffused or repeated, is anterior to its repetition. Yet what would a God who repeated and continued Himself be but matter? But then how can you attribute to Him unity and indivisibility?

Space is one, you say, but it must have parts, or it is no longer space. It is infinitely divisible: is that the reason why you pronounce it to be indivisible? It repeats things indefinitely, in so far as they are similar; hence it implies the things it repeats; wherefore it is no longer
infinite source, but indefinite repetition in space and in time.

It is a simple power, and you make it the act of God; it is passive, and you make it the energy of beings, a principle of action, the force of diffusion of the divinity, while it is only matter diffused external to God.

Spinoza supports this error by a false manner of considering quantity. In the scholium to the fifteenth Proposition, and in his twenty-ninth Letter on the Infinite, he distinguishes between two sorts of quantities—one which we imagine, and one which we perceive by the understanding. The first of these the imagination represents to us as divisible, and a natural inclination leads us to divide it; the second we conceive to be indivisible, by means of the understanding which shews us its substance and not its modes. Leibnitz, in his Refutation, contents himself with pointing out the strangeness of saying that space is not divisible; but we may, by the assistance of numerous texts, reconstruct his more developed opinion on this point, and oppose it to Spinoza in the following terms:—"You place quantity
in God, but it is quantity without divisibility. In fact, God or substance is indivisible, therefore, in so far as substance, quantity is so likewise. Now in reality this means nothing; and it matters little whether we have to do with a real or an ideal quantity. If the former, it is actually subdivided into an infinity of parts. I say an infinity, because there is no sufficient reason for limiting this division, and still less for asserting its indivisibility. If you speak of the second, that is, ideal quantity, it involves the possibility of division to infinity. Let us take, for instance, the quantity of matter: I agree with Descartes and with you, that there is no reason to limit it. But I am far from concluding that it is indivisible and infinite; I conclude, on the contrary, that it is infinitely divisible.* In fine, are you talking of the real or of the ideal quantity of matter? in the one case division is actual, in the other it is possible, but in both there is divisibility. You

* We reserve to ourselves the right of returning to this opinion Leibnitz, which the results arrived at by science appear to contradict. We insist only on this point, that it most assuredly contradicts the opinion of Spinoza.
cannot, therefore, be speaking of either, when you speak of indivisible and infinite quantity, which is God; therefore it must be some unknown quantity."

The supporters of Spinoza persist in considering this a fine application of mathematics to metaphysics. "According to Spinoza," say they, "finite quantities destroy one another, and what remains is infinity; this is precisely the rule of calculation which Leibnitz invented."

There is but one objection. It is true enough that, according to Spinoza, finite quantities annihilate each other; but then what remains is not the infinite, but the indeterminate. Leibnitz proves this by his subtle and delicate analysis of space; when you remove all its determinations, what remains is something worthless and incomplete, a simple abstraction and not the infinite.

Moreover, Spinoza is compelled to abridge all its determinations to make it an attribute of God; for in his philosophy all determination is purely negative, and an attribute, on the contrary, must be an absolute affirmation.
If he maintains a distinction between thought and space, he immediately limits space to a certain kind of being; *in certo entis genere consistit*, and in that case he becomes a Cartesian; but he should remain so, and not place space in God.

If, on the contrary, in consequence of the indeterminate, he makes space enter into the notion of substance with thought, this very indeterminate causes it to disappear; in this case he is no longer a Cartesian, but what he places in God, or nothing, is the same.

Spinoza therefore must, perforce, give up this attribute which expresses nothing; an infinite space exists only in imagination; a thinking, infinite being is God Himself.

Such are the forcible words in which Leibnitz concludes his criticism of the heterogeneous attributes placed in God so as to be the expression of His nature. According to Spinoza, God had two attributes which express Him: one is fallen, the other remains. Thought has once more triumphed over space.

Yet Spinoza does not give up the composition of the world, and if you ask him, Is
creation possible? he will reply that it is necessary. If we seek to discover the philosophical tendency of Spinoza with regard to creation, it is evidently to reckon as a fiction the idea of a creation derived from nothing, by virtue of the principle, Ex nihilo nihil. The celebrated scholium to the fifteenth Proposition, which in the last analysis tends to prove that the essence of matter involves its existence, assumes a polemical and triumphant guise, only occurring on decisive occasions, and betrays, along with the prejudices of the Kabbala, the secret and the effort of the logician.

Here, then, is the alternative whereat Spinoza finds himself. The principle, ex nihilo nihil, is one essentially materialist. Its origin, expansion, and results might all be described. It is the principle employed by Lucretius and all heathen antiquity to prove the necessity of matter and the eternity of the world. In its consequences it would suit Spinoza, but by its origin its use appears to have been forbidden him.

This principle, in fact, is derived from the very law itself, which regulates generations in
the order of nature, where it is sufficiently certain that nothing is made of nothing, in this sense, that everything has its germ. It is therefore a principle furnished by the investigation of particular and finite causes, and which, until the contrary be proved, is only available for finite and contingent beings. It is a principle, likewise, which tells us nothing about souls, and which Leibnitz defies to explain the modes of substance, an explanation become extremely necessary in a system which sees nothing but these modes in all directions.

But how could Spinoza, who rejects with disdain the assistance of experience, and takes no account of second causes, admit and employ the existence of a law which experience alone could furnish, and which nothing in the progress of a logical deduction introduces? By what right, in fact, could he apply to the infinite cause a principle, which could only be suggested to him by the consideration of second causes with which he professes to dispense? Evidently to admit it, Spinoza must have sacrificed his method; he must have quitted reason and returned to ex-
perience, and overthrown the whole order of his philosophy.

What does he then? He transforms this principle,* and makes it an axiom of reason. This principle, which he derives from the rude existence of finite beings, he invests with the value of an efficient cause, and reduces it to this formula: "Everything is in God, that is, God comprises the being and the idea of everything." This is the formula of his pantheism; he does not say: "Everything is from God, ex Deo, that is to say, God produces the existence of everything in conformity with its idea in Him. Everything is in God, in Deo. God includes the being and the idea of everything. Therefore all things produced are the product of the laws alone of the infinite nature of God, and are but the consequences of the necessity of His essence."

Such is, according to Spinoza, the unexpected transformation of the old principle on which the materialists of the heathen world had lived and disputed. The deduction is more learned; the result is the same.

* See his Letter 19.
But how can you attack, it is urged, an axiom recognised as an eternal truth; how can you invalidate its consequences? Would you make reason resist the evidence of its own laws, would you make it deny itself? In the very important question, as to the relation of the finite to the infinite, what is the problem? It is to explain the dependence of the world, and the action of God. Dualism explains this dependence and this action in its own way; pantheism in its own; the system of creation does not explain it at all.

I will only remark, that Spinoza, as we have seen, can explain nothing except by virtue of these two principles; either the materialist principle in its ancient formula, frequently quoted by him, "Ex nihilo nihil," or else this principle transformed, grown into a rational a priori truth, and the very formula of pantheism: "God includes the being and idea of everything."

If he employs the first, he is wrong in applying to God a principle which is only applicable to finite things. If he uses the second,
which is indeed the one he employs in the Ethics, he errs in applying to finite things an axiom which only refers to God, and to truths eternal and infinite.

Leibnitz applies himself to subvert the false application of the second principle, and points out with wonderful clearness the radical error of Spinoza’s logic, precisely that of confounding general ideas with individual notions; thus he destroys the alleged impossibility of creation. Far from seeing any impossibility in it, Leibnitz only beholds in it the realization of possibilities, which, from the original character of simple claimants, attain a real existence under the name of contingent beings. The ideas of these things are in God their author; there they constitute the great philosophical classes of the genera and species of Plato; they are the essences of things co-eternal with God, involved in His infinite essence, whence they perpetually gush forth as the eternal stream which carries things on to existence. Of these alone is that true which Spinoza applies to all, even to individuals and contingent and finite beings, I mean this axiom,
that the essence of a thing comprehends its being and idea.*

Spinoza here infers without proof the identity of general ideas with individual notions, and applies to the one what is only true of the other; he is mistaken in thinking that they are identical; they are not so. That which concurs with species does not concur with individuals; the characteristics of these notions differ. The former only follow the order of ideas, the latter follow besides the order of existences. We cannot apprehend God without ideas; we cannot apprehend existences without God. Essence is simple, and comprises only eternal or necessary truths. The notion of existence is complex and requires something else. This distinction obtains also between the species and the individual; everything in the notion of a sphere in general is merely abstract and theoretical, but, on the contrary, the notion of a certain given sphere must embrace everything which pertains to

* Notwithstanding the scholiast to the tenth Proposition, this axiom which Spinoza appears to disown, belongs to him peculiarly, for after having rejected it at the commencement, he returns to it at the conclusion. See Prop. X. p. 2.
the subject of this form. The former expresses but eternal truths, the latter comprises some voluntary decree of God, the sequel of the universe, and the very order of creation. Therefore the order of creation, the plan of the world, denied and misunderstood by Spinoza, is of considerable importance, even in abstract meditations on the nature of things. True philosophy has regard to it, false philosophy alone pretends to do without it.*

It is because he never consulted nor even understood it that Spinoza continually makes a false application of the axiom, *that the essence of a thing includes its being and idea.*

This axiom is true enough as to species, but false, or at all events inapplicable with regard to individuals. Individuals are not the basis of Descartes' distinct notions or clear ideas, as are essences and species; therefore they have no necessary connexion with God; hence are not the product of necessity, but of a voluntary decree, and of the inclina-

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* Undoubtedly Spinoza knew the distinction between the universal and the particular. He sets it forth in his Letters, but has misunderstood it, in the scholium to the fifteenth Proposition, and generally throughout the Ethics; Leibnitz is right in replacing it against him.
tion founded on reason of their author. "It is then false to say (Ethics, p. i., Prop. 34) that God is, by the same necessity, cause of Himself and of all things. God of necessity exists, but He produces things by His own free will. God produced the power of all things, but this power is distinct from the Divine power. Things themselves operate, although they have received the power of action."

The Refutation abounds in texts, which prove powerfully the free-will of God in producing the world. "He is wrong," says Leibnitz, speaking of Spinoza, "he is wrong in saying that the world is the effect of the divine nature, although he gives us to understand that it was not made by chance. There is a medium between that which is necessary and that which is by chance, namely, that which is free. The world is an effect of God, voluntary indeed, but on account of inclining or prevailing reasons, and although we should suppose it to last for ever, yet it would not be necessary. It was in His power either not to create or to create differently, but He was not obliged to make it (non erat facturus.)"
With Leibnitz, God has a connexion with possibilities, and determines them. He has therefore an understanding which possesses ideas, and a will which chooses. His understanding is the source of essences, and His will the source of existences. He is a free and intelligent cause. The features of the human person, enlarged and renewed, develop themselves there even in unattainable lustre. Great remains of the image of God in man serve to reconstruct his ideal. Leibnitz discovers in it hidden veins, by removing the obstacles to their appearance. It is easy to see that Spinoza, starting from an unalterable unity, could not admit these results. With him it is simple anthropomorphism. In fact, his God, ruled by the mechanism of His nature, is more simple, and he cannot be accused of making divinity a personage. He has neither understanding which goes to form truth, nor will which goes to form good. A God relative to His intelligence and will, is to him as strange as a God relative to motion and rest. Men thought to honour Him by their perfections: they did not know that the understanding and will which could constitute the
essence of God, would have no more connexion with their intelligence and their will than the dog-star has with the dog, a barking animal. Neither will nor intelligence belong to the nature of God. This is what Leibnitz strikingly expresses. "Spinoza," says he, "sought for a metaphysical necessity in events; he did not believe that God was determined by His kindness and perfection, but by the necessity of His nature, as a semicircle can only contain right angles, without having any knowledge of them or any will."

Nevertheless, Leibnitz himself recognises some obscurity in Spinoza's opinion on this subject, and in the Theodicea thus expresses the apparent contradiction: Cogitationem, non intellectum, concedit Deo. In his Refutation, he refers more to texts. By the scholium to the seventeenth Proposition, p. i., Spinoza denies to God understanding; by the first Proposition of the second part, he grants him thought. Wachter* pretended to explain everything by the distinction of two Words in God; one which should be internal, and

* For Wachter, see the notice which precedes the MS. of Leibnitz.
which Spinoza rejects; the other, which should be external, and which Spinoza admits so far as to convince Wachter that Spinoza acknowledged a creation by the word or external intelligence. It is easy to see that Leibnitz could not be satisfied with such remarks as these, and that he maintained the contradiction of the two Propositions.

Yet, notwithstanding the authority of Leibnitz, I will venture to assert, that in the eyes of Spinoza there is no contradiction. It is quite true that in his system, God thinks without understanding, and acts without will. In this way: thought, taken in a wide, and up to a certain point in a Cartesian sense, cogitatio, is an infinite power universally diffused in the nature of beings. As long as it does not attain to the knowledge of self, it is neither understanding nor intellect (intellectus.) Since it takes no shape, it loses none of its infinity. The being whose infinite attribute it is, can think without possessing intellect. He can act without willing good. At this indefinite point, nature is natural—that is to say, free.*

* See scholium to Proposition 40.
If, on the other hand, you mean determinations of thought, of which there are all kinds, (intellect is one, will is another, and so are desire and love,) then nature is *natured*—that is to say, necessary or subject to fate.

If we were to translate into less barbarous language this fundamental proposition of the Ethics, always cited to establish the distinction between God and the world in Spinoza's system, this is what it means; God is thought without consciousness of itself, (which is the very denial of thought in the terms of Descartes' definition.)* In this indefinite state, thought knows no limits: it is free as the ocean. If it determines itself, its determinate modes, namely, thoughts, particular volitions, &c., &c., everything, in fact, is only a necessary consequence of its nature.

But since thought is no longer in an indeterminate state, when it determines itself, it follows, that by the creative act, infinite thought destroys itself, and similarly freedom also, and then only a necessary world remains.

*Cogitationis nominem intelligo illa omnia quae nobis conscii in nobis sunt, quatenus eorum in nobis conscientia est. See also Spinoza's Letters 27 and 41.
All that results from the Theodicæa of Spinoza in its final analysis is the necessity of things. "I have shewn," he says, at the conclusion of his first part, "that everything has been pre-determined by God, not by virtue of an absolute free-will and pleasure, but by virtue of His absolute nature or His infinite power."

Leibnitz, with singular clearness, separates the error and the truth which are mingled in this conclusion. "He is right," says he, talking of Spinoza's polemics against the supporters of free-will and absolutism,—"he is right in denying a God who is indifferent, and who decrees all things by an absolute will. God decrees by a will founded on reasons, voluntate rationibus innixâ."

But he is wrong in not acknowledging goodness in God, and in teaching "that all things exist by the necessity of the divine nature, without any will on the part of God."

"Between mere necessity and chance, there is a medium, and that is free-will."

Such is not Spinoza's idea. After having explained, as he expresses it, the nature of
God, after having deprived him of intelligence and of will, and regulated his internal life by a dull necessity, his external by a brute mechanism, he turns to men, and invites them to confirm themselves more and more in the doctrine of necessity, and to create for themselves a destiny such as Mahometans believe. For his part, he has tried to uproot the inveterate prejudices of the human race. Two especially he has opposed and still contends with; the prejudice of exemplary causes and that of final causes.*

"I admit," he tells us, "that the opinion which subjects all things to a certain indifferent will, and makes them depend on the will and pleasure of God, is not so far off the truth, in my judgment, as that which makes God act in all things by the law of good." In fact, the principle of final causes ought to be unsparingly excluded from a philosophy which, in its issue, arrives at the identity of good and evil, of beauty and ugliness, of vice and virtue, and I can readily understand that Spinoza banished

* See Scholium eleventh to the thirty-third Proposition, and the Appendix to the first part.
them as troublesome companions, whose presence displeased him.

But this disdain of final causes without which everything was to be explained, concealed more ignorance than it revealed true knowledge. "Nature," as Leibnitz remarks, with great truth, "has taken its precautions against the exclusive supporters of the application of the geometrical method to metaphysics." She has veils she only suffers discreet and pious hands to raise. And, as she bears everywhere the traces of wisdom and harmony, we must have recourse to other principles than those of the dull necessity of geometricians.

The science of mathematics itself requires this process, and in the calculation of the Infinite, we are stopped at each step, if we know not how to handle a superior analysis which gives us fresh openings. The linear and purely geometrical path on which Spinoza entered, has its limits, and leads to no discoveries. "Spinoza died this winter," writes Leibnitz to the Abbé Galloys, in 1677. "I saw him as I passed through Holland, and I had several long
conversations with him. He has a strange metaphysical doctrine, full of paradoxes. Amongst others he thinks that the world and God are but one and the same in substance, that God is the substance of all things, and that creatures are only modes or accidents. But I have noticed, that some pretended proofs which he shewed me are incorrect. It is not so easy, as is generally imagined, to give true demonstrations in metaphysics; however, there are some very excellent ones." It was not, therefore, because he wished to demonstrate and define, that Spinoza erred, but his views were short and limited. He deprived himself of useful aids, and sacrificed everything to the appearance of geometrical exactitude. He introduced into metaphysics, unreservedly, and without real knowledge, the blind necessity of geometricalians. He neglected the principles of congruity, of harmony, of wisdom, because he did not appreciate their value and legitimate use. "Yet the concurrence," says Leibnitz, "which nature herself bears in her general laws, is a glorious one, the testimony of her Supreme Author, and this would never happen, if we always
had occasion for a geometrical demonstration."

The Refutation brings us back to the second and following parts of the Ethics. We must follow out the result of his errors with regard to God, in another department. We must see this celebrated theorist at work upon actual truths, who has, in so strange a manner, just now mutilated eternal truths.

But, in the first place, do actual truths exist in Spinoza's mind? By such I mean, with Leibnitz, truths which involve an existence,* and constitute an individual notion. Now, with Spinoza, substance is a notion complete by itself, requiring no other idea to form or complete it. There can be but one of this nature, it excludes all others. And as the idea of those which are called individuals always involves some existence, and thence receives its form and completion, the result is, that we might seek in vain of Spinoza a reality which he cannot give us. Spinoza does not acknowledge it; he believes firmly that as the

* Letters to Arnauld—Existentia est essentia rerum extra Deum. The existence of man is not an idea, but a fact.
order of what exists is in proportion to the order of ideas, we may form conclusions from one to the other, and argue on the particular sphere which surmounts the tomb of Archimedes, in the same manner as on the general idea of a sphere. By a process habitual to him, he transforms actual truths, among which are souls, bodies, and the whole of nature, in so far as it is created by God. As to thought and space, he thinks with Descartes, and still more than Descartes, that all this is granted to us in the very nature of substance, and he goes on to speak of souls and bodies, as of modes of thought and space. In vain Leibnitz shews him that particular thoughts are modes of the mind, instead of the mind being a mode of thought; that space supposes things which repeat themselves, instead of itself producing them; Spinoza sets up in opposition to the order adopted by God, and reproduced by nature, the order adopted by himself.

What is his object in thus subverting all the laws of nature, and doing such violence to all things? Here I must recall and set
forth the final result of Spinoza's Theodicea, and that of the Theodicea of Leibnitz. On the one hand is a God, insensible, subject to fate, inexorable, at one time appearing as the indeterminateness of thought, bordering on nothingness, at another as the logical mechanism of nature a priori, without regard to things. On the other hand, is a God, good, wise, the seat of eternal, the source of actual truths, whose intelligence is always one, always equal, always in action, whether it carries externally words of life, and calls things into existence, or whether it reproduces eternally within, the perfections of its nature in the unity of its substance.

After this, when I say, that both seek in things the expression of the divine nature, I think I shall be understood, and no one will fall into the error of those who confound their tendencies. Both, it is true, seek the expression of God in things, but the one seeks the expression of a free and intelligent God, the other of a God subject to fate, and unreasoning. The one follows out in the world an abstract geometrical necessity, the other, real
metaphysical certainty, in conjunction with morals; to either, the world is a mirror, but the object which it represents is different.

This radical difference will exhibit them to us in constant opposition on the important question of the relations between soul and body. Spinoza says, that soul and body are the same thing, only expressed in two ways. As in the unity of substance we have seen space and thought blend and annihilate each other as differences, to remain as elementary principles of identity; so in the relative unity of these modes of substance which we are, body and soul cannot be distinguished, the one from the other. The substance of both is identically the same. What the body is in space, the soul is in thought; for the relation of the bodily nature to God, considered as extended substance, is the same as the relation of the spiritual nature to God, considered as thinking substance.

This parallelism of one to the other, the fallacy of which in metaphysical theology we have demonstrated, brings Spinoza, by a natural tendency, to assert not only the
union, but also the unity, of the soul and the body.

He reasons thus: "There is of necessity an idea in God, yet nothing but one whence an infinity of things flow, whose ideas in their turn must be contained in the infinite idea of God. Moreover, every object has its idea; the circle has its idea, and so also has the human body. The soul is the idea of the body; the body is the object of the soul. And, generally, everything has its soul, for there is necessarily in God an idea of all things, of which He is the cause."

Men and things become objective by an idea which takes a body.

The idea of a body in God is a soul in us.

Leibnitz expresses his astonishment at this manner of animating nature. "There is not the slightest reason," according to him, "for saying that the soul is an idea; ideas are something purely abstract, as numbers and figures, and cannot act. They are abstract and universal notions. The idea of any animal is a simple possibility. The soul is not one idea, but the source of innumerable ideas. It has, besides
the present idea, something active, or the
production of new ideas."

Not only is activity wanting to this en-
tirely ideal and thoroughly abstract soul, which
Leibnitz justly compares to a number, but also
simplicity, identity, spirituality, and immor-
tality. What can be more complex, in fact,
then this soul of Spinoza, which is the idea of
a body, that is to say, an idea composed of a
crowd of other ideas, answering to the in-
numerable parts of the body, and whose finest
and slenderest woof is undoubtedly not less
complicated than that of the tissues of the body
which it expresses?

But again, what can be more variable?
"According to Spinoza," observes Leibnitz,
"the soul changes every moment, because to
the changes of the body there is a corre-
ponding change in its idea." And, further on,
"With him the soul is so volatile, that it does
not remain even at the present moment."

After this, I do not wonder if he makes
creatures so many transient modifications. In
fact, a soul without real unity, without true
identity, and altogether incapable of self-sup-
port, has no substance, and cannot remain even at the present moment.*

But such a soul has not a whit more the characteristics of spirituality. I know well enough that it is not corporeal, in the common sense of the word, since it is the idea of a space which is only nominally material. Undoubtedly, but go on refining as long as you please. As an idea of space, it is the idea of something passive; as an idea of space, it is not the idea of mind; as an idea of space, it cannot express God; as an idea of space, it has no being but that which it borrows from the body of which it is the idea. Not only is it connected with, but it depends on it; not merely is joined, but is identical with it. Whether it is the body or the soul that wants reality, it matters not, they are but one.

The immortality which Spinoza leaves this

* In Spinozism, there are no individual substances, because there are no real individuals, and because there can be no principle of individualization. With Spinoza, the individual is only a certain union of parts, and not the foundation of the accidents of substance. Now, parts are divisible, separable, and corruptible, therefore there is no real individuality in the body. As to form, that also is not a principle of individualization in Spinozism; for he makes it a simple negation, that is to say, whatever is most contrary to the definition of substance.
soul thus deprived of force and life, is but a chimerical, a shadowy immortality. Let us hear Leibnitz: "It is a delusion to say that souls are immortal, because ideas are eternal, as though we said that the soul of a globe is eternal, because the idea of a spherical body is so. The soul is not an idea, but the source of innumerable ideas."

Spinoza says, "that the human soul cannot be entirely destroyed with the body, that there remains something of it which is eternal, but that that has no relation to time, for he attributes duration to the soul only during the duration of the body." In the following Scholium, he adds:—"This idea, which expresses the essence of body under the character of eternity, is a determinate mode of thought, which relates to the essence of the soul, and which is necessarily eternal." "All this," Leibnitz remarks, "is a delusion," for he sees clearly enough that it is a shadow and not a being that Spinoza covers with a deceptive veil of immortality.

Therefore, it is nothing more than to say, "our soul is eternal, in so far as it envelops the body under the semblance of eternity; it
would be just as much eternal because it comprehends the eternal truths with regard to a triangle."

Spinoza destroys in the soul, life, recollection, and duration, and for its whole prospect he leaves one point of sight upon the eternity of the body, in so far as the substance of God involves it.

In making this incomprehensible idea of an unlimited space enter into the notion of the soul, Spinoza thinks he is making the soul eternal and infinite: he makes it equal to the body. He obeys this fatal inclination, which impels him to identify one with the other; and really, in his system, there is a perpetual link between souls and bodies, between the thinking substance and the bodily substance, yet then it is easy to draw the inference. If we prove that the body has no reality, it follows that the soul has none also; if bodily substance cannot attain to real individuality by form, thinking substance cannot attain to it by personality. If the physics of immortality are found to be false, the metaphysics of immortality cannot be true.
Undoubtedly the greatest danger of Spinozism, that which ought to have caused Leibnitz most reflection, is this joint constitution of the body and the soul, subject in his system to the same destiny. Philosophers used to prove formerly that the soul was unity, by reducing matter to zero. They were wont to admire such admirable economy of beings so regulated by Providence, that the bodies pass away, and the minds remain. They insisted upon this inability of matter to raise itself above the nothingness of its origin; and exalted in its own eyes so much the more, the dignity of the spiritual being.

All this Spinoza alters; he asserts that in space, in matter, there is a substantial principle, as well as in thought; that if the reality of the body is equal to zero, the reality of the soul must, by virtue of the law of substantial unity, be strictly equal to zero.

Now, in his system, the reality of the body is equal to zero. "But," inquires Leibnitz, "why did Spinoza fail in his attempts to establish the reality of the body?" For this reason, because he pretended to employ space
alone to constitute the world. Now, space by itself explains nothing, not even when it is conversant with bodily substances. It would be in vain to modify it by motion or to determine it by form, that is not sufficient; more unity, which it does not supply, would be required. Without stopping at lower beings, such as metals and stones, which, totally deprived, as they are, of feeling and life, only appear to be in fact a portion of space, and yet are something more, let us run through the entire scale of beings, from plants up to man. The higher we get, as unity becomes more real, so the impotence of space becomes greater, until it bursts forth in the wonders and delicate and varied organization of men and animals, whose life surpasses and exceeds space, as activity surpasses passiveness.

Space is insufficient to explain everything; but if I may so say, it is doubly thus in Spinozism. In fact, Spinoza, as we know, cuts off from it divisibility; now, it is this very divisibility of matter which, if extended as it should be, unfolds to us the incomparable riches of this world of infinite atoms,
which space involves without explaining. Divisibility is the vehicle which carries on to infinity all the powers of nature by showing in each particle of matter the incalculable details of beings, of powers, and of life, which it comprises without intelligence. It communicates to all distance the least effects, and the waves of light coming to our eyes with the prodigious swiftness with which we know they do, is one of the images which we might apply to the propagation of natural effects by space. In cutting off divisibility, Spinoza cuts off from space its principal quality, and it is a fact that in his system, still less than in that of Descartes, space is unable to give an account of the most beautiful properties which the nature of bodies reveals to us; above all, it can never tell us if they possess anything indestructible and incapable of generation, a principle of life. It can never construct a system of immortality.

It would, however, be well to form such a system; according to Leibnitz, such would close the mouth of materialists, and it might be arrived at by proceeding further than Spi-
noza did. Here, for the first time, appear atoms, the prolific applications of which, to the body, the soul, and the whole of nature, Leibnitz points out without expanding them; wonderful applications, furnished by a superior system of physics and geometry, and which leave no remains of Spinoza's fundamental error as to substance.* Space implies bodies: "Then," asks Leibnitz, "do not bodies imply minds?"

By itself, space is nothing, but the body is nothing more. The existence of the external world, speaking scientifically, has nothing effective or real, as long as the law which presides over its formation remains undiscovered.

Observe a line; this line may be considered as composed of an infinity of points. These points are not parts of the line, because the part must be homogeneous to the whole, and a point is not homogeneous to a line. In the

* We have here only to do with monadology, as far as Leibnitz opposes it to Spinoza. The letters to the Abbé Bourguet may be consulted upon this subject. It is well known that Goethe, at first a passionate admirer of the Ethic, ended by becoming a convert to monadology; a remarkable proof of the attraction and influence exercised by the spiritualism of Leibnitz upon one of the greatest spirits of the nineteenth century at first fascinated by Pantheism.
same manner we may regard the body as an aggregate of substances, but these substances do not constitute bodies as parts, for they are not homogeneous to them. This parallelism of the line and the body is carried on still further. As there is no portion of the line in which there is not an infinity of points, so there is no portion of matter in which there is not an infinity of substances.

Matter then is composed of an infinity of substances, but these substances are not its parts, they are its constituent principles, its immediate requisites.

They are not its parts, we cannot then arrive at it by a division of its parts. We require a calculation to bring us to the extremes of quantity, not to those which quantity embraces, but to those which are beyond quantity itself; to the indivisible, the unproductive, and the indestructible.

Of such substances these are constituent elements, the immediate requisites of matter; I call them atoms.

But in this degree of abstraction, atoms can enter into a calculation, as infinitely small, they
cannot contain a world. Leibnitz organizes them thus: Each one has a portion of matter attached to it, for naturally there is no soul without an animated body, nor animated body without organs. Every corporeal substance, then, has a soul and an organic body; and it is very true, that it is the same substance which thinks, and which has an extended mass attached to it, but by no means does this constitute it, for all this might be taken away without changing the substance. Spinoza's error consists not in saying, that the soul expresses the body, but in thinking that the soul expresses that only; it does not consist in attaching a soul to each body, but in identifying the soul with the body.

We cannot sufficiently admire the infinite skill with which Leibnitz conducts his atomic theory, and substitutes it for the simple space of Spinoza. Of space and matter, Spinoza wished to create a world, he only composed a shapeless mass; *Rudis indigestaque moles*. Take, on the contrary, a simple substance with the little space belonging to it, as its appendage, add to it perception, you have
already an entire world in this metaphysical view; for perception represents to us in unity, divisibility and matter diffused through a multitude of bodies. Vary the points of distance, multiply the simple substances, what prodigious variety immediately arises in the midst of the extended mass! What will it become if you add to it not only simple perception, but thought? what a new world arises! what an infinity of boundless worlds spring into being!

The nature of atoms is given us with their very constitution, they are indivisible, indestructible, and un producible. Impalpable powers, which sust ain and vivify the world, and people it with their invisible multitudes, a higher calculation reveals their existence, a miracle of God alone could annihilate them. In the order of science, they are therefore possible, in the order of nature they are indestructible. Death itself, which, by its sudden transitions, appears to carry us backward, may promote our further progress. It leaves entire in nature the power of following the course of its transformations, of recruiting itself, and of preserving even in its minutest
portions wherewithal to revivify and extend itself. What more is needed to make it indestructible?—Thus urges the author of the Monadology.

The principal inference which I would draw from this theory of simple substances against Spinoza is as follows:—Matter itself has no reality nor life, except by atoms, that is to say, by immaterial substances, wherefore it cannot alone account for any phenomenon of animal life, still less assist us in establishing the indestructibility or physical immortality of these very substances.

But if it could, still Spinoza would have effected nothing; he would yet have to explain all that higher immortality, which only belongs to reasoning creatures. If Leibnitz grants indestructibility to corporeal substances, it is because he reserves something higher for those spiritual. With him, after physics, come metaphysics and the ethics of immortality; for, after all, what is the physical immortality or indestructibility of beings, so far as substance goes, but the impossibility of a return to nothingness, and no more? But spirits re-
quire something besides; they seek the possibility of rising to God, which constitutes their most glorious prerogative, and the proper province of philosophy. In philosophy we estimate a system by the value which it attaches to souls. In Spinoza's theory, what becomes of them? Companions of the body, subject to its laws, deprived of moral qualities, dispossessed of their noblest privileges, without beauty or ugliness, without vice or virtue, they stagnate in inaction, and finally are lost in a chimerical eternity, where they carry with them the infirmities of old age, and the symptoms of imbecility; I mean the loss of consciousness and memory, of which, according to Spinoza, death benevolently spoils them.

With Leibnitz, on the contrary, the immortality of the soul involves recollection and the knowledge of what we are, that is to say, of the human person. "I think," says he, in opposition to Spinoza, "that some imagination and some memory always remain, and that without these the soul would be a simple non-entity. We must not imagine that reason exists without feeling or without a soul. Rea-
son without imagination or memory, is a conclusion without premises."

Such is the doctrine of these two philosophers with regard to immortality; their paths differ, and no less their merits. Indeed, we do not see that Spinoza effected anything in philosophy towards maintaining the prerogative of minds and displaying their excellence, proved by the preference of God and by the laws of love and justice, which Leibnitz holds against him. Nor do we perceive that he has done aught to extend beyond the present life that power of thought which he cites, and that reason whose privileges and titles, denied, misunderstood, abolished by Spinozism, Leibnitz restores.

In constant opposition, as to the nature of soul and body, and the laws which regulate these two worlds, it has been attempted to prove that they agree at least on those which unite them. Leibnitz, it is well known, withdraws himself from Spinoza by his atoms, but approximates to him by his Pre-established Harmony; at all events it is thought so.

This is a mistake. The Pre-established
Harmony being merely a consequence of the atomic theory, if the monadology had been specially directed against Spinozism, as is generally allowed, it is impossible that the previous Harmony, which is but a consequence, should confirm a system Monadology overthrows.

On this point the Refutation is very explicit; "Men," says Spinoza, "consider themselves in nature as an empire in an empire; in this they err." "In my opinion," says Leibnitz, taking up Spinoza's very expression, "every substance is an empire in an empire, but in exact concert with all the rest."

To these precise, irrefragable texts, what could be replied?

It is asserted that the Pre-established Harmony has a connexion with the two proportional so-called, but really identical orders of Spinoza, whilst Leibnitz, in his Refutation, resolutely opposes it to Spinozism, which, according to him, does not explain the agreement or communication of substances. And indeed, where there is but one substance, where can there be agreement, harmony, and number?*

* The system of Pre-established Harmony has been compared, in Ger-
But admitting that this radical difference between the two systems is not sufficient, let us go further, and fairly ask the question, What is the real meaning of Pre-established Harmony? How is it allied to the system invented by Spinoza to account for the agreement of beings, and to explain the union of soul and body?

Pre-established Harmony is a system which allows beings too much internal spontaneity, and does not leave them sufficient external influence. It has recourse, as a final resort, to the consideration of the infinite, as to the higher and real principle of harmony. I shall not return to the question of internal spontaneity. It is the peculiar feature of atoms. We had better establish this, that Leibnitz urges reaction against Spinozism until it becomes improbable and paradoxical, and that he goes so far as to restore, under the name of his atoms, the substantial forms of the schoolmen, heedless of the clamours this might
excite in the Cartesian camp. On this point a vast gulf separates Spinoza from Leibnitz.

Yet, not only does Leibnitz maintain the internal spontaneity of each atom—he insists also that the mutual agreement of these atoms is equally spontaneous, that is, that it springs from the source of activity proper to each. The internal principle of the changes of the atom is also a principle of harmony. For it is a concentration of the universe into one, a representation of the divisible in the indivisible, the very realization of the conditions of harmony, unity in variety. By the same power with which it is endowed to act, in the atom regulated; it receives with its own proper efficiency primitive delineations and original limitations conformable to its nature as a created being. The portion of matter which is attached to it as an element of passiveness gives it a sympathy with the universe, and prevents its withdrawal from the general order. A law which nature never violates, and which might be called the act of insensible transitions, makes it pass gently from one state to another, and imparts a continuity to the series
of its operations, so that everything happens to it in due order, and everything links itself in its different conditions.

Assuredly, such a system breathes a tendency to harmony, and although possessing infinite variety, yet has unity. Instead of this sort of spontaneous agreement which lays hold of soul and body, instead of that richness of organization, which, perpetually returning on itself, like circulating blood, unfolds and tempers itself with regularity, instead of those salutary limits which remind us of our dependence, what find we in Spinoza?

"Two simultaneous orders," he tells us, "the one of the actions and passions of souls, the other of the actions and passions of bodies;"* that is to say, at first sight, Cartesian dualism, which consists in putting on one side, thought, on the other, space, in distinguishing between mind and matter. But I have no hesitation in asserting, that in Spinoza's system this dualism only exists in appearance, and that really he suppresses it. In fact, according to Proposition VII., p. 2, these

* Proposition XI. p. 3.
two simultaneous orders are only two consequences of the divine nature, which fundamentally are identical, although expressed in two different ways.

With Spinoza, therefore, there is more than the agreement, there is also the unity of the soul and the body: but this is not the only difference. This agreement of one with the other is spontaneous with Leibnitz; in Spinozism their union is compulsory. With Spinoza, it excludes variety, with Leibnitz it expresses it. The notion of limits natural to the creature, preserved by the second as a principle of distinction, is misunderstood by the first, who plunges into illimitable obscurity. A brutal mechanism takes the place of that varied organization which attests so great skill. Spinoza removes primitive delineations, the traces of order and wisdom, and replaces them by contrivances, the effect of which, as well as the cause, is mechanical. The atoms of Leibnitz have the notion of harmony, but nothing in the unique substance of Spinoza can explain why his modes follow one another.

Some, however, have asserted that Spinoza
has a certain pre-established harmony, of which I am about to speak, and which hangs on the following coarse conception:—"The whole chain of space forms one individual, called nature. The whole chain of thoughts forms for it a soul, which is called the soul of the world. There is therefore a mutual agreement between the parts of space and the parts of infinite understanding, souls and bodies."

Now, and this is undoubtedly the most convincing argument against the strained approximation of the two systems, such an hypothesis is utterly overthrown by the most simple application of monadology. In truth, neither are bodies only parts of space, nor are souls only parts of thought, unless you first subdue the infinite resistance of the multitude of atoms, which Leibnitz has scattered everywhere, to wreck Spinoza. The soul of the world may easily have a place in an infinite understanding, when souls are made the fugitive modes of thought: but atoms offer an un conquerable resistance to this violent assimilation.

* See Spinoza, French translation, Part ii., scholium of seventh lemma.
The Pre-established Harmony which unfolds in beings internal spontaneity, restricts, or rather annuls their external influence. It is a consequence of the notion which Leibnitz entertained of substance. With him every substance is so peculiarly a being, in the proper sense of the word, organized, as it were in a little world by itself, with the power of self-support, and of drawing from its nature the order of its events, that he positively denies the action of one substance on another. Such an influence, says he, *physical or real*, strictly speaking, besides being inexplicable, is useless. It was the error of his age, shared by Descartes, to believe it inexplicable, but it is a feature peculiar to the genius of Leibnitz to suppose it useless.

In the seventeenth century, by *physical influence* was meant something analogous to the transmission of intentional species conveyed in the senses, or rather as if a stream flowing from the body had passed through the soul. To which Leibnitz wittily objects that his atoms have no windows, and suffer nothing to enter or depart.
To get rid of such an influence, and to suppose it useless, Leibnitz must have had a very strong faith in the potentiality of his atoms, or he must have been very fearful of permitting foreign influences to penetrate them: this fear, as will soon be shown, was not without foundation. But Spinoza, they say, did not admit, any more than Leibnitz, or their common master, Descartes, this physical influence of one substance over another. Undoubtedly Spinoza did not admit such influence; he could not, but wherefore, it is necessary to know.

Spinozism is a system which pretends to explain everything by the action of God. Spinoza compared God to a potter, who holds in his hands the clay from which he fashions vessels, some for honourable, others for inglorious uses. These vessels open, allowing the worthless or precious liquid with which God fills them to run out, admirably illustrate what souls and bodies become, in a system which deprives them of all action, and leaves it to God alone. Now this must be thoroughly understood. With Spinoza the power of acting in God is space. God acts, that is, ex-
tends Himself, and this extension repeats indefinitely His action according to the interrupted order of things.

Things are the modes of this action, just as ideas are the modes of thought. Modes alone can express the action of God, which is expressed truly, though tritely, by saying, that God makes all things.

But then, this physical influence, rejected just now by Spinoza as an inconceivable barbarism of the schoolmen, when the question was to explain the union of the soul and the body, does he not unwittingly attribute it to God, acting on the world? In fact, what is the action of God in his system, if it be not a real physical influence of the Deity? Not only does this action extend itself to things, it also extends itself in them. It is not by the efficiency of its power alone that it acts, there is also a transfusion of its realities in nature.

The peculiar character of such an influence is, that substance necessarily loses some portion of itself, and becomes altered in the act of communication. It quits one shape and takes another. It changes, or rather, it unnatural-
izes itself. Since Spinoza makes God enter into the nature of things as an element, and gives Him such extensive physical influence over them, all other influence necessarily becomes superfluous.

This physical influence of the Deity in nature is so great, according to Spinoza, that by it he tries to explain the knowledge which the soul has of its own and all other bodies. The soul which has perception of a body is God who puts in the soul the knowledge of this body. Malebranche saw in this a sort of divine operation, supernatural and almost miraculous. Spinoza beholds in it, on the contrary, a divine operation, natural or physical. In this way, God enters into the nature of the soul by ideas; in so far as He constitutes it, and expresses Himself by this nature, He has ideas; therefore the soul has perceptions.*

The same God, however, who enters into the nature of the soul by ideas, penetrates the nature of the body by space. He makes Himself perceptible, He assumes corporeal form, to bring near to the soul what it must perceive

* Coroll. Proposition XI., and Propositions XII., XIII., p. 2.
of the material universe; He becomes the matter of His own perceptions. Being in the soul by thought, and in the body by space, God is at the same time the subject and the object of knowledge, the mirror and the representation of the universe. When there is perception of the body by the soul, it is the extended God, who makes Himself perceptible to the thinking God, who is in us; these are the two portions of the same God which reunite.

Such belief of Spinoza, that God has a physical influence over our souls and bodies, gave him the assurance that there are order and series in all things. We can perceive also that he had visions of a universal order flowing from the general properties of things, easily explicable according to the laws alone of mechanics and geometry. He conceived that he found in souls and bodies equal traces of an activity subject to fate, and of a mathematical necessity. In making the former, modes of thought, and the latter, modes of extension, he obeyed that tendency which led him to identify them, and which he took to be the means of uniting them. Spinoza imagined by
the means of pantheism to solve with certainty the problem respecting the agreement and harmony of beings.

He was deceived; the exaggerated influence of God over things, is worth nothing with regard to the world. The order and arrangement of the Universe, what is called Cosmos, could not be produced by a series of mechanical effects linked one to the other by fate. The empire of efficient causes is not enough; we require further, that of final causes, or morality is destroyed. Instincts, inclinations, desires, reveal high tendencies, and cannot yield to force. To every body acting according to the laws of motion, there is a corresponding soul acting according to the laws of good, and to every physical order, there is a corresponding moral order. It is precisely in the agreement of these two powers that order and harmony consist. In suppressing one of them, as Spinoza does, we mutilate the world, and do not solve the problem.

Leibnitz points this out forcibly and deliberately in the Refutation. He arrays against him the rules of beneficence and perfection in
the nature of things: if nature is full of the effects of the power, it is no less so of the effects of the benevolence, of its Author. The opposite opinion destroys all the love and all the glory of God.

The character of this penetrating and subtle criticism has not always been thoroughly perceived, which, whilst it appears to grant much to mechanism and physics, ends by resolving them into metaphysics, pointing out that the very principles of bodily mechanism are concentrated in souls whence they derive their origin; seeking for the law of the change of beings in the ideal reasons which must have determined the Author of all things; and finally, raising itself to a series of higher considerations, into which the infinite necessarily enters.

Those, therefore, who thought they discovered traces of Spinozism in the Pre-established Harmony, are in error. The consideration of the infinite which Leibnitz employs as a higher principle of harmony is a new element, and one which peculiarly belongs to him. It is one application of his calculation of the in-
finite to nature. It is the elimination, by atoms, of mechanism excluded from the beginning of things. Never did Spinoza raise himself to such considerations. He employed the means of a Divine physical influence, and the power of nature. He placed action above or external to beings, never within them. He thought to regulate once for all the empire of changes, he only extended beyond limits, that of inaction.

We have now reached the end of Spinoza's Refutation by Leibnitz, in which we believe we have omitted nothing essential; more than twenty propositions taken from the Ethics have been analyzed and impugned; this is assuredly more than was necessary for the completeness of the Refutation, if the saying of Fenelon be true, that as soon as you impair this system in any part, you break the whole of its pretended connexion.

Leibnitz informs us in his Theodiceæ,* that on his return from France through England and Holland, he saw Spinoza, and conversed with him. This voyage to the Hague, where

* Theodiceæ, Pt. iii. p. 623.
Spinoza then resided, and the conversations which followed, have escaped the biographers of Spinoza and Leibnitz, with the exception of Mr. Guhrauer; but it must be owned that Leibnitz mentions it in his Theodiceæ in terms which would appear to deprive the fact of this interview between the two philosophers of all its value. If the conversation had taken and kept the altogether anecdotal turn which Leibnitz seems to insinuate, there would be no reason for attaching any great value to it; but Leibnitz has not told us all in his Theodiceæ. Spinoza was in the seventeenth century a compromising philosopher, and the mere fact of having visited him gave considerable grounds for suspicion.

Leibnitz, ever prudent, and sometimes rather diplomatic, knew how to give things a shrewd turn, which is very deceptive. "I saw," says he, "Mr. De La Court as well as Spinoza; I heard from them some good anecdotes about present matters." But it is a mistake to suppose that the conversation was only anecdotal and humorous. Leibnitz himself has taken the pains to inform us that it
was also and indeed chiefly philosophical, by an unexpected disclosure, extracted from some disconnected notes in his hand, where he is more explicit, and which throw some light on the history and connexion of their systems of philosophy.

"I spent some hours after dinner with Spinoza;* he told me he had a strong desire, on the day of the massacre of Mess. de Witt, to sally forth at night, and put up somewhere, near the place of the massacre, a paper with the words Ultimi barbarorum. But his host had shut the house to prevent his going out, for he would have run the risk of being torn to pieces."

"Spinoza did not clearly see the faults in M. Descartes' laws of motion, and was astonished when I proceeded to show him that they violated the equality of cause and effect."

Thus this note shows us Leibnitz pointing out to Spinoza, who has some difficulty in understanding it, the weak side of the Cartesian system, on a point which Leibnitz had already

* We found this note in the hand of Leibnitz among some papers where we by no means expected to meet with them. It is unpublished as well as the manuscript, which we publish at the end of this notice.
attacked. Therefore, when Spinoza writes afterwards, "as to the principles of Descartes' system, I consider them absurd," we must allow that he did not discover their weakness by himself, and that Leibnitz had at all events something to do with it.

Spinoza failed in criticism, and even in the absence of the manuscript note by Leibnitz, his works would furnish us with proofs of this. In his principles demonstrated in a geometrical manner, he blindly follows Descartes, nor does he always understand him. He evidently never comprehended the *Cogito: ergo sum*. In his letters to Oldenburg, he tries to criticise it, and fails lamentably. Descartes lost sight of the first cause and the origin of all things. He was unacquainted with true human nature, and did not grasp the real cause of error: what can be more vague than such criticism?

Later, when better informed, (in 1676,) one year before his death, and three after the conversation with Leibnitz, in a letter to some unknown person, his tone changes, and Spinoza now points out the difficulty: "You think that it is difficult, starting from the notion of
space, such as Descartes conceives it, that is, as a quiescent mass, to prove the existence of bodies. For my part, I not only say that it is difficult, I affirm it is impossible." We can see here that Spinoza had derived some advantage from his conversations with Leibnitz.

Unfortunately he only half profited by them, and even, at this time, he is uncertain and vacillating. When he is questioned, he answers evasively, and death overtakes him announcing to his followers and admirers a general system of physics which he never completed, and the explanation of the real nature of motion, which might in vain be looked for in his works.* The question being important, we will try to clear up this matter, which was very obscure to the last editors of Spinoza.

Leibnitz, who applied himself considerably to the weak points of Cartesianism, has shewn that he did not sufficiently understand what he calls the great laws of motion. But,—and this is the most particular point, and directly applies to Spinoza,—he has demonstrated that the error of Cartesianism, on this topic as

* See Letters 63, 64.
well as on all those which regard the corporeal world, consisted in trying to explain everything by space.

If this reproach apply to Descartes, still more does it so to Spinoza: the latter seems to fly to the notion of simple space to explain everything in bodies. Motion, which is a mode of space, ought here to assist him; and indeed, he finds considerable fault with Descartes for having placed nature in a state of rest. We may easily conceive that he requires motion, but if he wants a principle of motion, which he seeks in space to account for the modifications of matter, he also requires a principle conservative of the same quantity of motion, so that the world may be governed in an unchangeable and perpetual manner. He borrows therefore from Cartesians, and not from Leibnitz, as has been wrongly supposed, the maxim that the same quantity of motion and rest preserves itself. And, in a letter to Oldenburg, he employs it to establish the agreement of the parts of the universe. On the other hand, he rejects vacuum and atoms.
So far, Spinoza has only borrowed from Descartes, and yet already the alteration of the Cartesian system is considerable.* Indeed, when Descartes proposes his hypothesis of vortices, he takes two things for granted, the divisibility and the motion, of matter. Like the book of Genesis, he puts an initial division made by God Himself in the midst of the extended mass: Spinoza, bolder than his master, pretends to do without it, and only keeps motion. If we are to believe him, divisibility, as well as the idea of a vacuum, arises from a false method of considering quantity; in fact, what is a vacuum, but quantity separated from substance? And what is divisibility, but quantity taken apart from substance, in an abstract and superficial way? If the divisibility of matter is only a weakness of mind, we must raise ourselves above the divisible to the indivisible, that is, to the idea of this universe taken as an undivided and complete whole, without any real distinction. Whence it follows that true science consists in expunging more and more, modal distinc-

tions, so as to return to a common and identical foundation, substance or matter.

This is Spinoza's starting-point.* I have already given the opinion of Leibnitz upon the simple and indivisible space of Spinoza, and this chimerical synthesis of matter. The positive sciences of our time have penetrated it by fertile divisions, which attack, better than all the reasonings of real distinctions, the very centre of extended mass. Yet more; motion itself which Spinoza retains, escapes him as space escaped him just now: here, again, the scientific analyses of Leibnitz deprive him of all resource.

Spinoza would explain everything mechanically, and Leibnitz carries mechanical explanations still further than Descartes. He takes this primary matter, this simple passiveness, whence Spinoza wished to deduce bodies and their motions, and shows its inability not only to commence a fresh motion, but even to change the direction of the motion received. Everything must be explained mechanically, he tells us, because there are machines, and in

* Dut. II., i. p. 150.
order that a natural motion may be produced, touch is requisite. "A body is never set in motion naturally, except by another body which pushes it by impact."

This should satisfy Spinoza; but let us watch the result; from the inability of primary matter to alter motion in any way, what does Leibnitz conclude? That matter is not enough, and that motion of itself is not a whit more sufficient to explain anything.

"Analyze motion," says Leibnitz, "reduce it to its most simple elements: what reality will you find? If you only consider what it comprehends exactly and formally, that is to say, a change of place, its reality is very small, and this notion has about it, most assuredly, something imaginary, which is not altogether founded on the nature of things. To make something real of it, we require, besides, a detail of what changes, and the power of changing; and lastly, the reality of motion is in a momentary state of body, which being unable to contain motion, (for motion requires time,) nevertheless contains power, and which even consists in power striving
after change.* Motion, therefore, supposes power, or the proximate cause of change. This it is which has most reality, it is founded on a subject, by it we may know to whom motion belongs.

This power differs from motion; it is this which preserves itself equal in the world, and not motion, as Cartesians assert, because they consider space as an abstraction from power.

The notion of power is wanting in Spinoza; if he had understood it, Spinozism would have been destroyed, for he must have renounced his system, and accepted that of his adversary.

Still one sees that Spinoza could not arrive at the real laws of motion, because he had not even the real notion of motion, and was also deficient in beings susceptible of these laws. We have seen Leibnitz proving to him the falsity of most of those invented by Descartes: Spinoza, in a letter to Oldenburg,† acknowledges that the sixth appears to him to be false, but elsewhere he does not seem to have

* Dut. II. i. p. 45.  † Letter 15, p. 441.
any consistent views as to this, and on the whole he blindly follows his master. The object of Leibnitz, in attacking him on this point, was evidently to undeceive the Cartesian. He did not know that he was overthrowing Spinozism yet unborn, and still was attacking its very foundation.

"Spinoza did not clearly see the fault of Descartes' laws of motion," says he, "and was astonished when I proceeded to shew him that they violated the equality of cause and effect."

Spinoza was so little aware of the imperfection of these rules when applied to the material universe, that, in accordance with his habitual practice, he carries them into metaphysics, and regulates, by means of these purely physical laws, the development of God in the order of thought. Notice has not yet been taken of the incredible and final transformation which Spinoza makes Cartesian physics undergo, though destined for higher purposes. It deserves some consideration.

We recollect how Spinoza, in his Theodicea, pressed on all sides by the difficulties which besiege him with regard to creation, frees him-
self, by a sudden and unexpected transformation, from the old materialist principles Ex nihilo nihil, to a self-evident axiom, which proclaims itself the law of reason, and arrogates the title of eternal truth. This transformation, however, was nothing in comparison with that which Spinoza was preparing in the first book of the Ethics, and which he finishes in those following. This time it was a radical transformation, with no less tendency than that of changing entirely the aspect of science. For the question was, in order to remove the difficulties perpetually arising out of metaphysics, to borrow from the Cartesian physical system its principle and its laws of motion regulating the material universe, and to transport them into the spiritual world, so that, being subject to the same laws, souls might preserve the same order as bodies.

So that, as God, who creates everything in bodies, also creates everything in souls, everything must follow His laws, and a compulsory harmony be established between the modes of thought and the modes of space.

The Cartesian physics, we must allow,
afford wonderful facilities for such an undertaking. It is easy to conceive how this idea of a homogeneous matter diffused equally in every direction, only varied in bodies by motion, the idea which is the foundation of Descartes' physics, led away Spinoza. A world is given us of a wonderful simplicity, which, in order to be varied in a thousand ways, only requires the laws of motion. To preserve it, God has but to maintain in it a uniform quantity of motion, and the same relation of motion to rest.

This system of arranging the passive empire of matter, according to the general and immutable laws of geometry, must have pleased the genius of Spinoza; and, indeed, we see in one of his letters to Oldenburg, that he fully and even blindly accepts Descartes' law. But with him this very law is but a particular case of an infinitely more general law, applicable not only to bodies, but also to minds. Descartes' law, "that the same quantity of motion and of repose is retained in the world," becomes, in his eyes, an exceedingly clear and true axiom, even in metaphysics.
Descartes had said, "God alone can preserve in the world, the same relation of motion to rest."

Spinoza says, "God alone can preserve in the world, the same relation of thought to space, of mind to matter, of body to soul."

This law is a universal rule, true for souls as it is for bodies; it is the first law of general physics, invented by Spinoza. Descartes saw clearly enough, that God was indifferent to the determinations of space, that is to say, motion and repose, in consequence of which he preserves them, actually, in the same relation. But Descartes did not see that God is no less indifferent to the determinations of thought, that is to say, understanding and will, and that the relation is the same.*

This cannot be otherwise, for the same quantity of thought and space enters into the constitution of God’s substance; wherefore it is natural that the modes of substance, both minds and bodies, should preserve the same relation. Spinoza expresses this in the follow-

* Ethics, first Proposition, Coroll. XXXII. Will and Intelligence are in the same relation to the nature of God, as motion and rest.—Cf. p. 5, Proposition XXXIX.
ing manner: "Thought cannot conceive more than nature can furnish."

"Nature gives in space what she gives in thought."

"The relation of thought to space, or of space to thought, does not vary in the world."

This general law embraces all cases.

As space, the world rules itself by Descartes' law, "God preserves the same quantity of motion and rest."

As thought, it is regulated by Spinoza's law, "God preserves the same relation of intelligence to will."

Intelligence and will are the motion and rest of minds; they require, in order to exist and to act in a certain manner, that God should determine them to it, just as bodies require, in order to move and to remain at rest.

One could hardly have believed that Spinoza carried so far this gross application of Cartesian physics, if he had not himself taken care to remove all doubts on the subject, and multiply proofs. He is not content, in fact, with taking from Descartes the first of his laws of motion, No. 30 of his principles, he takes also the fol-
lowing one, No. 37, which Descartes expresses thus: "Everything, as long as this is in it, constantly continues in the same state;" "an admirable and incontestable law," says Leibnitz, "which Galileo, Gassendi, and many others have observed."

Only, what neither Galileo, nor Gassendi, nor Descartes noticed, Spinoza carries out this law, in the same way, to metaphysics, and applies it to will, which he defines the effort of each thing to continue in its being. And as will, according to him, (Propositions XLVIII. XLIX., p. 2,) is in no wise distinct from the particular volitions by which anything is affirmed or denied, he applies it to affirmations and negations. Thus, affirmation is only the effort of reason to continue in its being, that is to say, to retain its ideas. In a word, as will and understanding are one and the same thing, that is, determinations of thought, in the same manner as motion and repose are determinations of space, this law applies to understanding as well as to will. But this law, observed by Descartes, in the material universe, is only the law of the
natural inertia of bodies. According to Descartes, bodies receive a power of resistance, as well as of action. Both are the effect of the Divine will, which invests passive matter with a power of resistance. According to Spinoza, there is a natural inertia of souls as well as of bodies, and Descartes' law applies no less to the one, than it does to the other.*

We might follow still further these wonderful relations. The physics of motion, invented by Descartes, have two parts. We have only pointed out some things which Spinoza borrowed from the first part. This is not the place to follow his master through the details of rules invented for the communication of motion to the body, suffice it to say, that the points of contact are not less evident. Spinoza accounts for changes in souls, as though the question were concerning impact and rebound, swiftness or slowness. The man who believes himself free, is subject, as we have seen, to the impulse of external causes, like the stone of the road, which receives a shock

* Page 3, Propositions VII., VIII., and IX. See also page 1, Propositions XXXI. and XXXII., and page 2, Propositions XLVIII., XLIX.
and moves. After that, I no longer wonder at his undertaking to deduce the series of thoughts from that of corresponding bodily motions. Nor do I wonder more at the way in which he defines the words *action* and *passion.*

Actions are the motions of which we are the causes, and *passions* those which we undergo. All this is communicated in determinate proportions; the variety of determinations does not prevent the quantity of activity or passivity in souls from remaining always equal. These very determinations are carried into effect according to the laws of Cartesian physics.

These last tend to renew the science of medicine, why should they not renew that of ethics? The law of equal quantity of motion and rest, applied to the body, determines its equilibrium or health. This same law, applied to souls, determines also their equilibrium or wellbeing. It is no more in our power to procure health of mind, than it is to procure health of body.†

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* Ethics, Def. ii. and Proposition i., p. 3.  † Tract. Politi. C. ii., p. 271.
Both of them depend on the mechanical laws observed by Descartes.*

Spinoza exults in having discovered this novel application of the laws of physics to minds. "The ancients," he says, "never, so far as I know, conceived, as we do here, a soul acting according to determinate laws."†

The statement of these laws and their application, occupy the whole second book of the Ethics, and almost all the other three. The seventh Proposition of the second Part, states the principle in precise terms: "The order and connexion of ideas are identical with the order and connexion of things." It is this same thought which supports the demonstrations of the ninth, tenth, and twelfth Propositions. The thirteenth, joined to the seventh, contains the principle of the identity of the soul and the body, whence this consequence clearly follows, that the laws of body apply to mind. The fourteenth, fifteenth, nineteenth, and twenty-first Propositions refer to it. The whole theory of will, Part I., Propositions thirty-one and thirty-two, Part II.,

* De Emend. Intell., p. 361.
† Ibid, 383.
Propositions forty-eight and forty-nine, relate to it. The mechanism of passions is explained according to this principle.* On it two-thirds of the Ethics rest.

This is not therefore a fortuitous and unimportant relation, which we are pointing out, between the laws of bodily motion observed by Descartes, and the laws which regulate the motion of souls, applied by Spinoza. Spinoza, with a full knowledge of causes, has transferred the laws of bodies to minds. It is one of the most insane, but violent attempts of physics or metaphysics. And I am no longer surprised that Spinoza should have wondered, when Leibnitz, in the conversations at the Hague, undertook to prove to him that Cartesian physics were false; he had spent his life in extending them to souls.

*We have no intention of following Leibnitz in his attempts to point out to Spinoza the falsity of his rules. We have already given the essential points, but too much stress cannot be laid on the piquant and unforeseen nature

* See page 3, Propositions VI, VII, VIII, and especially Proposition XI.
of the interview of the two philosophers, and especially in the choice of subject. Leibnitz coming to visit Spinoza, at his room in the inn, and passing the Hague, in the nick of time, to show him the possibility of going further in physics than Descartes did; Spinoza, astonished, bewildered by the arrival of his guest, but still more by the ease with which he retouches and corrects Descartes' laws of motion; Leibnitz persisting in his attempts to prove to him, that they violate the equality of cause and effect.

This principle which Leibnitz puts forward astonishes Spinoza, and well it might; at first sight, one does not see its appositeness, and asks, what Leibnitz means? His letters to L'Hopital tell us, "It is the foundation of my Dynamics, he writes." In fact, on this principle, Leibnitz builds up a science in which space is nothing, and force everything.

But it is also the destruction of Spinoza's physical system, and consequently, Leibnitz, when conversing with him, has something of the irony of Socrates, in his discourse with Parmenides. In reality, what is this new
principle which Leibnitz brings against Cartesians, and the one most deceived of all, Spinoza? It is a principle which does not partake at all of that metaphysical necessity which Spinoza looks for everywhere. Leibnitz, on the contrary, sets it before us modestly, as a rule which he has made for himself, for want of, and while waiting for a better. "It is," says he, "a subordinate maxim, a law conformable to the wisdom of God, and furnished by the observation of nature." For instance, it suits perfectly the laws of motion; it is better fitted for them than the necessary principles dreamed by Spinoza. If it excludes necessity, it has congruity. In fact, we are far from finding in the laws of motion, that geometrical necessity which Spinoza looks for everywhere and in everything; and it is precisely because these laws are neither altogether necessary, nor entirely arbitrary, that they reveal the perfection of their Author. Had they depended on chance, we might look in vain for wisdom in them; but had they depended on necessity, what would have become of kindness? God, infinitely good, infinitely wise, makes them de-
pend on the principle of congruity or of the preferable, which He never violates, and on that of continuity, which nature never violates.

But, I am well aware, such principles must have made Spinoza smile with pity, and if before Leibnitz he shewed surprise only, it was certainly owing to politeness towards his guest. Open the Ethics, and you will there see how he values the principles of order, of beauty, of harmony, and of wisdom, which Leibnitz wishes to restore. Spinoza treats them as prejudices, and wishes to uproot them at any cost, because he believes them contrary to the true method of philosophy. It is in vain that Leibnitz points them out to him, and offers some of their most happy applications. Spinoza cannot understand them.

Subsequently, after Spinoza's death, Leibnitz receives the Ethics, and is astonished in his turn. "The Ethics," says he, in closing the book, "that work, so full of imperfections as to amaze me." Evidently Leibnitz expected better things, and would willingly have applied to the author the words of an ancient writer, "Oleum perdidit." With Leibnitz, the Ethics is
a defective work and nothing more. Something, however, would still have been wanting in the Refutation of Spinoza by Leibnitz, if he had contented himself with analyzing separately, the propositions of his book, without characterizing the sum total of the doctrine which he attacks. But the refutation is complete, and after the details, it gives us also an opinion on the whole. This opinion, under the form of a paradox, is comprised in an expression which I consider severe, with regard to Descartes, but true as to Spinoza; and, as we have here only to deal with the side on which it is true, we will confidently quote it:—"Spinoza," says Leibnitz, "began where Descartes left off, in naturalism, in naturalismo."

In the seventeenth century, naturalism meant materialism: but we must thoroughly understand the sense of the words matter and nature.

Matter is not, with Spinoza, a certain vast corporeal being, nourished on the blood of the mass, although he has somewhere said that we live in the universe, as little worms
in blood. Nor is nature such a corporeal mass: "By nature," says Spinoza, "I mean an infinity of beings." And elsewhere he adds, "the infinite Being whom we call God, or nature."

Matter is the extension; nature, the power of God. The naturalism or materialism of Spinoza, therefore, consists in seeing in things the necessary development of God.

Nature is always the same; everywhere it is one; everywhere it has the same qualification, and the same power. It knows neither languor nor exhaustion, and the common idea that it can fail in its work, and produce imperfections, should be considered a chimera. Perpetually employed in furnishing thought with its matter, it unceasingly gives in space, what it gives in thought, and by the working of its mechanism, it incessantly preserves the balance of mind and matter, without ever permitting the former to exceed the latter.†

* Ethica, iv., Preface, p. 162.
† If God did not exist, thought might conceive more than nature could furnish. (De Intell. Emend. 431, and Letter 45.) That the power of thinking is not more strongly inclined to thought, than the power of nature to existence and action, is an extremely clear and true axiom, whence follows, very truly, the existence of God as the production of His idea.
After this, who dares talk of disorder, or imperfection, in its operations? It operates on God Himself, it discharges into the world the properties of His substance, the perfections of His most perfect being. And, as the same amount of thought and space enter into the substance of God, its mixtures and combinations always yield the same quantity of each.

Nature is (if I may be excused the illustration less coarse than the thought) the production of God in minds and bodies. The world thinks, and extends itself, in an equal increase of space and thought. Bodies, as well as souls, express its power: and even the knowledge of the human mind depends on that of its object, the body. The series of thoughts can be deduced from that of bodily motions. Bodies furnish us with the element of generality, necessary to explain universal notions. They reflect a maximum of images, beyond which the mind becomes involved, and precipitates itself into the uncertainty of these notions. The soul has adequate knowledge so much the more extended, as its body possesses more points in common with external bodies;
and the mind increases in proportion as its external surface, called the body, is amplified. It is not with Spinoza alone, that naturalism, thus understood, is a doctrine. It is a method. When Spinoza said, "It is in the nature of the thing to be so," he said everything. When he places space in God, he makes the objection to himself, that it is imperfect. "What matters it," he answers, "since it is in its nature to be so, and in the nature of God to be extended?" Elsewhere, and this is the most curious instance of the application of this method, when the question is to explain the passions, vices, and follies of men, he takes his reader aside, shews him to us astonished, bewildered, because he wishes to explain them in a geometrical manner, according to a principle of necessary development, which is no other than nature. "But what is to be done," he answers, in a tone bordering on irony; "this method is my own. The laws and rules of nature, in accordance with which all things arise and are transformed, are, everywhere and always, the same, and consequently, we ought to explain everything whatsoever, by one and the same me-
thod, I mean by the universal laws of nature."**
But, however, has Spinoza profoundly examined its laws? Does he understand its living, animated organism? Do its grandeur and infinite variety affect him?

Undoubtedly, Spinoza believes it to be prolific. Too dry and abstracted to become excited at the sight of the wonders which it sets before him, it was for him, at all events, the attraction of a science, and the beauty of a problem. There are even certain passages in the Ethics, in which the inclination for natural researches carries him beyond the rule and compasses. There Spinoza points out, on his way, the marvels of the world of bodies; he speaks of the latent capacities of matter, which are, to the careful observer, a reason for believing the power of bodies to be incomparably greater than we imagine; he even alludes to those mysterious powers of the body, acting in a state of sleep, or of somnambulism,† by the

* Preface to the Third Part. Fr. Transl.
† No one has ever determined of what the body is capable, says Spinoza, Eth., p. 3, Sch. Prop. II. And we cannot wonder at this, because no one has ever yet sufficiently known the economy of the human body so as to be able to explain all its functions: I do not speak of those marvels which we observe in animals, and which by far surpass human sagacity,
laws alone of nature, so as to be an object of wonder to the soul which is attached to it.

From the world of bodies he passes to the world of spirits, and shews us, by an analogy habitual to him, understanding itself, making its instruments by an innate power, and will, which is only the natural inertia of bodies transferred to souls, making them continue in their state, conformably with a law of physics.

In another passage of the Ethics, he even employs material images, which we hardly expect to find from the pen of a Geometrician, to give us a sense of what reason alone could not make us conceive. Nature takes the colossal proportions of an individual composed of all bodies as of its parts, which nothing impedes in its development, and which contains in its vast bosom all changes, without losing anything of its immutability.† An infinity of infinites, flows from the nature of substance as its property, and the inexhaustible riches of its shapes are so great, that it arrays

nor of those actions of somnambulists, which they would not dare to repeat in their waking moments. French Transl.

* Intellectus sibi factit instrumenta vi nativa.

them all in succession. There is in it a ma-
terial source sufficient for all its transforma-
tions. And as the order of nature cannot
admit creation, and only allows generation,
everything in it is engendered according to the
law of progress to infinity. Thus is composed
the great aspect of the universe, to which is
joined a species of soul of the world equally
infinite.

I will not unfold the perils and error this
illustration contains. But, in truth, does Spi-
noza believe that to explain organization and
life in nature, it is sufficient to fall back on
the soul of the stoical world, and declare pro-
gression to infinity? The soul of the world!
progression to the infinite! Two high-sound-
ing words, void of meaning, which do not de-
ceive Leibnitz. In reality, what is this soul of
the world in Spinoza's system? whence comes
it? How can he account for it? As an ex-
cess of idealism, or extreme materialism, on
both sides the error is equal. If it be a simple
abstraction, an idea, as has been maintained,
what can be less real and more insufficient to
be the source of all souls, and the channel of

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the infinite? Besides, would it not be the most active solvent of bodies, a mode of making the world disappear into a fluid, of re-absorbing the substance of beings? If, on the contrary, it be a kind of emanation or physical stream of naturant nature, what naturalism is this, and what a degradation of the infinite! It is useless to say that it is the infinite form of eternal matter. That means, that there is a pre-existing matter which takes all shapes in succession. And it is a Cartesian, a supporter of mechanical explanations, who in a barbarous jargon, talks of naturant nature, and brings back the scourge of animism, from which his master, Descartes, had freed science!

The fiction of progression to infinity, perpetually cited by Spinoza, only makes the origin of things retrograde, whose existence is thus linked to an infinite series of causes, which do not allow any stoppage. It is a fresh attempt to do away with the limit of finite beings, to break the bonds of individuality passing away, and to absorb the particular in the general. Individuals are only a certain union of parts; species deprived of
their differences, are reduced to the various orders of infinites, which nature allows. The soul of the world and the individual nature, fill the whole scene, and it is only in passing through the series of its losses, that the infinite goes through the phases of its development.

Never, therefore, was a juster expression than that of Leibnitz applied to Spinoza, "He began in naturalism;" but Leibnitz adds, "in naturalism, where Descartes left off." And we must show, in conclusion, how this second part of the expression may be softened down, and receive a true sense.

When Descartes feels a passion for anatomy and natural researches, he obeys this tendency of his spirit which opens paths and directions in every sense. There can be little doubt but that it is precisely the Cartesian system of physics which misleads Spinoza. And yet nothing is more true; we have shewn it with regard to the laws of motion, which by an insane, but bold attempt, Spinoza transfers to metaphysics. If the question be asked, what is the fundamental idea of the Cartesian system of physics? it is to explain every-
thing mechanically. Never was enterprise more legitimate in the sphere to which Descartes confined himself. The ancients had multiplied the heavenly intelligences and animal powers, to support and vivify the world. Descartes drives to their tomb, all these ghosts of the ancient physics, and shews us laws, where we saw only phantoms. Urged to a conclusion like all reformers, he too hastily sacrifices to the manes of the physical system which he destroys, all the races of animals which the globe produces.

Spinoza, in his turn, has a passion for the Cartesian system of physics. He borrows from Descartes this idea of a homogeneous matter, which reduces everything to a molecular state and simple passiveness. He carries this elimination of activity to its extreme consequences. Already he appeals to what he calls, in a letter to Oldenburg, by a splendid expression which one would think was borrowed from Newton, the mechanical principles of philosophy; "principia philosophiae mechanica."

I have no hesitation in saying that the Ethic of Spinoza is only the application of
mechanical principles to moral philosophy. A phrase of Descartes, little known, might make us believe that Spinoza derives the fundamental idea of the Ethics from Descartes himself: "These physical truths," he writes, "are the foundation of higher ethics."* When such thoughts, from such a master, fall into the hands of a bold disciple, they may lead far; Spinoza's Ethics prove this. The opinion of Leibnitz, therefore, with the exception of his well-known prejudice against Descartes, deserves to become historical.

We may apply to philosophy falling from Descartes' hands into those of Spinoza, what an author said of surgery at his time:—Delapsa est in manibus mechanicorum inter quos primus Rogerus: it has fallen into the hands of mechanics, of whom Spinoza is the chief.

Spinozism is the false application of mechanical principles, or of Cartesian physics, to ethics. Monadology, on the contrary, is the powerful reaction of metaphysics against the

physics and mechanism of Descartes, carried to excess by Spinoza. It is thought oppressed, avenging itself on space.

This general conclusion embraces many others. It will be sufficient to enumerate the principal ones, and to arrange them in two classes, according to their relation to Spinoza or to Leibnitz.

1st. In the first part of the Ethics, Spinoza seeks to prove the unity of substance, whence follows the impossibility of creation.

He recognises in God two attributes, thought and space; but by virtue of the nature of substance he is forced to make them both identical, although they are heterogeneous.

His God thinks without understanding, and acts without will, by virtue of His indeterminate nature. He has then neither will, nor intelligence, nor goodness, nor wisdom. Consequent on this doctrine, Spinoza deduces the world from necessity, and banishes the ideas of the beautiful, of the good, of order and of harmony, from this fatal deduction.

2dly, In the second and following parts of the Ethics, Spinoza, after having deduced the
world, thus regulates its mechanism. There is only one substance of souls which, under infinitely varied forms, is passive or active, in human nature; this is the unity of substance, the foundation of ethics. There is only one substance of bodies, all whose natural phenomena are but combinations and different states; here we have the unity of substance, the foundation of physics.

By virtue of this principle, Spinoza identifies mind and body, as he had identified thought and extension.

He, de facto, abolishes individuals, whose notions he had abolished at first.

He confounds species, in which he neither recognises particular classes, nor differences.

He errs as to the laws of motion, which are inexplicable without final causes.

He places actual infinity in nature, and returns to the Stoic doctrine, of the soul of the world.

To these important errors, in the order of logic, there are corresponding analogous errors in ethics.

Spinoza abolishes individuals, whence he
comes to deny the identity of the human person, and only leaves it a derisive immortality.

He confounds species, and at the same time is led to deny the ideas of order, of harmony, of gradual connexion, and to destroy morality itself.

His errors on the laws of motion, which regulate the material universe, reappear in the intellectual and moral world, by reason of the false application which he makes to spirits.

He reduces good and evil, to relations analogous to those of motion to rest.

He reduces all the passions to one idea, as all the metals to a common standard.

The result of his physics, starting from homogeneous matter peculiar to everything, is the denial of corporal activity.

The result of his Ethics, starting from universal thought, indifferent to everything, is the denial of spiritual activity.

The characteristic of the whole, is naturalism, or a false application of physics to ethics.

As to Leibnitz:—1st, In his Theodicea, he blames Spinoza for not having sufficiently de-
fined substance, and for having made but miserable or unintelligible attempts at demonstrations, to prove its unity.

He shows, by skilful analyses, that as God does not comprise space, we ought not to look for the origin of things in matter, or space.

He maintains, against Spinoza, God's intelligence and will; he points out His wisdom and goodness, in the very order of creation, or plan of the world, denied and misunderstood by the latter.

2dly, In the order of creation, he maintains the distinction of mind and body, as he maintained that of thought and space, and sets forth the superiority of the former.

He maintains the reality of beings, by coupling it with the ontological idea of the atom, or simple substance, endowed with its appropriate activity.

Thus he points out to us in individual notions distinct from specific notions, a whole world unknown to Spinoza, without necessary connexion with God, but capable of being the support of all accidents, and the foundation of all phenomena, and expressing in its own way
infinite substance. He takes the great example of the laws of motion, to shew the utility of final causes, which Spinoza banished, and the impossibility of explaining anything by space alone.

He admits only one real infinite, that is God, and sees in the various orders of relative infinites constituted in nature, only ideal reasons, without reality in things.

In ethics, he is always attempting to link to the ontological idea of the atom, individual independence and free-will.

In physics, he reacts powerfully against homogeneous matter and simple space, and connects the motion and life of creatures, with the indivisibility, and indestructible nature, of the substantial forms, eliminated by Descartes and Spinoza.

The characteristic of his theory of substance, is power striving to act. The points of resemblance seen between two systems, one of which has for its only object the destruction of the other, fall before these precise conclusions.

Neither are the lightnings of Leibnitz's God,
identical with the modifications of Spinoza's substance, nor is the gradation of atoms turning towards their poles in Leibnitz's theory, equivalent to the frigid liberty of Spinoza. Nor, again, is the automaton* of Leibnitz endowed with intelligence and spontaneity, comparable with that of Spinoza.

The Pre-established Harmony itself, we have seen, although inadmissible, strives to maintain two kingdoms which Spinoza confounds. Lastly, between optimism and fatalism there is the wide gulf, which separates a God, free in his will, realizing possibilities, from a God subject to fate, producing neces-

* These words, spiritual automaton, met with in Leibnitz, are to be found also in Spinoza; they come from Descartes, (De Passionalibus, Art. 16.) This ought to have been borne in mind, before adding a chapter more to the wonderful relations of Leibnitz with Spinoza. They both borrow from Descartes, his idea of the mechanical or automaton man; only Spinoza receives it, doubtless, at second hand, and through the Cartesians in Holland; as he does not understand Greek, he takes the word on trust, without asking whence it comes, or what it means, and distorts it. Paulus, Gfrerer, and Salmot were of opinion that the text of the Emend. intellectus, where it is found, had the words automatum spirituale. Leibnitz, more precise than the editors themselves, restores the real meaning of the original text, that of the princeps edition, in 1677, made after Spinoza's manuscripts, which has everywhere (p. 384) the strange barbarism, automa for automatum. "He meant to say, automaton," says Leibnitz, who comes to his assistance. He has always written, automa, which is ridiculous, and prove how far the thought and expression of Descartes, the matter as well as the form, might be altered in its passage through the medium of a Dutch Jew. (See the manuscript, p. 62.)
sity. The two worlds, conceived by these two men, represent, like two mirrors, the extremely varied expression of the God whom they teach. It remains to follow in religion, these different applications of their doctrines, and to point out the connexion of their philosophy with theology. We shall see Spinoza proclaiming the divorce of the two sciences, and conducting out one of them, with the derisive honours given to those about to be interred:* Leibnitz, on the other hand, respectfully raising the office of theology, pointing out its wonderful congruity with philosophy, and concluding his Refutation in the following terms:

"Philosophy and theology are two concordant truths; truth cannot be opposed to truth, and if theology contradicted true philosophy, it would be false. It is asserted that the more philosophy and theology disagree, the less will theology be exposed to suspicion; on the contrary, since truth agrees with truth,

all theology which contradicts reason will be open to suspicion."

Look at the Averroist philosophers of the sixteenth century, who asserted that truth was twofold; they have long since been overthrown. There arose against them, Christian philosophers, ever ready to prove the agreement of philosophy and theology.
REMARKS

UPON

A WORK BY WACHTER,

ENTITLED

"DE RECONDITA HEBRÆORUM PHILOSOPHIA."
REMARKS

ON A WORK BY WACHTER, ENTITLED

"DE RECONDITA HEBRÆORUM PHILOSOPHIA."

The library at Hanover, where the librarian was kind enough to facilitate my search, possesses in its archives, a manuscript by Leibnitz, entitled, "Critical Remarks on a Book by J. G. Wachter upon the Secret Philosophy of the Hebrews."

This unpublished article, entirely written by Leibnitz, includes a refutation of Spinoza by him. We might wonder at finding it in a bundle of papers bearing the name of Wachter, did we not know that the latter, a philosopher and theologian, who, in his time, was strongly
suspected of Spinozism, and well versed in the Kabbala, had just undertaken to compare the Kabbala with Spinoza, and to point out their similarity, in a book called "De Recondita Hebræorum Philosophia, aut Elucidarius Cabbalisticus."

The object of Wachter's book is, as the title indicates, to unfold the secret philosophy of the Hebrews, and especially to determine the amount of legitimate influence which the Kabbala may claim, on one of the most doubtful of its disciples, Benedict Spinoza. If we are to believe Wachter, this influence was immense; the Kabbala already contained the whole of Spinoza's pantheism.

Mr. Frank, the author of a valuable work on the Kabbala, has already pointed out the improbability of this myth, invented by Wachter, according to which, the foe of tradition, would only have followed the traditional philosophy of the authors of his nation. According to Mr. Frank, the preponderant influence of Cartesianism effaced all traces of the Kabbala, and suffices to explain everything.

In my opinion, Leibnitz takes a middle
course between these two opinions so distinctly decided. After having mentioned, in his letter to the Abbé Nicaise, in 1697, the seeds of Cartesianism cultivated by Spinoza, at a later period, when better informed, he cannot help acknowledging, in his Theodicea, that Spinoza was versed in the Kabbala of the authors of his nation, and he mixes him up with an entirely Kabbalistic tradition, which, in fact, Spinoza appears to have followed.

I am rather inclined to the same opinion as Leibnitz. Spinoza's work, under a semblance of scientific strictness, is far from being a homogeneous work. His Theodicea everywhere bears traces of embarrassed theories with regard to God, and the creation of the world, which Cartesian philosophy was unable to entirely remove. And we can readily imagine that this conjunction of Cartesian philosophy with the Kabbala in an intellect vigorous, though deformed, produced the ethics.

Here I may be allowed, in closing these brief remarks, to pay a well-deserved tribute of respect to the Hanoverian Government,
which, venerating Leibnitz as the instructor of Sophia Charlotte, and the adviser of Ernest Augustus, reveres, as it were, the memory of this great philosopher, and has erected a monument worthy of Phidias, to this rival worthy of Plato.
CRITICAL REMARKS OF LEIBNITZ,

FROM THE

ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT IN THE ROYAL LIBRARY
AT HANOVER.
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The author says in his preface, that the primitive Christians received philosophy from the Jews, but it was more probably from the Platonists, from whom the Jews themselves received it, for instance, Philo.

According to our author, Benedict de Spinoza, a Portuguese Jew, followed the ancient philosophy of the Jews, and if we are to believe him, Spinoza acknowledged the divinity of the religion of Christ in full; but I wonder the author can make this assertion, after he has admitted that Spinoza denied the resurrection of Christ.
An Augustin monk (J. P. Speetth, see Letters of Spener) had been living some time with Knorr,* at Sulzbach, but being probably dissatisfied with his lot, he became a Jew, and took the name of Moses Germanus.†

The author, who had met this man at Amsterdam, wrote a book against him, entitled, "The World Deified," in which he attacks Spinoza, this Moses, and the Jewish Kabbala, at the same time, because it confounds God with the world. But subsequently he thought that he understood the matter better, and now defends the Jewish Kabbala and Spinoza, and maintains that they made a distinction between God and the world; but on this point he is by no means satisfactory.

With them, indeed, God is, as it were, a substance, and the creature, the accident of God. Budæus (in the Special Observations of Halle)

* Christian Knorr, Baron of Rosenroth, author of a book called "The Kabbala Unveiled, or the Transcendental Doctrine of the Jews," &c. Sulzbach, 1677. 4to. Leibnitz knew him, and went to visit him, at Sulzbach, where he had several conversations with him on the various testimonies of the Jews, and the Kabbalists, in favour of Christ, and especially on an unpublished work, entitled the "Infant Messiah." (See Leib. Lett. to Job Ludof.)

† John Peter Speetth, an Augustin, became a Jew, and, under the name of Moses Germanus, kept up a correspondence with Wachter on the subject of religion.
had written a defence of the Jewish Kabbala, against certain modern authors. He handled the same subject in the Introduction to the History of the Jewish Philosophy, where he attacked the author's book in a more learned manner. The author now both corrects himself, and answers Budæus. He vindicates the impugned agreement of the Kabbala with Spinoza, but he now defends Spinoza, whom at that time he had attacked.

The Kabbala is of two kinds, real and literal; this latter is called Gematria, (it transposes letters and syllables, and from one word makes another, or the cypher of another word); that is called Notariaca, which, from each letter, especially initials, forms fresh words. Themura is a species of stenography, and a change of the whole alphabet.

Many decide before they know. The author asserts that Knorr has not so much unveiled the true Kabbala, or the secret philosophy of the Jews, as its empty forms; but Knorr gave the good and the bad together, just as he found it.
There is an old tradition,* that the sin of Adam was the cutting off Malcuth from the other plants; now Malcuth, or kingdom, is the last of the Sephiresses, and signifies that all things are irresistibly governed by the will of God in such a way that men imagine they are following their own, while they are carrying out the will of God. They say that Adam had attributed to himself an independent liberty, and learned by his fall, that he could not stand by himself, but must be raised up again by God, through the Messiah. Thus Adam cut off the ramification of the Sephiresses, at the summit. Kabbala is derived from Kebel, that is, receiving, or Tradition.

According to Claude Beauregard, in the Circulus Pisanus, xx. pp. 130, 131, Origen, and certain gnostic Fathers, even Jerome himself, seem to assert, that deception is permitted to legislators no less than to doctors. Pythagoras experienced in person, how severe the discipline of the mysteries was among the Egyptians, since scarcely with the authority of King Amasis, to whom he had been recommended by

* See Theodiceea, page 612.
Polycrates, was he received by the priests at Thebes. He himself was an equally rigorous exactor of silence. Plato also has said, that it was impious to preach the author of the universe, in public; in another part, that we should speak of God enigmatically, so that any letters in danger of being lost, should be read by others, but not understood. (See Gassendi against the Aristotelians.) With regard to the Academics, Augustine states, (Book iii., against the Academicians,) that they only disclosed their opinions to those disciples who had lived with them till their old age. Moreover, according to Clement, (Strom. 5,) the Epicurcans themselves declared that there were certain things among themselves not to be read by all. So Descartes (Letter to Reg. 89, Part i.) observes, "You do wrong to our Philosophy, if you show it to the indifferent, or even if you communicate it to any but those who eagerly demand it."

Burnet,* in his Archæology, remarks, with

regard to the Kabbalists, that the sum of their philosophy is as follows: The original being, or Enso, contains all things in himself; there is always the same amount of being in the universe; the world is an emanation from God; hence arguments arise concerning objects that are empty, as vases, small vessels, channels which rays percolate, and as soon as these rays are withdrawn, the objects perish and are reabsorbed in God.

Some think that the Pseudo-Kabbala is a recent invention by Loria, or Irira.* Tatian is of opinion that the Lord of the world is the substance of all things, that God is the foundation of the universe. The Kabbalistic theses of Henry More, "that nothing is produced from nothing, that there is no matter in the universal collection of things," are dogmas peculiar to the Kabbalists.

According to our author, the Kabbalists interpret the thesis, that all substance is a spirit, with regard to the Divine Spirit, in a different manner to More. But our author maintains

* Isaac Loria, inventor of the new Kabbala. Irira, a Spaniard, and follower of Loria.
that the world or worlds are a necessary and immanent consequence of the Divine nature; that there are both immanence and emanation, and that the world is but one with God, in a wonderful degree of unity, as all conceive that there is no distinction between the thing and its mode, \emph{a parte rei}. In all this, however, he is wrong.

According to the Kabbala, it may be said that the universe is God, so far as manifested. In the philosophical doctrines of the Kabbala, with regard to the divine world, whence this world sprung by emanation, the Trinity is so openly acknowledged, that I readily subscribe to the assertion of a learned man, (Observations of Halle, vol. ii. Observation 5-16, No. 3,) that the Christians received the doctrine of the Trinity from the Jews. But in our author's opinion, Picus de la Mirandole erred in placing the Triad in the three highest sephires of the Kabbalistic tree, the boldest of whose followers is he who maintains (vol. i. Observation Sel. I, No. 11) it to be clear, from the very explanation of the Kabbalists, that by the names Kether, Binah, Chochmah, Crown,
Wisdom, Prudence, the three persons of the Trinity are intended.

But it should be remembered that the numerations or sephirot are far below Ensoph, who comprehends the Triad; below Ensoph comes Adam Kadmon, that is, the whole range of Sephirot, Lights, Numerations, and Aëons, not the only-begotten, but the first-begotten.

Tatian, in his discourse to the Greeks, proclaims himself a follower of the Barbarian, that is, the Jewish philosophy. "By the power of the word, he says, both He, and the Word which was in him, (the internal Word,) existed in the Lord himself of the universe. But when he willed it, the Word came forth from his singleness, not idly put forth, but the first-born work of his Spirit, (this is the external Word;) now, this we know to be the beginning of this world, (Adam Kadmon, the first-born.) It was, however, born by division, not by avulsion; for that which is torn away is separated from its original, but what is divided, being endowed with its peculiar functions, in no way diminishes that from which it has derived its power." These are
the words of Tatian, to which only the Hebrew words Ensoph and Adam Cadmon are wanting, but still Tatian is not, on that account, the precursor of Arius. Arius became a heretic by denying the first-begotten, or by confounding the first-begotten with the only-begotten. Bullus, in his defence of the Nicene Synod, shews (sect. iii. chap. v.) that Catholic writers, prior to the Nicene Synod, give the Son of God a certain nativity, which began at a certain period, and preceded the creation of the world. He quotes Athenagoras, Tatian, Theophilus of Antioch, Hippolytus, and Novatian, all of whom he discusses in order; and finally, he shews (chapter ix.) that some later writers acknowledged the Procession or Descent of the Word, from the Father, to create the world, which he proves from the discourses attributed to Zeno of Verona, but written after the Nicene Synod; from the letter of Alexander (of Alexandria) to Alexander, Bishop of Constantinople; from the letter of Constantine to the Nicomediens, from the panegyric on Constantine, by Eusebius Pamphilus; and lastly, from Athanasius himself.
He adds, (p. 394 and following,) "I dare not penetrate this mystery, although I think I see arguments which might be used concerning it, not without some weight. I return, therefore, to Athanasius, who clearly attributes a triple nativity to the Son. The first is that by which the Word, from all eternity, sprung from the Father, and abides with the Father. On account of this nativity, according to Athanasius, He is called in the Scriptures the only-begotten. (See Athanasius' third Discourse against the Arians.) The second nativity consists in that descent by which the Word went out of God the Father to create the world; in this respect, Athanasius thinks, He is called in Scripture "the first-born of every creature." His third and last nativity was, when the same Divine Person went out of the bosom and glory of his Father, and dwelt in the womb of the holy Virgin; and the Word became flesh. But let us be careful not to spurn this explanation of the great Athanasius, for it gives us the readiest clue to the discovery of the feelings and opinions of some ancient writers, whose expres-
sions the Arians have perverted to defend heresy, and whom some recent theologians have, by implication, accused of Arianism." This is what Bullus says.

Our author resumes, (chap. iii.,) "It must be remarked, that the Messiah is himself the eternal Word; not the internal Word of God, but that which proceeded; and this which we call in Kabbalistic terms, the Messiah, because he is born of the Holy Spirit, also is called by the Kabbalists, the Spirit of the World, because his Spirit animated the world.

"The Kabbalists are also compelled to acknowledge that the body of Christ is omnipotent, because Christ's body, according to them, is the primary body, whence all other bodies, through the creating Sephires, received their beauty and ornament."

The author passes on (Chap. IV.) to Spinoza, whom he compares with the Kabbala. Spinoza writes, (Ethics, p. 2, Scholium to Proposition X.)—"Every one must admit that nothing can exist or be conceived without God; for it is acknowledged by all, that God is the only cause of all things, of their essence as
well as of their existence; in other words, God is the cause of all things, not only as regards their production, but also their existence.” These are the words of Spinoza, with which the author seems to agree. It is true, indeed, that we must not speak otherwise of things created, than that they are permitted by the nature of God, but in this I am of opinion that Spinoza has not succeeded. We can conceive essences in a certain degree without God, but existences imply God, and the very reality of essences by which they issue into existences, proceeds from God. The essences of things are co-eternal with God, and the essence itself of God, comprises all other essences, so that no perfect conception of God can be formed without them. But existence cannot be conceived without God, who is the final cause of all things.

The axiom that “that belongs to the essence of a thing, without which it cannot exist nor be conceived,” must be applied to things necessary or species, not to individuals nor contingents; for no distinct conception can be formed of individuals.
Hence they have no necessary connexion with God, but are produced freely. God was inclined to them by a determinate reason, but by no means compelled.

The thesis, "that from nothing, something is produced," Spinoza considers a fiction, (De Emend. Intell., p. 374.) But in reality the modes which are produced, are produced from nothing. Since there is no substance of modes, neither the mode nor any part of it had a pre-existence, but there was another mode which has disappeared, and to which this mode succeeded. The Kabbalists seem to assert that the creation or existence of matter is impossible on account of the worthlessness of its essence, and that therefore, there is either no matter in the universe, or that matter and spirit, are one and the same, as H. Morus maintains in his Kabbalistic Theses. Spinoza also denies that God could have created any corporeal and material mass, to be the foundation of this world, "because," says he, "those who take the other side, know not by what power of God, it could have been created." In all this, there is some truth, but I do not think that
the subject is sufficiently understood. In reality, matter exists, but it is not substance, since it is an aggregate, or compound of substances: I am speaking of secondary matter only, or the extended mass, which is by no means a homogeneous body. But what we conceive to be homogeneous and call primary matter, is incomplete, since it is simply potential. Substance, on the contrary, is something complete and active.

Spinoza thought that matter, in its vulgar sense, did not exist. Hence he often tells us that Descartes is wrong, in defining matter as space, (Letter 73,) and in explaining space to be something worthless, which ought to be divisible in its stead, (De Emend. Intell., p. 385,) “because matter ought to be explained by an attribute which expresses an eternal and infinite essence.” To this I answer, that space, or if you like, primary matter, is only a certain indefinite repetition of things, in so far as they are similar or indiscrete; but as number implies things numbered, so space implies things which repeat themselves, and which, besides common features, have some
peculiar characteristics. These peculiarities when they occur, render the limits of magnitude and form, which were before only possible, now real. Matter merely passive, is extremely worthless, deprived of all virtue; but this only exists in an incomplete state, or in the abstract.

Spinoza (Ethics, p. i. Coroll. Proposition 13, and Schol. Proposition 15*) says: "No substance, not even corporeal substance, is divisible." This is not to be wondered at, in his system, because he only admits one substance; but in mine, it is equally true, although I admit an infinity of substances; for in my system, all substances are indivisible, or atoms.

Spinoza again says, (Ethics, p. 3, Schol. Proposition 2,) that mind and body are the same thing, only expressed in two ways, and that (Ethics, p. ii. Schol. Proposition 7) the thinking substance, and the extended sub-

* A very important scholium, but too long to be given in full. We can only give this part which bears on the question. "It is no less absurd to assert that corporeal substance is composed of bodies or parts, than to say that a body is composed of superficies, superficies of lines, and lines of points. And this, every one who knows that a clear reason is infallible, must admit, especially those who deny the existence of a vacuum.
stance, are one and the same, which is known, at one time, under the attribute of thought, at another, under the attribute of space. In the same place, he says:—"This appears to have been seen, as it were through a cloud, by some Jews, who thought that God, the intellect of God, and the objects conceived by that intellect, were but one and the same." With this I do not agree. Mind and body are no more the same, than the principle of action, and the principle of passion. Corporeal substance has a soul and an organic body; that is, a mass composed of other substances. It is true that it is the same substance that thinks, and has an extended mass joined to itself, but by no means does this constitute it, for every part of this might be taken away, without changing the substance. Besides every substance perceives, yet every substance does not think. Thought belongs in truth to atoms, as also does all perception, but extension belongs to composites. It can no more be said that God, and the things conceived by God, are one and the same, than that the mind and the objects perceived by the mind
are the same. The author thinks that Spinoza assumed a common nature, whose attributes were thought and extension, and that this nature is spirit. But there is no extension of spirits, unless you take a wider view of them, as some subtle animal, similar to the conceptions of angels by the ancients. The author adds, that the modes of these attributes are mind and body; but how, I ask, can the mind be a mode of thought, when it is itself the principle of thought? The mind, therefore, should be rather the attribute, and thought the modification of this attribute. We may wonder also that Spinoza (De Emend. Intell., p. 385) appears to deny that extension is divisible into parts, and made up of parts; all of which has no meaning, except, perhaps, that like space, it is indivisible. But space and time are orders of things, not things themselves.

The author rightly says that God found the origin of all things in Himself; as I remember Jul. Scaliger saying, "that things were produced, not from the passive power of matter, but from the active power of God;"
and this I assert with regard to forms either active or entelechia.

As to what Spinoza says, (Ethics, Proposition 34, p. 1,) that God is, by the same necessity, cause of Himself* and of all things,† and (Pol. Treat., p. 270, c. 2, No. 2) that the power of all things is the power of God, I do not admit it. God necessarily exists, but He produces things by His own free will; the power of all things is also produced by God; but this power is distinct from the Divine, and things themselves work, although they have received the power of action.

Spinoza says, (Letter 21,) that “all things are in God, and move in God. I assert this with Paul, and perhaps with all other philosophers, although in a different manner;‡ I would even venture to add, with all the ancient

* By Proposition 11.
† By Proposition 16 and its coroll.
‡ This remarkable testimony of Spinoza, who declares his adherence to the text of St. Paul, only by modifying the spirit, disappears in the French translation of Saissel, whom I have sometimes followed, but who here appears to weaken the meaning of the passage. Saissel translates: “declare it with Paul, we are in God, and move in God; which also all the ancient philosophers believed, though in a different manner.” In my opinion Spinoza asserts, that while accepting the assertion of St. Paul, which is to be found in ancient philosophers, he wishes to explain it in his own way. This restriction, which is an avowal, is wanting in the French translation, b. t. 2, p. 339.
Jews, as far as we may gather from certain traditions, although corrupted in every way." In my opinion, all things exist in God, not as a part in a whole, nor as an accident in a subject, but as a place in that which it fills up, a spiritual or subsisting place; not as a commensurate or participated place, for God is vast, He is ubiquitous, the world is present to Him; thus all things are in Him, for He is where they are, and where they are not; He remains when they depart, He is already there when they arrive.

The author states the Kabbalists concur, that God produced some things mediately, others immediately. This leads him to treat of a certain primary element which God caused to flow immediately from Himself, and by the medium of which, everything else was produced in order. This element the Kabbalists are wont to call by various names, such as, Adam Cadmon, the Messiah, Christ, the Word, the first begotten, the first man, the heavenly man, the Guide, the Shepherd, the Mediator, &c. Elsewhere I will give the reason for this assertion, the fact itself Spinoza acknowledged,
so that nothing was wanting but the name. It follows, he says, (Ethics, p. 1, Schol. Proposition 28,) in the second place, that God cannot properly be called the remote cause of particular things, except for the sake of distinguishing them from those which He produced immediately, or rather which follow from his absolute nature. Now, he has explained the nature of those things which are said to follow from the absolute nature of God, thus (Proposition 21):—Everything which follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God, must be eternal and infinite, in other words, by means of that same attribute, they are eternal and infinite. The author quotes from Spinoza these Propositions, which utterly want foundation. God produces no infinite creature; nor could any difference between this infinite creature and God, be pointed out or proved, by any argument.

The conception of Spinoza, that from any attribute, an infinite particular object might spring,—from extension, something infinite in extension, from thought, a certain infinite intellect,—arises from the varied manner in which
he regards certain heterogeneous attributes of God, such as thought and extension, and perhaps innumerable others. For in truth extension is not an attribute of itself, since it is only a repetition of our perceptions.

An infinite extension only exists in the imagination; an infinite thinking Being, is God Himself. Necessary things and those which follow from the infinite nature of God are eternal truths. One particular creature is produced by another, and this again from some other; therefore, by no conception, could we arrive at God, if we imagined a progression to infinity; and yet, in truth, the last of these creatures depends on God, no less than the one which precedes it.

Tatian remarks, in his Discourse to the Greeks, that there are spirits in the stars, in angels, plants, rivers, men, and though this spirit be one and the same, it possesses differences in itself. This, however, is a doctrine which I, by no means, approve. It is the error of the soul of the world diffused universally, which, like the air in the lungs, in different vessels gives different sounds, so
when the vessel is broken, the soul will depart thence, and return into the soul of the world. But it must be known that there are as many incorporeal substances, or if you please, souls, as there are natural organic machines.

As to what Spinoza says, (Ethics; p. 2, Schol. Proposition 13,) that all things have souls, though in different degrees, it rests on another singular opinion, that an idea of everything is given of necessity in God, of which, God is the cause, in the same way as the idea of the human body. But there is not the slightest reason for supposing that the soul is an idea; ideas are something purely abstract, as numbers and figures, and cannot act; they are abstract and universal. The idea of every animal is a possibility, and it is an illusion to say that souls are immortal, because ideas are eternal, as though the soul of the globe were called eternal, because the idea of a spherical body is so. The soul is not an idea, but the source of innumerable ideas; it has besides the present idea, a certain activity or production of new ideas. But according
to Spinoza, the soul will change at any moment, because with the change of the body there is a different idea of the body. After this it is no wonder if he considers creatures as evanescent modifications. The soul, therefore, is something vital, that is, contains a power of action.

Spinoza further observes, (Ethics, p. 1, Proposition 16,) "Infinite objects in infinite forms, (that is, everything which can fall under a divine intelligence,) must follow from the necessity of the Divine nature." This opinion is most false, and is the same error as that which Descartes insinuated, that matter takes all shapes in succession. Spinoza begins where Descartes leaves off: in naturalism. He is wrong also in saying, (Letter 58) that the world is the effect of the Divine nature, although he barely adds, that it was not made by chance. There is a medium between necessity and chance, namely, free-will. The world is the effect of God, voluntary, indeed, but on account of inclining or prevailing reasons. And although we should suppose the world to last for ever, yet it would not be of necessity.
It was in the power of God either not to create, or to create differently, but he was not bound to do so. He thinks also (Letter 49) that God creates the world by the same necessity as that by which He comprehends Himself. To this we must answer, that things are possible in many ways, but that it is impossible He should not comprehend Himself. Spinoza then says, (Ethics, p. 1, Schol. Proposition 17,) "I know that several philosophers think they can prove supreme intelligence and free will belong to the nature of God; for, say they, we know of nothing more perfect which we can attribute to God, than that which is, in us, the highest perfection."* For that reason they preferred to make God indifferent to all things, and only creating what he had resolved to create by a certain absolute will. For my part, I think I have shewn† clearly enough, that all things follow from the supreme

* Moreover, these same philosophers, although they conceive a supremely intelligent God as actually existing, do not believe that He can cause to exist all things which He actually contains in His intelligence; for they think that in this way they destroy the power of God. If God, say they, had created all things, which are in His intelligence, there would be nothing further for Him to create, a consequence which appears opposed to the omnipotence of God.

† The text refers to Proposition XVI.
power of God,\* by the same necessity, just as it follows† from the nature of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right angles. From the first words it is evident that Spinosa denies God intelligence and free will. He is right in denying that God is indifferent and decrees anything by an absolute will; He decrees by a free will founded on reasons. But he gives no proofs of his assertion, that all things follow from God, as properties from a triangle, nor is there any analogy between an essence and an existing object.

In the Scholium to the Proposition 17,‡ he

\* From his infinite nature, infinite objects in infinite forms; that is, all things have necessarily followed, or are following, perpetually by the same necessity.

† From all eternity.

‡ I deem it necessary to give this passage in full: "The intelligence and free will which, in this hypothesis would constitute the essence of God, must differ in every point from our intelligence and free will, and could agree with them in nothing but the name; just as for instance, the Dog, a star, and the dog, a barking animal, resemble each other, and this I will prove as follows: If intelligence belongs to the Divine nature, it cannot, like our intelligence, be posterior to, (as some think,) or simultaneous, by its nature, with the objects understood by it, since God is anterior to all things by his causality (by Coroll. 1, Proposition 16;) but, on the other hand, truth, or the formal essence of things, is only such as it exists so, objectively, in the intelligence of God. Consequently the intelligence of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute the essence of God, is in reality the cause of all things, both of their essence and their existence; and this is what those philosophers appear to have thought, who assert that the intelligence, will, and power of God are one and the same. Since then the intelligence of God is the only cause of things, that is, as we have shewn, both of their essence and of
asserts that the intelligence and will of God agree with ours only in name, because ours is posterior, and His, anterior to all things; but it by no means follows from this, that they only agree in name. Yet he affirms elsewhere, that thought is an attribute of God, and that particular forms of thought are to be referred to this, (Ethics, p. 2, Proposition 1.) But our author thinks that then he is speaking of the external word of God, because he says (Ethics, p. 5) that our soul is a part of the Infinite Intelligence.

The human soul, observes Spinoza, (Ethics, p. 5, Demon. Proposition 23,) cannot be utterly their existence, it must necessarily differ from these things with relation to their essence and to their existence; for the effect differs from its cause exactly in that which it receives from the cause. For instance, one man is the cause of the existence of another, not of his essence. This essence is an eternal truth, and hence these two men may resemble each other as to their essence; but in existence they must differ, and on that account if the existence of one ceases, the other will not necessarily cease also. But if the essence of one could be destroyed and become false, the essence of the other would be destroyed with it. Consequently, anything which is the cause of an effect as to its essence and to its existence, must differ from that effect, both as to its essence and to its existence. Now, the intelligence of God is the cause of our intelligence, as to essence and existence; therefore the intelligence of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute the Divine essence, differs from our intelligence both as to essence and existence, and can only resemble it in name, as we wished to prove. Any one can see that the same demonstration may be applied to the will of God."
destroyed with the body, but some eternal portion of it must remain. That, however, bears no relation to time, for we attribute duration to the soul only during the duration of the body. In the following Scholium, he adds; "this idea, which expresses the essence of the body under the character of eternity, is a fixed mode of thought, which belongs to the essence of the soul, and which is necessarily eternal," &c. This, however, is simply illusory. This idea is like the figure of a sphere, whose eternity prejudges nothing as to its existence, since it is only the possibility of an ideal sphere. Therefore it means nothing, when you say, our soul is eternal in so far as it involves the body under the character of eternity; it would be just as eternal because it understands the eternal truths concerning a triangle. Our soul has no further duration, nor is its time reckoned beyond the actual existence of the body. Thus argues Spinoza, who thinks that the soul perishes with the body, because he thought that the body alone, always remained, although it was transformed.

The author adds: "I do not find that Spinoza
has anywhere positively asserted that souls migrate into different bodies, and various abodes and habitations of eternity; but this might be inferred from his opinion." Here he is wrong. With Spinoza, the same soul cannot be the idea of another body, just as the figure of a sphere is not the figure of a cylinder; with him the soul is so fugitive, that it does not even exist at the present moment, for the body also only remains in idea. Spinoza says, (Ethics, p. 5, Proposition 21,) that memory and imagination disappear with the body, but I think that some memory and imagination always remain, and that without them there can be no soul. Neither must we judge that mind exists without thought or the soul; reason without imagination and memory, is a consequence without premises. Aristotle also conceived that the mind, or active intellect subsists, not the soul. But frequently the soul is active, and the intellect passive.

Again, Spinoza asserts, (Tr. de Emendat. Intell., p. 384,) "The ancients never, as far as I know, had any conception, as we have, of a soul acting according to fixed laws, and
as it were a spiritual automa," (he meant to say automaton.) The author interprets this of the soul only, not of the intellect, and says that the soul acts according to the laws of motion and external causes. Both err: I maintain that the soul acts of its own free will, and yet that it resembles a spiritual automaton, and I hold this to be true of the mind also. The soul is not less free than the mind from external impulses, nor does the soul act more determinately than the mind; as in bodies everything takes place by motion, according to the laws of power, so in the soul everything takes place by effort or desire, according to the laws of good. The two influences concur. Still it is true, that some things so exist in the soul, as that they can be adequately explained only by external objects; and thus the soul is subject to external objects, not by a physical, but as it were, a moral influence, in so far as God, in creating the intellect, considered other objects more than itself. For in the creation and preservation of each object, God considers all other objects.
The author wrongly calls the will, the effort of each thing to continue in its existence; for the will tends to more special ends, and a more perfect mode of existence. He affirms erroneously that effort is identical with essence, inasmuch as essence is always the same, but efforts vary. Nor can I admit that affirmation is the effort of the mind to persevere in its existence, that is, to preserve its ideas; for we have this effort even when there is no affirmation. Besides, with Spinoza, the mind is an idea, it has no ideas. Again he wrongly supposes that affirmation or denial, is volition, since besides these it involves the reason of good.

Spinoza (Letter 2, to Oldenb.) maintains that the will differs from this or that volition, as whiteness differs from this or that white object, and that consequently the will is no more the cause of this or that volition, than humanity is the cause of Peter or Paul. Special volitions, therefore, require some other cause; the will is only the existence of reason; this is the argument of Spinoza. We, however, understand the will as the power of wishing, the
exercise of which power is volition. Therefore it is especially by the will that we wish, but it is also true, that other special causes are necessary to determine the will, so as to produce a certain volition. It must be modified in a certain manner. The will, therefore, has not the same relation to volitions, that species or an abstraction of species, has to individuals. Errors are not free, nor acts of the will, although we often concur in our errors by means of free actions.

"Men," says Spinoza, "conceive themselves in nature, as it were an empire in an empire (Malcuth within Malcuth,* the author adds). They imagine that the mind of man is not the product of natural causes, but that it is created immediately by God, so independent of all other things that it has an absolute power of self-determination, and of rightly using its reason. But experience affords us abundant proof that it is no more possible for us to ensure health of mind, than health of body." This is what Spinoza says. In my opinion every substance is an empire in an empire,

* For Malcuth see above.
but acting in concert with other things; it receives no influence from anything else, only from God, but yet it is placed by its Creator, God, in dependence on every other object; it proceeds immediately from God, yet is produced consentaneous to other things; but all things are not equally in our power, for we are inclined more or less in different directions. Malcuth, or the empire of God, removes neither divine nor human liberty, but only the indifference of equilibrium, an invention of those who deny the reasons of their actions, because they do not understand them.

Spinoza thinks that as soon as a man understands that all events occur necessarily, his mind is wonderfully strengthened. But by this constraint he does not satisfy the mind of the sufferer, nor does he on that account suffer less acutely. Happy, indeed, would he be, if he understood that good arises out of evil, and that whatever happens is best for us, if we consider it wisely.

From all this it is clear, that what Spinoza says with regard to the intellectual love of
God (Ethics, p. 5, * Proposition 28) is only popular parade, since there can be nothing lovely in a God who produces good and evil indiscriminately, and of necessity. The true love of God has its foundation not in necessity, but in goodness.

Spinoza asserts, (De Emend. Intell., p. 388) that we have no knowledge, but only experience of particular objects, that is, whose existence has no connexion with their essence, and which are not therefore eternal truths. This contradicts his statement elsewhere, that all things are necessary, and that all things flow of necessity from the Divine essence. Again, (Ethics, p. 2, Schol. Proposition 10,) he attacks those who declare that the nature of God belongs to the essence of created things, and yet elsewhere (Ethics, p. 1, Proposition 15,) he had established that things cannot exist nor be conceived, without God, and that they spring of necessity from Him. For that reason he maintains (Part 1, Ethics, Proposition 21,) that finite and temporal things are not produced immediately by an

* Part 4, for p. 5, where intellectual love is discussed.
infinite cause, but (Proposition 28) that they are produced by other singular and finite causes. But in this way, how do they finally spring from God? For thus neither do they proceed mediately from Him, because we never arrive at anything which is not similarly produced from some other finite object. Therefore God cannot be said to act by the medium of second causes, unless he produces these causes. It would be more correct to say, that God produces substances, and not their actions, with which he only concurs.

The author (sect. v.) finds us no other excuse for the inconveniences of the Kabbala, than that they are common to all systems of philosophy, even those of Aristotle and Descartes, and therefore something may be taught even by the Kabbalists. He then alleges that Aristotle denies a creation and a Providence, that he only fixes one intelligence in the whole human species, and that Descartes does away with final causes. The author is of opinion (Schol.) that Aristotle was taught, by order, in the Academies.

The author fancies that the intention of
the ancients, in teaching in their schools, a philosophy which might be corrected and attacked by theologians, was, that no one led away by the devil, (the author here is joking, so we must excuse him,) from seeing the universal concurrence of theology with philosophy, might suppose the Christian religion to be the work of reason. These words of our author appear to me absurd: the more reason concurs with religion, the better all things proceed. Yet there will always remain some things revealed, which are actual, and superadd something to history and to reason; and to admit an enemy, under the pretext that we should not seem to agree too much with a friend, would be ridiculous.

According to the author, (p. 77,) theology requires no assistance from philosophy, and has nothing to fear from it; here he is wrong. Philosophy and theology are two concurrent truths, nor can truth be opposed to truth, and if true theology contradicted philosophy, the former would be false. He asserts that philosophy rests on a sceptical foundation, that is, on the respective reason by which men