PAUL N. MILIUKOV

RUSSIA
TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW
RUSSIA
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Official Soviet Map on Famine in Russia.
To

MY AMERICAN AUDIENCES
PREFACE

This book has its origin in my intercourse with American audiences during the past three months. Hence—its dedication. It could not have been written before the end of 1921, nor could it have taken its present form in surroundings less sympathetic or more inclined to take sides in the events here described. It was necessary for the cycle of events in Russia to come to a close, before its meaning could become patent and a criterium be found by which these events could be judged in their unity and completion. I think this is now the case with both the "White" and the "Red" movements in Russia. The former ran its course with the loss of the last patch of anti-Bolshevist territory in the Crimea; the latter—with the Great Russian famine. General Wrangel's defeat manifested the degeneration of the "White" movement. The famine of 1921 demonstrated Russia's exhaustion under the Bolshevik rule. Whatever happens in the time to come, these two phenomena will mark the turning point in the Russian Revolution.

I gladly accepted the invitation to deliver a course of eight lectures on Russia at the Lowell Institute, Boston, Mass., in October and November, 1921, because by this time I had come to a definite conclusion as to the meaning and the place of the Russian events of the past four years in the history of our Revolution. The reader will see that I draw a distinction between the Revolution as
a great historical process which transforms human psychology and institutions, and its passing stages and varying moods. In 1903-1905 I had occasion to explain to Chicago and Boston audiences the origin of our revolutionary process; now I was tempted to analyze its present significant phase.

It is important for the reader to discriminate between the passing form and the lasting substance of the Russian Revolution, as well as between its negative and positive aspects. While the destructive aspect of the Revolution is of necessity presented in detail in this book, I wish that the constructive processes of the Revolution should not be overlooked. We are witnessing the birth of the Russian democracy, in the midst of the ruins of the past, which will never return. One must not be impatient with the great and complicated revolutionary process which in other countries took decades, if not centuries, for its completion.

The double title of this book, “Russia To-day and To-morrow,” is intended to keep before the mind of the reader that basic idea of the Russian Revolution. One chapter is devoted to an attempt to foretell the outlines of the coming Russia, as a result of the Revolution. The reader will observe, however, that the conception of that Russia of to-morrow is present throughout the book and forms the thread which permits me to find myself and to lead the reader through the labyrinth of events.

I think that there are two requisites necessary for a successful presentation of my country’s case before the American public opinion: the presentation must be sincere and truly democratic in spirit. Were I not certain of my ability to meet these conditions, I would not
have come to America. I found my audiences here extremely interested in the subject, I saw what they wanted of me, and I finally decided to present in book form the contents of my lectures and addresses. Of course, I had to write this book afresh from my notes, and this gave me the opportunity to expand most of the chapters far beyond the space of an hour's lecture.

The first eight chapters of the book correspond with my lectures at the Lowell Institute (October 25–November 18, and November 1–November 22, 1921) and I have preserved their titles. The ninth and the tenth chapters, in their initial form, formed the contents of my address before the Civic Forum in New York, delivered, under the title "Russia To-day and To-morrow," at the Town Hall, on November 11, 1921. The ninth chapter ("Russia To-morrow") is closely connected with the lectures delivered in Boston, and presents their natural conclusion.

The last two chapters deal with the relations, diplomatic and intellectual, between Russia and the outside world. I did not intend to exhaust the question, but only to concentrate attention on the two aspects which are of special interest to America. The Russian, and especially the Siberian question, as it might have been put before the Washington Conference, could not be omitted at the moment when the Conference was in the center of the world's attention. That is why I have treated that problem in greater detail than in my lecture before the Civic Forum. The Siberian-Japanese problem formed the subject of my lectures at the Cleveland Reserve University (at the McBride Foundation) and at the Chicago University, on December 13 and 14. Of course, in its final form the sub-
ject has been brought up to the present moment, and
the chapter includes an analysis of the stand taken by
the Washington Conference; the readers will also find
in this chapter new material brought to Washington
by the Vladivostok delegation. The eleventh chapter
(“Russia’s Contribution to the World Civilization”) reprod-uces a lecture delivered at Columbia University,
on November 28, 1921. Its content is not closely con-
nected with the other parts of the book, but I followed
the advice of some of my hearers, who found that in
“Russia of To-morrow” the noblest side of the Rus-
sian life of yesterday and to-day, its great culture,
could not be omitted.

I cannot mention here all the opportunities afforded
me to address numerous American audiences on the
various phases of the Russian problem. The text of
some of those addresses is preserved in the publication
of the respective institutions.* I can only say that
it was the free exchange of opinions, of questions and
answers, which particularly stimulated me to fix my
views in this book and which drew my attention to
special points needing and deserving elucidation.

I hope that this book will meet with the same atten-
tion which was accorded its author by his American
audiences.

Paul N. Miliukov.

New York, February 7, 1922.

*See “The Consensus,” published by the National Economic
League of Boston, Vol. 7, No. 1, January, 1922; also the “Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.” Phila-
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RUSSIA TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW

CHAPTER I.

WHY THE REVOLUTION COULD NOT BE AVERTED.

Seventeen years ago, in 1904, I addressed an American audience on the subject of the Russian Crisis. Some of my present readers may recall, in substance, what I then said. I am now going to speak on the Russian Catastrophe. In this catastrophe, we witness the end, or, at any rate, the continuation of the same process which then began. This change from "Crisis" to "Catastrophe" may convey to you the tragic meaning of the revolutionary process which has developed in Russia during these seventeen years.

In 1904 the first Russian Revolution was approaching. It took place in the year following my first coming here. The symptoms of the Revolution were so clear and obvious to everybody, except the Tsar and his Government, that it was not very difficult to play the prophet. The reasons why the first Russian Revolution, in 1905, became unavoidable were discussed in my previous lectures.¹

I am going to tell you now what has happened since

¹"Russia and its Crisis," 1905, Chicago University Press.
and just what made necessary and unavoidable the second Russian Revolution in 1917.

The chief reason was that the first Revolution proved abortive. In a moment of panic the Tsar signed the renowned October (30) Manifesto of 1905. Had this promise been seriously meant and had it resulted in a real constitution and a sound beginning of political freedom been made at that time, the second Revolution might not have happened at all. But, as a matter of fact, the Tsar never wished to curtail his prerogatives. His view, and especially the view of the Tsarina, was that it was his moral duty, to pass unimpaired the whole inheritance that he had received from God and from his ancestors to his heir and successor. This uncompromising view, common to all autocrats, made tragic the Tsar's destiny. But it also caused the Russian revolutionary process to continue and at the same time it extremely complicated its issues.

The Tsar soon repented having yielded even so little as he really had given to the Russian people. He was always on the alert for a favorable moment to come, to recover his complete autocratic power. The young popular representative, the "Duma," on the other hand, wished to extend its power over the extremely narrow limits of the sham constitution of 1906. The Duma insisted on being a real representation of the nation and a real legislative organ of power. Nicholas II remained hostile to his creation. He preserved his right to nominate his ministers and half of the members of the Upper House, and he made unlimited use of that right in order to do what he liked and to paralyze every action of the Duma which was
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not to his taste. That is why the decade of years which passed between the two Revolutions (1906-1917) was filled with relentless struggle between the Duma and the Tsar's ministers, which made peaceful progress impossible for Russia.

This struggle passed through two stages, which correspond to the periods of the sessions of the two first and two last Dumas. The first stage, which includes the activity of the first two Dumas, was short and violent (1906-7). The second stage, that of the last two Dumas (1907-1917), was comparatively long and outwardly quiet. But there was no quiet in the country. A second conflict, much more serious than the first, was ripening, and everybody knew it.

The political party I belong to (the Constitutional-Democratic, founded in 1905, the first of the Russian constitutional parties) through all four Dumas never ceased to be in opposition to the Tsar's Government. In fact, all the parties that claimed to represent democracy, either bourgeois or socialistic, were on the same side. We, I mean my party, the "Cadets" (the Constitutional-Democratic) had been in the majority in the first Duma. An attempt was made by the Tsar, through his ministers, to approach me on the subject of building a majority Cabinet. But the mediators were not in earnest. They were anxious to have some popular names in the Cabinet, but they were not prepared to make any substantial concessions to our political program. Of course, under such conditions, we were unable to take the power and the responsibility before the nation. The negotiations came to nothing, and the chance for a peaceful evolution was lost. The
alternative, proposed to the Tsar by his bureaucratic minister, Mr. Stolypin, was, to dissolve the first Duma, "the Duma of popular hopes," as it was called. Unfortunately, the Tsar decided to take that advice. The Duma was dissolved after 70 days of existence. An appeal for passive resistance, issued by the opposition from Viborg, fell flat. However, the nation's answer to the dissolution of the Duma was given on the occasion of new elections. The electors, in spite of all exertions of the Government (not yet quite experienced in the art of electioneering), sent to the second Duma—the Duma of the "popular wrath"—a socialist majority, instead of the former bourgeois radical one. Thenceforth, the fate of the popular representation was sealed. A compromise had been possible with the constitutionalist majority, but, as has been shown, it did not materialize. No compromise whatever was possible with the socialist parties, who were then extremist and revolutionary. After 100 days of existence, in spite of its very cautious tactics, the second Duma was also dissolved. The motive—this time it was a very serious one—was found in the attempt of an extreme socialist faction to make use of their parliamentary seats to prepare for a revolution in Russia.

The second stage began with an open breach of the Constitution. Mr. Stolypin, under the influence of the nobility and reactionary parties, persuaded the Tsar, before summoning the third Duma, to change the electoral law. According to the Fundamental Law of 1905, granted by the Tsar himself, this change could not have been introduced without the consent of the Duma. But the Constitution was violated. A new electoral statute was promulgated by the Tsar's order on June 16, 1907, which artificially transferred the ma-
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From that moment the Duma lost all its influence on the nation. Political parties, representing the masses, were declared "illegal" and officially prosecuted. To take their place in the Duma, new parties were built under the auspices of the Government, and these represented the privileged classes or reactionary political groups. It was this fictitious representation, ready to follow every hint of the Government, which functioned as a legislative organ during the decade of 1907-17. Only such laws had a chance to pass as were desired or introduced by the Government. All exertions of the opposition to give the form of laws to the general principles proclaimed by the October manifesto of 1905, such as liberty of speech, liberty of conscience, of meetings, locomotion, inviolability of person, were regularly defeated by the governmental majority or were postponed ad Kalendas Græcas. On the other hand, important legislation was passed securing the landed

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<td>Landed gentry</td>
<td>34 (per cent.)</td>
<td>61 (per cent.)</td>
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<td>43 (per cent.)</td>
<td>22.4 (per cent.)</td>
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<td>3.4 (per cent.)</td>
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It must be added that under the electoral regulation of June 16, 1907, peasants' and workmen's deputies were elected from a number of candidates not by themselves but by a group of biggest landowners and richest burgesses, at their choice, in electoral assemblies of the Provinces. This explains why the peasants' representatives, who filled up the ranks of the opposition in the first two Dumas, now almost exclusively sat on the backs of the Government parties, thus enforcing the absolute majority of the landed gentry. See my article on "The Representative System in Russia," in "Russian Realities and Problems," Cambridge, Great Britain, 1917.
property of the nobles or curtailing the rights of nationalities (Finland, Poland).

However, there was another side to that domination of the Duma by the Government,—and it must not be overlooked. In such questions as budget, education, national defense, the governmental majority, from patriotic considerations or under the influence of public opinion, was often moved to vote with the opposition against the Government. Such votes, of course, had no practical consequences. They did not overthrow the Cabinets. The vote of mistrust in no way deprived the ministers of the Tsar’s confidence. On the contrary: it almost seemed that the more a minister succeeded in antagonizing the Duma, the more reliable he was considered to be in that contest between the old régime and the Russian democracy.

As a result, the activity of the Duma—even in its chastened form—far from removing the danger of a new revolution, rather contributed to increase this danger. Any constructive work which might satisfy public needs and thus help to mitigate popular disaffection, was made impossible by the governmental majority and by the Upper House of a unique structure: “a cemetery of the Duma’s good intentions,” as witty people called it. On the other hand, open criticism of the Government’s policy could not be forbidden to the opposition. The Duma’s sittings, which were public, soon became the only place where free speech was heard, and no censure was able to stifle severe exposure of the Government’s secret designs. The names of the opposition speakers in the Duma became widely known all over the country. This explains why, under the second Revolution, the opposition leaders of the Duma automatically became leaders of the popular
movement, in which the Duma itself was unable to play any part.

At the same time, public debates on questions of budget, legislation, foreign politics, military and naval defense contributed to lift the veil which until then had kept back the unqualified laymen from the sanctuary of governmental practice. Due to the Duma, political discussion was becoming common property.

In the general opinion, even of the moderate circles, the second Revolution was bound to come. Moreover, everybody was sure that this revolution was bound to be a greater success than the first one, as a result of the better political education of the masses.

This is a very brief and rapid outline of the political events which contributed to prepare the second Russian Revolution, in 1917. But you could never realize just why an uprising against such a tremendous power as that of the old autocracy seemed to be proved so easy, and why the whole fabric of the bureaucracy went to pieces at once and was so thoroughly destroyed to its very foundations, should I confine myself to that outward description of the general trend of the latest events, since I last was in America. A deeper insight into the Russian past is necessary in order to explain certain special features of the Russian Revolution. My explanation remains substantially the same as that which I gave to my American readers before the Revolution.

Speaking generally, one may say that at a certain period of national development a violent overthrow of obsolete political and social institutions is very likely to come in every civilized community capable of evolving from medievalism to modern democracy. The Russian Revolution is no exception to that general
It is in many aspects similar to other revolutions, e.g., the English Revolution of the XVII Century—and especially the great French Revolution of 1789-95. In my capacity of historian I have studied both. But after having passed through that living experience of our own Revolution, I read again, in 1917, Mr. Taine's volumes on the "Ancient Régime and the Revolution"—and I was amazed at many similarities in the smallest details which never before had arrested my attention. I now realize better than at any time of my former studies, just how much similar is the psychology of all revolutions.

But, at the same time, one must not forget that every nation has its peculiarities, in its revolutionary, as well as in its normal stage of development. To make you understand that special character of the Russian Revolution, I must draw your attention to these peculiar features, made our own by the whole process of Russia's history. To my mind, all these features converge into one. The fundamental difference which distinguishes Russia's social structure from that of other civilized countries, can be characterized as a certain weakness or lack of a strong cohesion or cementation of elements which form a social compound. You can observe that lack of consolidation in the Russian social aggregate in every aspect of civilized life: political, social, mental and national.

From the political point of view, the Russian State institutions lacked cohesion and amalgamation with the popular masses over which they ruled. This peculiarity can be explained by the origin of the Russian State and by the process of its historical growth. Originated on the confines of Europe and Asia, the Russian State was late to appear. You can observe a certain
regularity in the order of development of States as you go from the West to the East of Europe. The same process of evolution of State institutions which took place on the banks of the Seine and Loire as early as V-VII Century A.D., developed itself one or two centuries later (VII-VIII) in the countries eastwards from the Rhine, and four or five centuries later on the Eastern Mark of Germany (IX-XI). On the boundless plains of the future Russian Empire, State institutions developed five to nine centuries later than in France: the earliest date being that of Southern Russia (Kieff on the Dnieper River, IX-XII Century), and the latest—that of the Muscovite center (XIV Century).

Now, as a consequence of their later appearance, the State institutions in Eastern Europe necessarily assumed certain forms which were different from those in the West. The State in the East had no time to originate from within, in a process of organic evolution. It was brought to the East from outside. In the West, the State gradually evolved from the initial stage of tribal existence, through the intermediary stage of tribal aristocracy (the heads of the clans). In the East, the internal differentiation within the tribes had not yet made sufficient progress when the necessity of a State organization was felt. In the absence of internal elements of national statehood, the State institutions were then simply superposed over the tribal institutions. We have a very telling legend which symbolizes this kind of origin of the Russian State. The emissaries of the Russian Slavic tribes, the legend runs, went to the Northern viking Hröekr, to invite him to come to Russia and to take up the kingly power. “Our land,” it is related they said, “is a very large and
rich one. But order is lacking. Come to rule and to reign over us.” You will often hear now that expression “calling for Northmen,” used to suggest that Russia wants again its “order” to be brought from outside. The same legend was used by the first and the only doctrine of Russian nationalism we have ever had,—by the so-called Slavophil doctrine. The Slavophils wished to prove by it that Russian State institutions, being of foreign origin, remained foreign to the Russian soul and to the Russian country. The “land” did not wish to share in the sin of the “State.” The “land” would rather have chosen the way of “internal truth”—the path of Mary—and have left the path of Martha—that of “external truth,” of “order” preserved by force—to foreign hirelings.

The point is, indeed, that for centuries the State power has remained in Russia what it was when the Northern vikings first came: an outsider to whom allegiance was won only in the measure of his utility. The people were not willing to assimilate themselves to the State, to feel a part of it, responsible for the whole. The country continued to feel and to live independent from the State authorities. This was not only possible: it was practically unavoidable as a natural result of an extremely primitive and undeveloped system of administration. Under that system, which was characterized by an extreme scarcity of the executive organs of administration in the country, the central Government was simply unable to get at every single citizen. Whether it had to collect taxes and duties, or to prosecute criminal offenders, its only means for a very long time was to address itself to the whole community to which this particular taxpayer or criminal offender belonged. The community was made responsible for its
single member. When Peter the Great decided to change that state of things and to introduce a better order into that primitive anarchy, by following the example of the Swedish system of administration—which was then held in high repute—his foreign advisers informed him that it was impossible to apply that system to Russia. The simple reason was that it was too expensive. They told Peter that the cost of administering one small Province, like Liefland, on the Swedish pattern, was more than the current expenses for the whole of Russia, when kept in order by traditional means.

The population was too poor to bear the expenses of the perfected provincial institutions of more advanced countries. Nay, it was even too poor to bear the expenses of the central administration with its rapidly growing needs. Political development and the process of expansion of the Russian State was always in advance of Russia's economic development. That is why the State was forced to extract from its poor subjects more than they could possibly give. Hence the objective necessity to resort to force. The burden of sustaining the expanding State's institutions was becoming extremely heavy, and, of course, this growing charge was unable to contribute to transform traditional passive submission into a voluntary habit to obey.

You now can see why in Russia (1), the rural population up to the last remained, in a sense, natural anarchists; (2), why all important changes were bound to come from above, from the State authorities, and (3), why each new power, which did not get too much "under the skin" of the plain people, was sure of being passively obeyed. This explains to a great extent the events of the Russian Revolution.
We now pass to another aspect of the same basic feature: the lack of cohesion among the social elements in Russia. We do not find in the social history of Russia any groups of population strong enough to limit the power of the State. We know that the case was different in Western Europe under medieval feudalism or under more modern growth of urban liberties. In the European East there was no landed aristocracy and no “bourgeoisie” strong and united enough to be able to dictate conditions to the growing power of the Tsar. In Russia, as well as under the Byzantine or the Moslem rule, all land was supposed to belong originally to the Chief of the State, whether his name was Emperor, Tsar or Khalif. The landed aristocracy, far from limiting the power of their sovereign, was in Russia created by that same autocratic power as a class of the Tsar’s military “servants.” The Tsar allotted to them their landed estates, on the condition of actual military service.

It is very characteristic that in Russia, since the XVI Century, the words “courtiers” and “men of service” were used to designate the class of nobility and gentry. It is true that in the XVIII Century the Tsar’s donations of military lots of land definitely evolved into unlimited and unconditioned private landed property. But the Russian peasants did not forget that originally their landlord’s estates belonged to the Tsar. And from that very moment when military lots became the private property of the nobles, the peasants persistently waited for the time when the Tsar would be kind enough to learn about their needs and to give them back the “land.” They were sure that he would do that, while remunerating his old “servants” with money.

On their part the landed nobility were doing exactly
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the opposite to what was necessary to undermine that popular opinion. In the first place, there was no law of primogeniture in Russia. Landed estates were divided and subdivided, until in the third or fourth generation they formed a number of small lots which did not much differ from the peasants' holdings. Few ancient families of nobles remained alive: most of them died out. Admission to the gentry being free to everybody, the emptied ranks were gradually filled with newcomers. Especially, from Peter the Great's time it was sufficient to have reached a certain rank in the bureaucratic or military service, or (at a later date) to have been decorated with St. Vladimir's order, to enter the ranks of the nobility. As time went on, that new aristocracy of "rank" lost in its turn a great part of its possessions, together with the former aristocracy of "provenience." A good deal was purchased by the peasants as a result of the Emancipation Act of 1861. But the nobles still preserved about 105 million desiatines. They went on losing them during the last half century. Only a third of the number just mentioned (35 million) remained in their possession at the moment of the Revolution of 1917. The peasants insisted on this remaining third being given over to them with the rest. It was, practically, this claim of the peasants that lay at the basis of all political struggle of the last decades. It was this social question which complicated so much the just and timely solution of the problem of political freedom. The agrarian question had become the chief point of contention and competition in all party platforms. The socialist groups accepted the peasants' standpoint concerning the transfer of lands from the nobles, but they wanted these lands to be given to the State, not to private
peasants. My party, the "bourgeois" democracy, tried to reconcile the popular claims with the point of view of law on private property and with sound economic principles. It was chiefly with the aim to make such solutions impossible that the Government dispersed the first two Dumas, and changed the Electoral Law to the benefit of the nobles. Under the third, the Duma of the Government's own choice, the State authorities took the side of the big landowners. The new Premier, Mr. Stolypin, tried by special legislation to divert the peasants' attention from the lands of the nobility, and to remunerate the rich peasants at the expense of the poorest. This experiment of reactionary social legislation was among the causes which contributed to the success of the extreme elements under the second Revolution. The very first result of that Revolution was to deprive the new privileged group of the well-to-do peasant landowners of their possessions acquired under Mr. Stolypin's agrarian legislation. But then, the revolutionary process went farther. The peasants' solution of the agrarian tangle prevailed amidst the general crisis. The same revolutionary outbreak which destroyed the autocracy, also completely swept away its ally, the landed aristocracy and the gentry. You now can see to what a large extent this issue was favored and prepared by the social history of Russia.

Let us now pass to the third aspect of the fundamental feature mentioned above: to the weakness of mental cohesion between the different social groups of the nation. Of course, it would be strange to deny that a certain national way of feeling and thinking is common to all social groups. A Russian intellectual is no foreigner to his people. But history, here too
for a long time, prevented both groups, the intellectuals and the people, from being welded together. In the first place, up to the last half century, the only educated class in Russia was the nobility and gentry. The fate of this class was partly shared by the intellectuals. Under Peter the Great, (1689-1725) to serve the State in its process of reform, they hurriedly picked up some superficial knowledge of applied science abroad. Under the Empress Elizabeth (1741-1761), to please her, they imitated French fashions and learned to dress, to speak, and to dance, as it behooved accomplished courtiers. Under Catherine II (1762-1796), to follow her example, they read Montesquieu and Voltaire, and made progress in advanced politics. Under Alexander I (1801-1825), they definitely became revolutionaries. For the first time, they decided to serve—not the "State," but the country, and they did it in their own manner, in the way of Riego's and Pepe's. But, by their social extraction, as well as by the Government's policy, they still were prevented from actual intercourse with the people. The consequence of their estrangement from active politics and from contact with the plain people was an abstract way of thinking. Again, their abstract way of thinking drove them to a sort of intellectual extremism. The February Revolution in France (1848) made them socialists. They thenceforth obediently followed the metamorphoses of European socialism, passing from Fourier to Proudhon, from Proudhon to Karl Marx, and from Marx to revolutionary syndicalism. At the same time, beginning with the middle of the XIX Century, their ranks began to fill up from the lower social layers, and they definitely forsook civil and military service for journalism, for the academic career, science,
art and other liberal vocations. They studied pretty thoroughly the political life of the advanced democracies. But they had no access to their own. That is why they remained extremists, with very little, if any, political experience. The extremism of that part of the Russian intellectuals is to be greatly responsible for the failure of the first Revolution. It also proved detrimental to the success of our second Revolution, when a chance was given them for realizing their doctrines.

The fourth symptom of the lack of amalgamation is manifested by the divergent tendencies of the nationalities incorporated into the Russian State. I am far from asserting that no common interests united them with the whole of the Empire. On the contrary, there were a great many ties between them and Russia, and their severance is particularly keenly felt now that some of these nationalities are detached from the whole. But, there too, the aggregate was kept together by passive rather by conscious desire to make one. The system of centralization and oppression used by the autocracy revolted the national feeling. Disaffection grew particularly strong during the last three decades of years, since the last attempts made by the reactionary Government of Alexander III to "Russianize" these nationalities. At the end of the XIX Century it had already become quite clear, that at the first opportunity the leaders of the groups just then awakened to their national consciousness would search for support outside of Russia against that policy of bureaucratic centralization.

Such are the chief factors, deeply rooted in history, which were bound to come to the fore in any serious outbreak. A kind of spontaneous anarchy amongst
the masses kept in a state of passive submission by a régime of force; the decaying power of a privileged class doomed to perdition and depending, for its salvation, on the equally decaying power of the autocracy; the theoretical maximalism of the revolutionary intellectuals, inclined to Utopian solutions, with no political experience to back them; and, finally, the separatist strivings of intellectual leaders of national minorities: those are special features of any Russian revolution.

We now know why a Revolution was likely to come and what its character was bound to be in Russia. But the question remains to be answered, just why and when had it become unavoidable?

A revolution always becomes unavoidable when important and vital reforms are impeded by an authority which has lost its moral prestige and has become powerless to suppress a growing and universal disaffection among the masses.

We know what were the important and vital reforms impeded by the Government. Two of them had become especially urgent: the substitution of a popular constitutional régime for the patriarchal one and the transfer of the land from the decaying privileged class to the rural democracy.

It was also universally known what was the chief obstacle in the path of these reforms. They were opposed by a political alliance of the two forces whose interests were equally menaced by both reforms. Autocracy was menaced by the former; landed aristocracy was menaced by the latter. We know what were the poisonous fruits of this fatal alliance. It was the sham constitution of 1906 and the antiquated electoral system of 1907.

As to the moral prestige of the dynasty, it was defi-
nately undermined by the court life and the court scandals. The Tsarina, the "German," was positively disliked by the masses, and she was generally considered to be the evil genius of the Tsar. The comparison with Marie Antoinette was on everybody's lips.

There remained physical force, for the régime to live upon. That force seemed to be overwhelmingly strong and invincible, no match for the weak forces of political opposition. The only thing that could disarm the autocracy was an unsuccessful war. That war came.

In 1905 the autocracy received a first warning. After the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, the situation was favorable for a revolution. And Russia actually passed through the initial stages of a Revolution. That first Revolution failed for many reasons. The opposition forces were scattered. They had just begun to organize, but as soon as they got their first victory, the October Manifesto, they turned to fight each other. The dynasty was saved by the skillful maneuvering of a self-made politician, Count Witte. Count Witte knew how to divide the forces of the opposition, and played them against each other, thus protracting the struggle until the Russian Army came back from the Far East and a loan was given to the Tsar by France. Autocracy had money and armed force. The Government then felt free to deal a decisive blow to the first Russian representative Chamber.

In 1917 circumstances were much more favorable for a revolutionary outbreak to prove successful. There was no Witte, to save the Tsar. The moral and physical exhaustion and destruction, brought about by an unprecedented World War, was by far deeper than in 1904-5. The revolutionary forces were much better prepared and united, as a result of the first decade of
the working of political representation. What did the autocracy have to oppose to all this? Nothing besides a stubborn and blind resistance to the slightest concession, on the part of the Tsar's misguided and foolish advisers.

Revolution had become unavoidable as early as the Autumn of 1915. Already at the beginning of that year the military unpreparedness of Russia had become so manifest and the Army had had to suffer such serious defeats, for no fault of its own, that public opinion was roused against the Government. The public asked for prompt measures to follow the lead of Lloyd George and Albert Thomas. The Duma made itself the mouthpiece of public opinion. For the last time the opposition tried to give the Tsar a chance and to extend to him a plank of salvation. I was myself responsible for building an emergency majority in the Duma, which we called the "progressive bloc," although it was more than moderate in its platform. We wanted the Tsar to form a Cabinet which would "enjoy the confidence of the country." The Tsar would not listen to any hint at concessions. Moreover, he removed from office, one by one, all his Ministers who, without being liberal, felt the necessity of concessions and were favorable to the compromise proposed by the "progressive bloc."

The chasm was now (in August, 1915) wide open and was no more to be bridged. Under the growing pressure of more radical political groups, the moderate proposals made by the "bloc" had to be withdrawn. Public opinion asked now for a parliamentary system based on the principle of responsibility of the Cabinet before the House. For the Tsar this demand was equivalent to asking for a Republic.
Weak and indecisive by nature, Nicholas II fell completely under the influence of his hysterical wife. The Tsarina insisted that no concessions should be granted. In her own way, she came to the conclusion that Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette had perished just for having yielded too much to the popular wishes. Her unyielding temper was still more stiffened by a mystical idea that she was following God’s orders. The Tsar and the Tsarina both listened to the voice from above, borne to them by the notorious Rasputin. This illiterate peasant profited by their superstition, to threaten them with the Almighty’s wrath should they not follow his advice.

His advice was that the Tsar should go to the Army and invest himself with the power and the dignity of Commander-in-Chief. Everybody thought it extremely dangerous for the Tsar to make himself personally responsible for the coming defeats, which grew more than probable. But the Tsar followed the voice from above, and he played a pitiful figure at the headquarters of General Alexeiev. In the meanwhile, the Tsarina, who remained at her Petrograd residence, received the reports of the Ministers, retained in office such as pleased her, replaced others with her favorites, all of them quite insignificant personalities who came and passed like shadows. Rasputin’s protection could be bought by any one who wished it, for money, and a gang of courtiers formed itself in order to exploit Rasputin’s influence for getting pecuniary benefits. In addition to being hated, the Government was now despised by everybody. It no longer inspired any fear.

The Tsar’s family, the Grand Dukes, who saw the approaching downfall of their dynasty, tried to draw the attention of the Tsar to the risk he and they were
running. It was of no avail. To receive a hearing from the Tsar was difficult, but to have a talk with him on such unpleasant matters as called for decisive action on his part, was fully impossible. He would not listen to the advice, or, in case the informant should insist too much on his point, he would turn his back on him and—which was his favorite gesture on such occasions—would impatiently drum his fingers against the glass of a window.

It looked as if, in his innermost recesses, he knew what was coming, but felt unable to grapple with the danger,—and as if in advance he had decided to submit to his fate. In the face of the obviously approaching catastrophe, he preserved a passive attitude. This, of course, helped to increase the danger. The most faithful servants of the Tsar, noting his passiveness, lost courage and let things take their course. The heads of the Army were quite prepared to back the coming overthrow. General Alexeiev had even decided to arrest the Tsarina at the time of her visit to his headquarters. His sudden illness alone prevented him from trying in this way to escape from an extremely strained situation. At any rate, in this way or another, everybody felt that some change had to come. In mid-December, 1916, a group of the Tsar's relatives, with the aid of the most reactionary of the Duma deputies, killed Rasputin. But as the Tsar remained inactive, everybody felt that this was not at all a solution. Then, a group of prominent personalities, including General Krimov and an influential member of the Duma, decided to resort to a military conspiracy of the guards, in order to imprison the Tsar. The conspirators prepared to act at the beginning of March, 1917. But, a few days before that time, the stroke came from below,
in the form of an uprising of workmen and of some regiments of the Petrograd Garrison. It was neither a court conspiracy nor a military pronunciamento which deprived the Tsar of his throne. It happened to be a popular upheaval. The Revolution—hoped for by some, feared by many, foreseen by all—had finally become an actuality.
CHAPTER II.

WHY THE BOLSHEVIKS GOT THE UPPERC HAND.

In 1917, we had two revolutions: that of March, and that of November. We may call the first—a national revolution. The second was international.

In March all parts of the nation and all political groups—even the conservative ones—united in one common effort to defeat their common enemy—the autocracy. Just why were the conservative groups against the autocratic régime? This is explained by the exceptional conditions of war time. The ancient régime once more (after the Crimean and the Japanese defeat) proved unable to provide for the national defense. Both the conservative and the liberal groups of public opinion were unanimous in concluding that no victory in war was possible for Russia as long as the methods of autocracy were applied to the struggle. This was the motive which led both moderate and conservative groups to endorse the revolutionary movement.

This was also the reason why the Duma—conservative as it was in its majority—was ready and willing to cover with its authority the military insurrection of March 11 in Petrograd. The consent of the Duma at that moment was essential for the initial success of the Revolution. If there had been no Duma to lead
the movement, the responsible leaders of the army, such as General Alexeiev or Russki, would never have taken sides with the revolutionaries. The Tsar would not have been induced to abdicate so soon and so easily. A struggle would have begun on the very next day, in which the extreme elements alone and, perhaps, some parts of the Petrograd garrison would have fought on the side of the Revolution. They probably would soon have been isolated and defeated.

That is why the Russian reactionary groups are perfectly right to hold the Duma leaders responsible for the success of the Revolution. It would be wrong and not honorable for the moderate elements of the Duma to deny their share of responsibility now that the revolutionary movement has taken to the path which they could not foresee and were unable to approve and to follow. On the other hand, it is also not right on the part of the extremists to minimize or to deny at all the rôle of the Duma in what they consider to be their Revolution.

After the glorious days of the "bloodless" Revolution of March, there followed another Revolution which cannot be called national. For all purposes, this second stage of the Revolution, the Bolshevist revolution of November 7, 1917, was opposed to the former one. It claimed to be international, as its basic principle was a universal uprising of one single class, the working men, the "proletarians," against all governments and all other social classes, all over the world. Russia was to be used only as a stepping stone for that universal conflagration. The "communist" doctrine of the Bolshevist revolution was a combined product of Marx' theory, Mr. Lenin's comment on it and the latest syndicalist teachings: i.e., it was also preéminently inter-
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Moreover, the chief leaders of the Bolshevist revolution had just come back to Russia from abroad, from Geneva, Paris, London, New York, and they knew much more about the international socialist movement than about Russian realities.

On the face of it, the Bolshevist revolution of November 7 seemed to be too much Utopian, to be able to succeed. How could Russia,—an economically backward country, which only a few decades before had entered its industrial stage, and which still remained essentially agricultural,—how could such a country be converted to socialism? Should it really happen, would it not be equivalent to a refutation of Marx' doctrine? According to Marx, only such countries which have passed through the stage of capitalism, in its most developed form, can be lifted to a "communist" stage.

We shall see later on, that the Bolsheviks knew all these arguments perfectly well. But we shall also see that they never intended to introduce communism in Russia. The November revolution was to be a revolution not for Russia's sake, but for the sake of the world revolution. Russia was a means, not an aim in itself. Accordingly, the Bolsheviks only wished to make use of Russia for the period necessary to start revolutionary outbreaks in real capitalistic countries. They did not think that period would last long, and their only ambition, in the beginning, was to beat the record of the Paris Commune of 1871. However, the reality defeated all forecasts. The "communist" revolution of November, 1917, proved a much greater success than the national revolution of March. The last of the four governments of the national Revolution was overthrown after eight months' duration. The Bolsheviks
government has now lasted for more than four years. How is it possible that the revolution which seemed by everybody failed so soon while the extremist, the Utopian, the class revolution appears to be so lasting?

A complete answer will be given in the course of these chapters. But I must warn the reader right now not to be misled by their Bolshevik slogans. The "communist" revolution of November, 1917, is only a part of a long and complicated process. No "communism" was inaugurated by it in Russia, and the Bolsheviks themselves had to adapt themselves to Russian realities in order to be able to exist. It was the continuation of the general process of revolution which was secured by the Bolshevik victory: it was only a new stage which was thus opened. Accordingly, it is not the surface change of Governments, and not even the change in their tactics, but the continuity of that great principal stream of revolutionary transformation of Russia which is really important and which must draw our particular attention.

It is not only a struggle between leaders of political parties, between their programs and methods, that we are now passing through in Russia. It is a real revolution.

The psychology of all real revolutions is the same. They develop from comparatively moderate to more advanced and extreme tendencies, as soon as the movement passes from the leading groups to unorganized masses. A revolution is not only a dramatic overthrow of a central Government. It is a process, a changing state of mind in large social layers, and it takes time for this process to take root and to pass through all its stages. As long as that internal process in the social
organism has not run its inevitable course, the revolution is bound to last and to develop. The natural end of the process is—the realization of the claims and desires put forward by the masses and left without satisfaction by the social and political forces which are destroyed in the process of revolutionary struggle.

There exists a sort of instinctive fear on the part of the masses, lest a revolution finish too early. They feel it may prove abortive if the victory is won by the moderate elements alone. Whatever be the names or the programs of the political parties, the masses in the state of revolution always choose for their mouthpiece those who propose the most extreme solutions. On the contrary, such groups as intend to stop the revolution short of this mark, and thus seem to preclude the prospects of its possible achievements, soon become suspected of "counter-revolutionary" feelings and are thrown aside by a revolutionary movement in progress.

However, certain incentives are necessary to bring that revolutionary psychology in motion. The first impression concerning the Russian Revolution is that there were in Russia no such motives for the revolutionary movement to evolve, as we find them in the great French Revolution. To begin with, there was no struggle for or against the royal power. The Tsar abdicated at once, and his successor refused to ascend the throne pending the decision of the Constituent Assembly. There was thus no actual struggle for or against the prerogative, as was the case under the Constituent Assembly of the French Revolution. Such political groups as remained monarchists kept silent and did not take part in the movement. All parties—
even conservative ones—which were working in the limelight of politics, became formally Republican. Again, there was no fear of foreign invasion, no fear of outsiders who might come and join hands with the hidden monarchist groups, as was the case under the National Assembly and the Convention. There were no emigrants to insist on foreign intervention. All this appeared after November, under the class Revolution, and it explains the continuation of the process during the past four years. But in its first stage the "bloodless" Russian Revolution had no visible enemy, either "internal" or "external."

And yet, in spite of all that, there were certain groups to which the term "counter-revolutionary" was already applied. The danger of a "counter-revolution" in Russia was used as a pretext for pushing to the front the so-called "revolutionary democracy." Was it a fictitious enemy, an imaginary danger? Was it a mere invention of the demagogues, in order to frighten the masses? Or was the danger real?

In order to answer these questions, let us analyze the situation as it was between the two Revolutions of March and of November. There were three groups particularly active on the revolutionary stage:

1. The "bourgeois' parties, represented chiefly by the advanced groups of the Duma, by the more conservative commercial and industrial group, and, at the background, by some military organizations with a tendency to reaction.

2. The moderate socialists, divided in two currents: the agrarian socialists (Social-Revolutionaries) and the proletarian socialists (Social-Democrats of the Marxist type), the so-called "Mensheviks."

3. The international extremists, working for the world revolution, the so-called "Bolsheviks"; and some few Social-Revolutionaries of the extreme left wing.
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The first two groups, in the process of the struggle which was now going on, fell victims of their moderation—and also of their internal contradictions. The third group—the Bolshevist—was much more consistent with itself, and much more accessible for the popular understanding, and it finally won the game.

What were the contradictions under which the Duma groups labored? In the first place, there was the contradiction between the great reputation the Duma enjoyed in the country,—and which made it play a prominent part at the beginning of the Revolution,—and its real political insignificance. The fourth Duma was elected in 1912 under a very strong electoral pressure of the Government, whose aim was to form a majority ready to restore autocracy. This aim was not attained, and the Duma had no governmental majority. But at the same it did not have any other majority. The reputation for liberalism was won by the opposition minority alone and it did not correspond to the general spirit of the House. The Duma as a whole was thus unable to lead the Revolution. At the moment of the revolutionary outbreak, on that very day of March 11,—and without any connection whatever with the Revolution,—the Duma was prorogued by order of the Tsar. Contrary to the accepted legend, the Duma never intended to stay. It obeyed the order. The Duma's Committee, which had been selected on that day and which a couple of days later nominated the first Provisional Government, had not been chosen at a formal meeting of the Duma, acting as an institution. The election took place at an informal meeting which met privately in a room contiguous to the "White Hall" of regular sessions. Thus, the Provisional Government took its sanction not from
any legal authority of pre-Revolutionary times, but from Revolution. In a certain sense, this strengthened its power while it was functioning. But it also made it dependent on other manifestations, however irregular, of the "popular will." The Duma itself ceased to exist, as a political agent, from the moment of its prorogation. Its members did not resign their mandates, which expired in due time, in the autumn of 1917; but they only held a few private meetings, and their written declaration had no influence on the events.

After the disappearance of the Duma, the only "bourgeois" party which continued to exist was the Party of the People's Freedom (Constitutional-Democrats or Cadets). The Party was democratic and had its following among the burgesses and the peasants in Northeastern Russia (free from the institution of serfdom, which in other parts of Russia was abolished only in 1861). But, as a matter of fact, no real democratic party could possibly exist in Russia under the sham constitutional régime of 1907-1917. All requisites for organizing the masses were lacking. Autocracy is thus greatly responsible for the absence of good political guidance, and, as a result, for the chaotic and elemental development of the revolutionary process. All political parties, either bourgeois or socialistic were equally handicapped in their attempts to reach and to instruct the popular masses. The Constitutional-Democratic Party (which declared itself Republican in May, 1917) was chiefly composed of intellectuals and enjoyed great moral authority. Most of the "bourgeois" ministers of the four provisional Governments between March and November belonged to that Party. They worked in a coalition with moderate socialists—especially, the agrarian socialists (Social-Revolution-
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aries). Of course, there was nothing "counter-revolutionary" about them. But the masses which now were coming to the forefront did not know them. They confounded them with other "bourgeois" groups of the Duma and were quite prepared to believe extremist demagogues who called them "capitalists" and "imperialists." The very fact of their participation in the revolutionary Cabinets was sufficient to discredit the Government in the eyes of the masses.

But there were other reasons which made the task of the demagogues still easier. The "Cadets" wanted the great changes in the social and political life of Russia which were looked for by the masses to be enacted in a legal way, by regular legislation passed by a legally summoned Constituent Assembly. It was, however, not easy to prepare for elections on the new basis of universal suffrage in such a country as Russia. The "Cadets" found it necessary, for technical as well as for political reasons, to postpone general elections until local elections for new democratic organs of provincial self-government (the renewed "Zemstvos") had taken place on the same principle of universal suffrage. This was the only way to secure the controlling machine for really free and democratic elections. But under the conditions of growing mistrust and excitement, on the basis of social hatred fomented by the demagogues, it was really dangerous thus to postpone the session of the Constituent Assembly. The masses were unwilling to wait for its decisions on such capital questions as agrarian reform, or workingmen's control of factories. The revolutionary groups did not want to wait for the Constituent Assembly to decide upon the form of Government. It was easy to declare "counter-revolutionary" every one who was suspected of desiring
the postponement of such decisions. And it was a mistake on the part of the moderate groups not to pay enough attention to the consequences of their conscientious but dilatory methods.

I do not know whether I must call a "mistake" another feature of moderate tactics, which proved still more dangerous. I mean their views on War and Foreign Politics. They wanted the war to be carried to the end in agreement with the Allies. They thought it dishonest and mean to think of separate peace, and they knew that they were unable to persuade the Allies to conclude a "peace without victory." This proved to be the weakest point in the program of the Provisional Governments. Russia was reaching the limit of weariness and exhaustion. Even before the Revolution the Army had become impatient and unwilling to fight any longer. After the Revolution a new incentive was added for the soldiers to go back to their homes as soon as they could. Rumor had it that partition of the land was to be the first result of a democratic and really popular revolution. The soldier—who was also a peasant—would not wait for the solution of his special problem, not only until the Constitu-
tional Assembly met; he would not wait at all, fearing lest his neighbor in the village return first and profit by his absence in order to take the best-lots and more than his share. At any cost, he had to be back for the moment of partition—a moment longed for by so many generations of his ancestors.

To be sure, it meant expecting too much from the degree of civic education of the Russian peasant—to ask him first to fight on to the bitter end, with the risk of being killed, and then to await the decision of a Constituent Assembly on that momentous question of
land. He readily believed his “true” friends who told him to stop fighting, because it was the French and British “capitalists” and “imperialists” who wanted him to shed Russian blood for their colonies. From the other side of the front he heard the same thing repeated by Russian newspapers printed in Berlin and smuggled into the Russian trenches. German soldiers in front of him treated him to Russian “vodka” and German “schnaps,” and they invited him to fraternize and to make peace directly, at that very point of the front, and then go home instead of allowing himself to be shot at the very moment when the long expected lot of land was waiting for him in his village.

On the contrary, the “capitalist” and “bourgeois” ministers declared themselves faithful to the Allied agreements and forced him to fight on. He now knew who were his friends and his enemies, how to choose between them and whom to follow.

Before I speak of the attitude of the second group of moderate socialists, let us look at the other pole of Russian political life: that third group of Russian extremists who were ready to make use of this state of mind of the Russian soldier, which they had long before foreseen. Since 1905 and 1906—the years of the first Russian Revolution—they were always on the alert for some new war to come, in order to repeat their experiment that had failed. International socialism was then planning a universal international strike in the event of a declaration of war. Such also were the decisions of the international congresses at Stuttgart, in 1907, and at Basel, in 1912. But there was a small group of revolutionary internationalists which decided to go further than this. This group included Russian revolutionaries who had fled from Russia after the
failure of their first attempt to revolutionize Russia: both Lenin and Trotsky. Lenin's personal view was that the "revolutionary vanguard" which was generally expected to abolish the State in order to promote communism, had rather preserve State institutions and use them as a ready weapon of violence and repression. Instead of resorting to problematic strikes, Lenin's scheme was to immediately take the State power in the hands of the proletariat and to hasten the advent of socialism by means of the State machinery.

War was included in that scheme, not as an incidental agent, but as its necessary component part. According to the doctrine, war was sure to come, as a consequence of the normal working of the capitalist system. War had to create what they called a "revolutionary situation." It remained for the socialists to make use of that revolutionary situation in order to transform war in the trenches, between the states, into international civil war between the classes.

At the very beginning of the World War, in 1914, this scheme was formally discussed in Lenin's Swiss organ, *The Social-Democrat*. At the same time Trotsky and Martov, in Paris, took part in similar discussions of a small circle which met every evening at a small shop called "Librairie du Travail." All the future leaders of French extremism were there: Monette, Guilbeaux, Rosmer, the poet Martinet, Merrheim. The group felt rather isolated amidst the first outbreaks of national feeling, which found its political expression in the "Sacred Union" of the socialists with the bourgeois parties. But they were very proud of having remained faithful to the pure doctrine in the midst of the collapse of the "Second International." "A kind of grim satisfaction remained to us," one of them said, "to be
the first men in Paris who belonged to a future International... At this small hearth the spark of Zimmerwald was kindled."

And, indeed, this was the modest beginning of the Third International of Moscow. Not only such "social patriots" as voted military credits and entered war cabinets were severely denounced by the new current, even people like Kautsky—the so-called "center"—were branded as traitors to the cause of socialism. A new International was to be formed only of such groups—however small—as would follow the lead of Lenin and obey his orders.

Thus, Lenin knew perfectly well what he was out for when he first came to Russia through Germany in April, 1917. He was probably one of the few to know it and to have in his mind a cut and dried scheme of what was to be accomplished with the aid of the Russian Revolution.

Let us now come back to the second, the intermediate group between the "bourgeois" and the extremist. Clearness of view was not exactly its distinctive feature. This intermediate current was composed of two moderate socialist groups: chiefly of the Social-Revolutionaries, whose spokesman was Kerensky, and of the Social-Democrats (Mensheviks), led by the Georgian Deputy Tsereteli. They knew and openly admitted that a socialist society could not evolve from the revolutionary movement. They agreed that the only aim realizable for the moment, was a stabilized democracy in the form of a bourgeois Republic. On this fundamental point they shared the opinion of the bourgeois parties. That is why up to the end they wished—and they succeeded—to retain the power in the hands of a coalition of moderate socialist and advanced bourgeois
parties. But, on the other hand, they were unable to break definitely with their extremist fellow-socialists, and at all crucial moments, they felt themselves closer to them than to their "Cadet" colleagues. From the very beginning of the Revolution they fell under the influence of the extremist slogans—sometimes even without knowing their real purport. For example, they called themselves Zimmerwaldians. But they by no means were willing to join in the aim of transforming the war in the trenches into a civil war. They wanted an immediate peace to come, and they severely criticized the "imperialist" aims of the "capitalist" Allied Governments. At the same time they ranged themselves with the "socialist patriotic" ministers of the Allied cabinets, like Albert Thomas, and they even were induced by the latter to "persuade" the demoralized Russian army to start on an offensive.

Again, they did not wish to give "all power to the Soviets," which was then the Bolshevist slogan. But, on the other hand, they had to recognize themselves responsible before the Soviets, as revolutionary organs, where their parties were represented. They thus contributed to the weakening of the Provisional Governments of which they were members. They claimed to belong to the "revolutionary democracy"—a vague term which embraced such groups as were considered true to the Revolution. At the same time, they were brought to search for allies in the "bourgeois" ranks, which were considered by that same "revolutionary democracy" as being hopelessly "counter-revolutionary." They relied upon the Constituent Assembly to decide all fundamental questions put forward by the process of Revolution. On the other hand, they obediently followed in the trail of events which anticipated these
decisions. They thus officially proclaimed Russia a Republic, and they largely contributed—in a semi-official way—to the passage of the landed estates from the nobles to the peasants by encouraging a matter-of-fact expropriation which was covered by the euphemistic term "creating new revolutionary law by the people."

The extremists made ample use of all these inconsistencies and contradictions. The moderate socialists pretended to speak and to act in the name of the people. Their extremist opponents appealed directly to the masses. They accused the moderate socialists of making common cause with the "bourgeoisie" and the "capitalists." It was enough for a socialist minister to talk reason and common sense, to be accused of treason towards the people. Irresponsible critics were free to make unrealizable promises and thus to outbid their ministerial colleagues. Very soon the moderate socialists began to realize the success of the Bolshevist demagoguery by increasing defections from their own ranks. Gradually they lost ground in the Soviets and the Committees of the Petrograd workingmen and soldiers. They had to retreat, and they transferred their headquarters to the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Conference of the Soviets, where provincial groups which had remained more moderate than the population of the capital city were represented. But the enemy found his way even there, and, as a last refuge, the moderate socialists resorted to a selection of provincial deputies from the newly created democratic Zemstvos and Municipalities. This was the so-called "Democratic Conference," which also proved vacillating and uncertain.

The socialist retreat was keenly observed by the ex-
tremists, who were soon encouraged to try decisive blows. As early as mid-July, 1917, they made their first attempt at an uprising in Petrograd. It failed owing to the help which the moderate socialists received from the army detachments, speedily sent from the front. But then it became clear that the final decision lay with the army, and not with representative assemblies which served as a substitute for the Constituent Assembly. The Bolsheviks paid special attention to and made efforts to win, the Petrograd garrison, while at the same time the moderate socialists quarrelled with the army. Thenceforth their fate and the fate of moderate revolution was sealed.

For the soldiers Kerensky, the War Minister, was an "imperialist" who forced them to shed their blood for the Allies. And they answered his attempts to lead them against the enemy with a disgraceful retreat. On the other hand, for the officers Kerensky was a weakling and a Utopian who precluded the possibility of creating a strong revolutionary power and thus imperiled the further existence of the Russian State. They wanted a dictator, and they found their dictator in the person of General Kornilov. Non-socialist groups, which saw the approaching danger of a final blow by the extremists, also wished to prevent it with the aid of the sound elements of the army. They understood only too well that the danger was not to be conjured away by mere speeches and resolutions. Under certain conditions—the first and the most important was to make common front against the extremists—the Revolution might still have been saved from its own excesses. The choice was free for a time between Kornilov and Lenin. Unfortunately, no common front proved to be possible from Kerensky to
Kornilov, and by a sort of subconscious instinct the masses—because it was the masses that decided—chose Lenin.

The Kornilov movement, which wound up in an insurrection against the Government, for the first time revealed the existence of the real counter-revolutionary groups. A movement which could only win as a national movement, took the shape of a secret conspiracy led by adventurous personalities and backed by certain reactionary organizations. As a result, the story of Lafayette and Dumouriez repeated itself in Russia. Kornilov's attempt was finally repudiated even by his adherents and sympathizers. Instead of strengthening the Revolutionary power, it weakened the central non-socialist groups, isolated the Government and paved the way for the Bolshevist coup d'état.

The Bolsheviks now prepared quite openly for a new stroke, in the face of a passive Government. At the decisive moment, there were found only some hundreds of young men from military schools and women of the patriotic "shock" battalion, to defend the ministers in the Winter Palace. Then generals at the front refused their help to Kerensky and 500 Cossacks of General Krasnov tried in vain to bring him back to Petrograd. Everybody else kept quiet and the Bolsheviks won an easy victory.

However, a victory in Petrograd did not yet mean the victory in Russia. The real sanction of the Bolshevik coup lay in the fact that Bolshevism at the moment of its victory practically met with no resistance, with the exception of a few days' fighting in Moscow and the opposition it met with in the land of the Don Cossacks, in Southeastern Russia. The
leaders of the army, partly the same men who readily acknowledged the March Revolution, after a few moments of hesitation declared themselves on the side of the Bolsheviks. Of course, they were forced to do so through fear of being killed by their soldiers. But, at the same time, they somehow felt satisfied to see Kornilov's defeat avenged. Many of them thought that the Bolshevik régime would not last long and the time would soon come to settle their accounts with the Russian Revolution in general. The real counter-revolutionary elements thus detached themselves from the "bourgeois" democracy at the very moment when this democracy was forced to yield to the tyranny of a few. It was not the first time that the two extremes, the Red and the Black, came together and seemed better to understand each other than their opponents from the moderate center. Mr. Lenin is said to have often repeated, that in the event of being forced to go, he would rather surrender to restored autocracy than to a bourgeois republic, i.e., to stabilized democracy.

Our explanation of such conditions in Russia as made the Bolshevik victory unavoidable would not be complete should we fail to mention the internal situation in Russia, created by war and revolution. Russia was made ripe for the Bolshevik domination by its process of internal dissolution, which preceded the Bolshevik coup. I shall not dwell on the state of general exhaustion and slackening of moral and civil discipline, which is an outstanding feature of the post-war situation in all the belligerent countries. Let us rather have a look at the specifically Russian phenomena created by the Revolution.

This internal dissolution reflected itself first in the
complete destruction of all pre-revolutionary authorities. From the very first days of the March Revolution all functionaries of the former Tsarist administration simply disappeared, beginning with the upper ranks and down to the lowest. An attempt was made by Prince Lvov, the Premier and Minister of the Interior, to let the men from the Zemstvos take the places of these functionaries. But during the last period of the self-defense of the autocracy, the composition of these organs of Russian self-government had very much deteriorated, especially after the reactionary electoral reform of 1890, which gave all power to the local squires. From then on, the masses had not made much distinction between the Zemstvo men and the Tsar's officials: to them they were equally bad, and sometimes even worse than bureaucrats. That is why, this new personnel of the local administrations had very soon to yield to the "Soviets" or other self-appointed organs of the "revolutionary democracy," whose composition and functions were matters of their own choice.

They were like as many small republics, each acting at their own will. Unity of direction was completely lacking. The direct result was that the whole machinery of communications broke down at once, and it immediately reflected itself in the regularity of supplying the army at the front, which even before that time had been far from being in good order. Very soon the cities and towns also began to suffer from a shortage of food. Cases of real famine began to appear. The only resource left was to send special committees to the grain- and cattle-exporting provinces of Russia, in order to buy food at the source. Private persons followed the lead of public institutions, and soon all
trains were packed beyond their utmost capacity with a new type of passengers, nicknamed "sack-bearers" and "speculators."

But this was only a prelude. The real disaster broke out when soldiers began to desert from the front. It had always been a puzzle to the military authorities how to demobilize these millions of peasants without destroying communications and endangering the peace and order of the local population. Now a matter-of-fact demobilization began without any general scheme or measures of precaution. The deserters went in crowds. They took possession of trains, evicted regular passengers, traveled on roofs and platforms, forced railway officials under menace of death to break all traffic regulations, with the greatest danger for themselves. Or they went on foot in bands, ravaging and destroying everything on their way. Very often they chose for the objects of their raids stores of alcohol, preserved from the pre-war State monopoly. They then joined hands with the peasants, and helped them to burn their landowners' country houses and farms, to ransack their property, to partition their land. In the towns they helped the throng to break shops and seize stores of food, to search houses of well-to-do people or of some suspected "bourgeois." Now and then such incursions took the form of anti-Semitic pogroms.

The workingmen, the "proletarians," did not stay in the background. They claimed their share of profit from the democratic revolution. As a result of the "military socialism" created by the War in Russia, as elsewhere, the workingmen were accustomed to high wages based on Government orders for munitions and other products of new or increased war industry. They claimed in wages more than they produced in manu-
factured goods. The State had to pay for everything. The proprietors of concerns were remunurcated with new orders paid in advance in increased prices. The village also grew rich with paper money, printed and paid in abundance for agricultural products.

All this apparent prosperity was based on an emergency budget. Extraordinary income (from loans and other operations of credit) surpassed by far ordinary receipts from taxes, which were paid most irregularly. The population thus grew accustomed to living at the expense of the State. That kind of "State Socialism" served as a suitable introduction to the Bolshevist fantastic finance. Along with the Allied loans, the printing press was already being used in steadily increasing figures. The inflated currency reflected itself immediately in the rise of prices, which in its turn was responsible for new claims for increased wages and new subsidies.

In a word, at the moment when the Bolshevist coup d'état took place, in November, 1921, Russia was ready for Bolshevism. The situation was so bad that, in everybody's opinion, it could not be made worse by any new change. On the contrary, a change was looked for by the population as a chance for improvement.

We now can understand why a sort of sanction was given to the Bolshevist coup d'état in Petrograd by the passive attitude of a suffering population. A young shepherd found using his landlord's field as a pasture for the village cattle, summed up the state of affairs in a brief saying. He was asked by his landlord's manager, why he permitted himself to trespass on other people's property. "Well," he answered, "we now have equal rights" ("teper ravnopraviye"). He evidently understood it in the sense of J. J. Rousseau's primitive
state of nature. Ancient law was abolished by the new right of Revolution. No new law was there to take its place, and no legal authority was present to enact that new law. "Equal rights" were to last until a new social compact was entered into by the community and a new social will was created.

Let us now see what was that new social compact, proposed by the Communist Party as the last word of Social Science.
CHAPTER III.

THE BOLSHEVIST REGIME.

I have come to a subject which is much more in dispute than anything I spoke of in my first two chapters. The Bolshevist régime has been so often described by eye-witnesses from different and even opposite viewpoints, that the general public has gone astray and does not know whom and what to believe. People have had to choose between severe exposures of Bolshevism by observers who were by some suspected of "counter-revolutionary" and reactionary tendencies, and glowing pictures of a new life for a regenerated humanity, largely spread by the Bolshevist propagandists.

However, as time went on, the real facts in the situation had to take the place of gloomy forebodings or brilliant prospectives. During its four years of existence, the Bolshevist régime has had every chance to assert itself and to carry the social experiment, unique in the history of mankind, up to its last consequences. We now have that chapter of the story almost complete. We can trace Bolshevism from its origin, through its development, to its decline, which is now recognized by the Bolsheviks themselves. They would tell you, of course, that this is not yet the end, but only a respite, after which the experiment shall be renewed under better conditions. You may agree or disagree with this new prediction. But there can be no more doubt as to the past.
Let us now study Bolshevism in its past, as a living reality, not as a "promised land." I purposely use the word "Bolshevism," and not "communism," which is what Mr. Lenin wished his experiment to be called. "Communism" is an international doctrine; "Bolshevism" is a Russian achievement. The Russian peasants noted that distinction very well, as shown by their war cry: "Long live Bolshevism, but down with communism." They knew that "Bolshevism" was giving them the land, while "communism" wished to take that land back for collective use. They were for a time satisfied with the Bolsheviks' policy, but they loathed their Utopian doctrine.

The Bolshevik leaders also realized that difference perfectly well. As I have said before, they never expected to make Russia "communist." They were too clever for that and they knew their country too well. "Communism" was reserved for the next stage—that of world revolution, and for more advanced industrial countries. In Russia they were satisfied to remain Bolshevik, in order to keep in power until that second stage should come, and to use Russia's enormous resources and state machinery in order to hasten the advent of that World Revolution. This also explains why these uncompromising fanatics of doctrine were always ready—not only now—for any compromise necessary to keep them in power in Russia. "Communism" was for the World. For Russia a "preparatory stage" was quite sufficient.

You will never understand Bolshevism unless you look at it in the light of this commentary. But I must show you that this commentary is not my own. This is practically the main point of Lenin's special teaching.
This is where he goes further in his tactics than his predecessors, the revolutionary syndicalists and the revolutionary socialists of the second decade of the XX Century.

It was also always the main point of difference between Lenin and his Russian fellow-socialists. They taught that socialism was to come automatically, by itself, as a result of the gradual economic growth of capitalism. Lenin opposed to these "economist" followers of Marx the political and the revolutionary side of Marx's and Engels' doctrine. According to him, political revolution alone was able to accelerate the advent of socialism. To the usual arguments that the working masses were not prepared to make use of a political revolution for introducing socialism, Lenin found a ready answer in George Sorel's new doctrine of "violence." You need not wait long enough to get the masses quite prepared for socialism. Just take the lead now, directly, and start the attack with a few people who are already conscious of their class interests and who are prepared to act. There is nothing like action; action for the action's sake; "violence" practiced by a small vanguard of daring adventurers, in order to keep alive the revolutionary spirit in the masses left behind. Let us go out for direct action, whatever be the momentary practical result of it. This was the so-called "catastrophic conception" of the advent of socialism. Lenin accepted it but he proved much more consistent than the originators of that doctrine. Sorel and his friends thought it would be an international and general political strike which would bring about the dawn of socialism. But the political strike was long in coming, and Sorel himself called a "social myth," an object of faith rather than a practical scheme
to be realized at once. Lenin was too impatient to be satisfied with that indefinite upkeep of revolutionary spirit. He wanted his action now, to attain a definite purpose. Of course, he was also forced to adapt his program to the vicissitudes of the "revolutionary situation." In 1901 and even in 1905 he did not expect his political revolution to realize any other immediate result aside from building in Russia a bourgeois democratic republic. He declared himself, accordingly, ready to fight at the side of the bourgeois politicians and to enter a coalition government formed after the revolutionary success. It was at that stage that I personally came to know Lenin—a stubborn debater and a slow-thinking scholar as I found him to be. In 1917 his ambitions had grown immensely. He still thought that nothing beyond a preliminary stage to a socialist millennium could be achieved by a revolutionary overthrow. He knew and he often repeated that a revolution in Russia would stand and fall with a revolution in Europe, as no "communist" State could exist in the midst of a capitalistic world. But he seemed to earnestly believe that the more advanced capitalistic States of Western Europe were now ripe for a social revolution and that if only Russia would take the lead, a world revolution would follow directly. The Red Press in Bolshevist Russia had for years been spreading news about some revolutionary outbreak in Berlin, or in London, or in Paris. I think the first psychological shock which Lenin received on the subject came when half-confidently, half-mockingly, he asked Mr. H. G. Wells, while the latter was in Petrograd, just why the revolution in England was so slow in coming, and the skeptical Epicurean laughed in his face, telling him how things really stood. But even then he was not
quite disillusioned, as shown by his famous twenty-one points—or rather orders—to his fellow-communists all over the world, to stand aloof from all traitors to the cause of the socialist world-revolution and to keep their powder dry. Whatever be the case with Lenin's idealism, so far as other countries are concerned, his realistic view of the situation in Russia is very well proven by his tactics. He might well build his castles in the air elsewhere, but in Russia he wanted them to be built on the solid rock of old, good autocratic tradition. This was another, the "Bolshevist" side of Lenin's "communism," and these are the moorings on which the Bolshevist régime was to be fastened.

It would be a mistake to think that Lenin's concessions to reality are due to his recent disappointments. They lie at the very root of his tactics. Just before his triumph in Russia, in August and September, 1917, Lenin wrote a book, "The State and Revolution," wherein his political realism is shown at its best. Let us stop a moment at that other side of the picture.

Says Lenin: "The State, according to Marx" (he will always tell you that he is the only true interpreter of Marx's doctrine), "is the organ of class domination, the organ of oppression of one class by another." Well, then, why not use that 'organ of oppression' for the benefit of another class, against the 'oppressors'? "The advance-guard of the proletariat, capable of assuming the power and leading the whole community to socialism needs the State, the centralized organization of force and violence, both for the purpose of crushing the resistance of the exploiters and for the purpose of guiding the great mass of the population." To be sure, this view of the State precludes any "sentimental" application to political life of the ideas of democracy and
freedom. This is just not political life, but political struggle, and the State is only needed as a temporary instrument of struggle. "We are not Utopians," Mr. Lenin proudly asserts. "We want the Socialist Revolution with human nature as it is now. Human nature itself cannot do without subordination. . . . There must be submission to the armed (the 'conscious' vanguard is bound to be 'armed') vanguard" . . . until the "people will grow accustomed to observing the elementary conditions of social existence without force and without subjection." This period will be very long indeed, as you see, as long as human nature will not change from what "it is now." In the meanwhile, the consequence is quite clear. "As the State is only a transitional institution which we are obliged to use in the revolutionary struggle in order to forcibly crush our opponents, it is a pure absurdity to speak of a Free People's State. During the period when the proletariat still needs the State, it does not require it in the interests of freedom, but in the interests of crushing its antagonists." To "crush the antagonists,"—this is the principal aim of the "proletarian dictatorship," an aim to be attained at any cost. The program of using up the State machinery in the first line is not constructive, but merely destructive.

However, before crushing antagonists, you must win followers and adherents. What cannot be done by fear and terrorism must be attained by promises and concessions. And, again, promises and concessions have nothing to do with the realization of the "communist" doctrine. But they have very much to do with coming into power and keeping themselves in power.

We know that the Bolsheviks owe their initial success to their wanton demagogy. Once in power, they
had to fulfil their promises. They had to immediately grant every social group whose support they wanted everything that group wished,—and to give it in the most palpable form. They did it very adroitly, and they did not stop to think whether it was "communist" or not.

Peace to the Army, land to the peasants, control of the factories to the workmen. Peace, land and control were also promised by their antagonists. But the army had to wait for the Allies' decision to make peace. The peasant had to wait for the decision of the Constituent Assembly, to take the land. The workmen had to share their control with the State authorities. Then came the Bolsheviks who said, in the crudest form possible: "Take it now." To the soldiers they said, in substance, in their Decree of November 10, 1917: "Just meet the Germans at any place on the front and conclude the armistice on your own account." To the peasants they said, in their Decree of November 7: "Do not wait for the Constituent Assembly to decide; realize immediately what you had decided at the Peasants' Congress in June." To the workingmen they said, in their Decree of November 14: "Just go to the owners and to the managers of this, your factory and tell them that you are given the right to run the concern." The immediate result was that the soldiers, peasants and workmen were introduced to Bolshevism under its most agreeable form and recognized the Bolshevist government as representing their own interests.

This result was also foreseen by Lenin. There exists another pamphlet of his, written at the same time as the one quoted, and published under a very characteristic title: "Will the Bolshevist Power (they had not yet taken possession of the power) Be Lasting?"
nin’s point was that the looked-for Bolshevist victory could not be otherwise than lasting, because it was to be the victory of the rank and file, and everybody had to be made to understand just what his personal share in the victory was. “Well,” he said, “under this condition, we shall have at once millions and tens of millions of defenders.” Among other methods proposed, he then promised the lower social strata in Petrograd that they would be put in the houses and apartments of the rich bourgeoisie, who were to be directly evicted or confined to single rooms. That also was not new and not at all invented by Lenin himself. It is at the same time interesting to note that such methods of “unlawful direct action” met with opposition in advance, on the part of the socialists themselves. I may quote from a letter addressed to America by the German socialist leader and thinker, Kautsky—Lenin’s worst enemy—as early as 1912, in which Kautsky said: “To preach individual struggle against property means to turn the interest of the workers from mass action to individual action,” which is contrary “to the moral ideas of the masses” and “will repel them and injure the propaganda of socialism seriously.” But this was just what Lenin was doing.

Promises and intimidation, intimidation and promises: we will often have to come back to these alternate tactics of that Janus of Russian Bolshevism. You may also take it as a provisional answer to the question as to why the Bolsheviks have lasted so long in power. The provisional answer is: they came to power by promises; they have kept in power by fear.

But is that all? Did they not do or try anything in order to introduce some kind of communism in Russia? They certainly did. Of course, not at once, because
for the first weeks and months after their victory they were busy “crushing their opponents.” To remain alone in the field, they had to disperse competing political parties and dissolve institutions which claimed to represent democracy. On November 17, i.e., ten days after their victory, they dissolved the democratic Municipality of Petrograd. On January 6, 1918, they dissolved a much more important institution: the first Russian Constituent Assembly, which had been the object of the struggles and hopes, the symbol of the People’s sovereignty for so many generations of Russian Revolutionaries. They did not wish to hear about universal suffrage, another object of revolutionary creed of former generations. For a revolutionary ear in Russia it sounded like blasphemy. But the Bolsheviks sneered at intellectual superstitions. They had nothing to do with parliamentary institutions and political democracy.

As soon as they overcame their first difficulties, the Bolsheviks began publishing “communist” decrees. They did not yet know whether they would remain in power. But so much the more important was it for them to leave traces of their communist legislation. However, here they immediately met with a serious obstacle. The State they took possession of was, as we have seen, disintegrating. The Russian economy, which was supposed to represent a high stage of capitalism, to be directly transformed into communism, was thoroughly ruined. Even if the Bolsheviks really wished to introduce communism otherwise than on paper, they were face to face with the necessity of reconstructing the administrative machine and restoring the sources of production.

But these were contradictory and conflicting designs.
To strengthen their State power meant to postpone or to renounce communist experiments. To try communist experiments in earnest—meant to lose their political power. It was quite clear from the beginning that in the event of being obliged to choose between the two, they would sacrifice their idealistic aim to their realistic tactics: communism to Bolshevism. Let us now trace these two lines of their political conduct. You can guess in advance that, while the idealistic line of "communism" was extremely irresolute and unsteady, the realistic line of "Bolshevism" proved quite firm and straightforward.

Lenin has told us himself what measure of communism he found it possible to introduce at the transitional stage between capitalism and pure communism. This is how this "first or lower stage" of communist society is described in the terms of Marx' doctrine.

"The means of production are now (i. e., at that stage) no longer the private property of individuals. The means of production belong to the whole of society. Every member of society that performs a certain part of socially-necessary labor, receives a certificate from society that he has done such and such a quantity of work. According to this certificate, he receives from the public stores of articles of consumption a corresponding quantity of products. After the deduction of that proportion of labor which goes into the public fund, every worker, therefore, receives from society as much as he has given it." "'He who does not work, neither shall he eat'—this socialist principle is already realized (i. e., at that transitional stage)."

"'For an equal quantity of labor an equal quantity of products'—this socialist principle is also already realized. Nevertheless, this is not yet communism, and
this does not abolish 'bourgeois law,' which gives to unequal individuals in return for an unequal (in reality) amount of work, an unequal quantity of products." "The State is withering away in so far as there are no longer any capitalists, any class whatever to suppress. But the State is not dead altogether, since there still remains the protection of 'bourgeois law,' which sanctifies actual inequality. For the complete extinction of the State—complete communism is necessary."

"Incomplete communism" was thus to be immediately attained. What has been done to introduce the "incomplete communism?" A brief resumé of the salient facts will suffice.

In April, 1918, Lenin was obliged to avow that the process was very slow. He now proposed to take certain preliminary measures to "encircle" capital. Capital—in Bolshevist Russia? Yes, that is so, Lenin stated that the organization of the proletariat was far from being accomplished. The methods resorted to "look much more like methods of conquest than like methods of regular administration." Even the books for controlling the obligatory labor had not yet been introduced. One must proceed slowly and gradually, verifying every step tentatively tried by practical results." And indeed, the Bolsheviks proceeded very timidly. They did not at once attack the principle. They preferred to grapple with its consequences and thus to "encircle" the enemy. They recognized at once that to destroy the bourgeois régime was by far more difficult than to overthrow a bourgeois government.

On the next day after their victory the Bolsheviks published two decrees. One of them disposed of big landed estates, which were to be handed over to local agrarian committees, "pending the decision of the
Constituent Assembly." Another decree ordered the nationalization of banking institutions. The Bolsheviks thus intended to immediately deal a severe blow to unmovable and to movable big property. But they did not abolish private property at all. On the contrary, they left untouched small landed property and permitted the drawing of small sums from current accounts in the banks (1500 rubles monthly).

They proceeded with the same indecision in the question of workmen's control over the factories. They did not wish to nationalize the factories at once. In November, 1918, Lenin said that "socialism cannot be introduced before the working class learns to lead and to assert its authority." He explained by that maxim, why the measures taken in the question just mentioned were "incomplete and contradictory."

Neither did the Bolsheviks make up their mind to immediately abolish private commerce. When, in March, 1918, they were induced to nationalize commerce, it was for a special reason. They were forced to organize the exchange between the villages and the cities, in order to secure regular feeding of the urban population. Already at that time the peasants were unwilling to sell their grain for paper money and asked for manufactured goods. The Bolsheviks were forced to make a step in the direction of the "incomplete communism." In order to revise and to fix local prices of articles, special committees were formed in every town with at least 10,000 population. The existing stocks of merchandise were registered. Trading in manufactured goods was put under control. Thus, step by step, they came, on October 8, 1918, to the final decision to nationalize all domestic trade. All shops, great and small likewise, were closed, and their contents
used for the exchange with the village. However, the cost of the confiscated goods was added to the current account of the owners in the National Bank, and sometimes they were themselves permitted to run their enterprises as officials of the State.

Foreign trade was nationalized at an earlier date, on April 21, 1918, in connection with the signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace, and the commercial fleet was declared national property on February 8, 1918.

It proved more difficult to nationalize the industries, just because of that system of control by the workmen which was conceded by the Bolsheviks directly after their victory. The control was individual, each factory being run by its separate committee of workmen. The result was complete chaos. In some factories workmen's committees coöperated with the former administration and very eagerly defended the interests of private owners. In other cases, they themselves tried to play the part of owners. They everywhere increased their wages enormously, and they worked as long and as much as they pleased. Instead of the eight-hour day, which the Bolsheviks had inherited from the previous revolutionary Governments, the working men remained in the factories for five or four hours of unproductive work.

We shall see in another chapter how the Bolsheviks contrived to enforce the new discipline in the factories. But they were also forced to change entirely the conditions of controlling the national production. Their leading idea was that industry was to be centralized in trusts. Each branch of production was to be organized separately, as a preparatory stage for nationalization. Beginning with February, 1918, they proceeded to create "central" and "principal" boards for every
branch. The number of "Centros" and "Principals" was 15 in March and 51 at the end of the year. The central boards had to provide the raw materials and fuel, to regulate the demand and the sale of goods, fix prices. The "Centros" gradually took the place of the workmen's committees. Subsequently, the leading rôle in the "Centros" themselves was transferred from general assemblies to boards of professionals. Comparatively few of the workmen were permitted to serve in the boards. Their main personnel was composed of trained professional men or such intellectuals as were amenable to the Bolsheviks.

The time had now come for complete nationalization of the factories. But the Bolsheviks still hesitated. Up to August 1, 1918, nationalization was used rather as a means to punish the refractory bourgeois owners and managers than to embark upon a serious social change, leading to communism. Only 567 enterprises were nationalized and 271 sequestrated. The decision arrived at on June 28, 1918, to nationalize all factories, is explained by an incidental motive. The commercial treaty with Germany was being negotiated in Berlin, and, according to the provisions of this treaty, State monopolies were to be left free from treaty dispositions. Mr. Larin, who conducted the negotiations, sent word to Petrograd on June 25, and three days later Russian industry in its entirety was declared to be a State monopoly.

The explanation given in the Decree of June 28, to be sure, was a different one. The Bolsheviks wished "to put an end to the economic disorganization, to the disorder in the distribution of supplies, and to simplify the dictatorship of the workers and the paupers." At the end of 1919, 4,000 concerns with all their property
were declared to belong to the Communist Republic. The President of the National Economic Soviet, Mr. Rykov, stated that it was "all Russian industry."

However, according to the best authorities on the communist doctrine, it was not communism. It was "State capitalism." But further steps towards "incomplete" communism were in sight.

Now that all industry and trade was in the hands of the State, it became not only possible, but even necessary at least to work out some general scheme of production and distribution of commodities, just as had been done in the different capitalistic countries in wartime. A would-be communist State had to go just one step farther and abolish the bourgeois means of exchange: money. The Bolsheviks more than once promised to do it, but they never dared. How could they when paper money was their only means of existence? They had to first build a new network of distributive boards all over the country. And, indeed, a gorgeous scheme was prepared for the Commissariat of Supply to control the exchange and the distribution of commodities. At the end of 1919 the Bolsheviks decided to make use of the free coöperative societies, and in spite of a very strong opposition on the part of the coöperative societies, they gradually transformed them into State institutions, in order to make of them an integral part of their distribution system. The entire population was forced to enter the coöperatives and as early as 1919 Mr. Larin announced the great change to come soon. "The new organization," he said, "is now reaching the stage when it will be possible to put on the order of the day, as a piece of practical policy, the solution of the problem of 'naturalization' of salaries, i. e., paying working men's wages in commodities."
In another chapter I shall tell you what the dismal reality was as compared with these self-confident assertions. As a matter of fact, the only measure really applied to regulating distribution was the extension of ration cards (which had been introduced in Russia, as elsewhere, during the war time) to all other commodities. Under the Bolsheviks this system was diverted to serve purely demagogic aims. The urban population—who alone profited by the system of rationing—was divided into four categories, and the “parasitic” class, i.e., brain workers and “bourgeoisie” were put in the fourth category. They were to receive the minimum of foodstuffs, a real “famine” ration. But gradually that was changed: a new selection was made from professional men who declared themselves willing to serve the Bolsheviks. The Soviet functionaries—a new Red bureaucracy—were transferred to a specially privileged category. At any rate, even the first category rations were quite insufficient. The Bolshevikist statistics show that, e.g., in the winter season of 1919-1920 only 36% of foodstuffs (flour, bread, grain) was received by the urban population through the intermediary of government organs, while 64% had to be supplied by a clandestine free trade. It was still worse with the rank and file workmen who had to rely on other sources than their “natural” part of wages, for nine-tenths of their minimum consumption of food.

However, even in that imperfect form, the Bolshevik system of production, distribution and consumption had to be based on a strongly increased State power. We know that the Bolsheviks inherited the Russian State institutions in an utter state of disintegration. The dissolution had spread as a result of their first concessions and promises. Every province, every dis-
strict, and here and there even cantons or villages now acted as independent republics. Local "soviets" took the place of the former—also irregular—organs of self-government, and of the newly elected democratic Zemstvos. Here and there they even began to call themselves separate States, and they introduced their own legislation, taxation, finance, and even their own military defense, which was especially necessary under the obtaining state of universal chaos.

Facing such a situation, what ought the Bolshevist government to have done? After a few initial doubts and vacillations, it decided to be—as well suited a "revolutionary vanguard of proletarians"—a government by party. But the Communist Party, especially at the beginning, was not at all numerous. Of course, the ranks of the party were soon filled up with newcomers. But these "November Bolsheviks" were not at all reliable. They were—as Trotsky nicknamed them—"radishes," red outside and white inside. Even if we count the latter, the membership of the Bolshevist Party, for the whole of Russia, according to the Bolsheviks themselves, did not exceed 600,000, i.e., one man out of every 200 Russians was a member of the Communist Party. Practically it was much less than that, not more than one in 500 (1/5 of one per cent.). Even the Bolshevist officials were not Communists, in the great majority: e.g., in the large provincial town of Vologda, in 1918, we find for every hundred of local officials only 3 Communists, 37 "sympathizers" (who also could buy food at cheap prices from the Government shop) and 60 "non-party" men. A specially chosen group of representatives from all the chief workmen's unions in Moscow, selected to fetch grain from the villages, consisted of 78 per cent "non-party"
men, 13 "sympathizers" and only 8 per cent Communists (October, 1918). You can see how weak and isolated the Bolsheviks must have felt themselves in the country, in spite of all their triumphs. In order to assert themselves, they had to resort to very strong centralization. And as soon as their first difficulties were over, they entered upon that path. They acted systematically, with much determination and great tenacity of purpose. During the first year of their domination they had already achieved important results. Here we come to the second, the realistic, line of Bolshevik tactics.

To centralize the provincial administration and to bring it into their hands, new administrative local organs were soon created, which gradually took the place of the self-appointed "soviet.s." These bureaucratic organs were called "Executive Committees." They had to control the soviets. But then the soviets themselves must be transformed so as to serve the purposes of the government and the Communist Party. The Soviet Constitution made that quite easy. The famous paragraph 25 of the Constitution gave the right to the administration, in case the activity of some group of working people should be recognized as "dangerous for the Revolution," to deprive that group of their electoral right. It goes without saying that all bourgeois groups were disabled by the Constitution. I came across a curious order sent around to the villages in July, 1918, by the Bolshevik Commissary of the Interior. "The petty bourgeoisie in the villages," the order says (and let us not forget that 85% of the population belong to that "petty bourgeoisie"), "have dared to participate in the elections and even to be elected. They must be immediately arrested and
tried for having violated the Law of the Soviet Constitution.”

These people of the “petty bourgeoisie” are thus neither to be elected, nor to elect. Who then is to be elected? The Bolshevik authorities give a clear answer to that question. Here is another order, issued by the local soviet in the Province of Voronezh: “The right to nominate candidates (to the soviets) belongs exclusively to the groups and parties of electors which will file declarations to the effect that they acknowledge the Soviet authorities.” “All trade unions must file—not later than 4 P. M. on January 20 (1919)—a written declaration to the town soviet stating their relations towards the Soviet authorities.” It means that the “non-party” electors—who, as we have seen, made up (at that time) not less than three-fifths or even three-fourths of the Bolshevik officials—were not considered “politically reliable” enough to run their candidates in the elections.

On the other hand, such political parties as were considered reliable under the Bolshevik domination were few, and their number gradually decreased. Practically, the Communists alone are considered reliable, and official candidates only are admitted for election. Here is an appeal to the workmen of a porcelain factory, addressed to them by a political representative of the 270th Regiment of the Red Army, on the eve of the elections: “Comrades, workingmen! You have a difficult task to solve: to elect such comrades to your Committee as are useful, you have to elect people who are for the soviets. In order not to get into trouble, you must elect only such Communist comrades upon whom we can rely. Comrades! I do not see in the list of candidates any one, besides the following seven
names, who is worthy of being elected (he gives the names). If the Committee should turn out to be composed of other members than these, I will dissolve it immediately, and I shall propose that you proceed to new elections."

It is not always as definite as that, and rarely put down on paper. But that is the substance of all elections under the Bolshevist rule. It is easy to understand why the number of communist delegates, elected to the "soviets" of all degrees, is out of all proportion with their number among the population. It is also quite natural that such kind of elections deprives the soviets of every significance. The result is that the soviets meet rarely and only to approve the decisions of the Executive organs. They have to face accomplished facts. Debates are not formally forbidden, but they take place only on exceptional occasions, and merely the fact of there being a live discussion on a certain subject is already considered a kind of revolt against the Bolshevist authorities.

"All power to the soviets!"—such was the Bolshevist catchword when they had carried out their struggle against the Provisional Government. They now changed it for another slogan: "All power to the Communist Party!" They had been opposing democracy. Now they decided to stifle even socialist parties, with their proletarian following. Mr. Kamenev, a prominent Bolshevist leader, tells us very sincerely what the reason for that change was. "The membership of the Communist Party," he states, "is almost imperceptible if compared with the Russian popular masses. On the other hand, every party needs a certain amount of force to rule a country. That is why we, in Russia, deem it sufficient to have 'the majority of action,' to
keep in power." The Communist Party thus makes no secret of the fact that everything that is being done in Russia, is being done through and by the initiative of the Central Committee of the Party. "All military politics," the Central Committee states in its publication of December 25, 1918, "as well as the politics of all the other ministries and government institutions is being conducted on the basis of orders and precise instructions given by the Communist Party through the channel of its Central Committee and executed under its direct control."

However, it was not sufficient for the "majority of action"—in the hands of an "imperceptible" minority in the country—to rely for their further existence only on the authority they acquired by centralizing their administrative and economic system of government. The only means to keep in power was—armed force. The Bolsheviks knew this quite well and their first maxim for the winning of a communist revolution was always this: "Disarm the bourgeois force and arm the proletarians." We know how they disarmed the old, bourgeois army in the trenches, by demoralizing it. There was a moment when, after the dissolution of that army at the front, they had practically no forces left at their disposal. In January, 1918, the Red Commander-in-Chief, Krylenko, who took the place of the assassinated General Dukhonin, reported to the Central Executive Committee, that "Committees (revolutionary nuclei) were the only remnant of the army." There were, of course, a few thousand disciplined soldiers, drawn from alien elements, such as Chinese, Letts, or German and Hungarian prisoners. With their aid the Bolsheviks were able to live through that interval of complete, matter-of-fact disarmament. But they could
not go on like this. The negotiations with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk proved to the Bolsheviks that the argument of force could not be dispensed with even in their dealings with their secret protectors. Mr. Trotsky simply failed in his attempts to baffle German generals and diplomats by means of rousing Russian patriotism.

He decided to make use of Russia’s humiliation by the Brest-Litovsk treaty to popularize the necessity of returning to a standing army. It was also necessary to defend the new power from “internal foes,” which were already fighting against Bolshevism in the South of Russia under Kornilov. As early as January 15, 1918, a new “Red Army” was created by a decree of the People’s Commissaries, intended not only for support of the Bolshevik power, but also to serve for the “future socialist revolution” in Europe. This army was to be founded on the principle of voluntary service, and a recommendation by at least two members of Bolshevik institutions was required to enable one to enter its ranks. But this attempt was a complete failure. The Bolshevik Government had to flee from Petrograd to Moscow before the menace of German troops advancing to the Northern capital. It was then that the first great concession to reality was made by the anti-militarist leaders. Mr. Trotsky, who from a Foreign Commissary had now become a new War Lord of Russia, decided to copy all the Tsarist methods in order to create a real disciplined and strong armed force. He now preached respect for military science, appealed to Tsarist generals and officers to come and serve the Communist power, and in May, 1919, he definitely started to raise “a genuine army, properly organized and firmly ruled by a single hand.” This army was to be built
on the basis of conscription. Former revolutionary slogans of “democratizing the army” by permitting the privates to discuss at their meetings the military orders of their superiors, were now cast aside. Iron discipline was reëstablished—in pre-revolutionary forms—and made even more stringent. Successive mobilizations were started from July, 1918. A year later, in the autumn of 1919, there were 1½ million conscripts, and about a third of them (500,000 to 600,000) formed a real fighting force (“bayonets”). In the summer of 1921, the Red Army counted 85 divisions of infantry, 31 divisions of cavalry, 31 separate brigades, 9 separate cavalry brigades and 2,800 guns. The number of “bayonets” was 400,000, and the whole armed force numbered 600,000.

The political management of the Red Army has always remained in the hands of the Communist Party. Especially reliable members of the Red Army were nominated “military commissaries,” with the right of capital punishment of military commands for “counter-revolutionary” tendencies. Communist “nuclei” were formed in every unit of the army, in order to closely observe and to report about the state of mind of the officers and soldiers. Officers of the old régime with few exceptions, were, of course, not considered reliable, and the tendency was to replace them with young officers graduated from the new military schools created by Trotsky. But not before 1923 do the Bolsheviks themselves expect this change to be completed.

We shall come back in the following chapters to the question: Just how reliable is the Red Army on the whole? But, from what has just been said, you may conclude that special measures were needed in order to make it reliable. Special measures were also necessary
in order to control the whole population of Russia. And they were the same as are generally used under all systems of tyranny by an insignificant minority. Autocracy knew them, but the Bolsheviks have been and are using them to an incomparably larger extent. I mean the Bolshevik system of espionage, which is crowned by the Red Terror.

The system of terrorism in use at the time of autocracy met with universal reproof and aroused indignation all over the world. It is strange to say that the Bolshevik terror, which is by far worse than anything known before, was exceedingly leniently treated by the same public opinion, and every attempt to denounce Bolshevik "horrors" and "atrocities" was met with flat denials, as mere "packs of lies." Unfortunately, the facts about Red Terrorism are too numerous. They cannot be here quoted. What I must emphasize here is not isolated facts, but principles. And we know already that "crushing the antagonists" is the chief, basic principle of Bolshevik tactics. "No dictatorship of the proletariat is to be thought of without terror and violence," Lenin formally declared in the summer of 1920. "Terror, as the demonstration of the will and strength of the working class, is historically justified," said Trotsky in a signed article in January, 1919.

This kind of terror is not personal, but collective, and it searches for victims not among the criminals, but among members of a social class supposed to be hostile to communism. A pamphlet by the Bolshevik hangman, Mr. Latsis, which was officially published in Moscow, in 1920, states formally that terrorism is an inherent feature of the civil war preached by the Communists. "Civil war is a war in which prisoners are not taken and no compromises made, but opponents
are killed." Opponents are—the bourgeoisie, which just like wolves "does not change its nature." "We are not waging war against separate individuals," Mr. Latsis affirmed in November, 1918, in the organ called "Red Terror," "We are exterminating the bourgeoisie as a class. Do not seek in the dossier of the accused for proofs as to whether he opposed the Soviet Government by word or deed. The first question that should be put is, to what class does he belong, of what extraction, what education and profession. These questions should decide the fate of the accused. Herein lies the meaning and the essence of the Red Terror."

Nothing need be added to this statement, and it explains why that notorious institution of the "All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to combat counter-revolution, sabotage and speculation," which at the beginning was chiefly intended to conduct investigations and whose powers were never clearly defined legally, gradually erected itself into a sinister tribunal of inquisition, with its branches and its torture-chambers everywhere in the country, dreaded by the People's Commissaries themselves. "Hang the Executive Committee of the Workmen's Delegates and all the Soviet," an official of the Odessa torture-chamber is quoted as saying. "If we choose, we can arrest Lenin himself."

It is impossible to say how many are the victims of this "Che-ka" ("Chresvychainaya Komissiya," "Extraordinary Commission," named from its first letters). A report published by it in 1920, gives the following figures for Moscow and Petrograd:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1919</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executed</td>
<td>6,185</td>
<td>3,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrested</td>
<td>..........</td>
<td>46,348</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The great majority of the executed (7,068 out of 9,641 in two years) were shot for "counter-revolutionary activities," i.e., for political reasons. These figures do not include the work of the numerous provincial Extraordinary Commissions, and, of course, they do not mention the numerous victims slain here and there throughout Russia, without any form of trial. The number of such would probably amount to tens or even hundreds of thousands.

We now know what three pillars have supported the Bolshevik structure for such a long time. There are, in the first place, their highly centralized system of administration, numbering quite an army of officials, controlled by the Communist Party; in the second place, their Red Army, also controlled by the Communist Party, and in the third place, their secret police and espionage system, which is entirely in the hands of the Communists. Of the two aims mentioned at the beginning—preparing for communism and keeping in power—the former was gradually removed to the second place, while the latter has evolved into a system of self-defense of the small minority against their own people,—a system which has never been surpassed by any tyranny at any time in the world's history.

Whether or not this system is likely to save Bolshevism from its final downfall, will be shown in the following chapters.
CHAPTER IV.

THE REVOLUTION AND NATIONALITIES.

A chapter on nationalities and on the national question in Russia cannot be omitted even from such a brief outline as this. Russia was not—and is not now—an entirely homogeneous “national” (i.e., “one nation”) State as France, or Germany or Italy. An ethnographic map of Russia within its former boundaries (before 1914) shows variously marked spots not only on the outskirts of Russia, such as Finland, the Baltic States, Transcaucasia, the Central Asiatic Provinces, but also inside Russia proper. Many remnants of aboriginal tribes can be found in the North (Zeryans, Samoyeds), on the Volga and in the Ural region, (Tatars, Mordva, Cheremiss, Chuvashes, Bashkirs, Kirghiz) and in Siberia. The first impression is that Russia before the World War was a multinational State like Turkey and Hungary, bound to be rent asunder from within, as a result of the growing-national consciousness of its component parts. And indeed, this comparison has often been used. I find it, e.g., in General Smuts’ leaflet on the League of Nations. He treats Russia as one of the three vanquished powers, and he looks at the process of dismemberment of Russia, Austria-Hungary and Turkey in the light of “self-determination” of their enslaved nationalities.

The view of a liberal Russian like myself is, natur-
ally, a different one. We stand for self-determination and for national autonomy. At the same time, we are very strongly against the dismemberment of Russia. We expect to find a middle path between self-determination and unity in a Russian federation. A comparison with Hungary and Turkey we consider too far-fetched, if facts are considered, and unfair, when made by a recent ally.

In contrast with conditions in Turkey, the nationalities of the former Russian Empire, even in the worst times of autocratic policy, could not be considered as "enslaved." And, contrasted with Hungary, Russia had its numerically predominant stock which formed a geographically continuous and solid nucleus of the Empire. The numerical relation between the component nationalities of the former Russian Empire can be seen from the following figures. I take them from the census of 1897 (the only one we have had). The entire population then numbered 128 millions; it grew to 180 millions in 1918, and approximate figures for the present time can be calculated accordingly.

1. NATIONALITIES WITHIN THE AREA OF THE PRESENT RUSSIA (IN THOUSANDS):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>European Russia</th>
<th>Siberia</th>
<th>Central Asia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Russians</td>
<td>48,559</td>
<td>4,424</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>53,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Russians</td>
<td>20,415</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>20,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(&quot;Ukrainians&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Russians</td>
<td>5,823</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,836</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
74,797 & 4,659 & 691 & 80,147 \\
\end{array}
\]
### Turko-Tatars:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European Russia</th>
<th>Siberia</th>
<th>Central Asia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Kirghiz, Tatars, Bashkirs, Sarts, Uzbegs, Chuvashes, Torkomans, other)</td>
<td>4,220</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>6,618</td>
<td>11,313</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Finno-Ugrians:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Finns, Karelians, Lapps, Mordvinians, other)</td>
<td>2,433</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Mongols        | 171             | 289   |     | 460 |
| Jews           | 3,715           | 33    | 8   | 3,756 |
| Germans        | 1,312           | 5     | 9   | 1,326 |

Total: 11,851 | 855 | 6,648 | 19,354 |

2. **NATIONALITIES IN THE BORDER STATES THAT MADE PART OF THE FORMER RUSSIAN EMPIRE:**

**Finns** (in Finland) .... 2,353

**Poles** (Russian Poland) ... 7,866

(Russians in Poland proper: Great Russians, 267; Little Russians, 335; White Russians, 29; Jews, 1,267)

| Lithuanians      | 1,658 |
| Letts           | 1,427 |
| Esthonians       | 990   |
| Rumanians       | 1,122 |

**Caucasians** (in Transcaucasia):

(Russians in Caucasia: Great Russians, 1,830; Little Russians, 1,305; White Russians, 20)

| Armenians       | 1,096 |
| Georgians       | 1,352 |
| Turko-Tatars    | 1,880 |
| Other Caucasians| 1,631 |

Total: 5,959

(+- 3,766 Russians + 1,267 Jews, etc.)
In former Russia the Russian stock made up 65%, i.e., two-thirds of the population (43.3% Great Russians; 17.4% Little Russians; 4.5% White Russians). In dismembered Russia it makes up 80%, i.e., four-fifths of the population, and the remaining 20% do not represent continuous groups but, with the exception of the Central Asiatic Provinces, are very much scattered among the Russians. It is true that the Russians themselves divide into the three branches mentioned above. Since probably the XII-XIV Century these branches speak different dialects, and there have been some attempts made to prove that Little Russian and White Russian are not dialects, but entirely different languages from the Great Russian, which is the language of our literature. At any rate, they are much closer related to each other than to any other Slav language, either of the Western (Polish or Czech) or even of the Eastern (Bulgarian and Serbian) groups. All three Russian branches understand each other quite easily.

So far as the other nationalities are concerned, the difference between such as are now detached from Russia and such as have remained within Russia is a very gradual one. The difference is not so much in degree of national consciousness as in geographical position and in the degree of continuity of settlement.

To compare the relation of all these nationalities to the Russian stock, with the relation of the enslaved Christian nationalities towards Turkey means simply not to know the character of the Turkish domination. There was nothing in Russia like superposition of two races, the ruling and the conquered one, with their unfathomed difference of culture and civilization. It was not conquest and subjugation, but a lengthy process
of settlement and amalgamation. Up to quite recently no nationality in Russia thought of separating itself from the Russian State and even the idea of autonomy was not common. That state of mind of the nationalities entirely harmonized with the spirit of the Russian people, which never was aggressively nationalistic; nay, it was not always conscious of its own nationality.

A morbid and inflamed national feeling is born always under the menace of denationalization, which is particularly dangerous for small nations. No such menace could exist in a country like Russia. Russia was too big, and its population, far from being influenced by other nationalities, had not even much chance of learning about their very existence. It is often stated that the American Middle West found itself in a similar situation which, until recently, made it quite indifferent about other nations and foreign politics. Every great nation has its middle-something which does not come in contact with any boundaries and does not know much about any conflicts. This is about the state of mind of the Russian popular masses. There were, of course, exceptions to that state of indifference in the long historical life of the nation. The Tatar yoke of the XIII-XIV Century made the upper social layers in Russia feel keenly that they were Russians and Christians. When, at a later period (XVII Century and after), there was the danger of being denationalized by the Poles on the Western frontier of Russia, the Russian population disclosed a strong defensive or even militant nationalism. The whole nation rose up at the beginning of the XVII Century to defend Russia's political and national independence. There was also much feeling against that process of "Europeanization" of Russia, which began in the sec-
ond part of the XVII Century and especially with the reforms of Peter the Great. National feeling is again aroused now in the masses, as a result of the Allied policy toward Russia. But as I have just said, these are exceptions, and even in these cases popular feeling never turned itself against other nationalities in Russia itself (except the Jews). Still less was it possible to expect that the Russian people would "Russianize" other nationalities, as the Hungarians were "Magyarizing" their alien populations, or the Greeks, the Serbs and Bulgarians were trying to assimilate the population of Macedonia. It was not the people, but the officials; not the intellectuals, but the Government which during the reign of Nicholas I (1825-1855) started upon "Russianization" of the borderlands and made of militant nationalism a weapon of political reaction.

However, what remained unknown to the Russian masses was gradually learned by the small nationalities incorporated into Russia. Naturally enough, a strong and uncompromising national feeling was first developed by such nationalities as were more advanced and comparatively recently added to the Russian State: the Poles (1815) and the Finns (1809).

The end of the XVIII and the beginning of the XIX Century, as is well known, was the time of a general national revival in Europe, which followed as a reaction against the cosmopolitanism of the XVIII Century and of the Great French Revolution. It was a period of Romanticism involving learned researches for the spirit and soul of the peoples—the primitive peoples or lower social strata—which preserved their folklore, popular songs, national costumes and traditions. In Russia it was also the time when the first foundations were laid for the nationalistic doctrine which pro-
claimed that the "Russian" faith and the "Russian" form of government formed the substance of the Russian nationality. The doctrine had its refined philosophical development in the hands of the "Slavophil" group of Russian intellectuals. But it also had its simplified version which served quite well the nationalist policy of the Russian autocracy.

This policy was not always hostile to the awakening of national revival among the small nationalities in Russia. On the contrary, while combating the strong, the Russian Government protected the weak. It tried to oppose new germs of national life to the more dangerous nationalism of the neighboring powers. Thus Russia encouraged the modest beginnings of Finnish literature and defended it from the Swedish civilization of the upper social layers in Finland. Russia also protected the early manifestations of the Lettish and Lithuanian nationalities against the German civilization of the Baltic "barons" and Polish landlords. The Russian Government was not hostile to the revival of the Georgian and Armenian literature, while it played Armenian patriotism against the Turks.

What was the attitude of Russian liberalism and Russian public opinion concerning national questions? The influence of Russian liberalism on politics began to be felt in the second half of the XIX Century. But liberalism cared little about exclusive and chauvinistic nationalism. Russian liberalism was broad-minded, freethinking and cosmopolitan. Such also was the influence of Russian literature, poetry, fiction, wherever it found its way. The intellectuals of other nationalities reflected that state of mind, as they were strongly influenced by the same literature. They remained sympathetic to manifestations of the feelings of op-
pressed nationalities, but they chiefly resented political oppression, without being much affected by purely national demands.

The change came at the end of the XIX Century. After the comparatively liberal reign of Alexander II (1855-81) there followed a period of recrudescence of militant nationalism, under Alexander III (1881-1894), which continued also under Nicholas II (1894-1917). Two nationalities were especially persecuted by these reactionary Governments: the Finns and the Poles—the most advanced two. At the end of the Century a third group of Caucasian nationalities was added. The fourth persecuted group were the Jews. A real exodus of Russian Jews began after the world-known pogroms of the Ministers Durnovo and Plehve, about 1890. At the same time a new Jewish nationalist movement appeared—Zionism. Then it was perhaps for the first time that Russian intellectuals, as well as the Jewish, faced the national problem in its deeper sense.

The immediate result was a scission. The older generation preferred to remain faithful to the former type of Russian liberal cosmopolitanism. The young generation turned nationalist, both on the side of the persecuted and the persecutors. Those that defended themselves, as well as those that attacked, seemed to start from the same basic axiom: the principle of nationality was paramount for both.

Between the two generations, my personal position was difficult. I never shared the one-sided cosmopolitanism of the older generation, which ignored the very existence of national problems. At the same time I was unable to sympathize with the equally one-sided spirit in which the national problem was solved by the generation of the end of the century. And indeed, the
alternative was equally unacceptable,—to disregard and not to understand at all the process of growing national consciousness of small nationalities (which I just then learned to know at the hand of the Balkan example), or to oppose to that legitimate process the national exclusiveness of the main national body.

Both states of mind were now rousing friction between the Russian and the allogeneous intellectuals. The cosmopolitan intellectuals were accused by the other nationalities of "imperialist" proclivities and even sometimes of playing a double game with national questions. The cause of their supposed insincerity was that they in all conscience did not include the idea of national autonomy and freedom of collective manifestations of national feelings in the catechism of liberal principles which they preached. On the other hand, the young generation of nationalists, which fully understood the importance of national strivings, considered them to be dangerous to the State and often took the side of the persecutors, while they wished to have the Russian State built on the German pattern, as a "one nation" State.

I earnestly cherish the hope that the present generation, the third one, having grown up during the Revolution and having learned from its lessons, will know how to find a middle line between liberal cosmopolitanism and reactionary nationalism.

At the time when the Revolutionary movement in Russia began to win its first successes, there were as yet no disagreements between the Russian liberals and the national intellectuals. All national advanced groups fought under the same banner, the political banner. They did not then think of self-determination as their immediate aim. It was understood that the
liberation of nationalities was a part of the general political liberation of Russia from the autocratic régime. Poland alone claimed independence. But even that claim was modified by the uncertainty of the international situation, which made the task of liberating at the same time all three parts of Poland, the Russian, German and Austrian, almost impossible. Finland did not ask for more than an independent constitution which would not exclude common links in questions of imperial diplomacy, defense and partly in finance. The other nationalities did not even expect or wish as much as that.

In the first Russian Duma the representatives of the different nationalities united with the Russian deputies in a common political struggle. To realize their national aspirations, they formed with the Russians a "Union of Autonomists-Federalists." It is characteristic of that time that in the second Duma (socialistic in its majority), they dropped the second part of that title, thus emphasizing their desire for stronger unity. It was now a "Union of Autonomists."

The tendency to acquire freedom jointly and to postpone the fight for self-determination was especially strong with the more advanced parties, which united socialism with national aspirations. Such parties decidedly opposed the separatist tendencies of the older and more conservative groups. As early as 1904 the Polish National-Democratic Party renounced its demand for Polish independence. The Polish Socialist Party (P. P. S.) followed its example in 1907. The Lithuanian democrats changed their name in the same spirit. Instead of calling themselves "the Democratic Party of Lithuania" (an independent State), they assumed the name: "the Party of Democratic Lithuan-
ians" (i.e., an ethnic group fighting for democracy in general and basing itself on territorial autonomy instead of national independence). The Lithuanian Social-Democrats in 1906 renounced their separate Constituent Assembly in Vilna and declared themselves satisfied with the All-Russian one. In 1907 they renounced altogether their demand for federalism, declared themselves satisfied with autonomy and joined hands with the Russian Social-Democrats. The democratic Letts were still more moderate. They declared, in 1905, that separation was a dangerous tendency worthy of "barons and priests," and that "it would be equivalent to suicide—to separate themselves from Russia." In Georgia, too, at the beginning of the XX Century it was chiefly the noblemen who defended political separatism. Such socialists as were "federalists," provoked severe criticism on the part of their fellow-socialists and were kept at the background. The Armenian nationalists, the "Dashnaks," were an apparent exception. But their independent Armenia was to be cut out from Turkey—with Russia’s help, if possible—not from Russia.

The Mussulman population did not wish for anything more than freedom of religious and cultural life. They cast their lot with the Russian democratic parties (particularly the Constitutional-Democrats). They elected their deputies on imperial party platforms and these deputies in the first two Dumas sat with the "Cadets," before they formed their own separate faction. The Ukrainian radicals too at that time did not go beyond a "national territorial autonomy."

All these symptoms of moderation of the advanced national parties are especially interesting because here, for the first time in Russian history, they were able to
speak their minds quite freely. We can be sure that this was indeed the expression of their real opinion. They decidedly did not wish to be detached from Russia.

Two circumstances changed that conciliatory state of mind during the last decade before the Revolution of 1917.

In the first place, the nationalities were bitterly disappointed in the Duma. Not only did they not succeed in winning political and national freedom in the first two Dumas, but in the last two Dumas a majority could be formed by the Government, which was almost more reactionary in national questions than the Government itself. The most chauvinistic legislation was carried by the Duma, which hurt deeply the feelings of the chief nationalities, the Finns, Poles, Mussulmans, Ukrainians, etc. To be sure it was autocracy that was responsible for the composition of the two last Dumas (See Chapter I). The opposition parties fought by the side of the nationalities. But chauvinism breeds chauvinism. The public opinion of the nationalities turned vindictive. The opinion prevailed among them that the Russian liberals and intellectuals were as “imperialistic” as the Tsar’s Government, and that the nationalities could expect nothing from them, even if Russia should succeed in obtaining a good constitution and real political freedom.

The second reason for the change of mind of the nationalities was even more weighty. Their growing disaffection was very skillfully exploited by forces outside Russia.

The dismemberment of Russia—on her western frontier—was deliberately made a part of the Pan-German and the so-called Middle-European scheme of
reconstruction of the future Europe, after the German victory. The expected annexations of industrial regions on the Belgian and the French frontiers were to be balanced by an equivalent annexation of agricultural regions to the east of the Russian frontier. Russia's part of the indemnity was thus to be paid with land.

As early as the beginning of 1916 the German Army occupied a great part of the area under consideration: Poland, the Baltic Provinces, Latvia and Lithuania, also a part of the Ukraine. But even before that, as soon as the War was definitely decided upon—namely in 1913—there began an active German and Austrian propaganda among the nationalities they intended to detach from Russia. Subsidies were given in profusion to the leaders of the different national movements. Presumably, that was about the moment when Lenin also, then in Krakov, and Trotsky condescended to accept German and Austrian money. Lenin's international program was then enriched with a new, ultranational addition: "self-determination going as far as complete disannexation."

When the War began, a further step was taken to prepare for Russia's dismemberment. The prisoners of all the nationalities mentioned, the Finns, Estonians, Letts, Ukrainians, Moslems, were intentionally concentrated each group in a special national camp. They were there trained for revolutionary propaganda and for military insurrections in the corresponding parts of Russia. However, the opinion of the leading national groups even then remained moderate. At a special "Congress of Nationalities" which met at Lausanne in June, 1916, only the Finns, the Poles and the representatives of Bokhara and Khiva unconditionally
asked for independence. The Esthonians, the Caucasian nationalities, the Kirghiz and Tatars, and the Ukrainians formulated their demands in a conditional form. They still were ready to be satisfied with national autonomy.

But now the Revolution broke. The results of the aforementioned German-Austrian propaganda at once became manifest. Drilled propagandists of different nationalities rushed into Russia. Here they concurred in the forming, within the Russian army, of separate national military groups, composed of Ukrainians, Poles, Lithuanians, White-Russians, Moslems, Siberians. At the same time, Lenin proclaimed the right to "disannexation" of such "annexed" provinces as Finland, Poland, Esthonia, Courland, the Ukraine, Bessarabia, Georgia, Armenia, Daghestan, Turkestan,—together with Ireland, India, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, etc. His Krakov promises were thus fulfilled and surpassed by far. In vain did other Social-Democratic groups try to make head against Lenin and stand firm by their attitude of 1905 (which attitude we know), to stem the separatist strivings. Lenin's view prevailed fully after the Bolshevist victory of November, 1917. A week after his coup d'etat, on November 15, Lenin issued a declaration of the "rights of nationalities in Russia." He confirmed here the principles of equality and sovereignty of nationalities in Russia and their right "to dispose of themselves as far as the separation and building of independent States."

Immediate use was made of these gallant concessions by the Germans. On November 29, the German Chancellor Hertling declared in the Reichstag that he "respected the right of Poland, Courland and Lithuania to
decide" about their fate independently from Russia. On New Year's day these three provinces, as well as parts of Livonia and Esthonia were proclaimed definitely detached from Russia. It corresponded to the dot to the above-mentioned drafts of alterations on the Eastern Frontier of Germany. Moreover, by the Brest-Litovsk treaty, Russia undertook to directly evacuate Finland, the Baltic Provinces, the Ukraine and Transcaucasia. The Ukraine was forced to conclude a separate peace with Germany, as a first proof of its independence.

Up to that moment—everything was clear and easy to understand for every Russian. We knew that in the event of his victory our enemy would be inexorable in the realization of his decision to weaken Russia and to make use of her economic resources for himself. We fully expected Germany to do that. That is why we fought so hard against Germany and in fact very much longer than we actually could bear the strain.

On the other hand we also expected that our Allies, after having attained the aim of our common effort, would help us to make good the fatal results of our sacrifice. We did not expect them, of course, to restore the unity of Russia, as long as Russia remained in the possession of the Bolsheviks. We also understood that the newly-built border states had good reason to insist on their matter-of-fact separation, in order not to be swallowed by the Bolshevist Russia. As long as the situation remained temporary—as well as the causes which created it—there was no reason for real worry. The Bolsheviks were allies of the Germans; Russia was dismembered by the Germans. This state of things must change with the defeat of the Germans.
Germany was defeated. The Brest-Litovsk treaty was abrogated. Imagine our utter astonishment and dismay when after some waiting we began to realize that to weaken Russia was not only the aim of our enemies, and that "self-determination" of nationalities was really going to transform itself into "dismemberment" of Russia, under the conditions of a definite peace treaty! Mr. Lloyd George told us in the House of Commons, on November 17, 1919, that "fighting for a reunited Russia might not be a policy that suits the British Empire." He mentioned a "very great statesman, Lord Beaconsfield," who "regarded a great, gigantic, colossal, growing Russia as the greatest menace the British Empire could be confronted with." Lloyd George obviously shared that view.

The interests of the Allies were unequally distributed among the newly-built border states, and the recognition of their newly-acquired independence also varied in degree and in speediness according to the degree of interest of each of the Allies. The interest of France was chiefly centered on that idea of controlling Germany from the East and of finding a substitute for the Russian alliance. For a considerable time Poland was considered able to take the place of Russia, especially if it would be a "strong" and territorially enlarged Poland. Certain Polish statesmen tried to impress that idea on their Allies, and to a certain degree they succeeded. But, as a consequence of further events and complications, the traditional enthusiasm of the French public opinion seems to have cooled down. It left, however, a pernicious result in the form of the annexation by Poland of a strip of land with a 4,000,000 Russian population, contrary to the good ethnographic
frontier proposed to Poland by the League of Nations in July, 1919. The treaty of Riga of 1920, which contains that decision, will remain a source of dangerous complications in the future.

The British interest is chiefly limited to such border states as can be reached from the sea. Mr. Lloyd George, in his Guildhall Speech of 1919, formulated that policy plainly. "True to the instinct which has always saved us," he said, "we never went far from the sea," a remark which was met with the laughter of recognition. There are now two more seas added to the domain of British interest: the Baltic and the Black Sea. Situated on the Baltic Sea, Esthonia and Latvia were provisionally recognized by Great Britain on May 3 and November 18, 1918,—before their final recognition by the Supreme Council in January, 1921. An American writer sums these facts up in a keen comment, which I permit myself to quote here.1 "The recognition of the two governments of Esthonia and Latvia by Great Britain," he states, "has a commercial significance, not only in respect of the future of Russia, but with reference to general imperial policy . . . It appears to be understood that the Baltic Sea is a British trade realm in which there will be important developments in the future. Thus it was the British navy that blockaded the coasts of Germany and Soviet Russia. A British High Commissioner sits at Danzig, and British naval units have patrolled the coast of the Baltic. . . . All this is in line with the British traditional policy of establishing influence or control in

1 "The New World Problems in Political Geography," by Isaiah Bowman, Ph.D., Director of the American Geographical Society in New York.
ports and coastal belts serving as outlets for interior population, from which flow important currents of trade."

An equally important change took place in the status of the Black Sea, which reflected itself in the situation of the Transcaucasian border states, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaidjan. According to the treaty signed at Sèvres, on August 10, 1920, passage through the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus is made free not only for trading vessels, but also for all warships, irrespective of their flags, in time of war as in time of peace. This was done in spite of the observations of the Ottoman Delegation which found the sovereignty of Turkey, her integrity and security deeply affected, and also in spite of the objections of the Russian (unofficial) delegates who stated on July 5, 1919, that free access to the Black Sea for warships leaves without defense the 2,230 kilometers of Russia’s southern littoral. From the point of national defense, the situation on the Black Sea was thus extremely deteriorated, as a result of the World War. At the same time the Transcaucasian border states became an object of special attention on the part of the British.

It is impossible to describe here all the havoc played by the “Balkanization” in Transcaucasia. Geography, ethnography and historical tradition worked very strongly for unity among the three chief Transcaucasian nationalities and between all of them and Russia. The Russian population in that region, as can be seen from the table, constituted a very large minority. Russian civilization has had an enormous influence on these regions and their economic development is chiefly due to the peaceful conditions created by the Russian sway. Separatist tendencies prevailed here only under condi-
tions of imperative necessity. Directly after the Bolshevist coup, the prominent Georgian leader, Mr. Noé Jordania, declared (December 3, 1917): “As a part of Russia we continue to stand for an All-Russian platform. . . . Separation from Russia means submission to the East. . . . The interests of all Caucasians require a regeneration of the central power in Russia.”

As late as the end of February, 1918, at a Diet of Transcaucasian members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, representatives of all three nations, Georgians, Armenians and Moslems declared themselves for a “united Russian federative democratic Republic.” It was only when the Brest-Litovsk treaty was signed that the Diet was forced (April 27, 1918) to declare the “independence” of Transcaucasia, at the demand of the Turks whose armies invaded the country. The aim of the Turks was to unite the Transcaucasian Mussulmans and to form of them an independent “Republic of Azerbaidjan.” It was in order to save themselves from the Mussulman menace that the Georgians threw themselves into the hands of the Germans and asked the German Army to come and take up their defense against the Turks and the Transcaucasian Moslems, and, as a consequence of their demand, proclaimed the independence of their own “Georgian Republic” (May 26, 1918). The Armenians, who were the only ones to remain faithful to the Entente, had to pay the bill. Both the Turks and the Georgians wanted their land, and they could not but succumb under the double attack.

This was the state of things in Transcaucasia when, after the Armistice of November 11, 1918, access to the Black Sea was made free for the Allied fleets. Just before that moment an appeal by Mr. Balfour to the
peoples of Russia, published in Baku ("Azerbaidjan") on August 26, 1918, promised to support Russia against dismemberment. Such were also the first pronouncements of the British troops which came to the assistance of Baku against the Azerbaidjan and Turkish besieging troops. But soon that policy changed. General Thompson's proclamation of November 24, 1918, declared that the fate of the "Russian territory" between the Black Sea and the Caspian was to be decided (in the absence of Russia) at the Peace Conference. On December 28, 1918, the Azerbaidjan government was recognized by General Thompson as the only rightful power. On December 30, 1918, Mr. Balfour informed the Georgian representatives "that His Majesty's Government view with sympathy the creation of a Georgian Republic and are prepared to urge its recognition at the Conference and to support its desire to send its delegates to Paris with the object of presenting its claims." And, indeed, it was at Earl Curzon's initiative that on January 15, 1920, the Supreme Council recognized the de facto independence of Azerbaidjan, Georgia and Armenia.

However, this recognition took place after the British occupation of Transcaucasia was discontinued and the British troops withdrawn from Georgia and Armenia (July-August, 1919). Mr. Lloyd George's utterances as to the "instinct which always saved" the British and helped them to "extricate themselves," when they went too "far from the sea," seems to have been suggested by the situation in Transcaucasia. The Italians were also unwilling to take up the task which the British had found too costly and dangerous for themselves, and, finally, the newly created republics were occupied by the Bolsheviks. On April 28, 1920,
Baku was peacefully taken by the Bolsheviks, who were invited to come by a meeting of the representatives of the parliamentary parties. With Georgia, a peace treaty was signed by the Bolsheviks on May 8. But at the moment when they seemed to be restoring Russia’s unity, the real aim of the Bolshevik advance to Transcaucasia became clear. It was a part of their scheme to bring about a revolution in the East, and the Transcaucasian Christian nations were to be sacrificed to the Turko-Bolshevist Alliance. As a result of the decision of the Third International at Moscow, a congress of Eastern “peoples” met at Baku on August 27, 1920. Armenia was forced on November 7 to make peace with Turkey and to open a corridor between the Turks and the Bolsheviks by giving up two of her districts (Zanghezur and Karabagh). Bolshevik armies were sent to Azerbaidjan in order to coöperate with the Turks against the Armenians and the Georgians. As a result, communist governments were created in Armenia and in Georgia and both nationalities were put under direct Bolshevik control. The last treaty of the Bolsheviks with the Turks practically gives up all Transcaucasia to the Turks. Such were the results of the involuntary “self-determination” in Transcaucasia.

I am satisfied to state that the policy of the United States in all these questions concerning national problems and dismemberment of Russia was perfectly consistent with general principles of democracy and completely loyal towards the Russian people. The American viewpoint was especially well emphasized in Secretary Colby’s note of August 10, 1920, sent out in reply to the Italian Government’s questions as to the claims of Poland. “Friendship and honor,” Mr. Colby said, “require that Russia’s interests must be gen-
erously protected and, as far as possible, all decisions of vital importance to it, and especially those concerning its sovereignty over the territory of the former Russian Empire, be held in abeyance. By this feeling of friendship and honorable obligation to the great nation whose brave and heroic self-sacrifice contributed so much to the successful termination of the war, the Government of the United States was guided in its reply to the Lithuanian National Council on October 19, 1919, and its persistent refusal to recognize the Baltic States as separate nations independent of Russia. The same spirit was manifested in the note of this Government of March 24, 1920, in which it was stated with reference to certain proposed settlements in the Near East that 'no final decision should or can be made without the consent of Russia.' In line with these important declarations of policy the United States withheld its approval from the decision of the Supreme Council in Paris recognizing the independence of the so-called Republics of Georgia and Azerbaidjan, and so instructed its representative in Southern Russia, Rear-Admiral Newton McCully. Finally . . . the Government of the United States has taken the position that final determination of the boundaries (of the independent Armenia) must not be made without Russia's cooperation and agreement. . . . We were unwilling that while Russia is helpless in the grip of non-representative government whose only sanction is brutal force, Russia shall be weakened still further by a policy of dismemberment conceived in other than Russian interests."

This noble line of conduct has not changed under the new administration. The note of Secretary Hughes,
issued on the occasion of the Washington Conference, fully confirms Secretary Colby's statement.

The suspicion has often been voiced that under the cloak of that idea of sovereignty of the people and unity of territory the old Russian form of centralized government may be introduced. As we have just seen, it has already been introduced by the Bolsheviks in such border states of former Russia which they succeeded in bringing back under their control. I have little doubt but that the reactionary and monarchist extremists cherish an ideal that would be equally able to restore the formal, purely mechanical unity of Russia, based on passive submission. Probably, it is apprehension of such prospectives that urges the representatives of nationalities at present to insist on formal recognition of their newly acquired independence. Even such of them as are inclined to federate with Russia, will often say that formal independence is the best starting point for future negotiations. The difficulty is that there can be no final recognition of independence without the formal act of a legally constituted Russian Government. Recognitions by other powers are not binding for the Russian people. In an acuter form, we come to the same vicious circle that threatened the success of the Irish negotiations with the British. No negotiations without recognition, would be the view of nationalities. No recognition without previous negotiations, may be the view of the other side. What then is the way out from that probable imbroglio?

To a great extent it can be disposed of by the attitude taken by the Russian democracy. This attitude may be seen from the resolution adopted by the Con-
ference of the Members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly—which met in Paris, in January, 1921—with regard to the newly formed border States. Poland and Finland are here not included, as their severance from Russia is considered to be final.

The resolution reads as follows:

"1. The Russian Democratic parties have always recognized the justice of the claim of Russia's nationalities for free self-determination, and the Constituent Assembly accordingly proclaimed on January 5, 1918, the principles of a federal structure for Russia. This desire of the nationalities of Russia, however, in view of the tragic circumstances which ensued subsequently, took the form of a demand for absolute secession of the Border States and complete severance of all connection with Russia, from a desire to protect themselves against the despotic power and destructive policy of the Bolshevik dictators.

"2. As long as the Bolshevik dictatorship will continue to oppress Russia the gravitation of the Border States towards Russia will not be able to assume rational and lawful forms. The stabilization of any moral and political break between those countries and Russia will only lead to Balkanization and mutual feuds which will be taken advantage of to serve the interests of foreign imperialistic politics.

"3. Reckoning with the established fact of a number of new States founded through the efforts of the Border nationalities, and also with our desire to safeguard their independence, in as far as it is expressed by their representative institutions based upon universal suffrage, the democracy of Russia assumes that after the liquidation of the Bolshevik dictatorship and the restoration of popular rule in Russia there is inevitably bound to come to the fore a community of social, political and cultural interests which will dictate an economic and political coalition equally advantageous and even indispensable to both sides.

"4. A federal union appears to be the most appropriate form of such a coalition, harmonizing with the general tendencies of the historical process as well as with the cultural interests of mankind."
"5. Defending the standpoint of Russia's reconstruction along federal lines and having no desire to impose upon any one by force of arms any particular form of political connection, the Russian democracy considers a mutual agreement on a basis of liberty and equality for both agreeing parties as the only correct settlement of the issue."

The task which is here set forth is not easily accomplished. But the American example is there to show us that solution is not at all impossible. When the representatives of the separate states came together in the summer days of 1787, in Philadelphia, each state was hardly less zealous to preserve its independence than the new border states of Russia. Every precaution was taken to consider that feeling and the very word "Nation" seemed to be tabooed in order not to provoke separatist susceptibilities. But years have passed since, Federal institutions have been steadily working for amalgamation and the result is—the great American nation strong in its moral ties and united with common bonds of growing national tradition. We are confident that the United States of free and regenerated Russia will pass through a similar process of evolution.
CHAPTER V.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE BOLSHEVIKS.

The juxtaposition of these two words: Bolshevism and diplomacy—is it not a most flagrant contradiction? How can it be possible that an extremist party whose chief business is to blow up the world would be permitted to treat and to sign agreements with the same authorities against which it conspires, thus facilitating its task?

Well, life is the most improbable of fictions. Life gives us that exhibition of a Bolshevist diplomacy working in the open for the same aims which the Bolshevist agents of secret propaganda are at the same time striving to attain under cover. Moreover, the Bolshevist diplomatists are not only permitted to negotiate, they even have their moments of triumph. Their outspoken way of telling everybody unpalatable truths beats all records of diplomatic sincerity. At the same time, they are very much helped by what is so often lacking in professional diplomacy: unity of design and complete consistency in carrying it out. I do not intend to give them much credit for that, because their aim is too plain and absolute and unattainable while their methods are too daring and reckless and irresponsible, to be imitated by any civilized diplomacy. It is also important to note that while the Bolsheviks are consistent in pursuing their aims, they do not at all claim
to be consistent in their methods. They would change these methods and break the agreements entered upon as soon as they found it necessary to do so, to promote their chief aim. Also, they are never embarrassed when they change their arguments, or even when at the same time they use conflicting arguments in their diplomatic documents and their pieces of propaganda. Some one may raise the objection that even in current diplomacy the methods of Talleyrand and Bismarck are not unusual and that that principle, according to which agreements stand only as long as conditions remain the same ("rebus sic stantibus"), is regularly observed. But the Bolsheviks have carried these methods to the extreme. The great Bismarck once said that he could safely speak the truth because nobody would believe that he was doing so. The Bolshevik diplomatists have that advantage on Bismarck that they freely and daily speak out their main truth about the World Revolution—and they are believed—but the fine old-type diplomatists are satisfied to think that that is still a long way off, and that sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. In contradistinction to these old-school diplomatists, the Bolsheviks have one great big job ahead of them, and they keep clear of small details that obscure the chief issue. Monomaniacs are sometimes very clear-sighted people, in so far as the object is in the immediate sphere of their vision.

Whoever believes that the Bolshevik chief aim, i.e., World Revolution, can be changed—or even that they have already "abandoned World Revolution together with communism and all the other foundations of Bolshevism"—has not taken sufficient stock of Bolshevism and is bound to be utterly mistaken in all his judgments of the Bolsheviks' deeds. But we would be
equally mistaken were we to overlook that in their tactics the Bolshevist diplomatists have proved to be extremely keen and flexible. They knew how to learn from experience. In the four years of their existence they have thus gradually passed from the awkward and childish initial attempts to set fire to every piece of inflammable matter, to a widely spread and skillfully arranged organization, led by good experts who know how to mark time and how to continually modify their preparatory steps.

The origin of the Bolshevist diplomacy is contemporaneous with their first attempts to start raising an international organization with the avowed aim of "turning the war for booty into a war of all the slaves against all the masters." At the beginning their anti-war activity was skillfully diverted by Germany to serve her own purposes. Russian Bolshevists and their fellow-extremists from the Allied countries were used by the Germans to split patriotic public opinion and to demoralize the armies of the Entente. However, the first attempts to make use of the "Second International" for these aims failed, as socialist members of that "International" forgot their internationalism in the imminent national danger to their respective countries. It was then that the chance came for the "Third," the extremist International, to be tried. Here, too, German policy ran parallel with the Bolshevist. The basis for the "Third International" of "anti-war socialists of belligerent countries," with the exclusion of the "social patriots," was laid down at the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences (September 5-8, 1915, and April 27-30, 1916). A year of propaganda followed, and during 1916 the idea of transforming the patriotic World War into a revolutionary class war
against capitalism began to spread among the popular masses, both in Germany and in the Allied countries. The Bolshevik diplomacy, in the pursuit of its own aims,\(^1\) was gradually detaching itself from the German diplomacy.

A revolution in Russia, whose resistance was most weakened, was already planned at that time. It was to be directly followed by a Spartacist revolution in Germany and—within a brief time—by the triumph of the French and British “comrades” in Paris and London. A Swiss socialist, Mr. Grumbach, recollects that Lenin had told him, before his return to Russia, that he “firmly believed in a revolution in Germany, if only a revolution could be first victorious in Russia.”

Then followed, for the Bolsheviks, that period of asserting themselves in Russia—between the March and November revolutions of 1917—with which we are already familiar. The Bolshevik and the German diplomacy again ran parallel so far as the dissolution of the Russian army and statehood was concerned. But then, after the Bolshevik \textit{coup d'état}, the time came for them to redeem their pledges to Germany, who had been giving them help. This was the first opportunity for a purely Bolshevik—\textit{i.e.}, Internationalist—diplomacy to win its first laurels. Lenin was still sure that his Spartacist revolution in Germany would come soon, while the German Government was urging peace with Russia. Peace was also proclaimed by the Bolsheviks; but, as we know, it was a different kind of peace: a peace with the German “proletarians” and a beginning of civil war with the German “bourgeois-imperialists.” Accordingly, it was not to the German Government

\(^1\) See for further details my book on “Bolshevism, an International Danger,” 1920, Scribner and George Allen & Unwin.
but to the German soldiers that the Bolsheviks addressed themselves. "Peace is to be concluded not from above but from below," Lenin argued on November 11, 1917, in the Central Executive Committee.

The whole trend of the following events is explained and commented upon by the Bolsheviks in the light of their leading idea. The Germans consent to negotiate. It means, said Trotsky on November 19, that the generals of the Kaiser are forced "to pass under the yoke." To Trotsky's great surprise, "the actual proposals of the German Imperialists" do not at all agree with the program of a "democratic peace," as formulated by the Russian Revolution. "We, indeed, did not expect such an acme of impudence." Never mind. "We shall have to carry through other negotiations with Germany, when Liebknecht is at the head of the revolutionary proletariat, and together with him we will readjust the map of Europe." But, in the meantime, General Hoffmann is speaking quite another language at Brest-Litovsk? It does not matter. "We do not consider it peace negotiations that we are carrying on with Germany. We are speaking to them our customary revolutionary language." With the German people we will carry on "other negotiations, a true diplomacy of the trenches." But the German generals are using that kind of diplomacy to increase their demands? So much the worse for them. "The German proletarians and peasants will reply with the cry of revolt." And they protracted negotiations for fully three months, waiting for a German revolution to come.

Here came the first disappointment. The revolution was slow in coming. Trotsky then resorted, on February 10, 1918, to a method "never used in the World's history." He demobilized his army and "handed over
the Russian front to the protection of German workmen." Mr. Zinoviev, the Petrograd dictator, reveled in exultation. "We dealt a terrible blow to the World's imperialism, when, three months ago, we began our peace negotiations. Now we deal that imperialism a deadly blow by our new formula ('neither peace nor war')." At Smolny, in Petrograd, a member of the Assembly asked: "What next?" Lenin was calm as he answered: "Next is the revolution in Germany." And the Soviet voted its approval while expressing its faith "that German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish workingmen will do their duty and will not permit their Governments to assail the peoples of Poland, Lithuania and Courland."

The real result was somewhat different. A week later, German armies invaded the Russian borderlands. Petrograd was in panic. On February 24, the Soviet capitulated. "Yes," said Lenin, "these peace conditions are doubly ruinous, but we have not the strength to resist." . . . Three weeks pass after the signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace (March 3) and one week after its ratification by the All-Russian Soviet. And Lenin, in an interview with a Daily News correspondent (March 22), said: "The task of the Soviets is to hold on until the mutual exhaustion of the fighting groups of European capital brings about revolution in all countries." On October 22, 1918, he repeated before the Central Executive Committee: "In the chain of revolutions the chief link is the German one. The success of the World Revolution depends on it much more than on any other."

These people are mad, one might be induced to say. Just wait a while with your judgment. There was a method in that madness. At the moment when these
words were being pronounced, the German Army was already demoralized, and on November 11, the Armistice was concluded. What a chance for a "World Revolution" to follow! "Never before," said Lenin in the speech just mentioned, "was the universal proletarian revolution as close as it is now." A few days later, Zinoviev seconded him: "The bankers of France and of London will soon learn that a revolution in Berlin is not a feast but a momento mori to remind them of their coming perdition." And they prepared for the spring of 1919 an extensive scheme for revolutionizing the whole of middle Europe.

Millions of Russian roubles were rushed to Germany, in order to promote the revolutionary movement, through the new Russian "Ambassador" in Berlin, Mr. Joffe. After the Bolshevist literature was discovered in a diplomatic courier's bag, Mr. Joffe had to go (November 5, 1918). But in December another, unofficial envoy to the German proletarians, Mr. Radek, came, and in January, 1919, he concluded a formal "treaty" directly with Liebknecht himself. By the terms of his treaty, Lenin undertook to recognize Liebknecht as President of the German Soviet Republic, to furnish important funds for Spartacist propaganda and to order Soviet armies to take the offensive and cross the German frontier in support of a simultaneous Spartacist rising in Berlin. These were the same Red armies concerning which negotiations had been carried on a year before between Trotsky and Colonel Raymond Robbins for America and Captain Sadoul for France, in order to get Allied assistance and Allied instructors, to fight Germany. They now were to be used indeed to fight Germany—but with the aim of imposing communist law on Europe. Liebknecht, on his part,
pledged himself to establish a Soviet Government in Germany immediately upon his advent to power, to raise a Red Army of 500,000 men to be placed under the supreme command of Trotsky and observe faithfully and put into practice all the teachings of Lenin’s doctrine. After a successful revolution in Hungary, in March, 1919, another treaty was concluded between Lenin and Bela Kun, his Hungarian nominee, according to which “up to the time of the other European States going over to the Soviet régime” mutual military and material assistance was to be accorded; movements of troops were to be as a preliminary concerted “among the different Soviet States.” An attack was designated against “the Entente, and especially Poland and Rumania.” When on February 12, Radek was arrested, in his Spartacist-Bolshevik propaganda bureau in Wilmersdorf (Berlin), more proofs were found that “a great Bolshevik revolutionary stroke throughout Germany had been planned to take place in the spring, whilst at the same time a Bolshevik army was to attack Germany on the Eastern frontier.” This news was confirmed from Moscow, via Helsingfors. A Red army of 150,000 men was to be prepared in all haste to invade Germany at the end of April or the middle of May via Poland and Courland. The next step was—to put on a war footing several hundred thousands of Russian war prisoners, to take the line of the Elbe. This plan was said to have been worked out by a German major a certain Busch a former prisoner who had declared himself a communist and played a prominent rôle in Moscow. It is interesting to compare with this news, the boastful declarations of the Hungarian leaders after their revolution. “In three weeks,” they were saying, “we shall have 150,000 perfectly
equipped, trained men. In six weeks we expect to have 500,000 men trained. . . . We are surrounded with discontented peoples. . . . We shall start with Czecho-Slovakia. . . . Then comes Rumania's turn . . . Jugo-Slavia will follow . . . ; in three months Italy will come over to us. On April 8, there will be a joint meeting of Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils in Berlin. We have absolutely certain information that Germany will adopt Bolshevism. . . . How long do you think France will hold out? . . . Then will come England's turn. . . . We have every scrap of paper ready for Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Italy, France and England. No country will be able to hold out against us."

Bolshevist preparations for the Spring of 1919 were not confined to the West of Europe. A revolution was also expected to take place at that very time in the East, and especially in India. The Soviet official paper, the Pravda (The Truth), is responsible for the statement that 4,000,000 copies of pamphlets were published by a special "Bureau of Mussulman Communist Organizations," during the first ten months of 1918, in the Tatar, Turkish, Kirghiz, Sart and Hindu languages. At the same time explosives and money were sent to Bombay by the Bolshevik representatives in Stockholm, via London. A certain "Indian professor," May-avlevi Mohammed Baranutulla, a former German agent in Afghanistan during the war, formally declared in Moscow that "in the normal course of events this summer (1919) will prove decisive in the liberation of India." Afghanistan was considered to be "of primary importance for the propaganda in Asia," just like Hungary in Europe. The hopes of the Bolsheviks ran especially high when the new Afghan Ameer, Amanullah declared (in May) war on England. Although the
Ameer was forced to ask for peace, less than a month after the opening of hostilities, the negotiations were continued between Kabul and Moscow. As late as August, 1919, the Muscovite diplomatists addressed a note to the Ameer, to inform him of the advance of their World Revolution. "The successes of our troops in the East," they declared, "hold out the promise that we shall soon join forces with the Siberian revolution. Despite all difficulties, we can safely say that victory will be ours, not only in Russia, but on an international scale."

It is not necessary to narrate in detail, how and why all these great schemes fell flat. It is sufficient to mention that the invasion of Germany through the border states did not materialize, three successive uprisings in Berlin were stifled by Noske, Liebknecht was murdered, Soviet rule in Hungary was liquidated, revolutionary outbursts in Vienna and in Slovakia were stifled. Red armies, prepared to invade the Western frontier, were diverted to the side of the internal fronts in the North, in the East and in the South, where "white armies" of the Archangel Government, Kolchak and Denikin were advancing. The first year of the World Revolution, 1919, thus passed without realizing the Bolshevist aspirations. But at the same time it helped to disclose just how widely spread their schemes were and how active the Bolshevist propaganda and diplomacy were in pursuing these schemes.

Facing all these preparations which, of course, could not be kept entirely secret, what was the attitude of the Allied Powers?

The Allied diplomacy toward Russia since the Bolshevist coup d'etat has passed through three stages, each distinctly different from the other. The first stage
lasted from November, 1917, to March, 1918,—the time of the signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace. The second stage followed after the Bolshevist peace with Germany and its end came with the Allied armistice of November 11, 1918. The third stage begins after the armistice.

During the first two periods the Allied policy was actuated by the interests of the World War. As long as there was hope that the Bolsheviks would fight on against Germany, or that the Brest-Litovsk peace would not be ratified by the Soviets, or that at least after the ratification the struggle against Germany would re-commence, the Allied Powers kept in contact with the Bolsheviks and promised them help and support. For that aim a sort of diplomatists' *in partibus infidelium* was used. It was Captain Sadoul who, for France, daily visited Trotsky at Smolny,¹ and wrote long reports to Mr. Albert Thomas, which afterwards were published. Mr. Raymond Robbins, the head of the American Red Cross, was used for the same purpose by Ambassador Francis. Finally, the British Foreign Office worked through Mr. Lockhart. On December 2, 1917, Sadoul arranged for an interview between Trotsky and Mr. Noulens at the French Embassy, and both parted "pleased with one another," after a two hours' conversation. On January 2, 1918, Col. Robbins obtained from Mr. Francis a signed statement, promising every kind of assistance and even a recommendation to his Government for a formal *de facto* recognition, should the Bolsheviks continue the war and "seriously conduct hostilities" against Germany. Sadoul knew perfectly well for what purpose the Bolsheviks

¹Smolny Women's College was used by the Bolsheviks as their Headquarters.
were trying to reorganize the army. "Freed from war," he said in his letter of January 11, 1918, "they will make every effort to fight against the internal and external bourgeoisie, they will organize Russia, and will prepare in peace time an army which will afterwards assist the proletariat of Central and Western Europe to rid themselves of the old order." Mr. Raymond Robbins also admitted subsequently, before the investigation Committee of the United States Senate, that he "from the beginning was in full understanding of that purpose (of the World Revolution), but encouraged the Bolsheviks as the first attack was to be directed against Germany.

At the same time, however, the Allied powers were preparing for other measures to paralyze the Bolshevist peace with Germany. Beginning with December, 1919, they were engaged in parleys for intervention, to build up a so-called "Eastern Front" somewhere in Russia, in order at any rate to divert the German Army from being transferred to the Western Front, against France. Intervention—this was the meaning of the new stage which was to commence as soon as the hope for using the Bolshevist armies against Germany was definitely lost. The British landed in Murmansk and in Archangel, and the Japanese in Vladivostok. For a time the Allies succeeded in combining that policy with preserving a friendly attitude towards the Soviets. They even continued promising assistance to them. But as early as the end of April this ambiguous attitude became impossible. "Is it our intention to intervene without the Soviet or against them?" Sadoul asked on April 30, in behalf of Chicherin and Trotsky. On June 28, and on July 13, Chicherin protested against the advance of the British troops southwards from
Murmansk. On June 13, the Soviet complained that French officers had taken part in the "White Guard" mutiny of the Czecho-Slovaks. And indeed, at that very time the first anti-Bolshevist front was formed at Samara and the first anti-Bolshevist government appeared ("The Committee of the Members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly"). Thenceforth, the Allied effort turned to that side. The in partibus diplomatists had to be dismissed: Sadoul turned Bolshevik, Robbins was recalled, and Lockhart began to work for an anti-Bolshevist movement.

We shall have to return to that second stage of the Allied policy on another occasion. That stage did not last long. The main purpose of the Allied intervention on the new "Eastern front," namely the diversion of Germany's military forces to the East, disappeared with Germany's defeat. On August 9, the United States Ambassador for the last time described the Russian people as an "Ally against a common enemy." After the armistice of November 11, 1918, there was no "common enemy" any more. The enemy of the Entente was defeated. The enemy of Russia, Bolshevism, was considered as the "common enemy" of all the "capitalist" States only by the Bolsheviks themselves.

However, the Bolshevik diplomacy was sure that the "World Capitalism" would understand that. The Bolsheviks firmly believed that directly after the armistice the "capitalist" powers would turn their front against the World Revolution. Mr. Lenin was heard to say that "the situation was never so dangerous." As they knew the situation very well, they expected the blow to come—not from the North or the East, but from the South, as the most vulnerable point. Trotsky
declared beforehand (October 12) that the Allies would pass through the Straits to Southern Russia and that the Don Region would “become the wedge of the World Revolution.” Mr. Wilson’s project to build a “League of Nations,” they also explained in that light. Lenin’s comment was that here the world capitalism was going to form its own “International,”—a counterpart to the “Third International” of Moscow. Two “fronts” opposed to each other in a mortal grip: Lenin’s front and President Wilson’s front. Such was for a time the favorite theme of the Red press editorials.

Great was the astonishment of the Bolshevik leaders when, instead of an Allied armed force coming through the Straits, there came to Moscow from the Paris Peace Conference on January 22, 1919, a proposal to come and sit at the same table with the “bourgeois” diplomats and to discuss the question of peace. This sounded rather strange, and the first moment the Bolsheviks thought they were mistaken. But the news was confirmed, and the Bolsheviks decided at once to make use of the unexpected “respite.” Some objections were raised by M. M. Zinoviev and Kamenev. Would not, they wondered, the character of the Soviet Republic be altered and eventually destroyed by negotiations with “bourgeois” governments? Lenin had a ready answer. “Periods of rest,” he said, “are necessary for the successful development of the Bolshevik doctrine throughout the world. . . . After having conquered, as it were, two-thirds of the enemy territory, we must interrupt our offensive in order to establish new lines of communication, organize new depots, bring up more heavy guns, munitions, fresh reserves. I have never hesitated,” he went on to say, “to come to terms with bourgeois
governments when by so doing I could weaken the bourgeoisie and strengthen the proletariat in all countries. It is sound strategy in war to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of a mortal blow possible. . . . We must make peace not only with the Entente but also with Poland, Lithuania and the Ukraine, and all the other forces which are opposing us in Russia. We must be prepared to make every concession, promise and sacrifice in order to entice our foes into the conclusion of this peace. . . . We shall know that we have but concluded a truce permitting us to complete our preparations for a decisive onslaught.” These last words are confirmed by the fact that at that very moment, on January 23, 1919, Lenin was sending round an invitation, by wireless, to all revolutionary “socialists and communists of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal coloring” to come to Moscow and definitely to organize the “Third International.” We also know what provisions were taken simultaneously to start the World Revolution in the spring of 1919. Its failure to materialize has shown that Lenin’s “sound strategy” of postponement and truce was the more reasonable one.

That policy also soon became the policy of the Allies. In another place we shall come back to their policy of intervention on the anti-Bolshevist side, as it reflected itself in their activities in 1919. We shall then see the causes of the failure of that line of conduct, which, however, never was consistently carried out. As a result of that failure, the year 1920 opened with the famous decision of the second Paris Conference (January 17) to trade with the Soviets through the coöperatives. Two other policies still kept running side by side with Mr. Lloyd George’s policy of rap-
prochement with the Bolsheviks. I mean Mr. Clemenceau’s policy of the “barbed wire” and “sanitary cordon” around Russia, made of the border States, and Mr. Winston Churchill’s policy of intervention. As a consequence, the Supreme Council in Paris at the same session recognized the de facto independence of three Transcaucasian Republics, while the British squadron was ordered to proceed from Malta to the Black Sea, in order to observe the movements of the Red Army in the direction of Persia, India and China.

Out of the three policies mentioned, it was Mr. Lloyd George’s policy that survived. It is true, that Great Britain remained alone in her desire to conclude a trade agreement with the Bolshevist Russia. The French and Belgian delegates systematically emphasized the hopelessness of trade relations with Russia, as long as the Bolshevist rule continued to exist. It was also clear from the very beginning that at least two of the three conditions which Mr. Lloyd George put to the head of the Bolshevist mission in London, Mr. Krassin, would never be complied with by the Bolsheviks. Mr. Lloyd George insisted on cessation of the anti-British propaganda by the Bolsheviks and on non-interference with the British interests in the East. At the same time, an open communist propaganda subsidized with Bolshevist money was being carried on in London, and the Red Armies were occupying Azerbaidjan, making an incursion into Persia negotiating with Afghanistan and conspiring with Indian leaders. At a later date they flooded Georgia and Armenia, while, on the Western frontier, they were approaching Warsaw. The Bolshevist diplomacy scorned the Allied notes and twice refused the invitation to come to London with other representatives of the Border
States (July 11 and 28). On their part, they proposed to convene a conference of the Allied Powers on an equal footing with the Bolsheviks. As a condition of peace with Poland, the Bolshevik diplomacy proposed the organization of a civic militia of workmen. It meant coming back to the basic slogan of a communist world revolution: "Disarm the bourgeoisie, arm the proletarians."

Nothing short of a defeat of the Red Army at the hands of the Poles was needed to change that attitude of the Bolshevik diplomatists—and also that of the British Premier. Mr. Lloyd George finally decided to send away from London the Bolshevik Commissary, Mr. Kamenev, who was guilty of the regular Bolshevik tricks, and he suspended the "political" side of his negotiations. However, trade negotiations were resumed in September, 1920, and after fully nine months the British-Soviet Trade treaty was finally concluded. On the same day, Sir Robert Horne handed Mr. Krassin a paper disclosing some of the aspects of the Bolshevik propaganda in Asia. Simultaneously the Bolshevik diplomacy counted some minor successes in the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and Italy.

How did all this affect the basic Bolshevik aspiration for world revolution?

We have a series of Mr. Lenin's and his friends' avowals as to their mistakes in counting on an immediate advent of the world revolution. But we have none, as to the presumed change of the principle itself.

"Yes, perhaps we were wrong," Mr. Zinoviev said at the International Communist Congress in July, 1920. "Not one year, but two or three will be necessary for all Europe to become Soviet. You still have a period of grace, before you will be destroyed." On
August 23, 1920, Mr. Lenin gave voice to the same opinion—with the same underlying hope. "We have learned to understand," he said, "during the last three years, that basing ourselves on an international revolution does not mean calculating on a definite date, and that the increasing rapidity of development may bring a revolution in the spring (of 1921) or it may not. . . .

We must, therefore, know how to adapt our activity to the mutual class relations within our own and other countries, that we may be able to retain the dictatorship of the proletariat for a long time and, at least gradually, to cure all the ills and crises besetting us."

At any rate, "the world revolution is growing stronger, while the economic crisis in Europe is getting worse at the same time." . . . "Of course, the world revolution has made a great step forward, in comparison with the last year."

World revolution was thus not lost sight of. But the Bolshevist diplomacy now had a much more difficult task to solve. It had to "adapt itself" to changing conditions of work, instead of imposing its own solutions. And it had to use every opportunity to speed up the cause of the world revolution, and at the same time be ready to extend its activity "for a long time."

The new instructions to the Bolshevist diplomatists, for 1921, which were issued by Chicherin, were formulated accordingly. Their basic motive was: let us foment foreign discords and conflicts while trying to divert their attention for a while from Bolshevist Russia. "We must see to it that the center of gravity is transferred from us to the West. Let European diplomats break their heads over the solution of problems that cannot be solved. We shall always manage to remain the decisive factor. It is not to our benefit that
we should be feared and our power exaggerated. It is best for us to be temporarily in the shadow. Official recognition of our representatives, development of trade relations, gradual dissemination of propaganda and the strengthening of our authority among the proletarian masses—these are the aims of our work.” Accordingly, it was up to the Bolshevik diplomats to bide their time and in the meanwhile not be sparing of concessions. “Germany is in need of moral support? We will furnish that. Germany needs security for her eastern border? That shall be promised her. France wants to see us helpless? Let us show her our helplessness. England wants to exploit us? We shall grant her every opportunity to do so.” At the same time no opportunity to breed an international conflict must be left unheeded. Mr. Chicherin suggested to his missions abroad the following combinations as worthy of consideration. “British-Japanese, as a threat to America; British-German, as a threat to France; Italian-Greek as a counter-balance to the policies of England and France in the Near East; Polish-French as a direct threat to Germany; Czech-Rumanian as a threat to Hungary,” etc. “Should circumstances interfere with our activity in the West, it will then be necessary to transfer the center of our diplomatic work to the Balkan Peninsula and to capture the sphere of influence in the Near East.”

The Bolshevik agents abroad worked accordingly. I am in a position to give you a summary of their observations and suggestions to the central government, as given in their reports in the summer months of 1921. In substance, it was as follows:

So far as the West is concerned the Bolshevik observers know that the time for a direct world revolu-
tion is now over. The economic crisis upon which they were building their hopes is gradually settling down. The situation is no longer catastrophic for international capitalism. The post-war crisis had caught the working men unprepared, and they had let the moment pass. Now they are even more disorganized than a year ago, in spite of the activity of the Third International. The observer might add that the disorganization has come not "in spite" of, but as a consequence of Lenin's orders to the Third International. In a word, the chance for attacking capitalism at the moment of its greatest weakness has gone.

This is especially true as far as Germany is concerned. This country, according to the Bolshevist observers, has shown endurance, energy and steadiness at work to a quite astonishing degree. In Austria the situation remains critical, but it is better than a year ago. In Hungary as well as in Bulgaria the national economy has now been brought to a settled condition. Great Britain labors under an unprecedented crisis of unemployment, but the Government keeps the nation informed on all the difficulties of the situation, and, as a result, the confidence of the population in its Government is not at all shattered. In France, the near future is gloomy. Confidence and mutual understanding between the nation and the Government are here lacking. Finance and economy are in a bad condition. The only hope lies in the resumption of trade with Russia, France's chief pre-war customer. But this issue is precluded by wrong politics. Italy is ready to trade with everybody on a non-political basis. But all the hopes which were founded on the emotional receptivity of the working class were deluded. The revolutionary enthusiasm of the Italian communists did not stand
the test of the first serious resistance—by the fascist. The bourgeoisie organized themselves for self-defense, and the communist groups were obliged to change their open propaganda for underground work. Czecho-Slovakia has proved a much stronger organism than was to be expected. The reason is—a deeply-rooted instinct for private property (sic). A deep mutual understanding between the working men and employers precludes any possibility of success for the communist propaganda. National conflicts are also eliminated by a great degree of national toleration. Jugo-Slavia, on the contrary, is a State of the lowest culture. But it is an agricultural country, and no class antagonisms are here possible. The social movement on a communist basis, of course, could not strike roots in such a country. However, national conflicts are active here and can be exploited in the future. Rumania is as rich and as patriarchal as she was before the war, and is as much lacking in any industrial development. But outbreaks of national hatred are unavoidable, as a consequence of the recent annexations of the populations which are much more developed and receptive for social teachings than the original Rumanian stock. Poland's situation is still more compromised, and a crisis is here unavoidable, as a combined result of the aggressive imperialism of the leading political parties, the intense hatred of the annexed populations towards the Poles, the high degree of class consciousness of the Polish proletariat and the extremely poor economic conditions.

The foregoing may lead to the inference that nothing important could have been done in the West of Europe by the communist organizations. They were helping the Irish revolutionary movement, they supported strikes in Great Britain, carried on communist
propaganda in the Navy, in Manchester and Birmingham. In France—they transferred their activity to the French African colonies, in order to tender their hand to the revolutionary communists in Turkey and thus “close” the circle. They admit that their work in Germany was quite unsuccessful and that the attempt at an uprising in Hall (in March, 1921) was a grave mistake which caused the collapse of the whole organization. “The German working man is too realistic and only then does he decide on action when he clearly sees the practical consequence of his step.”

You see that the Bolshevik agents in Western Europe are not lacking in powers of observation. Their views as to the chances of communist success in the West are thoroughly pessimistic. But it is quite different with the situation in the East.

Of course, even here they no longer hope for immediate outbreaks. They are especially careful that their “trump card,” a revolution in India, should not be spoilt by any premature and thoughtless attempt. But they see great opportunities for the near future: not in the sense of an extensive social movement, but as the consequence of a widely spread pro-Turkish and Pan-Islamic propaganda. They report that they were here “obliged to renounce a forcible planting of communist ideas, and have had to cover the aim of the Communist International under a nationalist cloak.”

They are very well satisfied with the result. “In 1919,” they say, “we had great difficulties in defending Turkestan from the British influence. In 1921 we are out to attack the capitalist buttresses in India.” After their first congress at Samarkand and their second congress at Baku, after their last diplomatic negotiations at Trebizond, which ended with the conclusion of a
treaty between Afghanistan and the Government of Angora (April 25, 1921), they feel sure they have reached the stage of "a united and powerful Mussulman movement of the down-trodden nation, which will deal the final blow to the domination of capital and destroy its colonial basis."

They particularly appreciate the Indian national movement, for the reason that here they find themselves in their own atmosphere of social and class struggle. However, they are not at all induced by the reports of their communist organizations in India to believe that the outbreak must be undertaken just now. They believe, on the contrary, that a certain time must pass before the crisis will be reached and "the narrow nationalistic movement based on religious prejudices and on survivals of olden times, will be diluted in the powerful stream of a "proletarian uprising."

Until then, they appreciate highly the part played by the Turkish national Government in Angora, and they state that in spite of all exertions of the British diplomacy, in spite even of the "partial successes" of Great Britain in Egypt and on the Afghan frontier, as well as in Southwestern Persia, they nevertheless succeeded in arranging for coöperation with Angora. They are especially proud of having finished with the double game of Afghanistan and having caused the Afghans to recognize the political supremacy of Turkey in the great Mohammedan movement. The defensive alliance against foreign aggression, covered by points 4 and 8 of the Treaty, "annuls all British achievements in the Afghan question and creates a situation full of menace for the British domination of India."

You see that in spite of their skepticism concerning the West, the Bolshevist diplomatists are still very
hopeful so far as the general situation is concerned. Their analysis of the situation in the East makes them again not only optimists, but visionaries. They predict that as a consequence of a general shifting of the World politics, from Europe to Asia, the Pan-Islamic movement will necessarily come to the forefront. They are quite sure as to their friendly contact with the Turkish national assembly at Angora, and they think they can even have "a certain influence on the trend of events in Asia Minor and in Eastern Africa. "At present," they declare, "the whole territory from the Ganges to the Nile may be looked upon as a united front of enslaved nations, fighting against their oppressors for liberty and national civilization. The spiritual and the organizing center of the movement, which embraces hundreds of millions of Moslems, finds itself in Angora, and its branches are in Samarkand and in Cairo. . . . The diplomatic front, on which Soviet Russia defends the oppressed nations from the greedy hands of International capital, surrounds the powers of the Entente with a regular half-circle from Riga to Morocco. In the very next days this front threatens to be converted into a military front. The weakest point for Eastern capital, as represented by the Governments of the Entente, appears to be the Eastern frontier of (Western) Europe, round which the very next events will take place, which will mean the beginning of the end for the capitalistic hegemony of the victorious powers and the era of liberation for the working masses."

This is how, in a long roundabout way, the Bolshevik diplomatists have succeeded in regaining their initial enthusiasm about the imminent World Revolution. "Thoughts that breathe and words that burn" are inherent in their political and social creed. It is irrele-
vant that they have taken their new commandments from another people's catechism. They do not ask themselves just what has the Pan-Islamist movement in common with the communist ideal. They want something grandiose, and here is new stuff for glowing rhetoric. The light comes from Asia!

I am not going to discuss the problems here raised,—which are very serious indeed. It would make me digress very far from Russian Bolshevism. My only aim has been to show that now, as four years ago, the Bolsheviks still stick to their great illusion. They are ready to sacrifice everything, to "make every concession and promise," in order to see their vision materialize and to stay in power until they enter their promised land.
CHAPTER VI.

ANTI-BOLSHEVIST RUSSIA.

The subject of this chapter is as important for a general understanding of Russian events during these four last years, as it is complicated. Public opinion on the anti-Bolshevist Russia has been hardly less biased than on the Bolshevist régime. Of course, I shall try to put aside current popular judgments and let facts speak by themselves, just as I tried to do so concerning Bolshevism. But beside that danger of being—or rather seeming to be—partial, there are other causes which make the subject intricate. Anti-Bolshevist Russia was not one. It was divided in at least two different and in the main opposite political trends which only rarely came together. We saw the origin of their scission in the chapter which explained the causes of the Bolshevist victory. The non-socialist current held the moderate socialists responsible for their common defeat by the Bolsheviks. The Kornilov movement intensified that difference of attitudes, as it was directed against moderate socialism and morally supported by a part of its political antagonists. The scission weakened both anti-Bolshevist currents equally, and made easier the Bolshevist coup d'état.

Common defeat brought about a new stage of rapprochement. For about a year (November, 1917-November, 1918) both the socialist and non-socialist cur-
rents coöperated against Bolshevism. We shall see that the growth of influence of the military non-Bolshevist elements marked the end of coöperation. During the two following years, 1919-1920, the breach between the two anti-Bolshevist camps became irretrievable and again, as in 1917, the scission was followed by defeat. The situation changed for the fourth time, when the military anti-Bolshevist elements definitely broke down. A new coalition of democratic non-socialist and moderate socialist groups has become a fact from the beginning of 1921. Further events will show whether the reunion of democratic anti-Bolshevist forces will be lasting and will lead to success.

To sum up, there are five stages in the relations between the socialist and non-socialist elements of anti-Bolshevist Russia:

2. Scission—September-October, 1917.
5. Coalition of democratic elements—1921.

A further complication is due to the fact that not only the mutual relations between the two elements of non-Bolshevist Russia were changing, but that at the same time the attitude of the Allies and of the people of Russia towards the non-Bolshevist Russia was also changing. This chapter will show just how and why.

In the midst of these perpetually changing circumstances my personal attitude also could not remain invariable. It underwent an evolution, and to explain it to the reader would be the best means to introduce him to the exposition of facts.
I was an anti-Bolshevik from the very beginning and I still am. But until 1920 I belonged to that group of anti-Bolshevik Russians who thought it possible to liberate Russia by an armed Russian force, with the military help of our former Allies. I no longer belong to that group.

I thought—and I still think it now—that Russia might have been liberated from the Bolshevist yoke by the military method of struggle if all the conditions necessary for success had been duly considered and realized in time. Unfortunately this was not the case, and what was possible then (1918-1919) has become impossible since.

There were three chief causes which turned into failure what might have been a success. These causes are: (1) the insufficient help from the Allies; (2) the reactionary policy of the military leaders and (3) the disappointment in them on the part of the Russian people.

The first condition for success which did not materialize was the Allied help. I mentioned already how wavering and uncertain the Allied policy was towards Russia in distress. Now and then representative statesmen recalled to their peoples their "obligations of honor" and of "mutual loyalty" towards Russia. They were moral obligations, as a result of the great sacrifices Russia made in the war, but they were also legal obligations, as a consequence of that "one treaty which was not secret, the London Pact of October 4, 1914, which bound the Allied nations to make war in common and not to make peace except in unity" (Mr. Winston Churchill in the Commons, Nov. 5, 1919). It was understood that there existed an "unbroken continuity between the position held by the Russia anti-Bolshevist leaders and that position held by their (the
British) erstwhile great ally, without whose aid they never could have won the war" (the same speech by Mr. W. Churchill). Lord Robert Cecil regarded it as "the foundation of good faith and of the possibility of sincere dealing between one country and another," that "the engagements towards Russia shall be carried out," and he thought that "no responsible politician could throw doubt on this principle" (May 16, 1917). Sir Edward Carson once more solemnly declared: "We shall not abandon Russia" (October 26, 1917, Le Temps).

We shall see that the help that was really given to anti-Bolshevist Russia on the basis of that principle of continuation of a common struggle was selfish and inconsistent. But within the same cabinet there was another policy which paralyzed even such inefficient help as was actually given. It was this policy, the policy of Mr. Lloyd George, which finally triumphed. It was the policy of "hands off Russia" which for a long time identified itself with the policy of the Labor Party. Far from helping the anti-Bolshevist Russia on the principle of "unbroken continuity," the partisans of that policy wished to break the continuity as soon as possible: to recall as soon as possible the Allied troops still remaining in different parts of Russia, to stop sending munitions and, finally, to refuse every kind of aid. Between the two opposite principles the actual policy developed in zigzags.

The second—and probably the more important—cause of the anti-Bolshevist failure was the reactionary policy of the military leaders and of their environment. This was also the reason why the "hands off Russia" policy had the upper hand. It would not have amounted to much if that policy had been confined to
mere pro-Bolshevist circles. If the Bolshevist propaganda was able to determine or to modify the policy of the Allied Governments, it was because large circles of liberal public opinion grew suspicious. The world which deeply sympathized with the glorious beginnings of our Revolution of 1917 did not at all wish to see its sound principles and its lasting acquisitions thrown overboard all along with its horrible excesses.

There was little reason for suspicion at the beginning of the anti-Bolshevist struggle. There were reactionary elements among the "whites" but they kept quiet; the enthusiasm of the Revolution was as yet too strong in the "white" ranks to encourage that particular group. All the political elements, socialistic, democratic, liberal and conservative, stood together and there was no difference of opinion between them as to the admissibility of Allied help, which had not yet been called "intervention." However, gradually the military anti-Bolshevist movement degenerated into a purely reactionary movement. As a consequence, the socialist groups were the first to change their attitude towards it. They declared themselves neutral. For the Russian non-socialist liberal democracy, to which I belong, it also became increasingly difficult to identify itself with the reactionary tendencies of the "white" movement. For a while they abstained from open criticism, as they did not wish to interfere with the possibility of a military victory over the Bolsheviks. They understood only too well that it would not be a victory of liberalism in Russia. But at the same time they did not believe in the possibility of a lasting reaction in post-revolutionary Russia. They found their consolation in the idea that, at least, it would be some kind of State that would be reéstablished in Russia, while the
very foundations of Statehood had been destroyed by the Bolsheviks.

Now there came that third circumstance which made clear why the defeat of the anti-Bolshevist generals was inevitable, and it definitely changed the stand of the Russian democratic liberals. The Russian people themselves, the great silent masses, proved to be not at all willing to be liberated by the reactionaries, in whose ranks they recognized their former landlords. This is where many of us had to change and to improve our view of the masses. We had thought that the attitude of the popular masses toward the "white" movement would be if not sympathetic, at least passively neutral. But it was not. The uneducated Russian masses, who were thought to be groping in the darkness, proved to be the first to understand the situation as it really was. For the first time many of us then understood how great was the evolution of the Russian peasants towards political consciousness, which was caused not by Bolshevism, but by the Revolution.

Henceforth, there was no more room for doubts or wavering. Everybody understood that—and why—the military anti-Bolshevist movement had no more chance to win. Further bloodshed now appeared not only useless but criminal. One had to admit that the "white" movement far from being able to weaken the Bolsheviks was practically strengthening them, by keeping up the spirit of the Red Army, by giving them a chance to live at the expense of internal civil war, and also by giving the excuse of patriotism to former officers of the General Staff in the Bolshevist service. The Allied policy made good material for indignation against our former Allies. Their rôle was now ex-
plained not as that of Allies bringing help but as that of foreigners bent on intervention. Help was welcome. Intervention was to be repudiated.

The entire tactics of Russia's liberation had now to be changed. It was the new tactics that served as a basis for rapprochement between the moderate socialist and non-socialist democratic groups in 1921. Their common opinion now was that the liberation of Russia had to come about as the result of an internal process of change of mind in the large masses, not as the result of a military invasion from the outside, which now had definitely become impossible, both psychologically and technically. To follow closely and to help that internal process has now become the predominant aim of the Russian democratic groups. The remaining detachments of the former white armies were expected to demobilize. This idea, of course, met with resistance on the part of the military elements, which have definitely broken with democracy and joined the reactionary current which works for the restoration of monarchy.

There is one more point to make before we go into details. Where is the anti-Bolshevist Russia? Is it on this or on that side of the Russian frontier?

The anti-Bolshevist Russia is all Russia except the Communist Party, or rather a part of the Communist Party. All tendencies of the anti-Bolshevist Russia are to be found on both sides of the frontiers. The reactionary element, of course, is more largely represented among the émigrés. It is rare but not entirely lacking in Russia. The liberal and socialist political parties are much more differentiated outside of Russia, as a consequence of the possibility of free discussion of future possibilities and open expression of opinion. In
Russia the same tendencies, with the same variations, also exist, but the general tone of the underground political life is an intensely negative attitude towards the common enemy at present.

The history of the anti-Bolshevist Russia begins from the very moment of the Bolshevist victory. In November, 1917, all parties were united against the usurpers. The attitude of the large class of functionaries was that of complete abstention from co-operation with the new power: the Bolsheviks called it "sabotage." As long as there was any hope of the immediate overthrow of the Bolsheviks and as long as the means of subsistence were not entirely exhausted, this attitude of opposition did not change. Later on, some few fled away or continued their opposition in secret. The majority were obliged to enter the Bolshevist service, but only a few entered the Communist Party. Most of the anti-Bolshevist functionaries that entered the Bolshevist service called themselves "sympathizers" (of Bolshevism) or "non-party." On the contrary, the resistance of the workingmen to the Bolshevist régime increased with time and in the spring of 1918 attempts were already made for mass risings. The "Conference of Factory Workers," representing more than 100,000 workingmen of Petrograd, met in April, 1918, and demanded the resignation of the soviets and the transmission of power to the Constituent Assembly. The same demand was put forth by the railroad men, who threatened the Government with a strike. The sailors in Petrograd, who had helped the Bolsheviks to their November victory, repeatedly demanded the resignation of the Soviet Commissaries. The same regiments of the Petrograd Guards that brought about the November overthrow had to be dis-
armed a few weeks later, as well as many divisions of the Red Army, sailors serving on mine-sweepers, etc. It was then that the Bolsheviks began to resort to hired detachments of aliens, Chinese, Letts and Hungarians.

Out of all the Russian political parties only the left wing of the Social-Democrats (Mr. Martov's "internationalist" group) consented to coöperate with the Bolshevik Government. All the other parties, the so-called "minority" of the Social-Democrats ("Mensheviks" as opposed to the "majority," the "Bolsheviks"), the Social-Democratic group of the late Plekhanov ("Unity"), nearly all the Social-Revolutionaries, the Socialists-Populists and the Constitutional-Democrats (the "Cadets") were opposed to the Bolsheviks. All the parties mentioned together represent Russian democracy. The other, the conservative and reactionary (the "right") wing in Russian politics is not organized in political parties: such conservative and reactionary parties as had existed at the time of the Dumas (1907-1917) had been artificially built with the help of the Tsarist Government and broke down completely under the Revolution of 1917 (the "Octobrists," the "Nationalists," the "Union of the Russian People," etc.) Such elements of them as remained were unable to join the democratic groups, even for the purpose of fighting the Bolsheviks. That is why there were two separate political coalitions in the first half of 1918: the "Right Center" (conservative and reactionary) and the "Left Center" (the left wing of the cadets and the socialists).

The further evolution of these groups took place in the middle of 1918 (May) under the direct influence of the Allied scheme to form a new "Eastern Front" (see Chapters V and XI). After the Brest-Litovsk
Treaty some conservative and reactionary groups entered into relations with the German representatives in Petrograd and in Moscow. "Germanophilism" was traditional in these political circles, and they cherished the hope of making use of the Germans to restore monarchy in Russia. The secret soon leaked out and the disclosure brought about a scission among the members of the "Right Center." The more liberal elements, which were strongly pro-Ally, detached themselves from the "Right Center" (which soon ceased to exist) and built a new and really central group which called itself the "National Center," and entered into negotiations with the Allied diplomatists (especially Mr. Noulens). At the same time individual members of democratic and socialist parties formed a bloc called the "Union for Russia's Regeneration," which also entered into official negotiations with the Allies for restoring an Allied front in Russia. They even proposed to the Allies the plan for a military campaign on Russian territory, with the participation of the Allied armies, against the Bolsheviks. In June both groups received from Mr. Noulens a "verbal note" in which, among other things, was communicated the Allied decision to send military forces sufficiently numerous in order that the struggle might be successfully carried on from the very beginning and a regular anti-Bolshevist army evolve from the small partisan detachments. I must add that all three political groups (reactionary, central and democratic) had connections with respective groups of officers ready to start on an open struggle. As I have already mentioned, that struggle was universally considered to be a continuation—a new chapter—of the World War, and nobody thought that it might be construed as "intervention." The Bolshevist-German
alliance was an accomplished fact; German and Austrian prisoners of war were being organized in detachments and receiving arms and munitions from the Allied stores. Under such conditions, Allied help to the anti-Bolshevist Russian forces appeared quite natural.

Unfortunately, the germs of future misunderstandings were already in existence both between different Russian political organizations and between the Russians and the Allies. The "Union for Russia’s Regeneration" insisted on a collective form of a future central power: a "Directory of five or, at least, three members." The conservative wing wished to have at the head of the anti-Bolshevist movement a single person, a military dictator with unlimited powers. There was also no unity of opinion concerning the part to be played by the Constituent Assembly. The "Union" agreed that this Assembly, which had been elected after the November overthrow, under the influence of the Bolsheviks, and which included up to 40 per cent. of the Bolsheviks, could not be considered, after its dissolution by the Bolsheviks in January, 1918, as a legal exponent of the sovereign power of the people. But at the same time the "Union" was against its complete suppression. The moderate wing found, to the contrary, that the Constituent Assembly could no longer function as an institution, for any purpose whatever. The note of Mr. Noulens tried to conciliate both views and it proposed a compromise. The Constituent Assembly should meet only for two or three days, in order to sanction the newly-formed Government, to work out an electoral law for elections to a new Constituent Assembly, and then dissolve. The same note admitted that the new Government ought to be formed of three
members (i. e., it accepted the form of a "directory"). Both political organizations, which formally declared themselves pro-Ally, the "National Center" and "the Union for Russia's Regeneration," decided at the end of May to accept that scheme, and they even selected the three members, and substitutes for them, representing the military command and two political coalitions. General Alexeiev and his candidate, General Boldyrev, especially acceptable to the socialists, were chosen to represent the former element. Mr. Avxentiev was to represent the "Union," and I, or, in my place, Mr. N. I. Astrov or, as his substitute, Mr. V. Vinogradov, the Cadet member of the Duma, had to represent the "National Center." I purposely mention all these details, in order that the readers may better understand further developments and complications.

Another source of misunderstanding, no less serious than the difference of opinion between the Russian political coalitions, was the difference of views and aims of the Allies from those of the Russians. The Allied intervention, as the American Government stated it (see Chapter X), was intended rather to "make use of Russia," than "to serve her." The Allied promises to send sufficiently numerous armies in order to at once assure the anti-Bolshevist success could not possibly be kept. But the Allied representatives in Russia made the Russian political and military organizations believe it. Their immediate aim was achieved. Serious disturbances and uprisings took place in June, July and August, in provincial towns surrounding Moscow: Ribbinsk, Vladimir, Yaroslavl and Murom. It was promised that the detachments of the Allied troops, having landed in the North, in Murmansk and Archangel, would come on time to
their relief via Vologda, where the Allied diplomatic representatives had settled after the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace (March). As was to be expected, the promised help did not come.¹ The revolts in Ribi-binsk and Vladimir were stifled at once. Those in Murom and Yaroslavl succeeded, but issued in useless bloodshed. Yaroslavl held out for eleven full days, but finally fell, battered by the heavy artillery of the Bolsheviks. Whole quarters of that old Russian city were in ruins, heaps of dead bodies lay in the streets, and the population blamed the Allies for having broken their pledge.

However, the Allies decided, instead of their own armies, to make use of the Czecho-Slovak detachments, which had been formed of war prisoners belonging to that friendly Slav nation and had fought in the ranks of the Russian Army against their Austrian oppressors. They were ordered in February, 1918, to leave Russia and to go to the French front. At the moment when an “Eastern Front” was planned, this seemed very strange: the Czecho-Slovaks (and the Serbs) were practically the only Allied troops who were on the spot and could have been a real factor in the struggle. “Why send these troops out of Russia,” Ambassador Francis was wondering on March 30, 1918, “if an army is forming to resist the Germans?” “It would seem a foolish waste of time, money and tonnage to send troops around the world to get to the French front,” Mr. Raymond Robbins had surmised a day before. The Czecho-Slovaks in the meantime were slowly mov-

¹The original operations of French and British troops in Murmansk took place in April, on the supposition of cooperation with the Bolsheviks against the Germans. But by the middle of July the Allied forces occupied the whole of the Murman coast and moved southwards, via Kem, Soroki, Sumskiposad on the road to Onega.
ing to the East on their way to Vladivostok. They had reached the Volga and Cheliabinsk. At Cheliabinsk, on May 26, the Czecho-Slovak “rebellion” began. They occupied the railroad station and the city, took up arms, removed and arrested the Bolshevist authorities. They were ordered to disarm but disobeyed the order and fired on the Bolshevist forces. On June 4, the four Allied powers declared that they would consider the disarming of the Czecho-Slovaks as a hostile act. At the same time a decisive encounter took place between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Reds in Penza and at the Rtischevo station.

The war was thus formally begun, and immediately the Russian working men and the officers’ organizations, controlled by the Social-Revolutionary Party, joined hands with the Czecho-Slovaks on their approach to Samara (June 8). A “Committee of Members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly” was formed on the same day and a decision was reached to organize a new “People's Army” on the basis of voluntary enlistment. The Cossacks of Orenburg and the Urals joined the Czecho-Slovaks and the People’s Army. Altogether they did not number many men and they were poorly armed. But they showed great enthusiasm and capacity for self-sacrifice. The Commandant Alphonse Guinet, the French military adviser, was in Samara and it was his idea that a “Volga front” should be built, extending from Kazan to Samara, in the hope that they would soon be relieved by the Allies coming from the (non-existent) “Northern Front,” near Vologda. The task was almost impossible to accomplish. But after a very strenuous effort which cost heavy losses in men, Simbirsk was taken (July 22) and after Simbirsk, Kazan (August 7), under new promises of Captain
Borde, that the Allied army would join the anti-Bolshevist force by way of Viatka. For thirty-four days the Czechs and the People's Army held Kazan, while the working men of the Ishevsk Mines captured Sarapul and Elabuga, and proceeded towards Perm. Final success seemed to be assured, if only the Allies could come in time. But they could not and, what is still worse, did not intend to. On September 10, the small number of exhausted defenders gave up Kazan. In October the anti-Bolshevik troops had to leave Samara, and the "Volga front" was definitely broken up.

They now accused the Allies of having tied them up to a scheme of campaign based on consciously unrealizable promises. "If we had only known," Col. V. I. Lebedev says, "that the 50,000 Japanese and American soldiers who disembarked at Vladivostok did not intend to come to our help in the immediate future and that the holding of our front would be left to us and the Czechs, it is quite possible that instead of trying to open a way to Vladivostok and to build a front 4,700 miles long and 500 miles wide, we would have concentrated our forces on the Volga front and moved on to Moscow right after the capture of Kazan, in July or August. . . . We would have had enough troops for the advance on Moscow if we had not had to defend the Volga front while awaiting the arrival of the Allies." I leave it to the military authorities to decide whether the author is right or not. At any rate, his words express the state of mind of the anti-Bolsheviks after their first disappointment in the Allied help. A char-

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1 "The Russian Democracy in its Struggle Against the Bolshevist Tyranny" (Published by the Russian Information Bureau, Woolworth Building, New York). Col. V. I. Lebedev was one of the chief military commanders in that campaign of June-September, 1918.
acteristic feature of that first stage of the anti-Bolshevist armed struggle is that it is quite impossible to apply to it the terms "intervention" or "reaction." The movement was genuinely national and thoroughly democratic. This is also the only movement of that kind that developed from within Russia—of course, with the aid of foreign (Czecho-Slovak) disciplined troops—which secured a temporary success. This stage is unjustly forgotten, and that is why I especially wished to recall it in this short outline.

In the following stages the struggle passes from central Russia to the outskirts: to southern and southeastern Russia, on the one side, and to Siberia on the other. This geographical division of areas proved as fatal to the success of the anti-Bolshevist struggle, as the differences of political opinion and the inefficiency of the Allied help.

The advantages and the drawbacks of the two different theaters of military offensive against Moscow seem to be quite clear at the first glance on the map. Here were the rich provinces of Southern Russia, the Russian granary, densely settled, with easy access to the Russian center, through a railway net starting from the best harbors of the Black Sea and converging at Moscow. It is true that access to the Black Sea through the Dardanelles was closed to the Allies until the armistice (Nov. 11, 1918). But actual intervention developed after that date. On the other hand, there were the three harbors most remote from Moscow, Murmansk and Archangel in the North of Russia, Vladivostok in the Far East. They could have been easily controlled by the Allied fleets, but they were most inappropriate starting points for operations on land. They were connected with the interior by single rail-
way tracks passing through deserts very scantily peopled and possessing no local resources. Sufficient supplies could not be secured at such enormous distances from the base, with the constant danger of the railway lines being cut at the rear by the enemy's partisans. Again, it was quite natural that these ports should have been occupied by the Allies during the war time, but it was only by force of inertia that they still continued to use them for the new schemes of intervention after the armistice. As a result the attention of the Allies was persistently concentrated on Siberia and Archangel, while the greatest hope of military success lay with the operations in Southern Russia. Whatever was the reason of that aberration,—lack of knowledge and understanding, lack of sympathy with the undertaking, short-sighted selfishness, a blind game of chance,—the result was bound to be a failure.

Let us now come back to the anti-Bolshevist activities in Southern Russia. They developed directly after the Bolshevist victory in Petrograd and in Moscow, in November, 1917, and they were quite independent from the anti-Bolshevist movement in the interior of Russia. In the very first weeks after the overthrow, in November and December, 1917, the defeated political and military groups that wished to pursue an open struggle against the Bolsheviks were gathering in the land of the Don Cossacks, in their capital, Novocherkassk, and in the large commercial city of Rostov at the mouth of the Don River. General Alexeiev, the former Commander-in-Chief, had come, and he worked out the first plans for building a Volunteer Army. I personally took part in his first negotiations for help with the British, French and American representatives. I must add that at that time no help was given, except
from France through Rumania. A little later on, General Kornilov liberated himself from his seclusion at Bykhov, in which he had been kept by the Provisional Government after his unsuccessful uprising against Kerensky (see Chapter II). He came to Novocherkassk accompanied by his fellow generals, imprisoned with him, Denikin, Markov and others. At once two centers of influence were formed, as there was a good deal of difference between Alexeiev and Kornilov. General Alexeiev, a wise old man, very cautious in his plans, with broad views and great experience, was capable of appreciating the whole political situation and not only the military side of it. He understood perfectly that as things stood, a military movement against the Bolsheviks had to be based on a political platform capable of uniting all political groups, republican and monarchist, radical and conservative. He also saw the importance of basing the political program on the recognition of the leading principles of the March Revolution of 1917. The task was easier then than it has become since, as the recollections were very fresh in everybody's mind as to the part Gen. Alexeiev and other military leaders had played in the initial success of that Revolution. However incensed the officers might have been against Kerensky's policy towards the Army, they still were able to discriminate between a man's personal faults and the great ideas he represented. To be sure there were people at Novocherkassk who already were filled up with white rage and hatred against the Revolution as such. But these people for a time kept silent. Their hero was Kornilov. But Kornilov still called himself a republican and was not fit to become the center of an openly reactionary movement. First and foremost, he was a soldier, in-
trepid, daring in enterprise, rash in decisions, despising politicians and politics, but naïve enough to succumb to the chance influence of some haphazard adviser clever enough to flatter the General's ambition and to suggest a scheme which would be taken up as his own and executed with iron will. A "lion's heart but a sheep's head," as Kornilov was disparagingly characterized by one of his competitor-generals, he was just a contrast to Alexeiev, and they intensely disliked each other. General Kornilov, who had enjoyed the confidence of his mates at the Bykhov seclusion, gradually took the precedence, while General Alexeiev was removed to the second place. This was the origin of the prevailing influence of the military elements over the civil and political ones, in the policy and tactics of the Volunteer Army. From the very beginning the Generals did not understand that it was guerrilla warfare they had to carry on, and that the first condition for its success was to attend first and foremost to the interests of the population which was to be liberated. The great majority of them were satisfied to find themselves again, after the severe experiences of the revolutionary period, in their own sphere of an army organization built on the customary pattern, with its old discipline restored. They at once started building huge staffs each with a numerous personnel, the traditional red tape, etc. They did not see that they had almost no regular soldiers under their command, but only a few hundred young officers and "cadets" who like themselves had fled away from the Bolsheviks and, in their youthful enthusiasm, were ready to play the part of soldiers and, accordingly, to undergo soldiers' privations.

The situation was the more complicated by the fact
that the few “Volunteers” with the many Generals at their head were practically guests in a territory which did not at all desire to take their orders. It was the land of the Don Cossacks. It would be a great mistake to associate that name with the old reputation of the Cossacks as being the most reactionary defenders of the Tsars. The Cossack region belongs to the most democratic parts of Russia. The rank and file Cossacks still constitute the most influential social layer here and possess their landed property in common. They have preserved their military organization and since the Revolution they have restored the old custom of periodically electing their “Ataman,” who is the head of the executive power but is responsible before the Cossack “Krug,” a largely democratic popular assembly which meets at irregular intervals. The Don Cossacks are Great Russians and, with all their love for local autonomy, they are stalwart partisans of Russian unity. A part of the Kuban Cossacks are Little Russians (the Ukrainians) and they are more inclined to separatism. The Cossack strivings for autonomy and the lack of a local aristocracy of big landowners (the few who were there were forced to leave their estates under the Revolution) had for quite a time brought the Cossacks in contact with the Russian liberals and made them abhor the former Tsarist centralization. They now wavered between social radicalism and political moderation. Their younger generation, just coming from the disorganized Russian front, partly grew pro-Bolshevist, but they found themselves at variance with their fathers, mothers and wives, who had remained in their “stanitsas” (the name of the Cossack large village). The issue was uncertain and everything depended on the result of that internal moral struggle. The appearance
of the Volunteer Army under these conditions was looked upon askance. Radical groups of the population considered them as intruders and potential reactionaries. Moderate groups did not dare to take up their defense openly. The first Ataman elected, the chivalrous General Kaledin, was a warm partisan of the Kornilov movement, but he was also a thoroughly democratic representative of his region. He most willingly gave hospitality to the "White Generals" and their Volunteers, and he tried to help them enlist as many Cossacks as he could. But here he met with the radical evolution of mind in the midst of the Cossacks and he soon lost confidence in his own authority. The moral tragedy of that noble character was that of the whole of Russia. On the one side there was the necessity of building a strong military power to save Russia; on the other—the fact of democratic tendencies of the population, evolving into Bolshevism and decidedly opposed to the mission of the Volunteer Army.

Under such conditions, the position of some 300 young officers gathered at Novocherkassk and Rostov, in the midst of a population which was partly indifferent and partly openly hostile, soon became untenable. Early in December, 1917, they had a chance to prove their usefulness to the population, by stifling a Bolshevist uprising in Rostov. By January, 1918, they numbered about 3,000. But their very success drew the attention of the Bolsheviks to them, and a Red Army numbering about 100,000 gradually surrounded Rostov. The population positively did not wish to enlist and to help. It was no use to fight on. On February 23, 1918, the "Volunteer Army" began its famous retreat to the Steppes. A few days before, Ataman Kaledin had committed suicide in his palace at
Novocherkassk. The Bolsheviks were approaching. They took possession of the Don with their usual severities.

Two months later, at the end of April, 1918, the "Volunteers" came back covered with laurels but—without Kornilov. Their first campaign, the so-called "Icy Campaign," has remained in the recollection of its participants as a glorious and heroic effort. And, indeed, it was the period of high-spirited enthusiasm for the cause in that small group of glowing patriots who, without any prospects for the future, misunderstood and repudiated by the surrounding majority, still risked their lives for their country and, although accustomed to civilized comfort, did not resent any strain, privation and suffering. However, they were few, these heroes who came back alive from the "Icy Campaign." They were about one thousand. A full third of the army had perished during those two months of incessant fighting. General Kornilov was killed by a bomb on March 31, during the attempt to besiege and to take Ekaterinodar, the Kuban capital. The whole undertaking was hopeless and reckless in its substance. The first thing that the young General Denikin did, when he took up the command, was to have these worn-out young officers, who served as soldiers, seated on the cars requisitioned from the population and brought back to the Don. The greatest positive result of the retreat from Rostov was to preserve the nucleus of an anti-Bolshevist army up to the moment when the country could use it.¹

And, indeed, circumstances and the psychology of

¹The description of the "Icy Campaign" is given in a leaflet by Prince P. M. Volkonsky: "The Volunteer Army of Alexeiev and Denikin"; No. 7, Russian Liberation Committee, London, 1919.
the population had completely changed by April. In
the first place, the whole Black Sea coast and the whole
of the Ukraine was now taken by the Germans, who
had driven the Bolsheviks far to the north. In the
second place, the Cossacks of the Don and of the Ku-
ban now knew what Bolshevism was. A universal
uprising took place in April in the Cossack “stanitsas”
and the Bolshevik elements were exterminated with
the greatest embitterment. Returning Volunteer Army
men were now greeted as liberators. The Cossacks
were ready to join the ranks, and in June, 1918, the
Volunteer Army was four times stronger than it had
been in March. It numbered up to 12,000. By the
middle of July, thanks to its junction with the Kuban
Cossacks and a regular mobilization in the “stanitsas,”
the Army had become a force of 30,000 men. By Oc-
tober, 1918, it had gradually increased to about 100,000
men, extended over a front of about 200 miles. This
was practically a Cossack army as the Cossacks con-
stituted up to 80 per cent. of it. Ekaterinodar was
finally taken from the Bolsheviks on August 2. It now
became the capital of the Volunteer Army. The pos-
session of the port of Ekaterinodar, Novorossiisk,
opened the road to the sea, and the Volunteer Army was
able to get into touch with the Allies. Unfortunately,
the health of General Alexeiev had been definitely
shaken by the “Icy Campaign” and on September 25,
he died. The Supreme Command of the army passed
entirely to General Denikin. In questions touching
polities and civil administration he consulted the “Spe-
cial Council attached to the Commander-in-Chief,”
which, however, had no power to decide and to legis-
late by itself. The principle of military dictatorship
was fully preserved and all attempts at a “constitu-
tional" division of powers were relentlessly checked. Relations with the Kuban hosts soon became very much strained, as it was exceedingly difficult to draw the line between the "Volunteer" organization which claimed to be a nucleus of an "All-Russian" power but had only a few strips of territories (Stavropol and Chernomorsk) under its direct control, and the Kuban or the Don local administrations which wished to preserve as much as possible of their de facto independence. These were the germs of the coming difficulties, and in both questions of the "All-Russian" and the autonomous local administration the leaders of the Volunteer Army were already drifting from the only possible and really unbiased attitude that might have kept them in harmony with the political ideas and social forces promoted by the March Revolution of 1917.

The military side of their success in the Northern Caucasus was closely connected with the general situation in Southern Russia in 1918, a fact which they almost completely overlooked. But this time they had their excuse in their "pro-Allies" orientation. The Caucasus was separated from the Bolsheviks with two large regions which were now free: the Don Cossacks' region and the Ukraine. But both had been liberated with the aid of the Germans. German military authorities sat in Kiev and in Rostov. Austro-German garrisons, whose numbers varied from 600,000 to 150,000 were keeping all Southern Russia and the Crimea in order. At the same time, a national Ukrainian Government had been built with the German help in Kiev, under the "Hetman" Skoropadsky. The Austrian idea of detaching the Ukraine from Russia had been taken up by Germany. Skoropadsky, a Russian General and formerly a good Russian patriot, had been induced to
play the extremely complicated game of Ukrainian independence, while every alley was left open as to the future of the newly built State. Russia, Bolshevist or National, Germany, Austria, several Ukrainian parties,—they all had their own policies which were thoroughly inconsistent with that hope of becoming the head of a new dynasty with which Skoropadsky's ambition was nurtured. In the Ukraine the Germans were trying to lay their hands on the economic resources of the country. In the neighboring Don region they were satisfied with a very loose control over Ataman Krasnov's activities. On certain conditions they supplied him with arms and ammunition, part of which he was selling to the Volunteer Army. A kind of matter-of-fact military coöperation against the Bolsheviks existed between the Germans, Skoropadsky, Krasnov and Alexeiev-Denikin. I personally tried to transform it into a systematic common offensive. My correspondence with General Alexeiev to that effect was recently published. The German military authorities in Kiev were also interested in that scheme of overthrowing the Bolsheviks, but they were unwilling or powerless to change the German general policy towards Russia. On their part, the Volunteer Army looked at the activity of Skoropadsky and Krasnov as treacherous towards the Allies, and the anti-Bolshevist movement inside Russia was, as we have seen, closely associated with the Allies. Under such conditions, the Germans dropped the idea of a rapprochement with Alexeiev, and proceeded to build in the Ukraine, in Pskov and in Astrakhan the nuclei of new Russian anti-Bolshevist armies, formed of the most reactionary elements. It is difficult to say what the outcome of such beginnings might have been, because very soon the Germans were defeated and asked
for an armistice. The second chance to liberate Russia—from the South—thus came to naught.

The Russian political parties working in the Ukraine, the Don and the Caucasus then decided to make direct representations to the Allies. All the political groups already mentioned, the more advanced "Union for the Resurrection of Russia," the "National Center" which was especially influential at Denikin's headquarters, and the conservative groups newly reconstructed in Kiev, sent their mission to the Allied representatives in Rumania and, later on (December, 1918), via Constantinople, to Paris and London. The leading idea was to save Southern Russia after the armistice from a new invasion of the Bolsheviks. It seemed natural, before embarking on the liberation of Central Russia, at least to preserve such important parts of Russia as already were free from the calamity with which they were now menaced. The aim of the intervention which was beginning on the Volga and in Siberia could also be better attained and at less effort and expense if Southern Russia were used as a starting point. The armistice agreement foresaw the right of the Allied forces to come and to take the place of the retreating Germans. What had been easy for the latter—to keep order in the Ukraine—would have been still easier for the victorious Allies. Without a shot, the best part of Russia could have been thus preserved in order, and a chance given for the formation in the South of a real national army. Anti-Bolshevist Russia, in such a case, would have been able to cope with the Bolsheviks with her own forces, without any military intervention.

We (I was a member of that mission) were successful in our negotiations in Rumania, in the Balkans and in Constantinople. A few divisions were ready to be
sent to Southern Russia via Salonica, and there were ships enough to transport them to Russian harbors. But no sanction was given to these schemes in Paris and in London. The motives leaked out at a discussion between the heads of the Allied Governments in Paris, a few weeks later (Jan. 16, 1919). Both Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson had received information from their experts that the Allied troops in Europe were unwilling to stay there longer, that troubles had already occurred amongst the Canadians and other troops. "If the British tried to send any more troops there would be mutiny," Mr. Lloyd George concluded. The 150,000 men we asked for (the request was also supported by General Franchet d'Esperey and by M. Scavenius) was declared to be an insufficient number. Mr. Lloyd George thought that at least 400,000 were required. His general view was that "the mere idea of crushing Bolshevism by a military force was pure madness." On a false report that the Bolsheviks were ready to come to terms, he proposed to "summon these people to Paris ... somewhat in the way that the Roman Empire summoned the chiefs of outlying tributary States to render an account of their actions." In his February speech before the Commons Mr. Lloyd George used another simile, equally humiliating: He compared the fighting "factions" in Russia with the turbulent tribes on the Northwestern frontier of India which had to be brought to reason by some Commissioner, "to avoid the costly expedition." A little more knowledge in the matter would have shown that the only means to avoid the really costly expeditions which followed was to accept the advice that was rejected. With its rejection the third chance to help Russia to her speedy recovery was left unused. Di-
rectly afterwards the Ukraine was actually occupied by the Bolsheviks.

We now come to the year 1919, the period of a belated but real Allied intervention in the anti-Bolshevist struggle. This time it was not small groups of partisans, but large and disciplined armies which were fighting against the Soviets. Munitions and arms, at least at the end of that period, were also not lacking. But there was also a Red Army on the Bolsheviks' side, while on the side of the anti-Bolsheviks there was the damaging policy of reaction. The whole psychology of the situation was now different from that of 1918.

It was in Siberia that the conflict between the two wings of the anti-Bolshevik parties broke out in the open. In Southern Russia the conflict also existed, in a latent stage, but owing to the authority of Gen. Alexeiev and Gen. Denikin the reactionary extremists were kept well under control. In Siberia, the attitudes of the reactionary officers and the old régime officials, on the one side, and of the socialistic parties—which were predominant in the self-governing bodies—on the other, were so mutually uncompromising that clash was bound to come at the first encounter. The situation was complicated by the fact that there, as well as in Southern Russia, there existed a strong antagonism between the local autonomous strivings and the "All-Russian" program of liberation brought to Siberia by both the socialist and reactionary parties. Local Siberian patriotism turned, in the first place, against the socialist "All-Russian" Government, and afterwards against the non-socialist Government of Kolchak, which was equally "All-Russian," not Siberian. Accordingly, the local opposition changed color—or,
rather, at different stages it originated from different groups. It was conservative against the socialists, and radical against Kolchak. Last, but not least, there was one more influential factor in Siberia: the Czecho-Slovaks who played here, at the side of the Russian anti-Bolsheviks, the part played by the Cossacks in Southern Russia, at the side of the Volunteer Army.

They also formed the backbone of the anti-Bolshevist forces, and their coöperation or abstention decided military success or failure. The Czecho-Slovaks were much more dissatisfied with the reactionary policy of the anti-Bolshevist leaders than the Cossacks, and in a much more decisive way they took sides with the radical anti-Bolsheviks. Moreover, they felt much more free to stay or to go, as the fate of their country did not depend on the issue of the struggle. The Cossacks also regularly became homesick and preferred to leave, when they had to fight outside their own territories, but they were unable to separate their own cause from that of the liberation of Russia, while the Czechs did it at the first opportunity. This parallel explains to a great extent the difference in the trend of events in Siberia and in Southern Russia, while evolving practically from the same elements and winding up with the same results.

We noted military successes of the anti-Bolshevist "People's Army" on the Volga (June-August, 1918), which were due to the help of the Czecho-Slovaks, and we also noted their final collapse (September-October) caused by the absence of the more substantial help promised by the Allies. Siberia was liberated from the Bolsheviks at the beginning of that period, and it remained anti-Bolshevist up to the end of 1919.

However, the method of liberation was here different
from that on the Volga. The basic feature in common was the participation of the Czecho-Slovaks who, as we know, were scattered over the entire length of Siberia's railroad lines, from the Urals to Vladivostok. But instead of the democratic "People's Army" organized by the Social-Revolutionaries from Samara, the task of the overthrow was taken up by the secret organizations of the officers who were incensed against the socialists because of their part in the Revolution and especially in the suppression of the Kornilov uprising. Backed by the Czeches, who numbered about 40,000 men, the officers' organizations, led by Colonel Grishin-Almazov, easily set free the chief towns on the railway line (June, 1918), as the Bolshevist power in Siberia had not had time to strike root in the peasant population and was not supported by the burgesses. But then they found that a "Government of autonomous Siberia" was already in existence. It had been elected as early as January 26, 1918, at a secret meeting of a few members of the "Siberian Regional Duma" (20 out of 150) in Tomsk, at the very moment when that Duma was dissolved by the Bolsheviks. The composition of that Siberian Government was too radical for the officers. But the most radical members had fled from the Bolsheviks to Vladivostok, and on June 30, the more moderate five (out of fifteen) proclaimed themselves at Omsk a legal Siberian Government possessing sovereign power over the whole Siberian territory. This was the first coup d'etat, which, however, did not quite satisfy the officers, as the five ministers were still under suspicion of sharing socialistic views. However, the bourgeois groups approved the decisively anti-Bolshevist decrees of the new Government, while the socialists were placated by the Government's prom-
ise to convoque the "Regional Duma," Social-Revolutionary in its majority, for a new session on August 15.

There were now two anti-Bolshevist Governments: that of Samara, which insisted on its being recognized as "All-Russian" and as basing its power on the Constituent Assembly of 1917, and that of Omsk, which swore allegiance to the white-green banner of the "independent" (or, at least, autonomous) Siberia and did not wish its power limited even by that of the Siberian "Regional Duma."

The Czecho-Slovaks insisted on the building of one, single All-Russian Government. Under their pressure, after two preliminary conferences in Chaliabinsk, on 15-16 July and on August 23, the representatives of all the local Governments and all the political groups met in September in Ufa. The Social-Revolutionaries were in the majority (more than 100 out of 200), but it was decided that all resolutions should be adopted unanimously. It was just the moment when the Volga front was definitely crumbling, and the Czecho-Slovaks threatened to leave the front and Siberia if there should be no agreement. A compromise was finally reached, and a Provisional All-Russian Government elected on September 23, 1918, partly formed of the candidates chosen by the political groups in May in Moscow.¹ Omsk was selected as the seat of government, and until January 1, 1919, when the Constituent Assembly was supposed to meet, the "Directory" was invested with the supreme power.

But two days before, on September 20, a second coup d'état had been carried out in Omsk by the reactionary

¹N. D. Avxentiev; N. I. Astrov (substitute, V. Vinogradov); Gen. V. Boldyrev (substitute, Gen. Alexeiev); N. V. Chaikovsky (substitute, Zenzinov), and Mr. Vologodsky (the Siberian Premier). Vinogradov and Zenzinov took the places of the absent two.
officers, in order to "save the country from the pernicious influence of the socialist ministers." The Siberian ministers suspected of extremism had just come to Omsk from the Far East. Two of them were arrested, and the third (Novosselov) was killed by the officers. The Regional Duma was dissolved. This time the Czecho-Slovaks decided to intervene on the side of the socialists, and they arrested the acting Minister of the Interior. The conflict was solved by a compromise, pending the arrival in Omsk of the All-Russian "Directory" chosen in Ufa.

The Provisional Government arrived on October 9. They found an extremely heated atmosphere. Lengthy negotiations ensued between the "supreme power" just recognized, and the Siberian ministers. The Directory made all the concessions that proved necessary: they guaranteed the Siberian autonomy, promised a peaceful self-dissolution of the Regional Duma, nominated nine former ministers (out of 14) to take part in the new cabinet. Among the newly-nominated ministers was Admiral Kolchak. Avxentiev expected to be soon recognized by the Allies.

The military group now decided to prepare for a third coup d'état. The candidate for a dictatorship was ready in the person of Kolchak. The last measure to take was to show Kolchak, who had recently come to Omsk from the East, to his army. He went to the front and came back on November 16. In the night of Nov. 18, Avxentiev and his colleagues in the Directory were arrested by the officers. It is now known that the British military attaché, Gen. Knox, then in Omsk, approved of the overthrow. The Council of Ministers endorsed the accomplished fact. After a short and embarrassed discussion all decided for a
dictatorship and against the “Directory” as the form of government, and all voted for Kolchak, as the “Supreme Ruler.”

A year later, in his deposition before the Bolshevist tribunal which sentenced him to death, Admiral Kolchak recognized that the coup d'état of Nov. 18, 1918, was a political mistake. One might add that the mistake was not his own, and that it was much more than a mistake. The events in Siberia which are just described make it clear why Russia could not be liberated by the anti-Bolshevist forces. Both socialists and non-socialists had not yet fully learned their lessons. The mistakes of 1917 were not yet forgiven and forgotten to the socialists. The non-socialists were just committing their own mistakes, and thus the cause for which they fought was doomed to lose. Moreover, with the coup d'état of November 18 a turning-point was reached after which even that kind of very imperfect coöperation that had existed between the two anti-Bolshevist groups since November 7, 1917, definitely broke down. The military element was left to itself and has made itself an exponent of social groups and tendencies of the old régime. The socialist element has not yet detached itself from its extremist connections. Between the two extremes, the right wing of the Social-Revolutionaries and the left wing of the Constitutional-Democrats, i.e., the very elements that were united in the “All-Russian” Government of Avxentiev, might have been able to form a democratic center. But these elements were as yet few and powerless to combat the prejudices of their opponents on both extreme wings of public opinion. The Allied representatives might also bring the help, but they did not know again, as had been the case in 1917, where to find that
center. In May, 1918, M. Albert Thomas had helped to enthrone Kerensky. In November, 1918, Gen. Knox ousted Avxentiev. A coalition had been formed when it was dangerous for the success of the Revolution. It was now destroyed just at the time when it was vital for the liberation of Russia.

Who was Kolchak? I came to know the man in 1908, under characteristic circumstances. I was a member of the democratic opposition in the Third Duma, and he was a young and brilliant naval officer, fearless, learned and deeply patriotic. He fought for a program of reconstruction of the Russian fleet, which had been destroyed at Tsushima, and, quite exceptionally in his position, he was not afraid to address himself to the group of deputies then considered to be most dangerous revolutionaries by the Government. Like General Alexeiev, he was among the first to recognize the March Revolution of 1917, as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Like Denikin, he struggled as long as possible against the dissolution of the national armed forces and he did not wish to serve the government of Kerensky, who was generally accused of being responsible for that dissolution. Hence his hatred against the Social-Revolutionaries.

The group of officers which sought for a dictator had singled him out to play the part which a little later Kornilov was induced to play so unsuccessfully. Kolchak's sense of duty and readiness for self-sacrifice might have impelled him to listen to their appeal, but there was something in him which did not permit him to accept. He followed the advice of some political friends—to save himself for the future—and left for America on a special invitation. His appearance in the Far East is surely connected with the decision of the
Allies to intervene, and he was doomed to pass through all the vicissitudes of that intervention, which here showed itself at its worst. At the very beginning of it Kolchak repudiated being a weapon of Japan, unlike Semenov (see Chapter X), and he returned from Eastern Siberia to Tokio. He was ready to fight the enemy under the British in Mesopotamia, but on his way there he received a new call and came back to Western Siberia in the Autumn of 1918 when intervention had become a general (as opposed to purely Japanese) Allied undertaking. I am rather inclined to think that he knew what was being prepared for him by General Knox (who had met him in August, 1918, in Tokio) and by the reactionary officers for November 18. A man of noble character and heart, he was, however, a freshman in politics and thus bound to depend on other people's opinions for arriving at the most important and responsible political decisions. He had no personal ambition and there was not a jot of the dictator in him. The reputation of an "iron will" did not at all correspond with his real nature, extremely sensitive and refined. But he felt it his duty to play in all conscience the part he was given, and he patiently wore his mask. Like his southern colleague, Denikin, he was unable to make use of his strongest side, his military knowledge and talent. The daily business of a supreme ruler was so cumbersome and the details of it were so new to both that their complete attention was absorbed, and the real direction of affairs, concerning the civil administration as well as concerning military operations, gradually slipped out of their hands. Kolchak, as he grew aware of it, became extremely nervous, and he vainly tried to supply with outbursts of wrath—which became more and more frequent—what was lacking in
steady design and in firmness of will and purpose. Denikin, more disciplined and equilibrated, tried to remain equal to the task, and he submitted to the inevitable and fatal in his situation with equanimity and even with a certain sense of humor. But the result was the same: a growing contrast between claim and achievement,—the showy display of a resuscitated "All-Russian" Government and an extremely poor reality upon which it was artificially built. This also explains why both political structures, which seemed so solid for a few moments, crumpled so rapidly and so completely for the very foundations.

On the face of it, the Omsk Government looked so firmly established indeed that most of its members and adherents at once felt transported to their customary atmosphere of a normal statehood and acted accordingly. The "Supreme Ruler" was surrounded with the attributes of power. A brilliant diplomatic corps of the Allied Powers made people forget that as yet there had been no recognition extended to that Government. The whole set of former State institutions functioned according to the former State Law: legislation, finance, trade, justice, administration,—each of these branches had its own organ, provided with a numerous personnel of former experienced functionaries and specialists. They were even much more numerous than ordinarily, even for an "All-Russian" scale, as there were so many refugees gathered from everywhere in that small provincial town, with no "society" at all, except some local tradesmen. There was also a regular army formed partly of volunteer, partly of conscripted soldiers, with more officers at the rear than there were at the front. The army began to win its first victories: on December 23, 1918, Perm was taken; on March 14, 1919, Ufa was
taken back from the Bolsheviks. The official and the semi-official press was enthusiastic about these military successes, and some people began to speak of Moscow. The only doubt was whether Moscow should be taken from the North, with Archangel’s help, or from the South, with Denikin’s help. There were even some moments in September, 1919, when military successes in Siberia coincided with similar successes on other fronts—in the South, in the West, in the North of Russia. The final solution seemed to be approaching. Drafts of laws were being prepared in a number of different ministerial boards, “on an All-Russian scale.” They were being discussed, and revised, and discussed again . . .

What was the reverse, the actual state of things? It consisted, in the first place, in the fact that the power of the Omsk Government did not go farther than the town of Omsk. The large masses, the peasant population remained quite indifferent towards the new power. One of the Kolchak Ministers, Mr. Guins, made a trip to a village 250 miles from Omsk. “What about the Bolsheviks?” he asked a peasant. “Well, what did they do to us?” was the answer. “They just came here like you, and also came to my house, because it is the prettiest, and they wore rifles, like you.” “Have you heard something of Kolchak?” Mr. Guins asked an old Cossack. “No, nothing. He is probably an Englishman?” the old man asked. The peasants’ answers, according to a Siberian newspaper inquiry, may be summed up by the following statement: “We cannot judge about parties. Let come what will, if only we can get more land and pay less taxes. Old men and women are afraid of the Bolsheviks, but the young ones approve of the Bolsheviks because they ended the war.” “It is
time to finish the war,” the peasants repeated at a meeting. “It is not good to make war without end.”

But that was just what the new power was doing. Its only contact with the population was on the cause of war. Conscriptions and requisitions were inevitable. The peasants were quite willing to comply, but not “without end.” They grew especially unwilling when they came to know that it was not a “Siberian” but an “All-Russian” Government which was forcing them to serve and to pay, and that the struggle was going on somewhere on the other side of the Urals. An “All-Russian” war was more than Siberia could afford. And from the very beginning of Kolchak’s power military coercion was the only means to carry on the war. But military coercion definitely deprived the Government of the sympathies of the population, and issued in peasant uprisings which the military authorities stifled with great severity. The population, which did not yet know the Bolshevist régime, decided that Bolshevism was better.

Mr. Guins, whom I have just quoted, repeats for us a conversation with Admiral Kolchak which makes especially clear that fatal vicious circle. “I am the Commander-in-Chief,” Kolchak said, “and my aim is a military one: to break the Red Army. Civil war must be pitiless. One of us must shoot the other. That is why I think that all your civil legislation is useless. However good will be our laws, if we fail, they will shoot us.” “But just in order not to fail we must secure order and good administration,” the Minister answered. “The people may not be interested in parliaments and republics, but they are interested in the personalities in possession of power who are in close touch with them. We must coöperate with new men.
Your chancelleries do not have any initiative and base themselves on old laws, instead of adapting themselves to new conditions. Your generals are abolishing the local civil authorities and popular self-government. We cannot succeed if we do not inspire the people and do not build a political point d'appui. Do you not feel that the people around us are indifferent to us and look at us, your ministers, as something temporary and secondary? That is why we have been unable to create a support for you in the country, to build a 'peasant' defense in the provinces, a 'peasant' parliament in the center. Since the overthrow of November 18, 1918, the power is centered in the military circles and the civil administration has been absorbed by you and by your generals, who have taken upon themselves too much responsibility. Our struggle against the Bolsheviks has become too much impregnated with counter-revolution." "You are right," Kolchak answered, "the spirit of the country must be aroused, but I do not believe in conferences and discussions. I can believe in tanks, which I never succeed in getting from our dear Allies; I believe in a loan, which might straighten our finance; in manufactured goods which could cheer up the village. But where can I get them from? If I only could improve the sanitary situation of the army! . . . Do you not know that certain detachments are just like moving hospitals? No laws and no reforms can help if we suffer new defeats. It is not laws but men that matter. What can you do when you are surrounded with thieves, or cowards, or ignorants? We build with bad stuff. Everything is rotten. The degree of general pollution simply amazes me. And the ministers, well, they live on their paper work. It would help us much more if instead of pre-
paring drafts of laws they would shoot five or six scoundrelly militiamen or a couple of speculators. But nobody wants to make use of his power.”—“All right, let me order that the military censors be made subordinate to the governors of provinces?”—“No, by no means; I am Supreme Commander, and I am responsible for everything. I cannot change the ‘Regulation for field administration of the Army’ and the respective construction of power; the experience and the genius of ages is embodied in it.”

The conflict between the psychology of the “new men” and the “genius of ages” was really tragic. The rift between the military leaders and officials of the old generation on the one side, and the political parties and the population on the other, had been steadily increasing since November 18, 1918. The Social-Revolutionaries who were mostly in the majority in the local Zemstvos and Dumas (County Councils and Municipalities, reëlected under the Revolution on the basis of universal suffrage) declared war on the Kolchak Government. On the other hand, Kolchak’s generals considered as revolutionary even such modest consultative assemblies as were legally formed to discuss questions of finance, economy and the electoral law. The central bloc of moderate socialist and liberal groups, which tried to give Kolchak the support of public opinion, made some attempts to compromise, but was never taken in earnest and finally fell to pieces. As long as there was some success at the front, compromise with public opinion seemed immaterial. When the period of defeats came, no compromise was possible any more.

1 G. K. Guins’ book on “Siberia, the Allies and Kolchak” was published in Pekin, 1921, in two volumes in Russian. It contains a great deal of first-hand material.
General Knox explains the military defeat of the Kolchak forces by the fact that "things were taken out of Kolchak's hands." He wished to proceed slowly and "gradually to work up the recruits to the necessary level of efficiency." Such was also the view of the organizer of the Siberian Army, Grishin-Almazov. But on his coming to power Kolchak found that "the Siberian Government had already ordered a mobilization of 80,000 recruits." Grishin-Almazov was dismissed by one of the plots arranged by the officers' organization as early as September 5, 1918. Under his successor, Ivanov-Renov, the old army régime was reëstablished, and the army had become an independent factor before Kolchak appeared. The "dictator," obviously, could not dictate to such as put him in power, and,—I quote again Gen. Knox' authoritative statement,—the recruits "were called up where there was insufficient barrack accommodation, clothing and trained instructors. They were sent to the front half trained. Thus our task was half lost before we began." The severities of the winter campaign did the rest. The only moments of enthusiasm and success reached at the front were connected with the activity of the democratic Ural army, formed of some tens of thousands of working men from the Ishevsk and Votkinsk mining concerns. This was also the only army that did not dissolve and pass over to the Bolsheviks when the general retreat began in October, 1919.

With the retreat, the attitude of the Allies changed at once. It is known that at the end of May, 1919, the question of Kolchak's recognition was formally raised. It was reduced to the mere promise "to assist Admiral Kolchak and his associates with munitions, supplies and food, to establish themselves as the Gov-
ernment of All-Russia” on certain conditions formulated by the “Big Four” in their note to Kolchak on May 26. Kolchak stood the test, and his answer of June 5 was declared by the Allies, on June 12, “to be in the main, in accord with the proposal” they made to him, “and to contain satisfactory assurances,” as to his democratic intentions. The recognition was expected to come, but there was one more “test” to pass through,—a test of arms. If this did not prove satisfactory, no more aid was to come from the Allies. “Kolchak is not strong enough for us to support him,” was now the view of the Allies. All requests for help at this critical moment were politely declined. The Czecho-Slovaks finally declared (November 13, 1919) that they could not bear further responsibility for the “burning of villages, the killing of peaceful Russian citizens by the hundreds, the shooting of representatives of democracy without trial, on the mere suspicion of political unreliability,” which had become familiar occurrences under the military rule of Kolchak. They wished “immediately to go home.” At the same time, uprisings in the villages had become universal, and the Social-Revolutionary groups had already in October discussed the overthrow of the Government. A new political organization was formed in Irkutsk, under the name of the “Political Center,” which united the Central Committee of the Social-Revolutionaries, the Social-Democrats “Mensheviks,” the Zemstvo boards and professional unions. The Irkutsk Duma on November 26 made their political platform clear by demanding a purely socialist government based on the Zemstvos and Dumas and on the class organizations of workingmen and peasants.

I cannot describe in detail the tragic agony of the
Kolchak Government. In fact, it was no more a Government, as it left Omsk on November 10, 1919. As the Czechs took the railroad for themselves, the evacuation became exceedingly difficult. Kolchak was lost in his train, between Omsk and Irkutsk. He was detached from his Government, which asked him by wire first for substantial concessions, then for his resignation, until it gradually melted away itself. He was also cut off from the remnants of his army, which was forced to start on an "icy campaign" of retreat through snow and wind, at the side of the railway. We shall meet again with these brave Ishevsk and Volkinsk workingmen—with such of them as remained alive—in the Far East, where their valiant leader, General Kappel, tried to conduct them. (See Chapter X.)

Round Irkutsk the iron ring of rebellion was gradually tightening. On December 24, the uprising broke out in the city itself. The Czechs were practically on the side of the revolutionaries, and the Allied representatives only formally neutral. They finally proposed to Kolchak's Minister to surrender to the "Political Center," as it had "nothing in common with the Bolsheviks." The negotiations came to nothing, as the "Political Center" did not want to guarantee safe passage to Kolchak, his functionaries and his retreating army. On January 5, 1920, a manifesto of the "Political Center" announced that "the power of the dictator, Kolchak, who carried the war against the people, has been overthrown by the will of the insurgent people and army." Admiral Kolchak was declared an "enemy of the people," and the Czechs, with the silent consent of the French General Janin, extradited him to the new Irkutsk power. After 17 days of existence that power in its turn surrendered to the Soviet of Workmen's,
Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies. On the approach of Kappel's army to Irkutsk, on February 7, Admiral Kolchak and his last Premier, Victor Pepelayev, were shot by the Bolsheviks, after a mock-trial.

Conditions were much more favorable for the liberation of Russia from the southern part of it than from Siberia. It was much easier for the population to understand it as an "All-Russian" task and to become interested in it. As the burdens of being under the Bolshevik régime were already known from personal experience in Russia proper,—and especially in central parts of it—the population was much more ready to welcome the liberators. Both economic means and human material for building and sustaining large armies were far more readily obtainable than had been the case in Siberia. There was no ground for complaints about lack of leading men, which had generally served as an excuse for the Siberian failure. All specialties, all capacities, all political groups were liberally represented among the refugees, and they all were happy to serve the cause. Within Russia itself there had also remained a plentiful supply of assistants of every kind. The elements of statehood were much more deeply rooted in the minds and in the habits of the population of Southern Russia. The Allied countries of Europe were close at hand. The interstate and international interest of restored peace and solidarity, moral, economic, financial, was much more immediately felt. Why was it then that even here, in spite of better means and richer resources, the process of liberation also failed?

The reasons were the same as they were in Siberia. To begin with the personality of the leader, of course, General A. J. Denikin was a stronger and better bal-
anced man than Kolchak: a "soldier" also, but more apt to understand the political aspect of the situation. However, he is quite right in his autocharacterization, when he says: "To me the Army is almost identical with all my life. There are so many recollections, dear and never-to-be-forgotten, which are connected with it; everything is so tied up and interlaced into one thread made of swiftly flown days of sorrow and joy, hundreds of dear tombs, buried dreams and unextinguished hopes." 1

At Ekaterinodar and Rostov, the "Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Southern Russia" (this was in 1919 a new title for the former "Volunteer Army," now formed to a large extent of conscripts) was still under the spell of these recollections. He surrounded himself with his fellow-generals of the Bykhov prison and of the "icy campaign," most of whom were much more narrow-minded than he, while the friends of these friends were connected with the reactionary groups of officers. The civil administration was represented by the "Special Council" mentioned above: an intermediate institution between a Council of Ministers and a small deliberate assembly. Personally General Denikin sympathized with the tendencies of its liberal wing, represented by some members of the "Cadet" Party, and the "Cadets" (Constitutional-Democrats) were sometimes made responsible for his policy. But they were only four in the "Special Council" as against the twenty-three members of the conservative wing. The Council was presided over and controlled

1 General Denikin's Memoirs ("Sketches of Russia's Troubled Times") are being published in Russian in Paris (Pavolozky, publisher). It shows the author as a very talented writer. Thus far two parts of the first volume have been published, finishing with the imprisonment at Berdichev, after the Kornilov uprising.
by a general whose ideas belonged to the past (Gen. Abram Dragomirov). With a kind of good-humored optimism Gen. Denikin kept in balance the discordant elements in his Council, the members of which all recognized his moral authority. But the result was that the army was left to do what it wished, and there was a complete lack of any political program. According to Gen. Denikin's ideas this was to be a "transitional" period, during which all substantial questions were to be left open, until the "constructive period" set in with the liberation of Russia and with the opening of a "National" Assembly (Gen. Denikin tried to avoid using the term "Constituent Assembly" which was the Russian name for Constitutional Convention). If that time should bring with it a struggle between the political parties for constructive issues, Gen. Denikin had often declared, he would not take any part in it, but after Russia's liberation would play Cincinnatus and "plant cabbage."

However, in the second part of 1919 that kind of program proved quite insufficient. The liberated territory was speedily expanding. At the end of September it represented a large quadrangle limited by Kiev, Odessa, Novorossiisk, Stavropol, Tsaritsin, with the triangle of Kiev, Orel, Tsaritsin on its top. But for a long time there was no Minister of Interior among Denikin's "councilors." The civilians felt it extremely difficult to combine their administration with the matter-of-fact predominance of the military rule. The generals were glad to be left free for as long a time as possible. The result was that the army was demoralized and the population extremely disaffected. There was at least one question the solution of which could not be possibly postponed: the agrarian question. Committee after
committee was appointed by the "Special Council" to prepare for its solution. Their work was more than once cancelled by Gen. Denikin. And here it appeared for the first time just how dangerous was that easy-going method of neglecting urgent political demands and public opinion. The Commander-in-Chief found himself encircled by a group of influential landowners and ensnared by their ideology. The progressive members of the Council gave him unsatisfactory advice, and all his attempts to break the resistance of the gentry resulted in complicated compromises where plain and decisive solutions were needed to make the peasants confident and willing to help.

An uncompromising position was taken by Denikin himself and by his advisers on the question of the Cossacks' autonomy. "Russia united and undivided" was understood by them in a sense which made "federation" appear almost a treacherous idea, while a part of the Kuban Cossacks were already preaching complete independence. Protracted negotiations fostered ill feeling on both sides. The hatred of the Kuban Cossacks towards Denikin grew especially strong when one of the separatist Kuban leaders was murdered by the reactionary officers, and another sentenced and hanged by one of the generals on the accusation of high treason. One can imagine how it reflected itself in the state of mind of the Cossacks who were fighting at the front, far from their native land.

At the same time, the reactionary officers considered Gen. Denikin too much of a "Cadet." His head of the Staff, Gen. Romanovsky, was especially hated, because he refused to restore to the officers of the old army their pre-revolutionary distinctions and to revive the old guard organization. They were also indignant
because of Denikin's decision to leave the question of monarchy open until the Constituent Assembly's decision. The situation had become particularly strained when, after the loss of Kiev and Odessa, new groups of politicians and officers came to Ekaterinodar and Rostov, who were both monarchist and pro-German. The anti-Ally feeling was speedily growing as a result of the half-hearted policy of the Allies, and the pronounced pro-Germanism of the newcomers found the ground prepared. The sympathies of the officers soon began to turn to a man who while in Kiev had given proofs of his monarchist and pro-German tendencies. It was General Wrangel, a very gifted military leader, whose ties with the army were tightening in the same degree as Denikin's reputation was falling down. The reactionary officers finally were ready to resort to their usual means of plotting and killing. "If I shall be killed," Gen. Denikin used to say, "it will be by the Right ones (the reactionaries)."

How did all this affect the process of the liberation of Russia? The results of the chaos in the civil administration, the high-handed deeds of the demoralized army, the complete neglect of the interests of the liberated population, the predominant influence of the former privileged class of landlords, the elimination of the democratic parties influential among the popular masses, the growing suspicion on the part of the Cossacks,—all this proved fatal to the hope of final success.

The state of mind of the population in the Bolshevist part of Russia was more favorable to Denikin's offensive than ever, and the population was certainly more inclined to help the liberators than either the population in Southern Russia or in Siberia, which latter had not yet experienced the evils of the Bolshevist régime.
All the consequences of that régime which are described in Chapter VII began to make themselves felt in 1919, and especially in the second part of it, and the population had lost patience. The people in the towns lacked food, and there was no personal safety. The peasants had stopped sowing and selling grain and wanted their new acquisitions of land to be legally acknowledged. The Red Army did not wish to fight and its ranks were being deserted. Finance, industry, the food and fuel supply, and the means of transportation had reached an unprecedented state of break-down. The Soviet powers were making spasmodic efforts to wade through the crisis. Requisitions, mobilizations, prosecutions by the Che-Ka seemed to have reached the limit, and all classes of the population, intellectuals, workingmen, soldiers, peasants had been brought to the point of despair. The idea was widespread that the Bolsheviks would soon be overthrown.¹

The "White Army" of Gen. Denikin was met with enthusiasm. The intellectuals and the cooperative workers, who for the most part belonged to moderate socialistic parties, discussed the question whether they must immediately offer their services to the liberation or wait until called upon "as only the propertied classes had been appealed to." Red officers were quite prepared to go over and to join their former comrades of the old Russian Army. The soldiers found it useless to fight on as "all the country is waiting for the downfall of the Bolsheviks." The peasants met the "White" detachments on their knees, and the bells were rung

¹See a secret report on the state of the Bolshevik part of Russia in October, 1919, written by a close observer who worked for two years in a provincial professional union and lived for five months hidden among the peasants in the zone of military operations. Published in "The New Russia," Vol. I, No. 7, 8 and 9. London, 1920.
in their honor in the village belfries. However, all this did not last long.

The “White Army” was no longer what it had been at the time of the “icy campaign” of February, 1918. Most of the young enthusiasts of the first hour had sacrificed their lives in the incessant battles. The newcomers who joined the army at the time of its growing success were often moved by less idealistic considerations. They had no scruples against making up for their mockingly low salaries by speculating with army supplies or even by looting the population. Plunder, not only by individuals, but by entire units, became almost a profession. Hundreds of railway cars were packed with spoils which impeded the regiments in their movements and finally caused them to look upon retreat as a means for transferring their looted goods to the rear. The Cossacks, who formed the majority of the army, were especially known for that. Bribery, drunken orgies, and every kind of violence became customary, especially in the large cities and among the chief commanders. The “White Army” gave no quarter to the “Red” officers and very soon it was noticed that the “Red” command had become by far more efficient than it had been before. The people also changed their mind, and several months after the triumphal receptions no “White” officer could sever himself from his detachment, even for a short time, without the risk of being tracked and assassinated by the inhabitants.

The disaffection towards the officers and soldiers was extended to the civil administrators, who followed the army. The population often learned, first with astonishment and then with indignation, the names of those officials, who were those known to them from pre-revolutionary times as the worst type of local satraps.
They had only increased now the amount of their bribes and had changed the methods of collecting them. That was, indeed, a very telling symptom of the restoration of the old régime. After a short while the population forgot the horrors of Bolshevism and began to say, "This is worse than the Bolsheviks."

But this is not all. Former landowners were also coming back with the army. Each one endeavored to return to his own former estate, which had been taken by the peasants. They were escorted by a special militia called the "State Guard." If the landlord was a kindly man he was content with coming to an amicable arrangement with the peasants, which the latter sometimes quite willingly accepted. Occasionally, the landlord was intent on revenge for the mistreatment or murder of some members of his family by the peasants. His return was then coupled with relentless reprisals, which naturally were bound to lead to further retribution on the part of the peasants. Such happenings, of course, were much more apt to impress the masses than sophisticated schemes and prospects for some future solution of the agrarian question. Unfortunately, the landlord was permitted, according to these schemes, to collect one-fifth of the crops from the peasants. This was enough for the peasant to come to the conclusion that the estates of the nobles would be taken from him by the new power. It was a much more serious menace than the ineffective scheme of "socialization" of the land, according to the communist program.

The disappointment was universal, and a new sort of peasant movement appeared: the so-called "Green" armies. The "Greens" declared themselves neutral between the "Reds" and the "Whites." They were the
"Greens" because they wandered about in the green forests. The original idea was to stop the civil war by armed resistance and to preserve the village from the lootings of both the "Reds" and the "Whites." Gradually, many of the "Greens" became actual bandits, a new scourge for the village. But the peasants still preferred them to both the Reds and the Whites. The "Green" movement began in the Caucasus, but it soon spread to Denikin's rear, in the Ukraine, and one of its leaders, the notorious Makhno, for a time threatened to raid Rostov.

The intellectuals, moderate socialists, coöperators,—all were mercilessly confounded by the "Whites" with the Bolsheviks. Everything which went beyond the incomplete spectrum of extremely tame political groupings permitted to exist openly at the seats of the "White armies," was considered by the "Whites" to be pro-Bolshevist. The Crimean Government, composed of "Cadets," who wished to remain democratic, became suspected of extremism. The Zemstvos and the Municipalities were reëlected on the basis of a revised electoral law, and, as the socialist parties in most places abstained from electioneering, conservative elements took the place of the former radical majority. These and similar methods served to alienate the sympathy of the popular masses from Denikin's Government.

All these drawbacks and shortcomings explain why Denikin's armies were becoming steadily weaker as they were coming nearer to Moscow. There were, of course, strategic reasons which partly account for the failure. Under the normal conditions of a regular war such a speedy advance without reserves and without securing the rear would hardly be considered wise. But this was a civil war, and in a civil war everything depends
on the state of mind of the population living under the competing systems of government. We have seen how favorable that state of mind was for the liberators and how much it changed in the process of liberation owing to the utterly bad tactics of the "White" armies. The point is that the bad tactics was not at all incidental. It was so closely connected with the political attitude of the liberators and with the social composition of the leading elements, that no individual will could bring about any substantial change in the situation. Denikin's failure, as I have said, was not his own. It was the crucial test for such remainders of the old Russia as had gathered round his banners: people for whom Denikin himself was almost a revolutionary. For any clear-thinking political observer that last experiment definitely proved that this method of liberating Russia from the Bolsheviks must never again be resorted to.

It was so self-evident, indeed, that Denikin himself, at the last hour, tried to change his tactics completely. In about three months (October-December, 1919) all the territory between Orel and the Don River was lost. On Christmas Novocherkassk was taken by the Bolsheviks; on the next day, December 26, Rostov shared its fate. Out of the 200,000 fighting at the front before October,¹ only 10,00 of the Volunteer Army, 40,000 of the Don Army and 6,000-7,000 of the Caucasian Army (Kubans) remained. Denikin had to go back to Ekaterinodar not as a conqueror, but almost as a supplicant. He agreed to limit his power by creating a "South-Russian" Government, and he made every concession desired by the Kuban Cossack Assembly. It was too late and neither side believed the other. The

¹There were 700,000 "eaters" in the army, but only 200,000 "fighters" at the front.
only result of Denikin’s concessions to the Cossacks was that the reactionary officers definitely decided to hand over the power to Gen. Wrangel. Wrangel’s scheme was to forsake the Cossacks entirely and to retreat to the Southwest, to the Crimea and to Odessa, where he planned to arm German colonists. Denikin retreated to the South, to Ekaterinodar and Novorossiisk. He profited by the delay of two months (Novorossiisk was evacuated on March 12-14) in order to prepare a new base for the retreating army in the Crimea. Neither he nor his new Government had any power left. Denikin finally decided to resign. In compliance with the general desire of the army, he nominated Gen. Wrangel his successor and an hour later left for London (March 22).

At the same time with Kolchak’s and Denikin’s attempts to liberate Russia a third attempt was liquidated, that of General Yudenich. Aided by the British and, through their mediation, by the Esthonians, General Yudenich had prepared for a military raid on Petrograd, with an army which was one-tenth the size of Denikin’s army (20,000 “fighters,” out of the 70,000 “eaters”). In a few days, however, Yudenich’s offensive, which was very clumsily executed, was checked by Trotsky (October 10-25, 1919). The whole episode had no importance in the general scheme of the anti-Bolshevist struggle, Yudenich’s raid could only have succeeded if Denikin had come from Orel to Moscow and Kolchak from the Urals to the Volga. But, here too, the anti-Bolshevist military movement revealed the same features, which are familiar to us, with the addition of some others peculiar to the local surroundings in the Baltic region. The contrast between a showy display of lib-
eralism by the Government and the reactionary disposition of the army was here especially emphasized, because the Government, the “Northwestern,” had been specially created at the British order, while the great part of the army had been drilled by the Germans. On August 11, 1919, General March had actually ordered a group of Russian politicians in Reval to build, in forty minutes, a “democratic” Government and to immediately recognize the independence of Esthonia and to summon at once a sort of National Assembly at Pskov or at Dorpat-Yuryev. The dependence of General Yudenich upon that Government was purely fictitious. As soon as he got one million pounds sterling from Kolchak he felt free to act as he liked, and he decided to formally dissolve his “democratic” Government as soon as he should take Petrograd. Some officers connected with the former secret police prepared a list of people to be murdered in Petrograd, at the moment of its occupation. Two Russian detachments, organized by German reactionary generals, were expected to take part in the operations of the “Northwestern Army”: Prince Lieven’s division and General Bermont-Avalov’s corps. Both were controlled by Gen. Ludendorff’s subordinates, Gen. von der Goltz and Gen. Bischoff. At the decisive moment Gen. Bermont’s corps, instead of helping Yudenich, occupied Riga, the seat of the Latvian Government (October 9), which at once made the Estonians change their attitude. It also caused the British fleet to change its plan, and, instead of bombarding Kronstadt, rapidly to steam off and to bombard Riga. The lack of decision and of unity of command, and the disappointment of the population did the rest. Yudenich fled away, the “Northwestern” Government evaporated, the retreating sol-
diers and officers were disarmed by the Estonians, and the remaining funds mysteriously disappeared. The enthusiasm with which the Petrograd working-men seemed to be inspired in warding off Yudenich's attack might have served as a new warning to the people who asserted that the task of liberation was easy and that it could be solved by mere military operations from outside. It was again the "spirit" of the population that decided.

The natural end of the armed "White" movement seemed to come with the downfall of the three centers of it in Siberia, Southern Russia and in the Northwestern border States of Finland, Esthonia and Latvia. Under dissimilar local surroundings the basic causes of failure, as we have seen, were always the same, that is, inherent in the movement itself. The chief drawback was that it was the formerly privileged groups of the population, disinheritied by the Revolution, which took the lead and were eager to stay at the helm, to the exclusion of the rest of the population and of all the really democratic political parties. They could steer only into the old channel because they knew of no other. But, the trend of actual life could not be diverted to that channel of old Russia.

However, the end had not yet come. The armed struggle continued for fully eight months more (March 22-November 14, 1920), under the leadership of General Wrangel. On March 20 the British Admiral de Robeck had proposed to Denikin that he stop the civil war and accept Britain's mediation, under the threat that all further aid would be withdrawn. On August 12 the French Government decided to recognize Wrangel's government in the Crimea as the de facto government of Southern Russia, "after having taken
into consideration the military successes and growing strength of Wrangel's government as well as his assurances as to the democratic character of his internal politics.” Later on in the year, on October 20, when the necessity of diverting the Bolshevist army from the Polish front to Wrangel's front had passed, the French Government became less credulous as to Wrangel's assurances, and the French High Commissioner at Wrangel's headquarters, Count de Martel, warned him about the incongruity of his sayings and doings and insisted on necessary changes of policy. These three moments determine the curve of Wrangel's rise and fall in the eyes of the Allied diplomacy.

Of all the prominent leaders of the “White” armies Wrangel was the only one who was ambitious and had a personal taste for power. He was also clever enough to see the obstacles in the way to power. He had no desire to repeat Denikin's mistakes and was quite decided about taking the right path, without discriminating between the political parties or programs. In the first place, he knew too well that no success was possible as long as the army was demoralized. That was his chief point against Denikin and many well-meaning people who supported his claim to Denikin's place were moved by the consideration that Wrangel was the only man who could reestablish discipline in the army. And indeed, in a few weeks Wrangel succeeded in raising the spirit of the army and in restoring its confidence. However, the secret of his success was soon brought out in strong relief. It was the spirit of caste with which the army was now imbued, and the solidarity of crime and lawlessness had taken the place of military discipline. The prevailing influence rested in a group of young officers, to whom everything was permitted.
They tolerated only such superiors as shut their eyes to their debauched conduct and simply refused to recognize such nominations as did not please them. A civilian was to them a nonentity. As a matter of fact no civil administration existed. The only courts of justice that still existed, the military courts, were completely disregarded if the culprit belonged to the privileged caste, and they were forced to sanction hangings and shootings, if the privileged ones condescended to put their victims before the tribunals. It was only natural that when this army went on an offensive, looting and robbing of the population at once became universal. A regiment on the march looked, according to a witness, something like a "gypsies' camp." The whole detachment consisted of 200 to 300 armed men—or 500 to 600 at the utmost. Behind them for long miles there followed a train of wagons loaded with furniture, chickens, porkers and—a great many women. The population soon began to ignore the mobilizations: certain cantons of the Malitopol district, *e.g.*, instead of 1,000 gave six to ten men. Gen. Wrangel ordered that property of the relatives of the deserters be confiscated, and the "punitive expeditions" were thus practically free to loot the whole population.

Now, there was another idea which had become axiomatic: the land was to be left with the peasants, in order not to repeat the mistake of Denikin's agrarian legislation. Gen Wrangel was ready to straighten it out. But, here again, he was unable to carry out a really democratic solution. His idea of democracy,—and he was supported in it by the former Tsarist Minister, Krivoshayin,—was that of old Russia. The peasants, according to this idea, want the Tsar, the supreme "Master-Owner" (the Russian word "Khozyain" im-
plies both meanings), and do not need the “Cadets” or intellectuals. If left alone, face to face with the squires, they will easily agree and work hand in glove, from their villages and cantons upwards to the Constituent Assembly. This was again that “betting on the grey (the peasant)” which falsified the agrarian and the electoral reforms of the time of the Dumas. According to Gen. Wrangel, Gen. Denikin’s mistake had been his reliance on the “Cadet” agrarian program. The “Cadets” and the “National Center”—even the tame “Cadets” of Denikin’s period—were now to be ignored. Krivoshayin’s influence was paramount.

Consequently, the agrarian regulations of May 25, 1920, were full of loopholes and tricks to restore whatever possible from the landed estates of the gentry. The size of plots, the way of remunerating the former owners was left to the “Land Councils” in the townships, and the influence of the squires on the decisions of these “Land Councils” can be measured by the great size of the estates restored to the former possessors. Under the peculiar conditions of land ownership in the Crimea, the reform did not provoke open resistance. But outside of the Crimea word soon spread that General Wrangel was an enemy of the peasants, and the name “Krivoshayin” was enough to persuade them that this was true. The peasants boycotted Wrangel’s agrarian regulations and waited for some new power to come to their rescue.

A third point whereat Wrangel earnestly wished to improve upon Denikin was the question of autonomy or federation. The very use of the word “federation” had been strictly forbidden under Denikin. It was now made use of by Wrangel’s advisers. But, again, the choice of advisers and executives was dictated by Wran-
gel's political connections. To improve the relations with the nationalities and with the Cossack territories a man was chosen who was as much suspected of favoring centralism, as Krivoshayin was of landlordism. It was Mr. P. B. Struve, the well-known protagonist of Russian—and even of "Great-Russian" nationalism. So far as the Cossacks were concerned, the result was the sham agreement with the "State formations of the Don, Kuban, Terek and Astrakhan territories" of August 4, 1920, which the atamans were ordered to sign in twenty-four hours, in order to "demonstrate their union with Wrangel before Europe." The document met with protests outside the Crimea as it was by far worse than Denikin's draft-constitution which had been rejected by the Cossacks. Some amendments were introduced, but they remained on paper. An agreement with the Ukraine was as essential for Wrangel's military schemes as that with the Cossacks. On September 23 Gen. Wrangel consented to receive a delegation from one of the moderate Ukrainian federalist groups ("the Ukrainian National Committee in Paris"). The official statement sent out by Mr. Struve after that interview was as follows: "Prompted by the desire to unite all the anti-Bolshevik forces, Gen. Wrangel is ready to support the development of national democratic forces on the same lines as proclaimed by the agreement with the Cossack regions. Gen. Wrangel does not admit the possibility of allying himself with any separatist movement." Even for the "federalists" such a statement was hardly satisfactory. Mr. Struve's idea was to negotiate with the military units fighting against the Bolsheviks, and to avoid rapprochement with the political organizations that backed them. But under the conditions obtaining no such negotiations—
with Pavlenko, to the exclusion of Petlura, the separatist; or with Balakhovich and Permin, to the exclusion of Savinkov, the "vassal" of the Poles—could fructify. As a matter of fact, nothing came of the negotiations.

A formula was found by the partisans of Wrangel's policy which very well emphasizes its political meaning. It was the "left (i.e., liberal) policy carried out by the right (e.g., conservative) hands." We know of examples of a "right" policy carried out successfully by the "left" hands; such was, e.g., the policy of Lloyd George or Briand. We have also precedents of conservative cabinets carrying out liberal programs in earnest, to take the wind from the sails of their political opponents. Gen. Wrangel's policy was unlike either. It was a clumsy attempt to cheat the world with liberal catchwords for the benefit of a small group who were over-confident that they alone knew the real Russia, the Russia of illiterate peasants ruled by benevolent squires, with methods of patriarchal compulsion.

However, the very basis of Wrangel's power was too shaky and uncertain, for this last variation of the "White" policy to materialize. A few days before his nomination to Denikin's post Gen. Wrangel had told his friends that the situation was desperate. He did not wish to negotiate with the Bolsheviks, as had been proposed by the British, but he at once started on preparations for the evacuation of the Crimea. That idea of an evacuation bound to come, sooner or later, stuck at the back of his head, and it explains many things in his conduct, as a military leader. His first offensive move in the immediate neighborhood of the Crimea was explained to the world as caused by the necessity
to secure food from a grain producing region. But his further schemes of attack were all risky and reckless, while the only defensive scheme,—fortifying the Crimean Isthmus, which might have made his last refuge an impregnable fortress,—was utterly neglected. In July and in August Gen. Wrangel tried to start an uprising of the Don Cossacks and at the same time to take possession of the mouth of the Dnieper. The only result was—enormous losses of men and the seizure by the Reds of a very important passage across the Dnieper at Kahovka. The second scheme was to transfer the military base back to the Caucasus and to prepare for it by an uprising in the Kuban Valley. A landing took place on August 13 and a serious uprising began in the neighboring "stanitsas." But as soon as the Cossacks saw the high-handed way in which Wrangel's generals were treating them, the movement fell flat at once and the population saved themselves, their cattle, their horses, their carriages, their foodstuffs by hiding from mobilization and requisition. It was the same passive resistance as shown by the population of the Taurida Province (the Crimea and neighboring districts). In a couple of weeks the operation was liquidated. The third scheme of attack, which began on September 12, was directed straight to the North. The moment was favorable, as the Red Army had suffered defeats at the hands of the Poles. All the Russian anti-Bolshevist armed groups on Polish territory and the remainders of the "Northwestern" Russian detachments (see above) were ready to recognize Wrangel. He proposed, in Paris, a scheme for a concerted action with the Poles on Kiev. But the Bolsheviks prevented that action by proposing peace to Poland, with territorial and financial concessions.
It was in order to turn all the Red forces against Wrangel that Mr. Joffe, the Bolshevist plenipotentiary, capitulated at Riga and consented to the annexation by the Poles of a stretch of Russian territory one hundred miles wide, to the east of the so-called Curzon Line, which later almost coincided with the ethnographic frontier and had been proposed by the League of Nations in July-December, 1919. On the occasion of the Riga Treaty, the French diplomacy forsook Wrangel, and Mr. Lloyd George in a speech at Llandudno made one of his recurrent declarations that he wanted peace with the Bolsheviks as a condition of general peace in Europe. Thenceforth, Gen. Wrangel was lost. His desperate attempt to outflank the Bolsheviks at Kahovka by acting from the rear, from behind the Dnieper (end of October) resulted in a complete rout of his troops. A disorderly retreat to the Crimea began, and as there were no fortifications on the Isthmus, the Red troops immediately penetrated into the Crimea peninsula. The second week of November (8-14) was the last of the Government of South Russia. Evacuation was practically the only operation successfully performed by Wrangel, because it was the only movement well prepared for in advance. That is also why the last stage of defense was so much neglected and the last bit of anti-Bolshevist territory so easily left behind.

“We have no other territory, except the Crimea,” Gen. Wrangel announced openly on November 10, 1920. “The Government has no means to help the evacuated, either on their way or in the future. No foreign power has given its consent to receive them. Their fate is completely unknown.”

Disregarding that warning, people fled for their
lives, panic-stricken. Fully 135,000 went to Constantinople, without food and drink, in 136 packed ships, where they were forced to stay for weeks before they were permitted to land. Tens of thousands of others who were left in the Crimea were shot by the Bolsheviks. Contagious diseases and utter misery was the lot of many who saved themselves. Such as survived were morally dead. Dead was the “White” idea,—the “White dream,” as one of the “dreamers,” Mr. Shulghin, now called it. But Mr. Shulghin was right when he added that it was not in Constantinople that the “White dream” was dispelled. It died when the lower instincts of looting and enriching oneself at the expense of the population, when drunken orgies alternating with the cruelties of the “White terror” took the place of heroism and of the patriotic enthusiasm of the first hour. It was then that the “White” idea was definitely rejected by the masses and the military men became a caste, isolated in their own country and having no choice but to flee and to emigrate. They remained isolated even among the flood of refugees, and, as they still stuck to their privileges in the midst of the general suffering, the rank and file refugees were heard to say: “Whatever you think of the Bolsheviks, you must agree that they have rendered one great service to the Russian people: they have thrown out of Russia all those dregs, all that rot.”

The truth is that the appearance of Gen. Wrangel’s army abroad (he counted them as 70,000 out of 135,000 refugees) finally split the Russian emigrants into two camps. The democratic groups defended the view that the whole system of struggle against the Bolsheviks had to be changed and the

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"White movement" definitely discontinued. They held that the last traces of Wrangel's power had to be abolished, his army demobilized and turned into regular refugees who would be free to earn their living. There was a strong movement within Wrangel's army itself to break free from the fetters of Wrangel's discipline and to go. But it met with the deliberate resolve on the part of Wrangel's generals to keep the men together by methods of violence. The White terror of a Kutepov or of a Turkul was now applied to the camps at Gallipoli, Lemnos, etc., where the disarmed officers and soldiers were kept like prisoners. The idea was that the "living force" must be preserved up to the moment when it would be needed for some new armed struggle against the Reds. Gen. Wrangel had decided to preserve his power until that time, and he even formed (April 5, 1921) a kind of government, the "Russian Council." In vain did France inform him as early as November 30, 1920, that she considered his government as non-existent and that his army, according to international law, must be disarmed and disbanded. Gen. Wrangel still clung to the phantom and stubbornly continued his game, appealing to Russian patriotism and treating as traitors every one who did not agree with him. France repeatedly warned him that some day the feeding of the emigrés must be discontinued. From January, 1921, the French Government had to prolong the rationing of Wrangel's camps to February, from February to April, from April to May. They even tried to enforce the return of Wrangel's Cossacks to Soviet Russia. (Some 11,000 actually returned.) Finally it was decided to transfer the remainder of the troops, with other refugees, to Serbia and Bulgaria. In the autumn, 1921, that process was consummated and
Wrangel with his generals had to leave Constantino-
ple.

Unfortunately, even this may not yet be the end of
Gen. Wrangel's game. We have seen how, gradually,
a selection of the most reactionary elements took place,
and these elements have remained faithful to Wrangel.
This was a natural starting point for a systematic and
well-organized political propaganda, in order to make
of the rest of Wrangel's forces a ready weapon for a
monarchist restoration in Russia. In Bulgaria, and
especially in Serbia, the work of sustaining the refugees
is kept well in the hands of Wrangel's commanders and
other reactionary agents, who make use of their power
for enlisting the refugees in monarchist and reactionary
organizations. Their political activity is supported by
reactionary centers in Budapest, Munich and Berlin.
The branches of the monarchist organizations are
widely spread in Europe (Paris, Prague) and
even in this country. The former "Germanophilism" of
Wrangel and of the Russian reactionary elements
seems to have helped them in binding connections with
the German monarchists. I have already mentioned
that since 1918 attempts were made by German mili-
tarist groups to organize monarchist armies in Russia,
and we noted the activities of some of these armies on
the Northwestern frontiers. Since Yudenich's defeat

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1 On my landing in New York, in October, 1921, I was kindly
favored with a leaflet entitled: "Miliukoff—the Traitor. His Po-
litical Record" New York City, October, 1921, signed by the "Rus-
sian National Society," "Association Unity of Russia," "Union of
Russian Peasants in America and Canada," "Union of Russian Mon-
archists in America" and "Russian Brotherhood in Galicia." I was
told that there are few members in these "Unions" and always the
same. The leadership seems to belong to Mr. Brasol. Archbishop
Platon addressed a monarchist petition to President Harding but
did not seem to receive a satisfactory reply.
certain elements of these armed detachments are still in existence and are controlled from Berlin.

However, if *that* were all there is to anti-Bolshevist Russia, the Bolsheviks might feel on sure ground. The more the anti-Bolshevist movement was becoming reactionary and monarchist, the more it had to rely on foreign help and intervention, and, as a consequence, the more it helped the Bolsheviks. A feeling of patriotism evolved within Russia and especially in the ranks of the Red army, which was used adroitly by the Bolshevik power to rest their authority on a moral basis. If the reactionary emigrants were to take the place of the reactionary "White" armies, the ties would be entirely broken between emigration and Russia.

Fortunately, this is not the case. In the measure as reaction was unmasking itself, the liberal elements among the emigrants had to take sides. A nucleus of democratic groups was formed as early as January, 1921, at a conference of the Members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, which met at Paris. Elements of former political parties are regrouping themselves around that nucleus. Their political faith is: Democracy and a federated Republic in a Russia that has grown politically conscious through the process of its revolution. It is this program, not that of reaction and monarchist restoration, which is hailed by the anti-Bolshevik elements in Russia itself. The issue which is now being fought out is not between Bolshevism and reaction. It is between Bolshevism and democracy. To keep that issue clear is the task of Russian liberalism abroad.
CHAPTER VII.

THE DECLINE OF BOLSHEVISM.

We have seen the origin of Bolshevism and we now know its aims, both in internal and in external policy. We know that in their internal policy the Bolsheviks never intended to introduce real communism in Russia and were satisfied with "State Capitalism," for which they are even ready to substitute "State Control," if only they can get a new lease of life at the price of this concession. We also know that their chief interest has been centered in their foreign policy, as their only aim has always been to bring about a world revolution.

What is the result of the long experiment which has lasted for four full years? The Utopian dreams have gradually receded to the background, while realistic tactics has been becoming an aim for and in itself. The achievement of the World Revolution has had to be postponed. Now the Bolsheviks are reaching the point when—in one way or another—they will be forced formally to repudiate their experiment in "incomplete" communism. The "dictatorship of the proletariat" will be the last thing they will concede, and this is practically the only thing they really achieved—if you pass over "the proletariat" part of it and explain the "dictatorship" as a survival of old autocratic methods, in their crudest medieval form, of a rule by direct violence.

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Of course, the Bolsheviks themselves explain their utter failure by that unforeseen circumstance that the world proletariat was too slow to follow their example. No communist State, they argue, can exist in the midst of the capitalist States. With the same reason some sectarians finally admitted that no “sons of God” can carry on their paradisic existence among the “sons of evil.” The argument is poor because it begs the question, whether sons of God can exist at all in this world of sin.

The real explanation of the Bolshevist failure is, of course, much simpler than that. No human society that consumes without producing can exist. Bolshevism has only succeeded in building a huge machine of bureaucracy and warfare while at the same time it has destroyed all incentive for industry and trade and has had to live on the natural produce of an equally ruined agriculture. History knows one single instance of a similar experiment. It was the late Roman Empire where “the number of such as spend finally became larger than the number of such as produce” and which could only continue its frail existence on the obligatory work of a conquered people. This has now become the fate of the “Republic of workmen and peasants.” Of course, the result was bound to be the same: a gradual decay of highly developed forms of State and a return to the medieval or even to the tribal stage of life. Of course, there is another side to this process: that of a new growth, and we shall come back to it. But so far as the Bolshevist experiment is concerned, we now must analyze its process of degeneration and disintegration, in order to understand what must be its natural end.

The first sign of decay is reflected in Russian de-
mography. The Russian nation belongs to that group of younger nations whose birth rate has not yet undergone the checking influence of urban civilization. Russia headed the world's list in births and, unfortunately, also in the mortality of her children. In the fifteen years from the census of 1897 to 1912 Russia's population increased by 42.8 millions, i.e., at the rate of 2.8 millions a year. The following figures will show how that state of things was changed first by the war and then by the Bolshevist rule:

(Per 1000) 1900-1909 1917 1919
Births ............ 46.1 39.4 13.0
Deaths ................ 29.4 25.4 74.9
+ 16.7 + 14.0 — 61.9

That is, instead of an increase of 1.7=1.4 per cent. of the population, we have the distressing fact of an annual decrease of 6 per cent.

A Russian economist, Mr. S. Maslov, who has just escaped from Soviet Russia, gives the following figures showing the movement of the population in the twelve provinces of the old Russian center, which has especially suffered from Bolshevism.

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{Urban Population} & \text{Rural Population} & \text{Total} \\
1916 & 6,779,482 & 18,416,496 & 25,195,978 \\
1920 & 3,851,487 & 18,375,031 & 22,226,518 \\
\hline
-2,927,995 & -41,465 & -2,969,460 \\
(43.2 per cent.) & (0.2 per cent.) & \\
\end{array}
\]

It is also interesting to note the change in the composition of the population by sexes, unfavorable to the
towns and favorable to the villages (in the same twelve provinces):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Urban Population (Male)</th>
<th>Urban Population (Female)</th>
<th>Rural Population (Male)</th>
<th>Rural Population (Female)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>134.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The disintegration began from the head, the industrial population of the towns. The city population was in general comparatively small in Russia, but its number was increasing: from 4 millions in 1897 to 6.8 millions in 1916 in the 12 provinces mentioned (in all Russia the proportion of the city population increased for the same period from 12.9 per cent. to 17.5 per cent.). Now, in 1920 the figure fell to 3.8 millions, i.e., less than it was in 1897. The facts of gradual deterioration and final destruction of buildings in the towns, of decay of municipal enterprises, such as waterworks, sewerages, lighting systems, tramways, etc., are too well-known to be dwelt upon. Let us turn to the state of industry in Bolshevist Russia.

Fuel can be called the key-production which determines the state of industry. In Russia the "starvation minimum" for fuel, absolutely necessary to keep up production and life in the country, is considered to be 10 to 11 million cubic "sagens" (1 cu. sagen = 343 cubic feet). Here are the figures showing the total amount of fuel in the country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1919</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Millions cu. &quot;sagens&quot;</td>
<td>17.</td>
<td>13.</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After 1918 Soviet Russia was cut off from its coal and petroleum supply by the civil war, and it was only
in the Spring, 1920, that it entered into possession of the respective territories. It was thus left without its starvation minimum. Population, industry, transportation suffered greatly from the lack of fuel, as can be seen from the following figures showing fuel used in millions of cu. "sagens":

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1919</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (heating, water, light)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>9.</td>
<td>6.</td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1920, after the defeat of Gen. Denikin, the amount of fuel was expected to rise to 13.3 million cubic "sagens." Coal, oil, timber was again under the control of Moscow. But, owing to general conditions, the output had decreased too much in the meantime to satisfy even the "starvation minimum." It was a little better in 1921, as one can see by the output of coal for six months of 1921 as compared with the same period of 1920 (thousands of poods):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January 1920</th>
<th>June 1921</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donetz Basin</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow Basin</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siberia</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkestan</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>187</strong></td>
<td><strong>253</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But it is still very far from normal production (Donetz in 1913—753).

The production of iron has fared no better. The
total amount of metal required by industry for 1919 was 113 million poods. But only 37 millions could be provided, i.e., about 30 per cent. The actual amount of iron used, however, was only one-half of it, 15 per cent. The reason was—the diminution of productivity, which was no more than 10 or even 5 per cent. in the best factories. The chief work of the metallurgic trust "Gomza" which unified in the hands of the State 614 nationalized concerns (out of the whole number of 1191), was the construction of locomotives and of rolling stock. Only one-fifth or one-seventh of the program of construction was accomplished. If compared with 1914, the productivity of the Maltsev factory, one of the best, was decreasing at the following rate:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1914</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1919</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>100.</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>12.</td>
<td>7.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attempts were made in 1920 to stop the fall in the productivity of labor, but in 1921 it again resumed its downward course. In the Auerbach Mine in the Urals, e.g., the average output of ore per workman was (in poods):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1921</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>234</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>132</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The production of pig-iron fell in the interval from 1913-1920 from 257,398 thousand poods to 6,133 thousand poods, i.e., to 2.4 per cent.

Let us take another important trust of the State: the sugar trust. The decline in production is here characterized by the following figures:
Area sown with sug. beet (thous. dessiatines) ........... 697 682 613 539 411 387 180
Output of sugar (million poods) 105 91 73 56 20 5 6

The production of flax was one of the most important features of Russia’s foreign trade. One-third of the output was exported. But the peasants stopped sowing flax, in the first place, because they had to sell it at fixed prices, which were too low, and in the second place, because they needed grain and preferred to sow cereals. If compared with 1913 the area under flax was especially reduced. If we take the figure for 1913 (1½ million dessiatines) as 100, the following figures will be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1920</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a result, instead of the 35-40 millions of poods of the pre-war crops of flax, there were 13-10 millions reaped after the war, while in 1919 and 1920 the crops were 5 and 2 millions. That ancient branch of Russia's production and industry is thus entirely ruined.

It has been no better with the other branch of the textile industry, which was particularly important in Russia's industrial history and formed the backbone of the Russian rich "bourgeoisie,"—the cotton industry. Just before the war we succeeded in growing our own cotton in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, and home-grown cotton was gradually substituted for the American, Egyptian, East Indian and Persian. The Russian cotton industry occupied the fourth place in the world production (after Great Britain, the United States and
Germany). It was all destroyed under the Bolsheviks. The area under cotton in Turkestan speedily decreased as a result of the disorganization of transport, decline of industry, high prices of grain and low prices of cotton. The figures are as follows (taking for 100 the figure for 1916, 553,761 dessiatines):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1920</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The slight improvement in the cotton crop acreage was not reflected in improvement of the industry owing to the very inefficient system of purchase and distribution of raw cotton by the "Glavnotextil." The nationalized concerns represented (in 1919) a total of 6.9 million spindles and 162 thousand weaving looms. Their yearly requirements in raw materials amounted to 18 million poods of cotton and to 14 million poods of yarn. What did they obtain from the Central Board? About 4.7 per cent. of their requirements. The Centrotextil set 1,320 thousand spindles (i.e., 19 per cent.) and 53 thousand weaving looms (32 per cent.) to work. But after 8 months 300 thousand spindles (4 per cent.) and 18 thousand weaving looms were actually working (11 per cent.). 93 concerns were closed during 1918-1919, and the remaining ones worked only a part of the week. In 1920 the factories received about 14 per cent. of their requirements (2 million poods of 16 million), but proved unable to cope even with this quantity. The output fell to about 4.3 per cent. of that of pre-revolutionary times. The program "maximum" for 1921 (198 concerns with 5 million spindles and 120 thousand weaving looms) necessitated a consumption of 11.5 million poods of cot-
ton, while no more than 6.5 million were to be found in Turkestan. Under the conditions of general decay it was hardly possible to achieve even the program “minimum” (103 concerns, 2 million spindles, 48.5 thousand looms, with an output of 4 million poods of yarn and 646 million arshins of cotton goods).

Under such conditions of decaying industry what could be the position of the working class, the “proletarians”? We know that their initial rôle of masters of the situation was gradually changed. Few of the rank and file succeeded in passing from the “Factory Committees of Workmen” to the newly built “Central” and “Principal” boards (see Chap. III). They were there in the minority: in 1918 in 12 “central” trusts there were 162 workingmen to the 231 commissars, former owners and managers, specialists and engineers to whom the real direction was now intrusted. The administration of separate concerns was also given over to responsible directors, who were subordinated to the central boards, while the workmen’s committees were abolished.

For a time it seemed as if the workingmen were being remunerated by an extremely speedy increase of their wages. But very soon great disappointment ensued. The adjustment of wages could not keep pace with the increase in the market prices of foodstuffs and commodities. Wages were doubled before the end of 1917, but market prices went up sevenfold. Up to the end of 1918 wages were increased from 12 to 20 times, compared with November, 1917. But during the same period the price of bread increased 19 times, the price of manufactured goods 20 to 22 times, soap and shoes 25 times, etc. In the middle of 1918 an inquiry was made in Moscow into the budgets of 2,173
workingmen occupied in 238 factories. The result was to show that more than a half (56 per cent.) received less than 500 rubles a month, while the other 44 per cent. received from 500 to 1,000 rubles. Neither group could live on the wages alone: they had to cover about one-third of their budget (34.5 per cent.) by spending their savings (17.8 per cent.), getting loans (9.3), selling objects of their property (2.2), etc. They had to economize on all items of their budget (dwelling-places, clothes, drugs, cultural needs, etc.) in order to buy food. That item which before the war made up from one-third to one-half of the workmen’s budget (34 to 45 per cent.), had now increased to three-fourths of the whole (72-75 per cent.). It follows that the wages was now barely sufficient to cover the expenses for food. But as a matter of fact it was not sufficient even for that. The same inquiry made it clear that the workingmen could buy only 11.5 per cent. of their supply of food (8.1 of the whole budget) for prices fixed by the Government (by the ration cards). The remaining 88.5 per cent. (62.8 of the whole budget) had to be bought in the free market, for speedily growing prices. What could they get there? The Petrograd statisticians evaluated the minimum nutriment to be 3,580 calories a day. That figure was reduced to 1,850 calories in the autumn of 1919. Now, in 1918 the working men received only 6.8 per cent. of that “famine ration” (245 calories) for fixed prices, and had to spend, according to the market prices, about 1,200 rubles for the remaining 93.2 per cent. or—if they could not—be undernourished. In 1919 an inquiry covering 44 concerns with 73,000 workmen in Moscow showed that more than a half of them received from 10 to 20 per cent. of the diminished minimum of calories (i.e., 185 to
while the largest quantity distributed did not surpass 28 per cent. (518). It was a little better in the grain producing regions: 790 calories was distributed by card rations in the Volga basin, 853 in the Urals and 1,557 in Western Siberia.

The workingmen had to supply the rest, as I have said, from the free market. But was there a free market in "communist" Russia? Of course, it did not exist on paper. But, as an inevitable correction of the paper legislation, it continued to exist in life. Everything was sold and bought in the free market, but as the dealers had to run the risk of official raids and requisition, and as they also had to adjust their prices to the speedily falling value of a depreciated currency, the prices grew enormously. Before the War (1914) a daily food ration, evaluated at 2,700 calories (which is midway between the two "starvation rations" mentioned above) cost in Moscow fourteen copecks. Its price in January, 1920, was 798 rubles, 50 copecks, i.e., 5,703 times as much (in Siberia it was 95 rubles, 70 copecks, i.e., 683 times as much: these are the two limits between which prices fluctuated in the different provinces of Russia). How could a workingman afford to cover that increasing difference between what he received and what he had to have for his minimum expenses?¹ He went to the free market, but he could not go there with empty hands, and his salary as well

¹The last data about the situation are given in a report of the Medical Director of the American Relief Administration, dated November, 1921. It shows that the situation is changing from bad to worse.

"Prices, especially of food, are rising apace and the ruble decreasing in value; the exchange rate was 68,000 for $1.00 on our arrival in September, and is now over 200,000; and unofficially as much as 300,000 per dollar is being paid. Considering that 600,000 rubles is an average salary, even in Moscow, and that flour costs 16,000
as his savings were far from sufficient. He had to help himself. He did it, in the full measure of the political influence which he still possessed as the "hero of the revolution."

In order to produce official evidence of how he did it, let me quote from a statement based on the investigation conducted by the Bolshevist Interdepartmental Commission. "We assert," the official Red organ, *The Economic Life*, says, "that the abundance of goods of all kinds which exists now on the 'speculation' market has for its source only the warehouses of Soviet Russia, from which these goods are supplied there in a criminal fashion. It is we, ourselves, who feed 'Sukharevka' (a market place in Moscow which became the chief center of free trading) with the goods it sells and render useless our struggle against the village exploiters who supply foodstuffs to the Sukharevka in exchange for our own cloth, metal goods, etc."

Stealing and selling of "nationalized" goods stolen from the Government on the free market has become quite a custom in Russia. Nobody thinks it dishonest. Workingmen occupied in concerns which produce goods for sale, employees at the Soviet warehouses and stores of supplies, and the lower class of the Soviet bourgeoisie steal in order to save themselves from starvation. The latter are an exceedingly numerous clan, as every one who does not produce is obliged to

rubles per pound, meat 18,000 rubles per pound, sugar 50,000 rubles per pound, butter 50,000 to 60,000 rubles per pound and milk 10,000 rubles per pint, it is quite obvious that food shortage and misery extends beyond the actual starvation zones. Persons in cities and towns increase their resources by selling in the market, or privately, anything saleable which they may have in their homes; in fact streets about the markets are crowded with persons offering for sale their household effects; ornaments, bonnets, toys, jewelry, overcoats, carpets, furs and what not, limited to the provinces."
fill up the ranks of the Bolshevist bureaucracy. Before the Bolshevist usurpation (1917) employees and clerks formed from 10 to 20 per cent. of the number of workingmen in the Moscow region. At a later date, under the régime of nationalization, the Bolshevist economic journal counted 2,000,000 employees to the 3,135,000 workingmen, i.e., 63 per cent.

However, bringing the manufactured goods from the stores to the free market is only one-half of the task. The other is—to bring to the same market foodstuffs from the village. The workingmen undertook also that other part of the task. A special profession of middleman between the town and the village was founded: the so-called "bagmen" or "sack-bearers." They carried flour and vegetables from the village, to sell or for their own use. The profession was not without danger as the workmen had to leave their factories, which they did mostly on the pretext of illness, while the peasants had to sell their produce in a clandestine way as they were forbidden to sell anything before paying the assessed amount of foodstuffs. To block the free exchange between the village and town special "stop detachments" were formed, which intercepted the peasants and the "bagmen" at the railway stations and in their vicinity. But the men of the "stop detachments" were themselves no better and they often acted as an organization for helping, not checking, the speculators." "For a bribe in money, alcohol or substitute liquor," the Petrograd Pravda says (Dec., 1919), "they not only permit the 'speculators' to bring in their products but even help them. At railroad stations one can often see these 'guardians of the law' carrying a bag with flour or other food products on their
shoulders, pushing the passengers aside, and followed by the ‘speculators’ in whose pay they are and whose contraband they carry.’"

Thus, there was much more behind that barter of foodstuffs for manufactured goods than the mere wish of a customer to sell and to buy. A substitute for a free trade apparatus appeared in the persons of small tradesmen, peddlers or other men of energy and initiative. Two types of real “speculators” appeared which soon became the nouveaux riches of the communist society. One type was that of a market dealer in goods who knew where to find the buyer and the seller, who was himself buying private ownings from the helpless “bourgeoisie” for ridiculous prices, who received commissions and soon turned into a millionaire. He would then transform his money into more solid property, gold, jewelry, foreign currency. Sometimes such a “speculator” became the victim of the agents of the “Che-Ka,” who extorted from him his “unearned increment.” But they were too many, thousands and tens of thousands, to be thoroughly wiped out. The second type was that of a “speculator” of a higher rank. He would receive orders from the Government and travel, with regular permits granted by the Soviet institutions, in a separate car. He would buy some 20 poods of a merchandise for the Government, and 200 for himself and store them in his privileged car. He would buy saccharin in Moscow for 50,000 a kilo and would sell it at Tomsk for 1,500,-000; or he would buy dried fruits and rice in Tashkent fifty-six times cheaper than he would sell these staples in Samara; he would buy wheat flour in Tashkent for 40,000 a pood and sell it in Samara for 200,000; he
would buy butter in Omsk for 6,000 a pound and sell in Tomsk for 12,000.1 These privileged speculators belong to the higher Soviet bourgeoisie, the so-called "Sov-boors" who now rent nationalized concerns and take contracts from the Government. They are recruited from engineers, lawyers, former high officials, the middle or even upper bourgeoisie. Of course, they must know how to bribe influential Soviet officials and commissars. Some of the latter have regular shares in the organized speculative business. The socialist principle (see Chap. III) "he who does not work, neither shall he eat" has become transformed in Russia into a more popular saying: "He who does not speculate, does not eat." Speculation indeed is universal, and people help each other to evade detection by the authorities. This is the substitute for free economic initiative. *Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.*

The new Soviet bourgeoisie—the only social layer which enjoys life in Russia—were, of course, mostly left unmolested. But a series of restrictive measures were taken against the workingmen. As a result of small wages and shortage of food, they were leaving their factories in numbers. Some of them became "bag-men," some entered the ranks of the Red bureaucracy or served in the Red Army. Such as had preserved some connection with the villages settled in the country. Instead of the 9,200,000 "proletarians," numbered in that social group in 1897, only 4,775,000 remained, according to the official statistics for 1921. In January, 1918, the official number of men in the nineteen principal industries represented at the All-Rus-

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1 These facts are given in a personal letter by a Russian who has just escaped from Siberia.
sian Congress of Professional Unions was 2,532,000. But two years later Trotsky stated that in all the important branches of industry there were not much over one million on the list. The number of actual workers was only about 800,000. At the same time the Committee on Universal Compulsory Labor estimated the labor shortage as 230,000 of skilled and over 2,000,000 of unskilled labor. From September, 1919, to February, 1920, thirty-eight factories and foundries working for “national defense” asked for 39,145 skilled working-men. But only 27 per cent. of the number required (10,158) could be supplied. In March and April, 1920, the absences in railway workshops and factories were more than 80 per cent. All these were the so-called “shock-industries,” particularly important for the Bolshevist Government.

This could not be tolerated. Commissary Lomov in June, 1919, declared that as things stood, “proletarian principles must be put aside and the services of private capitalistic apparatus made use of.” As early as March, 1919, this was also the advice of Mr. Krassin. The Bolsheviks followed it so successfully that not only the “communistic” principles were thrown overboard, but even such acquisitions as had been won by labor in its struggle against capital under the autocracy, and which formed the substance of the former Factory Laws, were entirely lost under the “dictatorship of the proletariat.”

They began by reintroducing the system of piece-work wages, which had been abolished by the Provisional Government. They added to it the system of premiums for increased productivity. Of course, that “capitalistic” device had its usual consequence. In March, 1919, Mr. Rykov, the President of the Supreme Council of National Economy, declared that in
certain concerns the productivity had increased by 30 per cent. In 1919 the surplus wages paid under the piece-work system as compared with daily salaries was estimated for 12 concerns in Petrograd as 68.3 per cent.

Other "capitalistic" methods were also revived. It was permitted to arrange for overtime work according to "internal regulations" of the factories, without the sanction of the Unions. Then a supplementary hour's work was introduced as a "voluntary" contribution of the workingmen. It was also on the "voluntary" basis that the workmen were supposed to agree to a full day's work on Saturday. Finally, the Bolshevik power proceeded to legislate, and it introduced by decrees the ten, eleven and even twelve hour day in railway work-shops and in concerns working for the Red Army. Thus, gradually they paved the way for a system of compulsion of labor. The system of premiums for increased productivity was supplemented by the system of penalties for idleness and absence from work. These are the very words of the Decree of May 10, 1920:

(a) For the first day of absence during a month 15 per cent. of the monthly premium is deducted, for the second day 25 per cent., for the third day 60 per cent.

(b) Besides this, the work left incomplete during the absences must be made up for after the working hours and during holidays. In this case the workman may be put to any kind of work irrespective of his specialty and will be paid according to the normal scale without premiums or additions established for overtime work.

(c) In cases of absence for more than three days in a month the guilty will be charged with the crime of "sabotage" and prosecuted by disciplinary tribunals.
The pre-revolutionary Factory Laws did not permit the fining of workingmen more than three rubles or six days' wages for bad work or for absence, on the condition that the whole sum should not be more than a third of his earnings at the moment when the fine is imposed.

But the climax was reached when the Bolsheviks decided to militarize labor. The idea was suggested by three circumstances. In the first place, compulsory labor service had existed from the very beginning of the communist régime. But it was chiefly applied to the "bourgeoisie" and the intellectuals with the obvious aim to "break the will" and to degrade the former "parasitic" class. The "bourgeois" were forced to remove human refuse, to pave and clean the streets, to unload the coal, to drain the marshes, etc. Now the same principle was to be extended from the "unproductive" or "privileged" groups to the whole population on the ground of State necessity. The second circumstance which suggested the militarization of labor was the necessity of demobilizing the Red Army after the defeat of the "White" armies. The original idea of Mr. Trotsky was to make use of the demobilized army for the purpose of introducing a unified system of economy "in every branch of the economic life of the country, agriculture, industry, transportation." "The masses," he explained to the Ninth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, "should be in a position to be moved about, sent and ordered from place to place in exactly the same way as soldiers. . . . Without this we cannot speak seriously of any organization of industry on a new basis in the present day conditions of disorganization and starvation."
However, soon Mr. Trotsky changed his mind as to a continued existence of the Red Army. The “first Labor Army,” transformed from the Third Red Army in January, 1920, instead of being demobilized, was only temporarily given such work as wood-cutting and gathering, loading, etc. The result was ridiculous. Only one-tenth of the army of 150,000 was actually at work, and the productivity of their unskilled labor was thirty times less than the standard of 1916. Trotsky went on ordering new conscriptions and increasing his army on the pretext of new dangers menacing the Republic of workingmen from the “rapacious imperialists” all over the world.

There remained the third reason for militarizing labor—“desertion of work” which was increasing from the beginning of 1920 at a menacing rate. The “struggle with labor desertion” was formally sanctioned by the Ninth Congress in April, 1920. Methods of “militarization” were to be preserved in that struggle. As Trotsky stated, it was more than an analogy (with the army discipline). “No other social organization has ever considered itself justified in subordinating the will of the citizens to such an extent as the army.” It was no more the “political will of the intelligentsia” that was now to be “broken” (Trotsky’s utterings in January, 1919) but the will of the “backward element” of the proletarian masses.

Accordingly, a decree was published in the spring, 1920, which incorporated the whole population into special labor armies. A “General Committee” (“Glavkomtrude”) is at the head of the new centralized organization and local committees in the provinces (“Komtrude”) are affiliated with it. The “Glavkomtrude” began by evaluating the whole number of labor
requirements for 1920 at 131,895 skilled and 1,809,037 unskilled workingmen. (See above.) It had then to proceed to mobilization, and extremely severe measures of punishment were announced at the end of May for evasion of labor conscription. Even persons "guilty of aiding or giving refuge to labor deserters" were to be punished by "fines or by partial or complete confiscation of their property," by imprisonment or even by trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal. The special "Revolutionary Council of Labor" ("Revsovtrude") was empowered to send the enlisted workingmen to wherever it desired, without discrimination of training, in the order of their registration.

During 1920 the process of mobilization was pursued, rather fitfully and with very poor results, all over Russia. The new organization seems to have met with passive resistance on the part of the proletariat. A very small part of the scheme for "distribution of labor" in 1920 was accomplished. For the first trimester of 1920 only 11,359 workingmen were distributed in 25 provinces for railroad service. The seven largest metallurgical foundries, working for railroad repair which is badly needed for the transport, asked the new organization during the second half of 1920 for 14,571 men. 13,383 were ordered to go, but 8,442 of them simply disappeared, and they only got 4,941. In Petrograd itself, at the end of 1920, 27,629 were ordered to report for wood-cutting. Only 2,967, i.e., less than 11 per cent. actually reported. The amount of work expected from them was 321,530 cubic sagens of wood and 1,147,970 logs. The work actually accomplished was 77,298 cubic sagens of wood and 57,020 logs, i.e., 24 per cent. and 7 per cent.

This was the best answer to Trotsky's assertion that
"the statement that free labor—namely freely employed labor—produces more than labor under compulsion is correct only when applied to feudalist and bourgeois." The working class now practically felt much worse that under the "bourgeois order." The resolution of Petrograd workers of September 5, 1920, reads: "We feel as if we were hard labor convicts where everything but our feeding has been made subject to iron rules. We have become lost as human beings, and have been turned into slaves."

As a result of that state of mind, a wave of strikes passed over Soviet Russia in 1920. Strikes have been called in 77 per cent. of the large and middle-sized works. In nationalized undertakings strikes were continuous and 90 per cent. of them were called in just such factories. This is the statement of the Bolshevist board of statistics of the Commissariat of Labor.

If such was the policy of the Bolsheviks toward a class which they claimed to represent, one may imagine what it was concerning that other class to which the great majority (85 per cent.) of the population belonged,—the class of farmers which was classified as "petty bourgeoisie" and, accordingly, a potential enemy.

Under normal conditions of economic life the free play of exchange served as a basis for regular intercourse between the town and village. This normal relation was now greatly disrupted, since the State had taken up the task of organizing the whole system of production, distribution and consumption. Neither the task of providing the town with foodstuffs nor the task of providing the village with manufactured goods could be even approximately solved by the Bolshevist Government. The result of that wholly ineffective mediation was bound to be disastrous both for the
town and the village. Far from being able to cope with the complicated functions of a "State Capitalism," the Bolshevist State proved unable to perform the more elementary functions of the formerly existing State for which it had substituted itself. We have seen how it destroyed industry, and we shall see how agriculture was destroyed. But before we come to it we must dwell somewhat upon the havoc it played with its own finances. It is especially in that branch that the resources of a modern State were completely destroyed by the new possessors of the State power and, as a result, the whole structure has crumbled down to the bottom.

The Bolsheviks came to power with the most sanguine and naïve hopes as to the use to be made of the financial reserves stored by the "greedy" bourgeoisie, especially after their war-time "predatory profits." Their first financial scheme was thus to take from the "bourgeoisie" as much money as they could get out under the menace of terror. By a decree of October 30, 1918, they ordered "an extraordinary revolutionary tax to be collected only once." They expected to get from the "bourgeoisie" the sum of 10 billion rubles: a part of the "enormous gains won by unrestrained war speculation." Unfortunately for the Soviets, these 10 billions could never be paid.

The sum total of the yearly national income in pre-war Russia was estimated to amount to 15 billions. Less than one-fifth of that sum, i.e., 2.6 billions, could be collected as income tax, under ordinary conditions. There were in Russia only 30,000 taxpayers who were in possession of a yearly income above 10,000 rubles. They had to pay 60 per cent. of the sum assessed. As may be seen from these figures, Russia was very poor
as compared with the other "bourgeois" nations. Moreover, just these 30,000 well-to-do people—or as many of them as had remained within Bolshevist Russia—had already suffered from every kind of confiscations and requisitions. It was thus natural that by the middle of 1919 only 1½ billion was actually paid. The Bolsheviks were finally forced to recognize that their great confiscation tax had utterly failed.

Another attempt to grab the "bourgeois capital" was made by laying hands on their open accounts in the banks. This idea was as naive as the former one. Two billions of the "capitalist" money had been found in the banks on December 15, 1917. On May 1, 1918, this money had been confiscated, with the exception of 33 millions.

The third device was to put into the budget for 1919 the revenue of all the nationalized industry, commerce, ways of communications, former State monopolies, which amounted to about 13.5 billions. This was a great item: full two-thirds of the evaluated income. But they forgot that the State had taken upon itself the ungrateful task of running all these concerns. Just how unprofitable it was can be shown by the following figures. The "Centrotextil" (see above) advanced for the second part of 1918, on account of products to be received, 1,348,716,000 rubles. The value of goods received to secure this advance was up to January 1, 1919, only 143,716,000 rubles, i.e., about 10 per cent. of its advance. They expected to receive for goods issued for consumption during the first half of 1919—1,503 millions. The sum actually received was 55 millions, i.e., 3.5 per cent. The railways, which in 1916 gave a net profit of 140 million rubles, after their nationalization worked at a loss of 8 billions in 1918.
The estimated expense for running railroads, nationalized concerns and supplying the workers amounted for 1919 to 24.1 billions, i.e., the expected income of 13.5 billions turned into the big deficit of 10.6 billions. The reality was much worse than the estimates: the final deficit was 33.9 billions, and in 1920 it amounted to 315.6 billions.

What was to be done? Indirect taxation was generally objected to by socialists. But the Bolsheviks not only preserved all the former indirect taxes, they extended indirect taxation to all possible articles of consumption, and they thus were able to add to the former income of a quarter of a billion eight times as much: 21/4 billions in all. Compared with their enormous expenses it was still a trifle.

The only source left was to print paper money. It was rather queer for the people who had repeatedly promised to abolish money altogether. But they had to do it. That was the only way to cover their colossal deficits which were growing in geometrical progression. Of course, 'paper money in its turn increased the nominal figures of expenditures. The balance of revenue and disbursements was as follows: ¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Revenue (in billions)</th>
<th>Expenditures (in billions)</th>
<th>(Expenditures in gold value)</th>
<th>Deficit</th>
<th>(Deficit in per cent. of expenditures)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>49.</td>
<td>215.4</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>166.4</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>159.</td>
<td>1,215.2</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1,056.2</td>
<td>86.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We see that two-thirds of the budget for 1918, more than three-fourths for 1919 and almost nine-tenths

¹I take these figures from M. Maslov's remarkable articles in the Paris Posledniya Novosti (The Last News)—a Russian daily paper.
for 1920 were to be covered with paper money. Inflation of currency had already become conspicuous during the war time. Before the Revolution of 1917, 272 million rubles had been printed monthly. The Provisional Government increased that figure to almost four times: up to one billion. The Bolshevik Government in 1918-1919 printed six times as much as the Provisional Government—six billions monthly. In 1920 the monthly emission of paper money rose to thirty-eight times (38½ billions).

The quantity of paper money in circulation increased accordingly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War time (1914-16)</td>
<td>about 10 billions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March Revolution (1917)</td>
<td>&quot; 19 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bolshevik Revolution:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918 and 1919</td>
<td>&quot; 175 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of 1920</td>
<td>&quot; 1000 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We know that the consequence was an exorbitant and rapid rise of prices in speedily increasing proportion. No adjustments of wages or salaries, however frequent, could keep pace with the fall of the paper currency. At the beginning the Government tried to standardize prices. But it had proved difficult even under the Provisional Governments of 1917. In August, 1917, fixed prices for grain were to be increased in order to impel the peasants to deliver their grain. Under the Bolsheviks fixed prices were preserved, but as early as January, 1918, fixed prices for grain lost at least half their value when compared with prices quoted for other articles of prime necessity.

Henceforth the peasant preferred to sell in the free market, for actual, not for fixed prices. But it meant selling to private purchasers, not to the Government.
At the beginning paper money was willingly received, and soon the peasants became millionaires. They could no more count their rubles. They kept them in bundles, weighed them and it became customary to say: "We have so many pounds or poods of rubles." But then they saw that their paper wealth was rapidly depreciating. They changed their minds and asked for manufactured goods. There were some stores of these preserved from former years, but they were soon distributed. The farmers could have no more iron, cloth, shoes, matches, etc. They had to be satisfied with what the burgesses were bringing them from the town: furniture, rugs, gramophones, pianos, etc. They hoarded all that, but finally they had enough of it, and at the same time the "bourgeoisie" had little left to sell.

Of course, the Bolsheviks did not care about the "bourgeoisie." But the Red Army and the Red bureaucracy had to be fed and paid in kind. In some way or other the Bolshevikist Government had to provide for that. Otherwise the very basis of its existence would be shattered.

The Bolshevikist Government had inherited from the Provisional Government the grain monopoly, which had been introduced in April, 1917, in order to secure supplies for the Army. The Bolsheviks preserved it as it fitted perfectly into their scheme of nationalizing the whole system of the national economy. This was just "State Capitalism." But there was that question of fixed prices for which the peasant was unwilling to sell. For instance, in the fertile province of Kursk in 1918 there was grain enough to be sold at a price of $17.00 or $19.50 the pood (36 lbs.). But the peasants refused to deal at the fixed price of $8.75, i.e., at half
the price. As a result, food was sold to the "bagmen" or to the Coöperatives, but not to the Government. The number of carloads of grain actually sent off from the provinces to the central Government was decreasing at a speedy rate. Here are some figures to illustrate the situation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Carloads Ordered</th>
<th>Carloads actually sent off</th>
<th>Per cent. of orders executed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voronezh</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viatka</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazan</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kursk</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orel</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tambov</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>14.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The whole quantity of food supplies (flour, rye, wheat, barley, oats and peas) arriving in Petrograd in 1917 and 1918 varied as follows (in tons):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January-March</th>
<th>April-June</th>
<th>July-September</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>24,626</td>
<td>24,165</td>
<td>20,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>12,001</td>
<td>5,388</td>
<td>2,241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The situation was becoming so menacing that the Bolshevist power decided to resort, here too, to methods of compulsion. They were twofold. Free trade, through "bagmen," was to be precluded. Grain was to be registered in the villages and delivered to the Government.

The former measure had been taken as early as February 19, 1918, in the shape of a "compulsory regulation" introducing "stop detachments" at each large railway station, to confiscate provisions carried by the passengers. The practice of these "stop detachments" was confined to looting, and the requisitioned goods—
of every kind—were mostly distributed among themselves. But to a certain extent the "bagmen's" trade in its primitive form was actually reduced and it took the professionally organized form of which we have already spoken. (See above.) The prohibition only increased "speculation" and the further growth of prices.

The latter measure was taken by a Decree of May 14, 1918. The Decree was a fierce attack upon "the village bourgeoisie," which "remains stubbornly deaf and indifferent to the wailings of starving workmen and peasant poverty, and does not bring the grain to the collecting points," while selling it "at home at fabulous prices to grain speculators." The Bolsheviks decided that "the answer to the violence of grain-owners towards the starving poor must be violence towards the bourgeoisie." "Not a pood should remain in the hands of those holding the grain, except the quantity needed for sowing the fields and provisioning the families until the new harvest." The amount to be retained was exceedingly low: 432 lbs. of flour and 648 lbs. of potatoes. The Russian peasants under normal conditions need almost double that quantity, as bread and potatoes form practically their sole sustenance. In order to "compel each grain-owner to declare the surplus," the workingmen and the poor peasants were invited "to unite at once for a merciless struggle against the grain-hoarders," and the powers of the People's Food Commissioner were extended so as to override all local food bodies and to use armed forces in cases of resistance.

The Government thus entered the stage of class war between the town and the village. A "crusade" against

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the village bourgeoisie was formally declared by a decision of the All-Russian Executive Committee. The Soviets of Moscow and Petrograd were ordered in June "to mobilize 10,000 workers, to arm them and to equip them for a campaign for the conquest of wheat from the rapacious and the monopolists."

The "rapacious," the "tight-fisted" village dealers and "profiteers" as a matter of fact were the great majority in the Russian village. The Bolshevist emissaries met with the most decided and stubborn resistance. When they appeared in the village they were often beaten half-dead, hunted like wild animals, killed and torn to pieces by the infuriated crowd. That is why the order was to "equip for a campaign" full detachments of workingmen. Such detachments were really formed. In June, 1918, the "Food Army" consisted of about 3,000 bayonets. In December it had grown to 36,500 men. But the Bolsheviks themselves in their report on the work of that Food Army had to avow that "in the course of its work (i.e., during four months) it has lost 7,309 men killed, wounded, etc.,"—i.e., one-fifth of its number.

The more important point for the Bolsheviks was that, although the amount of grain collected increased a little owing to the activity of these requisitioning detachments, they had to be fed on it first, and the amount of supplies that reached the cities continued to decrease. In fact it was never as low as just at that time (see above figures for July-September, 1918 for Petrograd). If the civil war was to bear any real fruit, it obviously had to be transferred to the village itself, and not be brought to it from the outside. And so it was decided. The "poor peasants" had to join the workingmen.
On June 11, 1918, a decree was issued establishing the "Pauper Committees" (or "the Committees of the Poor") in every village. Only such as were supporting the Bolshevist authority were elected to the committees, and mostly they were the worst elements in the community: the least thrifty, sometimes criminals. Outsiders, as "chance visitors," were permitted to be elected together with the "local residents." The "Pauper Committees" were given great power, and one can easily imagine how much lawlessness and mutual hatred was introduced into the Russian village by this new form of the rule by the "conscious minority." It can also be easily understood why it was just the Pauper Committees which made the farmers closely acquainted with the methods of the Bolshevist compulsion and provoked a series of uprisings. The "paupers" were, of course, the first to suffer from these uprisings. But then, detachments of Red soldiers, chiefly aliens, were sent to punish the rebels, and the uprisings were regularly stifled. However, one result of this new form of civil war appeared as early as the autumn of 1918. The peasants reduced the area of their autumn sowing. "Why should we sow?" they are reported to have said. "If one is permitted to take away grain from others, without doing any work,—well, we had better remain without grain, and be classed as poor."

The Decree of May 14, 1918, started with the supposition that "in the producing provinces of Russia there were large reserves of grain of the harvests of 1918 and 1917 not yet even threshed." The Decree of October 30, 1918, still tried to persuade the "paupers" that the well-to-do peasants had "surpluses" of grain, because the land was not yet partitioned in equal lots and they possessed better and larger lots than the
others. The reason is not good, as the well-to-do peasants who formed the great majority just possessed the average lots. But the fact of there being reserves of grain in 1918 is probable. It is also true that the attempts of the Government to lay its hand on these reserves failed utterly. Lenin himself avowed that no more than 28 million poods in the first half of 1918 and 67 million poods in the second half could be collected by the Governmental agencies as a result of the Bolshevik food policy. The Bolshevists had to recognize their mistakes and change their methods.

A new term now appeared in the official decrees of 1919: “the middle peasantry.” Both Lenin and Trotsky in their letters published in February, 1919, agreed that there was a “third group” in the village, between the “tight-fists” and the “paupers,” “with its one wing adjoining the proletariat, with its other merging with the bourgeoisie.” Lenin wished to believe that they “were not the enemies of the Soviet Government,” while Trotsky desired to persuade them that the Soviet Government “does not compel and never intends to compel the middle peasantry to change to the communistic forms of land tilling.”

Obviously, the peasant uprisings of the autumn of 1918, had duly impressed the Bolshevik leaders. In the same autumn an official order was published which tried to conciliate the “middle peasantry.” It was recognized that “in many cases the interests of the middle peasantry were violated.” As the “village paupers” were considered by the population to be “an instrument of repression against the rest of the rural population,” it was explained that, on the contrary, the pauper committees were “revolutionary organs of the whole of the peasantry against the former land-
owners, the rich 'tight-fists,' the merchants and the priests.' This classification, of course, was also far from being definite. Lenin, in his speech at the Congress of the Communist Party, in April, 1919, went further. He said: "Even with respect to the rich peasant we do not speak with the same determination as with regard to the bourgeoisie. We do not say: absolute expropriation of the rich peasantry. We say: the suppression of the resistance of the peasantry. . . . This is not complete expropriation!" At the same time Lenin counseled his comrades to moderation. "We cannot expect the middle peasant to come over to our side immediately." "We have learned how to overthrow the bourgeoisie and suppress it. . . We have not yet learned how to regulate our relations with the millions of the middle peasants and how to win their confidence. . . . We must live in peace with the middle peasantry. The middle peasantry in a communistic society will be on our side only if we lighten and improve its economic conditions. . . . First help him, and then you will secure his confidence."

Accordingly, new tactics were resorted to in the villages. Lenin's idea was to try the Coöperative apparatus now, and it was so decided by the Congress. By a Decree of August 8, 1918, the consumers' Coöperatives (about 20,000 organizations uniting about 7,000,000 consumers) had been made use of as semi-official organizations for the compulsory purchase of grain from the peasants. The peasants had to bring their grain to collecting-centers and receive payment for it partly in money and partly in credit orders on Coöperative stores in the vicinity. In March, 1919, another decree was issued which permitted "free sales of products, including foodstuffs." As a symbol of the
union between the peasantry and the proletarians, Kalenin, a peasant-Bolshevik, was elected President of the Central Executive Committee, and in his address (April, 1919) he preached a conscientious collection of the tax in kind and depicted idyllic scenes of free exchange of articles of agriculture and of home consumption for farm and household utensils at local fairs.

The results, however, did not justify these expectations. By September, 1919, only 38.1 per cent. of the assessed quantity of bread and fodder grain had been collected (about 100 million poods); by January, 1921, the figure was a little over 200 million poods. The Government needed twice that much.

The official organ Izvestia (November 3, 1919), explained the lack of success by "the class war which has become permanent and continuous," as well as by the diffidence of the peasants. They are not yet "sufficiently farsighted to be quite convinced of the stability of the Soviet Power and of the inevitability of socialism," and for this reason or some other they "consider Soviet money of no value, not being able to buy anything with it." The paper does not mention the fact—officially stated in another Red periodical—that the area under cultivation had already diminished for that year (1919) by 13,500,000 acres in 28 provinces: a further result of the slackening of incentives for keeping up production on the level attained under better conditions.

"The peasants conceal their bread": such was the official explanation of the failure to receive the necessary food for the Red Army and the Red officials in 1919. The practical conclusion was that the whole flirtation with the "middle peasantry" was useless and unnecessarily sentimental. The "selfish" policy of the
farmers was thus exposed and censured by Mr. Ossinsky, the Soviet economist. "In order to escape requisitions, the middle peasants in many localities plant grass and other crops unfit for human consumption, instead of food grains. They make every effort to reduce the area under cultivation, sowing only what they require for themselves. . . They sell whatever horses they have in the autumn, attempting in that way to evade labor duty, and then dispose of whatever fodder they have to "speculators."

Arguments like these convinced the Food Department that force must be applied to compel the peasants to mind their interests. At the same time the government decided to increase their claims from the peasants. The program for 1920 was again about 400 millions. Unusually severe measures were to be applied to carry it out. (See Chap. VIII.) As a matter of fact, more than the assessed amounts was requisitioned from certain localities and, in general, the local authorities did not concern themselves with the figures designated. They were helped by the fact that in 1920 new territories, especially rich in grain, were added to Bolshevist Russia, such as Southern Russia (the Ukraine), the Caucasus, Siberia. Food stores were as yet unexhausted in these regions, and this helped the Bolsheviks through the year 1920. But this was their last resource. In 1920 and 1921 they exhausted Siberia in the same way as they had exhausted the original territory of Bolshevist Russia in 1918 and 1919. It was the same Pauper Committees in the villages, the same civil war and continuous uprisings, the same system of repression and extermination of the more active and intellectual element, and, as a result, increased assessment of grain tax and enforced requisitioning of
stores. The objections of local specialists against the immeasurably high assessments were explained as "sabotage" and counter-revolution. In many regions of Siberia there was not enough grain left even for seeds, and in 1921 the planted area was no more than 50 per cent. of that in 1920. The well-to-do peasants preferred to hide their grain rather than sow it; they preferred to slaughter their live stock for meat, to consume their milk, butter, eggs, than to give all these to the Bolsheviks. Here, as elsewhere, the Bolshevikist food policy "took out the soul from agricultural labor, deprived the peasant of any stimulus to work, any desire for improvement and increased effort." I have summarized here a very detailed description in a personal letter, and my informant adds: "What a relief it might have been for starving Russia—these two million dessiatines left without seeds in the Altaisk, Tomsk and Semipalatinsk regions, where crops were satisfactory in 1921. The Volga basin would not have been converted into a real dead wilderness and peasants would not have died as early as August, if the Soviet power had not pumped out absolutely all the stores left in a region which already in 1920 had suffered from great shortage of food." (See Chap. VIII.)

I especially emphasize the fact of exhaustion of stores in old and in newly acquired territories because it partly explains the exceptionally good success of Mr. Ossinsky's large program of food requisitioning in 1920. The theoretical estimate, based on the yearly home consumption of 664 lbs. per head of the population, was that only 108 million poods of crops would remain free, to be requisitioned by the State. But as a matter of fact the Commissariat of Food Supply succeeded in collect-
ing 350 millions by assessment. Moreover, it was estimated that about 240 million poods were obtained by the "bagmen." Where could the 482 millions (350 + 240 − 108) lacking be found? Mr. J. Larin, the leading Bolshevikist economist, answered in Mr. Ossinsky's spirit: "It is clear that the peasants have succeeded in cheating our statisticians to the amount of 482 million poods or to about one-quarter of the total amount which the population has declared to the local statistical organizations as the total yield of the crops (1,687 million poods, exclusive of 513 million poods of seeds)," and he confidently raised by 25 per cent. the program for 1921. To which Mr. Larin's communist opponent, Mr. Popov, who is the head of the Central Statistical Department, very reasonably objected, that it remained to be proved whether the mysterious 482 millions really were taken from the available surpluses. "Was it that the Commissariat of Food really took surpluses, or did it take grain according to the assessment, the assessment for 1920 being fixed without any regard to surpluses or to deficits? This being so, all the conclusions arrived at by comrade Larin fall to the ground."

We quote this learned dispute between the two economists of Bolshevikist Russia in order to show how superficial and irresponsible were the minds by which Russia was doomed to pass through the famine of 1921. There can be no doubt that the 350 millions requisitioned by the agents of the Food Department were taken from the reserve stocks, which were now utterly exhausted, and that the real yearly consumption for 1921 fell far below that tolerably good figure of 644 lbs. per head.

The gruesome fact of starving Russia, which we shall
describe in the next chapter, is a convincing answer to Messrs. Ossinsky and Larin's indictment of the peasants' concealment. The Bolsheviks foresaw the dry season and were unable to close their eyes to the disaster. They were frightened—not so much for Russia as for their further existence. Mr. Lenin, at a new congress of his party, on March 15, 1921, came out with a new program of concessions.

"The situation is now this," he said. "Either we must satisfy the middle peasants economically and consent to a freedom of commodity exchange, or it will be impossible to maintain the power of the proletariat in Russia, in view of the slowing down of the international revolution." "We know that only an understanding with the peasantry can save the social revolution, until the revolution is ready to break out in other countries."

There followed some elementary avowals. Mr. Lenin now dared openly to recognize that "the small peasant has aims that are not the same as those of the worker."

"In Russia the industrial workers are in the minority and the small farmers overwhelmingly in the majority."

"The transformation of the entire psychology of the petty peasants is a labor that will require generations." In the meantime "it is impossible to deceive a class of the population and it is dangerous to go on deceiving one's self. It is time to admit frankly that the peasants manifestly refuse to accept proletarian dictatorship any longer. . . . We must grant freer economic relations between the workers and peasants. As a matter of fact, we have hitherto acted in a too military manner. . . . If some communists thought the organization of a socialistic state was possible in three years, they were dreamers. Freedom of economic relations means free
trade, and free trade signifies a return to capitalism. Those who believe that in this Russia of peasants socialism can be reached, simply believe in Utopia."

Far-reaching conclusions could have been drawn from these new admissions. But such conclusions would have implied the possibility of resigning or renouncing the whole experiment. Far from this being the case, Mr. Lenin’s concessions to reality and to “capitalism” did not go beyond what he planned for 1919 when the danger of destruction of the agricultural basis of the national economy first became universally self-evident. Lenin’s proposals accepted by the March Congress were:

1. To replace the levy as a means of supplying the State with foodstuffs, raw materials and fodder by taxation in kind.

2. The amount of the tax to be estimated so as to cover the minimum requirements of the army, the town workers and the agricultural workers, but at the same time to be less than the quantity assessed in accordance with the State levy.

3. The surplus supplies, in excess of the tax, to be freely exchanged for manufactured goods, either at the local market place or through the coöperative societies.

However, there were reasons enough for the peasant to remain suspicious. The independence of the coöperative societies was at that very time finally abolished by the Decree of March 20, 1921. They were incorporated into the State organism and hierarchically subordinated to the central institutions. Liberty of initiative and enterprise on the part of the population was thus definitely destroyed. Manufactured goods, of course, were not to be had by paper order. Lenin expected “to obtain a certain part of the goods from abroad” and thus to strengthen the power of the State
and "to keep power more firmly in the hands of the proletariat." But it took time to restore trade relations with foreign capitalists. Again, one could not see how the change in form of assessment could bring about with it the diminution of the amount of tax, if the requirements of the Red Army and the bureaucracy were to be met. Poor crops did not permit the Bolsheviks to diminish their "minimum" demands. The "minimum" was estimated at its former figure of 400 million poods, namely:

For the army, the workingmen and rural population (Bolshevist bureaucracy) 200-250 millions
For the urban population, at the minimum ration of 400 lbs. per head..... 160 millions

The tax in kind was to give 240 millions, and the rest was to be obtained by exchange of goods. But they themselves admitted that in 1921 the tax in kind could hardly give more than 180 millions and they expected to get the other part also "from import." They also could not conceal from themselves that the help to the starving population would amount to 60 millions at least, even at half-minimum rations. All these elements of uncertainty left the whole scheme of the new tax and free trade in suspense.

No complete picture can as yet be drawn of the results of the food campaign for 1921. But preliminary and detached facts testify to an ominous failure in all details of the program. In the first place, it was made known too late in the rural districts, and a great number of local committees refused their coöperation and continued to levy grain by force. In the second place, the scheme met with suspicion and opposition on the part of the population which very often looked at the tax
in kind as an addition to the former assessment, not a substitute for it. The attempts of the Government compulsorily to increase the planted area, on the occasion of the spring seed failed. Sometimes the irritated population went to the limit of burning the Government seeds. At last the central authorities yielded to necessity and decided to come back to the former methods of compulsion. In December Lenin ordered the Executive Committee to resort to force for collecting the arrears of the tax in kind, said to amount to 100 million poods. Beginning with Dec. 10, the Executive Committee had to work "day and night," in order to finish the collection before Christmas. The most energetic communist workers were "flung" into the provinces and the revolutionary tribunals prepared to punish the recalcitrants.

I do not know what was the result of this new effort. But figures given by the Food Commissariat on October 6, 1921 (the agricultural year ends with September) were far from promising. The Commissariat had collected:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tax in kind</td>
<td>34.9 million poods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the Soviet Estates</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return of seed loans</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundry</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the Ukraine</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>58.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The "Soviet Estates" is an attempt to introduce communism into agriculture. The land taken over for Soviet estates is exclusively that which formerly belonged to the large landowners. Of course, only a small part of that land could be given for communist or collectivist experiments, as the peasants took most of it (86 per cent., or 20.8 million dessiatines out of 24.1) for individual holdings. The "Soviet Estates" (Sovkhoses) received about 9 per cent. of that land. For 1921 the "Sovkhoses" were expected to sow over half a million
As we know the total amount of the tax in kind was to be 240 or at least 180 million poods, while the total requirement of food for the Soviet Government was about 400 millions (see above). You now see that the situation had become quite tragic, and drastic changes were to be introduced into the food budget for the Government to be able further to sustain themselves and their chief supporters. If all could not be fed by the State, a choice of the most necessary ones had to be made by the Government.

We have proofs that the Bolshevist Government has indeed trodden that path of self-liquidation. The Red bureaucracy—or rather such part of it as had filled up its ranks involuntarily, in order not to starve, were the first to be sacrificed. The announcement was published that a full 2½ million, especially women, were to be given notice. We also have the figures of a program of food distribution for 1922 (October to October), covering all the persons who will receive food from the State, exclusive of the Ukraine and Turkestan, some special fund, and the fund of the army. This
program also shows great reductions to be made, especially in the civil service, and great pessimism concerning the resources to be drawn upon. The food resources are here estimated as follows (cf. the figures above):

Food levy, return of seed loans and charge for milling ................. 160 million poods
From free trade ....................... 15 " "
From the Ukraine ..................... 57 " "

Total ................................. 232
Deducting for fodder 45

Grain and grits, total............. 187

The ration is based on 2,600 calories per person per day. The groups of the population which still are to be cared for by the State are (the numbers of "eaters" is doubled, to include the "families"):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Eaters (thousands of poods)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workingmen:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>1,800,000 24,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>2,300,000 31,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Employees:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in central boards)</td>
<td>2,350,000 28,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children, invalids, charity, prisoners...</td>
<td>925,000 11,306.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed loans .....</td>
<td>&quot; 15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famine Relief</td>
<td>&quot; 12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundries</td>
<td>&quot; 13,292.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,375,000 135,168.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Probably the rest, as compared with the figure of 187 million poods of grain and grits and 45 million poods fodder, is intended to a great extent to feed the Red Army. Of course, the arrears of the assessed amounts were also to be taken in consideration.
It is explained in the *Economic Life* of October 18, 1921, from which these figures are taken, that "the number of persons supplied by the State has diminished three times by comparison with the preceding year. Food is no longer to be supplied to the non-working population and the number of workmen and employees in the State institutions and enterprises has been decreased."

This is the beginning of the end. The "conscious minority," after having exhausted the resources of the country, limit the circle of privileged groups permitted to share in their power and confine the functions of the Communist State to the strict limit of running its own machinery. The old saying: *L'état c'est moi* of the King-Sun of France is now undisguisedly made a motto of the King-Red-Star. If left to itself the Red Star will last as long as there will be something to sacrifice and to sell in exchange for its further existence. Its excuse will always remain the same: waiting for the great World Revolution.

There are two things which can cut short that long waiting. One is the changing state of mind of the popular masses. We have noted the symptoms of that change in this chapter. But this is the political side of the question. I purposely confined myself in this chapter to the economic side,—to the state of the economic resources of the country. There is a limit to their exhaustion, and we have seen how this limit is being gradually reached. Can that limit be overstepped with impunity? Beyond it is death and destruction. Destruction and death are in Russia. The ghastly summary of the four years of Soviet domination is the great Russian Famine of 1921.
CHAPTER VIII.

THE FAMINE.

The year 1921 will be remembered as the first year of the great Russian Famine. None similar to it can be found in Russia's history. It is as unparalleled and unprecedented as the events that caused it.

The wide extent of the disaster which has befallen Russia can be seen from the map. I have purposely selected this one because it represents an official statement by the Soviet Government. It was presented by Dr. Nansen at the second session of the League of Nations at Geneva, in September, 1921, on his coming back from Moscow. As the map covers only the part of European Russia directly controlled by Moscow, the Ukraine is not included, although it is also suffering from poor crops.

The Northwestern part of Russia (No. 8)—the only part which has connection with the outer world, through the Baltic States—is also the only part which had the average or normal crops of 51 pooods and over of cereals from a "dessiatine," i.e., 680 lbs. per acre ("pood" = about 36 lbs.; "dessiatine" = 2.7 acres). But this does not mean that this part of Russia had surpluses of grain to dispose of. It is the grain-importing region, and was never able to live on its own production of cereals: If left to its own resources, its population is bound to be underfed.
The Southeastern part of Russia is its grain-producing and exporting region. And this region is colored on the map in black of different shades. This is the famine-stricken area. The strip which includes the spots numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, extends beyond the frame of this map, to the Ukraine in the West and to the Asiatic provinces in the East. The intensely black area designated by 1 is the basin of the lower Volga and Kama to which all the horrors refer, as described below. The crops were here less than one-tenth of the average, i.e., less than 5 poods per dessiatine (68 lbs. per acre). Twice this amount is necessary for seed only. The minimum annual consumption of grain on which a Russian can exist (lacking other foodstuffs) is calculated as 13.5 poods (486 lbs.)

The areas designated by 2 are next to the former ones: their production was less than one-fifth of the normal, i.e., less than ten poods (136 lbs. per acre). No. 3 and No. 4 mark areas with less than two-fifths of normal crops and Nos. 5, 6, 7—less than three-fifths, four-fifths and the normal.

It is exceedingly difficult to give the exact figures as to just how much grain Russia lacks and must import. However, one thing is certain and admitted by the Bolsheviks in their most optimistic estimates. Russia cannot feed herself by her own surpluses. Even if Russia's entire crop could be equally distributed among the whole population of Russia, the population would be put on a starvation ration. But no such equal distribution was possible, in the first place, because such surpluses as were to be found outside the famine-stricken area were badly needed by the Bolsheviks themselves, to feed their army and their officials. In the second place, the Bolshevik official
sources admit that they would be unable to transport the necessary grain to the starvation area. Under such conditions, every region had to rely on its own resources.

The estimates of the Soviet authorities, as to the total figure of food-shortage in Russia, generally optimistic, varied considerably during the year. At the end of October, the Bolshevist Central Statistical Bureau gave the following figures which it considered as definitive. The famine-stricken area covers more than 20,000,000 planted dessiatines, with 32,000,000 rural population and 5,500,000 urban inhabitants. It comprises 41% of the entire planted area in Russia, 33% of the rural population and 30% of the urban population. The minimal consumption of grain is estimated for the famine-stricken area as 240,000,000 poods, and in the remaining part of Russia as 623,000,000 poods,—total 863,000,000. But production is respectively 123,000,000 and 566,000,000 poods, i.e., there are deficits in both parts of Russia of 117,000,000 and 57,000,000 poods,—total 174,000,000. It is considered that about 60% of this amount could be (theoretically) covered with the surpluses of production in the Ukraine and some other regions. But about 75,000,000 poods or 1,250,000 tons would have to be imported into Russia from abroad. This last figure does not agree with the 850,000 tons, as asked by the Bolsheviks, nor with the 2,000,000 tons as mentioned by Mr. Nansen. As a matter of fact neither can be really imported into Russia.

Who is responsible for this shortage of grain and this misery? The answer of the Red press is that it is due to the state of exceptional dryness in the famine-stricken area. From October 1, 1920, to the end of June, 1921, the rainfall (including the snow) was only
2.75 inches, while in the ten previous years the average rainfall was five times more—14 inches. The greatest part of the rain fell, moreover, before the sprouts appeared above the surface, and there followed an exceptionally early thaw.

This is quite true. But it is not quite so exceptional. This part of Russia is periodically exposed to dry winds from the Asiatic deserts. The moving sand of the Asiatic wilderness gradually advances in the western direction, pushed by the winds. However, a series of measures had been tried in the past by the Government and by the Zemstvos in order to check this advance and to paralyze the detrimental consequences of the recurrent dry seasons (which regularly last for two or three years at a stretch, when they come). Perfected methods of modern agronomy were used, such as dry farming, fastening of the slopes of sandy ravines, planting of trees, etc.

Not only have all these methods been discontinued since the Bolshevist domination, but even the normal resources of rural economy have been utterly destroyed. The import of agricultural implements, which had increased ten times for the last twenty years before the war, has practically ceased, while the local manufacture has been unable to supply, e.g., in plows even 10% of what has had to be scrapped as outworn. The monthly average of the local output of agricultural implements—if the figures for 1913 are taken as the hundred—represents catastrophic decay:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1921</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ploughs</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrows</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaping-machines</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threshing-machines</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another cause of deterioration of conditions in agriculture is the decrease in the number of live stock, due to the lack of fodder and to the policy of requisitions and assessments by the Soviet authorities. A well-known Russian economist, Mr. Lositsky, writing in a special Bolshevik organ states that the average consumption of meat in Russia increased from 0.82 pood per capita in 1918-19 to 0.91 in 1919-20 and 1.59 in the winter of 1920-21. Cattle were slaughtered in abnormal quantities owing to a widespread shortage of food and fodder. The figures given by the official Red press for December, 1920 and February, 1921, show that the number of horses has been reduced by 28.6 per cent., compared with the pre-war situation (Mr. Maslov gives the figure of 43 per cent. for 1916-1920); the number of horned cattle up to 1920 had been reduced by 22 per cent. The number of sheep and pigs diminished between 1916 and 1920 respectively by 29 and 40 per cent. (other economists give 42 and 45 per cent.). At the same time, the composition of the herds is dangerously altered, as can be seen from the following figures (in per cent. of the whole):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foals</th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1920</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 4 yrs.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 4 yrs.</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Horses</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1921</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over 1 year to wkg.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 4 yrs.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>124.0</td>
<td>1012.0</td>
<td>141.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 4 yrs.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calves 1-2 yrs.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cows</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 2 yrs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reduction in the number of young horses and
homed cattle will make the replenishment of the herds difficult through the coming years.

The amount of available manure diminished proportionally to the decrease in the number of the live stock. But mineral fertilizers, which were being imported into Russia in increasing quantities (from 5.8 million poods in 1889 to 35.3 million poods in 1912), are completely lacking while the home production is too trifling to meet the requirements. The intensity of cultivation has declined accordingly.

To a certain extent, the conditions created by war and by revolution account for all the phenomena described. But they cannot explain the continuing decay of agriculture after four years of the Bolshevist régime. Just how far the régime itself is responsible can be especially well seen from the gradual decrease of the area under cultivation. The annual “Narodnoye Khozystvo” for 1921, published by the Bolshevist “Supreme Council of National Economy,” gives a general picture of that process which can serve us as a basis for further conclusions. “The area under crops,” the annual states, “in 1916 was certainly reduced as compared with the pre-war years. . . . The former Ministry of Agriculture estimated its decrease in 1916 as 6 per cent. as compared with the figures of 1914. . . . The Revolution has exerted a strong influence on the peasantry, by effecting a shifting in its ranks and by giving to the peasants the land of the former landowners. But the agricultural production, taken by itself, in its methods and results, has remained the same as before. This fact is to a great extent responsible for the decrease in the area actually cultivated by the peasants, which has been going on since 1917. The census of 1917, which was taken in conditions in which both the influence of
the war and that of the beginning of the Revolution (agrarian disturbances) had found their expression, gave an area under crops almost equal to that of 1916. In the 23 provinces we are comparing, taking the area in 1916 as 100, we arrive at the figure 97.5 for 1917. "In 1919 the area under crops was greatly reduced as compared with 1917, the decrease amounting to 16.4 per cent. In 1920 the decrease proceeded further, and, if 13 provinces may be regarded as a fair sample, the coefficient of decrease reached 27.3 per cent." The decrease in the seeds for 1921 is approximately estimated as 13.4 per cent. of the area of 1920.

Now, if we take the planted area of 1914, the last normal year, as 100, the progressive diminution of the area cultivated will express itself in the following figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1914</th>
<th>1916</th>
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<th>1919</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1921</th>
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<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>51</td>
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We see that the factors of war (1916) and revolution (1917) were not decisive, and that the really catastrophic change came as a result of the Bolshevik policy, as described in a previous chapter (VII). The famine began as early as 1919 and 1920, with the shrinking of the planted area to three-fourths and two-fifths of its normal size. It fell down to the half of the area planted before the war in 1921. Under such a condition, shortage of food has become an inevitable consequence, even if there were good crops in Russia. The worst of it is that this situation is bound to last as long as the causes that brought it about last. Famine has become endemic in Russia.

A Russian eye-witness of Tatar descent who saw the origin of the disaster at one of the places where it
is at its worst, in the so-called "Tatar Republic," i.e., in the Kazan Province on the Volga, thus testifies to its connection with the Bolshevist policy of requisitioning grain. "The cause of the poor crops is, of course, an unprecedented heat and dryness. . . . But the reason why these poor crops brought on a famine which menaces the lives of millions is that in the last year grain was requisitioned with unheard-of severity in the Volga region, and the agents received special thanks from the 'Central Committee' for having collected 170 per cent. of the amount assessed. . . . It was a real orgy. The whole area of the Tatar Republic at the time of the requisition looked like a conquered country delivered as booty to the victorious soldiers. Violence, looting, bribery, orgies of drunken commissaries, night visits to private houses, arrests and shots and what not were daily occurrences. They left the peasants from their crops of 1920 an amount of food barely sufficient to sustain life until the next crops on starvation rations. In fact, the peasant could feed on that grain only until the spring, 1921. Even thus he had to consume a part of his seed reserve, and as a result almost 40 per cent. of the summer fields remained unsown. You probably think that the famine began on the Volga only in July or even in August. This is not true. The famine has been raging with us from the very spring. It is only the panics, the 'migration of peoples' that began in June. At that moment the last ray of hope of getting good crops this year was lost, wells and lakes had dried up, fields and meadows transformed themselves into continuous sunburnt yellow steppes, and whole herds of cattle had begun to die. Pictures and

1 A personal letter, written at the end of September, 1921, after the author thereof escaped from Bolshevist Russia.
correspondence from the famine-stricken provinces are all true, but they do not reflect the hundredth part of the real horrors, and the correspondents, much honored and closely observed by the Bolshevist authorities, cannot discover the hidden corners and heartrending scenes of actual life."

This criticism is not quite justified, as in the correspondences of Mr. Bechhofer in the London *Times*, Mr. Gibbs in the Chicago *Tribune*, and in the articles and reports of Mr. Hoover's representatives and agents one can find descriptions which give an adequate impression of the Russian distress. But a Russian can see the same things from a different angle and has the inside view which may be lacking with a foreigner. To complete the picture drawn by foreign correspondents, let me quote from the Russian sources, and chiefly from the Red papers published in Bolshevist Russia.

Here is a picture of that "migration of peoples" at its initial state, when no help was forthcoming and no foreign correspondents had been able to reach the suffering regions. I quote from the same letter of my Moslem witness, which was not intended for publication.

"As early as the end of June, 1921, the streets and squares of Kazan, as well as the strip of land 4½ miles long between the city and the pier, were packed by the starving crowd. The police gave up all attempts to disperse them, and indeed there was no place where they could go. Starving people were literally lying everywhere with their children and their sick: they could be shot but not removed. They lay prostrate for days, nay, for weeks. After having eaten up all they had brought with them and sold out everything they possessed, they besieged the Bolshevist institutions, begging for food and permits to go further. After a while some of them died in the same places, on the street. The remaining ones gradually disappeared, nobody knew where. New
crowds were pouring into the town, taking their places in the streets, lying down, or dying, or going away in their turn. A human corpse on the streets of Kazan became a familiar appearance and it no longer frightened any one. We stepped over them without minding it. It is only here (outside Russia) that I came to my senses, and I now cannot dispel that vision. It seems to me as if they were still lying in the same places, men, women, children, side by side. When I went out at the end of June to the pier, the meadows between the river and the town presented a continuous black mass of people for weeks awaiting their turn for a place on the steamer. They lay days and nights in the open fields; the sun burnt pitilessly, the hot wind raised clouds of dry dust, and they drank water from a putrid swamp nearby.

It was an endless open-air hospital with cobblestones or filthy earth beneath them, instead of beds, with rags, dirty sacks and pieces of bast, instead of blankets. Most of them purposely passed their time lying down, to quell their pains of hunger and not to be forced to take food too often. But many were unable to get up because they were ill. Some had the convulsions of cholera, and such as died from cholera continued to lie in their places.

"I cannot describe the scenes of free fights, of children and sick trodden down under the feet at the entrance to the steamer. Many thousands pressed for places, and our steamer was packed beyond its limit. It did not stop at the following landing stations, as everywhere it was the same crowd of thousands of people waiting and the same nightmare would repeat itself. One could not move on the docks. There starving people covered with rags lay everywhere. They ate a kind of stale black bread prepared from a mixture of acorn and seeds of orach, roots and grass. On the ninth day, when we were reaching Perm (another provincial city up the Kama River), not more than twenty people (besides the crew) were moving about. All the others lay in their places, like dead. Corpses were regularly thrown into the water in the night time. In Perm the picture was the same: the pier, the station, the streets and squares filled with a starving crowd in rags, waiting for a train to go to Siberia . . .

"I recollect very well the famine of 1891. At that time
there were no dreadful scenes and no unheard-of panics. The population waited quietly for help and believed that help would come. Now they do not believe anybody, they are in complete despair and suspect lies and mockery everywhere. . . . The commissars declared in the villages that other States far from sending help wish Russia to starve, as they are ruled by capitalists. . . . And the peasant does not expect the grain to come from anywhere."

Such was the situation in June, 1921. No local help and no help in sight, either from within or from outside of Russia. Under normal conditions there were storehouses filled with grain in every village community. Now most of these storehouses were empty. In the past there were good ways of communication, good crops elsewhere and good people ready to help. Now the ways of communication are completely broken down, crops are insufficient everywhere and no public opinion is permitted to organize to work for relief independently from the Bolshevist authorities. The population is purposely kept in the dark and consciously misled as to the feelings of the "bourgeois" world towards the "proletarian" Republic. Under such conditions, nothing could be expected, indeed, and the peasants took to the ancient Russian recourse in times of utter despair: to flight from their homes.

Of course, not all could afford it. Only such as had something to sell, as still possessed a horse and a carriage, were able to take their families with them, to shut the doors and the windows of their houses, and to go. Where to? They did not know that themselves. They went to the East, to Siberia, the rich country and the last to be exhausted. They went to the Southeast, to Turkestan: they had heard that somewhere beyond there was an "Indian king" who might help them. They went to the Northwest, to big cities,
to Moscow, in the first place, because there was a Government there which must know. They also went to the Western frontier, to meet "the Americans": the American help—the only one that was not a mere illusion and did not delude them. . . .

But it took time for the American help to come. In the meantime, the "migration of peoples" continues. The peasants go in crowds, in long files of vehicles. They fill up the roads. The same dreadful scenes repeat themselves as they go. Days and weeks pass, all supplies are consumed, and there is no more fodder for the horse. The horse dies on the way and the whole starving family is left alone in the midst of that endless strip of a road that leads nowhere. The father tries to find some food in the neighboring village. But the local population is hostile, as their own reserves are scant and it is no good to share them with newcomers. The reasoning is the same as that heard by Mr. Goodrich from a peasant in the Samara Province. "There is not enough to keep us alive until next harvest. So if we divide up now and do not get help, we shall all starve to death. It is better that some should die in order that others may live." The words of horrible realism are followed by acts. The peasants of the villages along the highways arm themselves and ward off any one asking for food. The road is thus turned into a solitude in the midst of densely peopled regions, and the Caravan of Death is left to go its way of perdition. If it succeeds in reaching a provincial town, in the direction of Moscow, Red soldiers wait for the starving crowd; the towns are entrenched as for a regular siege. The soldiers fire at the approaching crowd. . . .

The father thus comes back helpless to the eagerly waiting family. He has not found any food. The
mother, the grandmother, the children lie flat in their carriage. They are too sick to feel any emotion. Sile-
ently, noiselessly, they die one by one, and off he goes on foot and alone, from the place of his catastroph.

The great majority, the rank and file, are too poor to try their escape in flight. They remain in the village.
Let us go there. This is a description—one of the many—which I take from a Bolshevist newspaper. It is the
Samara Province and district, the village of Semeykino, in August, 1921. "It is so silent now in the Russian
village. There is something solemn in this sinister silence. We lift our hats, as if in the presence of death.
And indeed, death is in the streets, death is in the ham-
lets. The people speak in whispers. Men and women wear clean holiday shirts, and all the houses are
cleansed. They walk about the streets in silent medita-
tion, as if without protest, in fatalistic submission to
their fate. They are marching to the encounter with
death. They have even calculated the exact time when
death will come. 'We now feed on grass and on birch
tree leaves. But soon the frost will strike. By the old
style the grass-eating will come to an end on the 14th
(29) of September. There will be no leaves then.
Well, we may somehow hold on as late as the beginning
of November. But later on we all shall have to die.
Before Christmas every one of us will be buried in the
graves.'" In the spring of 1922, Semeykino (the word
means "little family") will be empty.

"Where are your people?" another Bolshevist corre-
spondent asks his driver, as in August he enters Ivan-
rovka, in the Pugachov district of the Samara govern-
ment. "Have they all died?" The idea is suggested
by the abandoned houses on the outskirts, with their
straw roofs torn off for fodder. "Well," the driver an-
swers, "why should they walk about? They have enough of walking, with that grass-eating. They mostly lie down. Let us go to the church; there will be some people there." And indeed, round Father Paul, the village priest, there is a small gathering. "It is difficult for them to walk," he confirms; "they are, as you see, all exhausted to the limit. Most of them have swollen legs; they walk on sticks and they reel. But to-day they have come because they have heard of your coming." Maybe, help will come? "It is time to help us, otherwise there will be no starving people, but dying only. Two hundred have already died from starvation in our village; two of them just died to-day." They tell him their story. The underfeeding began at Easter time (end of March). But there were hopes for good crops. Week after week they were waiting for rain, but in vain were all prayers. There was a drought. Instead of 200 poods from a dessiatine, they finally expected to collect 20 or 30. But there came locusts. "Probably, God is against us," they decided. Father Paul would know, and they asked him: "Tell us, Father Paul, is this really the end? Just tell us that we may know in advance." "Is it not a quiet people?" the correspondent remarked. "Well, you see for yourself: they are just like wet rags; you will hear no sound from them."

However, they have their own way of passive protest. Here is another church gathering in Sarapul, a district town on the Kama River. The background is always the same. Babies with swollen bellies, mothers trying to suckle them with breasts void of milk, women's cries and lamentations, men clad in sacks imploring for alms—in vain; dead horses lying in ditches along the road, in complete decomposition, full of worms.
Doctors walk around looking perplexed, with no drugs and at a loss as to what can be done. Red guards and secret police agents listen to the people’s talk, ill-tempered and thrown-off the scent. Carriages filled up with corpses move slowly along the streets; the thin and yellow legs of the deceased shake queerly in rhythm with the jerks of the wheels. A priest in surplice goes among that mournful gathering and hastily performs ritual ceremonies for the dying members of the community. The bells of the church tinkle, tremulous and uncertain. On the porch a little old man with scraggly beard speaks to the peasant crowd in subdued whispers. “To death you will come, wherever you go! Yes, to death! All will die. Have you ever seen how wolves run from the forest fire, how bears walk about in the villages? Well, they run for their lives. Now, you, brethren, you beggars, where do you mean to go? I say unto you: You will not run away, no,—not run away from death! O God, O my Lord: Hast Thou not designated our hour? Who are we to escape Thine hour, O Lord? And thou, O soul of man: Why dost thou toss about? Dost thou not know where thy limit is laid? Fire in the wood, fire in the sky, fire in the heart, fire in the hut. Let us burn in the fire, brethren, let us burn! Comets will rise in heaven and stars will fall down to earth. Void and empty has the Russian land become. Let us burn in fire, brethren, let us burn!”

There is a curious parallel between this propaganda of self-burning and that which was carried on at the end of the XVII Century by fanatic priests among the persecuted sectarians. Thousands burnt themselves in their houses or on wood piles, saving their souls from the life which had become unbearable. This old form
of Russian passive protest has been revived. The correspondent just quoted, while leaving Sarapul, drew attention to an ash-heap at the side of the road. The driver told him that this had been a chapel. The inhabitants of a village nearby had all fled away. The few that were unable to go shut themselves up in the chapel and set fire to it. "People say they were singing songs,—namely, in the fire... Probably, psalms," the driver commented. Obviously, the old man on the porch of the church did not preach in vain....

There have been also other methods of collective suicide. Sometimes, whole families have locked themselves in their houses, shut chimney and window openings, filled the house with smoke and suffocated themselves. Sometimes mothers with children have drowned themselves in rivers. My Moslem witness mentions an instance of an old woman with her little granddaughter. The woman wrapped herself in a shroud, took her Koran and went to a minaret of a mosque. After a week both corpses were found there in a state of decomposition....

"When will the help come? Will it not be too late? Will these starving people live long enough to be able to make use of it?" These questions are anxiously put to every one who visits the famine-stricken area. The unvarnished truth is that there is no answer to that question, except that millions will die—are sure to die—before help can be given. But "millions" is a figure, and figures do not speak. Let me give you one single instance to bring home the whole meaning of that merciless truth. I take the picture again from a Bolshevik correspondence. We are at Samara, at the railway station. In the first-class dining-room there is exquisite food, everything you like to order, tasty white
bread, steaks, pork chops, wine, ice-cream, fruits, long tables covered with snow-white linen, flowers in vases of crystal. But this is for the commissars and “speculators,” the *nouveaux-riches*. A few feet away there is that human cloaca known to us, with its unbearable stink of foul clothes and half-dead corpses, covered with black dust and clouds of flies, one mass of filth, rags and refuse. On that background, here is the picture:

“Under the very windows of our railway car starving children are lying day and night, and all the day and all night long you hear one single endless call: ‘Give us bread, little uncle!’ A girl is dying just here, under my window. She is about sixteen, a good-looking girl, thin and well shaped. She lies on her back, with closed eyes. Now and then she opens her eyes, for a few minutes, and she stares at the sky, with her immovable, deadly gaze. When in the morning I get up and look out she is there, in the same posture, clad in black, pale-faced, with her eyes shut, with arms folded on her breast. When in the evening I come back, she is always there, as immovable as before. I bring her bread and milk. She does not want it—nay, she cannot eat. I try to persuade her. She half-opens her eyes, she looks at me with an absent-minded, unearthly glance. I wish to lift her and to bring her into the car. It seems to me that she can still be saved. She does not say anything. But she throws at me an imploring glance, as if she were saying: ‘Do not touch me; let me die.’ This glance frightens me; I flee away. I become frightened and I am afraid of being left alone with the dying girl. . . . But I cannot sleep. The night passes away, and it seems to me as if I dreamt nightmare dreams. I want to get up. A long, clear star-lit night that never ends. Shall I go out, look at her? I am too much frightened. . . . At daybreak I run to the town in search of a doctor. Maybe I can save her. After three hours of running from one hospital to another, I finally find a student associated with a mission for combating epidemics.—‘Hurry up, doctor!’—We drag along to the station. We have come. ‘Hurry up, doctor!’ We run to my
She lies there, in the same posture, immovable, with closed eyes, with thin, pale, little childish hands crossed on her breast. The student bows to her, takes her hand. . . She is dead. She died about half an hour ago! . . ."

It is especially children that cannot wait and fall the first victims. Their mothers cannot bear their sufferings. They kill them, they drown them in the rivers, they die together in the smoke of their locked huts,—or they leave them alone on the streets and before the doors of the Soviet institutions. In the streets of Samara two hundred children have been picked up daily, abandoned by their parents. In the streets of the town of Ufa 150 children are being picked up daily, abandoned by their parents. As to the general number of children starving, the following figures were given by the Bolsheviks in the autumn, 1921: 300,000 children in the Chuvash Republic; 1,500,000 in the Tatar Republic; over 500,000 in the Ufa Province; 800,000 in the Province of Simbirsk. "According to official data, there are at present (September, 1921) no less than 9,500,000 starving children in Russia." The figure may seem exaggerated. It is at any rate exaggerated for to-day, as the mortality has been too great for this number of children to be still among the living. A Bolshevik report published in October, 1921, at Berlin, states that "the mortality in some cases is as high as 75 per cent. Cholera, dysentery and typhus prevail, in addition to the horrors of starvation. Children's homes are often characterized as "ante-chambers of death.""

To take an instance, this is a description of one of these children's homes in Samara (previous to American relief), by Mr. Mark Krinitisky, a Bolshevik correspondent.
“Alongside the wall some ten little children’s bodies lay on bare wooden boards without any bedding, clad in skirts alone. Their glassy eyes looked mournful and hopeless. Their thin hands and legs looked like sticks with knots at the joints. The tightened skin of their old-looking faces bore the stamp of death. A nurse bowed carefully over each one in turn to drive off the greedy, sticky ‘dead house’ flies, sticking round their immovable victims. . . It was still worse in the next room. If 5 to 10 per cent. of these children will live on, it will be a good result, says the superintendent of this cemetery of children.”

At last the help comes. But it is not sufficient to satisfy everybody. It will take much time and patience until experiences like the following one are no more repeated. I take it from a Bolshevist periodical. The correspondent writes from the station of Buzuluk, Province of Samara.

“A grievous, intolerable, soul-shattering moaning. Our railway-carriage is besieged on all sides. People strive to clamber in at the windows and the doors. The children climb up like cats, lose their hold and fall. Bony hands at all apertures, accompanied by terrible, inhuman cries: ‘Bread, for God’s sake, bread! Save us, help us!’

“We attempt to give them bread, but scarcely have we reached it out, when hundreds of hands clutch at us, pull us this way and that, with terrible cries. We try to give something to the children, but the adults push them aside, striking and biting one another. Their eyes, especially those of children, are unnaturally bright. They no longer bear the semblance of children, but of aged infants. Their dried-up skin is drawn
tight over their prominent bones. Their faces are wrinkled, their eyes feverish. Some of them have lost their voices and can only move their lips.

"The starving number hundreds, thousands. I tried to arrange them in some kind of queue so as to give each one something, if only a bit. But they were mad with hunger and each man feared he would get nothing. If they see food, the starving tear it out of your hands by force. Here is an emaciated little boy of eight, so weak he can scarcely stand. One of the passengers attempts to give him an egg, when suddenly hundreds like him make their appearance and with cries and tears rush on the passenger, and in one moment the egg is broken into atoms."

The real help has come with the A. R. A. (American Relief Administration). A private organization, working since the armistice under the chairmanship of Mr. Herbert Hoover and with the financial support of the United States Government, the A. R. A. has saved the lives of about 2,000,000 undernourished children in the Baltic States, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Austria and Hungary. It was decided by Mr. Hoover and his chief assistants to make use of the great experience acquired by the personnel of the Administration and of the funds available, to give the starving Russian children a daily meal of the food value of about 800 calories. A satisfactory agreement was signed at Riga with the Soviet Commissary, Mr. Litvinov, as early as August 20, 1921. The A. R. A. reserved for itself complete independence from the Bolshevist authorities and free disposal of its supplies, while the means of transportation and the necessary premises for feeding were to be provided by the local authorities. The first food train arrived in Kazan on September 17, and others to Samara, Sim-
birsk, Saratov followed rapidly. By November 1 over 202,000 children were being fed, and by December 1 the number had reached 750,000. The limit was to be 1,200,000, which was to be reached in January, 1922. By the end of 1921, 35,000 tons of food had been sent from America. But now help is to be further extended, including the adults, thanks to President Harding's recommendation in his annual message to Congress on December 6, for an appropriation to supply the A. R. A. with 10,000,000 bushels of corn and 1,000,000 bushels of seed grains for the famine victims in the valley of the Volga. Governor James P. Goodrich, of Indiana, who had just returned from a visit to the famine-stricken area, told the Congress that the proposed appropriation must be doubled, to satisfy the need. He proposed to send to Russia 20,000,000 bushels of corn and 5,000,000 bushels of wheat. $20,000,000 was appropriated by Congress on December 24, 1921. Thus the limit was reached of what Mr. Hoover thought it possible to transport to the starving area during the next six months, taking the probable capacity of the railways from the two ports of Riga and Novorossiisk that were available (100,000 tons or 6,000,000 poods a month). Of course, it is not the limit of Russia's need, as may be concluded from a comparison with the figures given above. What are the other resources, if any? What can the Soviet Government do, to cope with the famine?

Of course, the official version of the Bolsheviks was that the "capitalistic" governments want Russia to starve, and that the real help can only be given by the international proletariat, directly or under their pressure. Thus the famine could be made use of for the world propaganda. But this was for the gallery. At
the same time, behind the scenes the question of an international loan to be given to the repentant Bolshevism was being discussed in London, and probably elsewhere. The aim of the loan was to be—economic reconstruction, useful and necessary to any future government in Russia. Would the question of the famine promote or hamper the question of a loan? The first idea of the Bolshevist Government was to simplify the situation by denying the facts of the famine. But soon it became impossible. An old Russian organization, the Agronomic Society in Moscow, met on June 22, 1921, and decided to draw the attention of the Soviet Government to the terrible situation of the Volga population. The second thought of the Government was to use the prominent non-Bolshevik members of the Agronomic Society as mediators in their negotiations with Western Europe. On July 23, an All-Russian Relief Committee was organized by the Bolsheviks. Mr. Kishkin and Prokopovich, former ministers of the Kerensky Government; Mr. Golovin, the President of the Second Duma, with some other non-Bolsheviks, were invited to join the committee. “For the first time after four years,” as Mr. Kishkin said in his introductory speech, “the representatives of the governing power have met the representatives of non-official circles in order to start, in common accord, on a work of national and social significance.” The character and the real causes of the disaster were stated openly in the same speech. “The famine,” Mr. Kishkin stated, “has been aggravated by the deep and general crisis in the economic life of the country. An almost complete ruin of industry, a considerable decline in productivity of work, a conspicuous diminution of sown area, an exhaustion of reserves formerly accumulated,
the disorganization of transportation, the depreciation of the ruble,—all these evils have made the poor crops, caused by bad weather, bring about a really catastrophic situation. Most decisive and complete measures are necessary in order that all classes of the population who are in the same predicament may take part in the struggle.

We shall see in another place that just that attempt to unite the non-Bolshevist Russia in that gigantic task of helping themselves made the Bolsheviks suspicious and brought the work of the Moscow committee to a speedy close. As it has always been the chief aim of the Bolsheviks to influence public opinion outside of Russia by their display of moderation, they planned to send the leaders of the committee on a mission to Britain, France and probably America. Negotiations have been started to that effect. But in the meantime the Bolsheviks saw that they could talk with the outer world without intermediaries. After the agreement with Mr. Hoover they concluded another, much more favorable for them, with Mr. Nansen. They reserved for themselves the complete control of supplies to be received through Mr. Nansen and, in addition, they empowered Mr. Nansen to negotiate a loan for them to the amount of £10,000,000 (September, 1921).

However, this time they were very much disappointed. On Mr. Nansen's coming back to Geneva from Moscow, he met with a very skeptical reception on the part of the League of Nations. His agreement was found unsatisfactory, and his request for credit at least premature. Many questions had first to be decided, such as recognition of debts, conditions of economic reconstruction, the extent of recognition of the Soviet Government, etc. The Bolsheviks made things
still worse for themselves by their insolent refusal to let an international commission of inquiry, headed by Mr. Noulens, enter Russia. Thenceforth it was quite hopeless for them to expect that Europe would pass over the question of economic reconstruction to the direct help asked by Dr. Nansen. On October 6, 1921, the International Russian Relief Commission in its plenary sitting at Brussels repeated its demand for a Commission of Inquiry to be sent to the affected areas, as a condition of any credit to be given. It emphasized the importance of guaranties for the distribution of relief, and made the following recommendations as to the Soviet's request for credits:

(1) Whatever may be the extent of the famine, no definite solution can be found until economic conditions have been realized guaranteeing normal production within Russia, and until confidence has been sufficiently restored for foreign exporters to send their goods to Russia.

(2) The confidence necessary to secure the support of the commercial communities can only be created and maintained when Russia's debts and obligations have been recognized and all advances to her sufficiently guaranteed. These principles apply both to credits granted by the Governments and by private concerns.

(3) The Conference is thus led to the conclusion that, in order to obtain the credits for the purpose of aiding exportation to Russia, the two following conditions are absolutely essential:—

(a) The Russian Government must recognize its existing debts and other obligations.
(b) Adequate guarantees must be given for all credits to be granted in the future.

These recommendations hopelessly confounded political questions with that of mere philanthropy. The Russian democratic parties wished to discriminate be-
between the immediate help on American lines, which they enthusiastically greeted, and the question of reconstruction which could not be solved as long as the Bolsheviks continued in power. The Supreme Council of the Allies put itself before an alternative equally dangerous on both sides: recognition of the Soviet Government or complete refusal of help to the suffering population.

The Soviet Government was thus left to its own resources and to the aid of voluntary organizations (in the first line, the A. R. A.). Its own scheme for relief is based on the allotment of some 12,000,000 poods of flour and grits, 10,000,000 poods of potatoes and 1,750,000 poods of meat for the space of time from October, 1921, to June, 1922. They expected to feed with this a gradually increasing number of children and adults: respectively 375,000 and 125,000 in October; 1,500,000 and 1,000,000 in January, after which the number of adults is to increase up to 1,750,000 in March. The motive was that "it is necessary to give a little food to the workers in the field, so that they will not fall down while going behind the plow," and that "this is the only way to save the spring seeds from being eaten by the starving people." In May the number of adults is to decrease, and it comes down to 750,000 in June. One must add that even that scheme does not go beyond the feeding of 3,250,000—the highest figure—in March, while the whole starving population is estimated for the same time as 12,000,000. The amount of seed necessary for the 15 starving provinces is estimated by the Soviets as more than 22,000,000 poods, of which they hoped to buy in Sweden and in the Baltic States 5,000,000 poods; to get in exchange for goods, through the Coöperatives, another 5,000,000,
and to appropriate 15,000,000 from the supply fund. Of course, all these were merely plans, and it is impossible to say what part of them can be realized. The last figures of imports of food to be found in the Red press refer to December 6, 1921, and they can give us a good idea as to the relative proportion of help given to the Russian people by different organizations. Here are the figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Car-loads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Relief Administration</td>
<td>1,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Russian (Bolshevist) Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famine Relief</td>
<td>674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Children’s Relief</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nansen’s organization</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quakers’ organization</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Bulgaria</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Red Cross</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Volga Committee</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the activity of the American Relief Administration is the most conspicuous, and it is only natural that the news about the Americans helping Russia has traveled to the remotest corners of Russia’s provinces. No propaganda and no other form of activity could lay such a firm foundation for lasting friendship between our two countries as the activity of these 75 Americans who form the working personnel of the American Relief Administration. It is no wonder that the Bolshevist authorities abstain from interference with the American work (although they still try to discredit it through the press). But even the lawless elements which are now so many in Russia, the bandits and the robbers, are kept in check by the high moral value of that humanitarian activity. I find a touching account in a cablegram of the A. R. A. of December 8:
"Raiders, 800 men and women, all dressed in sheepskin coats, riding black horses, carrying two rifles, looted all Government warehouses, taking what they wanted, telling the populace to take the balance. But they left the A. R. A. warehouse entirely untouched. The tall thin black-bearded leader even knew Floete's name. He made a speech in the public square saying that he liked the American representative who had humanity at heart and only wanted to feed the starving. Coming and going I met several unprotected wagon trains carrying our supplies but always left un molested when they learned the origin and purpose."

Before I finish this chapter, let me quote a few more passages from recent American reports. They will give us the latest news as to the state of the famine in Russia and, as was to be expected, they will show that the situation far from being improved has become worse with the beginning of winter.

Mr. Rives Childs, regional inspector of the Kazan district, made a trip of 560 miles through 12 of the 13 cantons of the Tatar republic. This is what he wrote while on his way (December 17):

"Conditions are growing worse by leaps and bounds. I am thoroughly convinced after my last trip and on the basis of reports we are receiving that to say that half the population of the Tatar republic will starve before the end of the winter would be in the nature of a conservative estimate. Conditions took a turn for the worse in most cantons beginning with November and will reach a crisis in January. The only meal that 75% of the children in our kitchens are receiving to-day is from the A. R. A. Unless the outside world awakens to conditions here I doubt if we shall save more than half the children we are feeding to-day."

After his return, Mr. Childs gave (January 5) some figures to support his statement:

"Six hundred thousand children have no resources upon which to live through the winter and 50% of these are al-
RUSSIA TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW

ready in acute need. Excluding the number of children we are feeding and a small number reached by Russian Relief, only 12% of the remaining population can survive the winter. During recent months 34% to 72% of the horses have been killed for food and cows to even a greater proportion. These figures are confirmed in 40 villages representing every canton visited.”

To the south from the Tatar Republic the situation is the same. Here is the state of things in the Bashkir Republic, as reported by the Ufa supervisor (January 9):

“Of the total population of 2,000,000 of the Ufa Government half a million are famishing children. Of the 1,125,000 population of the Bashkir Republic 90% are famishing. People are eating their last supplies of food substitutes and in some localities are making flour out of bones. Government kitchens are soon to be closed because of the exhausted supply of foodstuffs.”

A more detailed report from a trip through the Bashkir Republic via Samara—Ufa—Sterlitamak (the capital) by Mr. Dickinson (December 28) completes the ghastly picture:

“Villages in this region are from 20 to 40% deserted by the people fleeing from the famine, and the remaining inhabitants are living mostly on bread made from weeds and clay. The dead are carted from railroad stations and trains at Ufa, Samara and elsewhere by wagon road. When a wagon is not immediately available the dead are thrown into big bins and snow shovelled over them to preserve the bodies. The dead are usually buried in big trenches in cemeteries. At Samara Dickinson, visiting a cemetery late in the day, saw 50 bodies still unburied although workmen had been busy all day.”

Still more to the south, the situation on the lower Volga, about 50 miles southwards from Saratov, is thus
summarized in a report from Mr. Clapp (December 22):

"I inspected 15 villages. Children are badly swollen from starvation and dying daily. Horses are killed for food and soon there will be no live stock left. Total population has absolutely nothing in the way of substantial foodstuffs, almost no clothing. There is a general exodus from the district. The roads are teeming with wagons with families with few possessions going to Saratov. When asked where they are bound for they reply: 'America,' or some place where there is bread. All have a vague hope of crossing the frontier somewhere and ultimately getting to America."

These are all cold facts, but we can understand how, after having passed through many heartrending scenes, the American visitors finally break into pathetic appeals. Mr. Childs writes thus from his trip to Elabuga:

"I am sure that if our representative American citizens who sit in Congress, or those diplomats who affect to speak for millions of their citizens, could have passed with me along the way which I was traveling and could have seen the mute appeals I saw in the faces of the hungry and could have heard the tales of distress as I heard them told so simply, there could exist no doubt as to whether such a woman as this (see below) should be given sufficient food to endure the winter."

Here is the distressing scene reported by the observer:

"The mother (of two children), a young woman schoolteacher of about 28, looked tired and despairing (in the village school they had tea). Asked what food she herself lived on, she answered that she had nothing. She did not know what to do to save herself from starvation which seemed, in view of conditions confronting her, to be in-
evitable. I turned over to her all the food which we were carrying with us consisting of two or three pounds of bread and as many pounds of rice. The gifts did not elicit from her tired face even a smile. The only evidence of any human emotion was the glance of tenderness which she bestowed upon her children as they scampered about the bread."

This case was not an exception, as is to be expected. Mr. Childs reports:

"The mothers and fathers of the children, it was found, were now running out of food and I believe, in view of this fact, that unless it is possible for the A. R. A. to undertake adult feeding that it is quite possible in view of the critical conditions which are sure to come this winter that the feeding of the children alone will come, it might also be said, to naught."

Mr. Childs' general conclusion is:

"It is all bad; there is only a difference of degree. One might sum up the situation by saying—some have starved, some are starving, and others are on the verge of starvation, and it is not a question of months or weeks, but of days."

I could complete these reports with a number of quotations from the Red press, which confirm the American descriptions, but enough has been said to show how great the need is, how powerless the Soviet Government is to cope with it, and how inevitably insufficient must be the help from outside. Of course, this is by no means an argument against that help. Nor do I think that help given to the population can strengthen the Bolsheviks. I would not raise my voice against the saving of Russian lives even if I thought so. But this is not the case. Nothing can help the Bolsheviks to their feet again. The disproportion between what is necessary for a State to exist and what
can be done by the Soviet power to improve the situation can only grow with time. A great nation like Russia cannot be saved by philanthropy. It has to work out its own salvation, and no salvation can be found as long as the State is run on false economic principles by people who are not interested in its preservation nor in the fate of its population.
CHAPTER IX.

RUSSIA TO-MORROW.

There are two sides to the process I have been describing in the preceding eight chapters. "The old crumbles down, time brings changes, and from the ruins blossoms forth a new life." 1 I used that quotation from Schiller twenty-five years ago, to sum up my "History of Civilization in Russia." I am tempted to use it again, to sum up what some people are inclined to call Russia's return to barbarism.

To be sure, with the background of the World War, the Revolution has brought great destruction. Conditions proved extremely favorable for Bolshevism to take hold of the Revolution. But the Revolution in Russia is a long process of change in the minds of the people and in the institutions. It is organically connected with the whole process of Russian civilization. Bolshevism is only a stage which is passing away. Even in this stage the process is not confined to the destruction brought about by the Bolshevist power. There are many germs of new life blossoming from the ruins. The other side of the process is not destructive, but constructive. It is this side that makes us hopeful in spite of all and proud of our Russia of to-morrow.

It is probably easier in a great process of change to predict what will be the final outcome than to make

1.Das Alte stürzt, es ändert sich die Zeit, und neues Leben blüht aus den Ruinen."
prophecies as to what is going to happen next. But the latter question is generally asked first, and an answer is suggested in what has been said in Chapters VII and VIII. The Bolshevist stage of the great Russian Revolution is coming to a close as a consequence of two factors: the economic exhaustion and the attitude of the population towards the present power.

An outsider easily grows skeptical when he now hears about the coming end of the Bolsheviks. Prophecies to that effect have been repeated for four years but they have proved wrong. The closer observer of Russian events knows, however, that these prophecies were never entirely mistaken. Mr. Brailsford has just told us in his "The Russian Workers' Republic" that one of the ablest leaders of Bolshevist Russia made the avowal to him that "in 1917 they hardly hoped to maintain themselves for two months." There were many causes which contributed to their staying. There was also a gradual process which eliminated those causes, one by one. In Chapters II and III we noted the part that the Bolshevik promises played in their success and in the strengthening of their power. But gradually the masses saw they were being deluded. There was also fear, caused by the organization of terror, and this motive is still working. But this factor alone can never suffice to sustain the Bolsheviks in power once the population has withdrawn its tacit moral consent. There were two additional reasons which contributed to the moral consent given to the Bolsheviks to rule, in spite of the fact that their promises had already proved false. In the first place, there was that "White" movement. There was a moment, especially in 1918-1919, when the population wished for the success of the "White" movement and tried to
help it. But we also know (Chap. VI) why finally the population found that this was "worse than Bolshevism," and chose the lesser evil. From then on the "White" movement helped to strengthen Bolshevism instead of destroying it. It promoted a national feeling as against the foreign intervention and it made the population realize that they still had to defend their social gains from the claims of the dispossessed privileged class. In the second place, the Bolshevist propaganda succeeded in implanting in the people the idea that a communist revolution was impending all over the world, and they naturally concluded that it was useless to combat it in Russia. Many a construction of Russia's greatness was based on the speculation of a convalescent young Russia in the midst of the old world grown sick.

Now these last two causes no longer exist. Since the beginning of 1921 there is no "White" movement, and the people have to rely on themselves for their salvation. The consequences of that change of mind have already made themselves felt in a series of isolated uprisings. On the other hand, even the Bolshevist leaders no longer expect the world revolution to come at once, although they have not lost faith in it. The people are tired of waiting for a world overthrow. The objection may be raised that just this state of despair as to the possibility of a speedy change to come from the outside might move the population to look at the Bolshevist régime as final and to support it, by the force of a growing tradition. This objection would have value if the Bolshevist régime could make itself at least minimally acceptable for the nation. But it cannot.

Can Bolshevism evolve? This is the question in dis-
There is no doubt that the Bolshevist power is making concessions. But the point is that it makes them in order to remain a Bolshevist power. We know the reason for their readiness to make concessions: it is that Russia is only a means for them, while their aim is international and universal. They may change the exhausted Russia for some unexhausted place in the East: that idea had been discussed and preparations had been made in their hour of distress, in 1919. It seems to have been revived again, with the increased possibilities for some national and even social overthrow in Asia (see Chap. V). But the Bolsheviks cannot change their system, neither in an exhausted Russia, nor in another place: I mean the system of arbitrary rule of the Communist Party based on compulsion. So far as this system is concerned they are even less able to compromise than ever autocracy was, which fell just because of its incapacity for compromise. There was an idea in autocracy which could be broken only with autocracy itself. There is an idea in Bolshevism which also cannot be broken unless Bolshevism is broken. But even if there were no idea, if they really were only a gang of rascals and assassins, even then to tone down by an evolutionary change is impossible for them for the reason which one of my American friends formulated in the picturesque phrase: “You cannot dismount if you ride on a tiger.”

It was Mr. Lloyd George’s idea, to which he stuck from the time of the invitation of the Bolsheviks to Prinkipo, in January, 1919, up to the time of the invitation to Genoa, in January, 1922, that trade with the Bolsheviks will be the powerful factor which will smooth down all difficulties and bring into Russia the
sobering influence which will gradually transform the "cannibals" and "assassins" into a sort of decent government. Accordingly, a formula of minimum requisites was sought for to make a civilized intercourse with Bolshevist Russia possible at all. Secretary Hughes' formula given out in his Note of March 25, 1921, was as follows: "It is idle to expect resumption of trade until the economic bases of production are securely established. Production is conditioned upon the safety of life, the recognition by firm guarantees of private property, the sanctity of contract and the rights of free labor." Nobody can say that these are political demands. They can be complied with by the mere existence of a code of civil law, which might be enforced by regular judicial institutions, under the supposition that there is a legal order defended by the power of the State. It is, however, characteristic for Bolshevism that the citizens of the very country which entered into a formal trade agreement with the Bolsheviks (Great Britain in March, 1921) were the first to come to the conclusion that no such prerequisites as those just mentioned can exist in Soviet Russia. Mr. Leslie Urquhart is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of a powerful British company, "The Russo-Asiatic Consolidated, Ltd.," possessing important mines and works at Kyshtym, Tanalyk, etc. He received a proposition from the Bolsheviks to enter into an agreement concerning that property. He went to Moscow and in August and September, 1921, discussed with the Concessions Commission, in all details, the draft of a contract embodying 27 clauses. As a result, the Company preferred "to remain as heretofore claimants against Russia for damage caused by the Soviet Government for unlawful appropriation of properties and working capital." The
motives for this decision are stated by Mr. Leslie Urquhart in a letter to Mr. Krassin, and they are so closely connected with my trend of argument that I may be permitted to quote them at some length. Says Mr. Urquhart:

“As communism does not recognize the right to private property on which the previous Civil and Criminal Code was based, magistrates have been suppressed and Courts of Justice have been abolished. Nothing has been substituted for these except a so-called Court of revolutionary conscience. Under the new system, taxes have been abolished, the mining, factory, customs, forest and railway laws and regulations, in fact all previously existing authorities, have been destroyed, as is evidenced by the Clauses of that draft Concessions Contract reviewed in this letter, and nothing but incomplete Decrees and instructions which are issued daily have taken their place. Further, the communistic system does not recognize any obligations between individuals and therefore no contract or obligation between two persons can be enforced; nor does the State itself recognize any obligation to individuals or subjects. The only obligation recognized and enforced in the communistic State is the absolute subjection of every individual to the State.

“This extraordinary position, the absence of all laws and regulations, dominated, as you are aware, the discussions all through the negotiations.”

The summary of what was said by the British business man during the negotiations is given by himself in the following words:

“We pointed out that Russia under her present communist system of State economy produces nothing to trade with,
that the process of unlimited emissions of banknotes has utterly exhausted the remnants of credit and that the stocks of products and materials of the old capitalistic system had been used up. The abolition of rights to property, of economic freedom and the complicated system of economic restrictions generally have killed individual initiative and enterprise while the elimination of private gain had destroyed all incentive to work and produce. The policy of nationalization of all industry and trade had killed foreign credits, and foreign capital without which the resuscitation of Russian industry will be difficult, if not practically impossible, would not be forthcoming if the present economic system were to continue."

Now, as we know, 1921 was the time when the Bolsheviks found themselves badly in need of individual initiative and enterprise, as well as of foreign credits and capital. By the Decree of March 30, they granted the peasant and town workers permission to barter and to trade, they decided to denationalize small industries and to offer concessions to foreign capitalists. In August, on the basis of these concessions, they tried to negotiate a loan of £10,000,000 through Mr. Nansen. On October 29, in a speech before a party conference, Mr. Lenin invited the Bolsheviks to a further "retreat." "State Capitalism," he said, has not succeeded. "The exchange of manufactured goods for the produce of agriculture has not materialized, in the sense of taking the form of simple buying and selling." "The private market has proved to be stronger than our authority." The next position to defend is "State regulation of buying and selling and of money currency." We know that practically, buying and selling in a kind of free market was never stopped. But formal recognition of that basic law of political economy first came now. Did it mean that Lenin
had decided to come back to "capitalist" economy? By no means. The leading principle, as stated by Lenin himself in the Moscow Pravda in August, remained that all concessions to be made should be "within the limits of what the proletariat can concede without ceasing to be the dominating class."

Can legal order, ordinary justice, "sanctity of contract" and "firm guarantees of private property" be conceived as finding themselves within these limits? They are certainly within the limits of what autocracy could concede without ceasing to be the dominating authority. Autocracy had been securing all these things, which did not have anything in common with politics or political freedom, since at least the time of Peter the Great. But now they are outside the limits of a régime which demands the "absolute subjection of every individual to the State." No space for the activity of civil law is thus left, and the demand for "legal order" under the Bolsheviks has become a political demand implicating the overthrow of the basic principle of their régime. Lenin can never go that length without endangering the continuation in power of the "dominating class."

The invitation to Genoa seems to have dealt with that impossibility. The only condition it puts, not merely for the restarting of trade, but for "official recognition" of the Soviets, is that the property and the rights of foreigners shall be respected and that the sanctity of their contracts shall be in some way guaranteed. In the Russian view this is tantamount to the introduction into Russia of a régime of capitulations and exterritoriality for foreigners. Russia is thus to be treated like old Turkey or old China and to be turned into a colony of foreign exploitation. Such is indeed
the scheme that was suggested by Mr. Keynes in his well-known book ("The Economic Consequences of the Peace") and taken up recently by Mr. Stinnes and, probably, by Mr. Lloyd George. The Russian people is not likely to go to that limit. It remains to be seen whether the Bolsheviks are ready to go. An alliance with foreign "capitalists" in order to preserve their power over Russia may be within the scope of the negotiating parties, but it hardly will contribute to the Bolsheviks' "evolution" into a decent government.

There is one specious and well-sounding reason used to cover the "retreat" of the Supreme Council from the only sensible position, which is that of Secretary Hughes and Mr. Leslie Urquhart. The Supreme Council said: "It is the right of each country to choose for itself the system which it prefers." But this is just what the Russian people was not permitted to do, and will not be permitted to do as long as the "dominating class" keeps in power. When asked by the late Prince Kropotkin at the most critical moment, in September, 1919, whether he would admit the building of a coalition cabinet with other political (namely socialistic) parties, Lenin replied with a deliberate: "No." The Soviets in Hungary, he argued, were overthrown just because they accepted such a government. He was not going to repeat the experiment. However, rumors went again to the same effect in the summer of 1921 and, while in America, I was often asked whether it was true that the Bolsheviks had addressed themselves to certain political leaders with the proposal of sharing the power with them. The only answer I could give was to quote from a secret circular which was sent by the Central Committee of the Communist International to the Bureau of the Western European Propa-
ganda on May 18. The circular states that “certain irresponsible persons who call themselves representatives of the Communist International, the Russian Communist Party and the Soviet People’s Commissaries” were carrying on negotiations in Paris, Berlin, Prague and Vienna, “regarding the possibility of a compromise with the aim of forming a coalition government.” The document quoted called such negotiations “a pure provocation” and ordered the Western Secretariat to inquire about the facts and to punish the delinquents as dangerous conspirators, “whatever be their revolutionary past or their personal authority in the party.”

However unfounded the mentioned rumors are, I was still asked what would have been my answer if such a proposal had been really made to me personally. The only answer possible for any Russian democrat would be just this: Give the Russian people the right really “to choose for itself the system which it prefers.” If under the conditions of really free elections to a popular assembly the people say they prefer the Bolsheviks,—well, all right, we will submit to the government of their choice. If there must then be further struggle, it can be carried on by parliamentary methods. But for the Bolsheviks to concede free elections, the reestablishment of political freedom, together with the abolition of the notorious “Che-Ka” and their system of espionage, would mean to commit suicide. It would be too naïve to expect it from a party which is still, as Mr. Brailsford rightly states, “fighting for its life” and which, “in their tremendous adventure, entirely discarded democracy.”

No, there is no way open to the Bolsheviks except to fight on to the bitter end. No substantial change in the conditions of the national economy and, accord-
ingly, in the state of utter exhaustion of the national resources can come as long as their basic method—which is domination by an insignificant minority—and their basic aim—which is the world revolution—are not surrendered.

In the absence of such a possibility what are their own prospectives? An undertone of pessimism pervades the last speeches of Lenin. In the October speech mentioned above he reviewed the three stages of the Bolshevist struggle. "When the question was about the power of the Soviet, the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly (i.e., end of 1917 and beginning of 1918), the danger was political and it proved to be negligible. When the period of civil war set in, and it was supported by the capitalists of the entire world (i.e., second part of 1918 to the end of 1920), there appeared a military danger, and it was much more formidable. But when we changed our economic policy (i.e., spring of 1921) the danger grew even much stronger, because it is formed of an enormous number of every day's trifling details which nobody takes care of." It is, Lenin might have added, a struggle against the laws of life expressed in the science which he made the object of his special study: political economy. In another speech, held on October 19, before a congress of the institutions of "political education," Lenin was still more explicit. "The struggle will be more desperate and more violent than that against Kolchak and Denikin." To win in war has been a familiar thing for centuries, but this time it is the war of the understanding, of political preparedness. Now, "the proletariat has been declassed and, as a class, it has ceased to exist." It will grow with the new growth of capitalism, but this is not the basis on which a "proletarian power can rest."
Is it the Communist Party? Lenin "hopes" that at least 100,000 members will be removed from it and he will be "still more pleased" if 200,000 will be removed, as they are "red-tapeists" and "embezzlers." There remain the peasants, but "they can have no understanding because they suffer from illiteracy and grope in the darkness. They are just like semi-savages. How long it will take for all the different kinds of committees to liquidate that illiteracy, it is impossible to say." On the other hand, no waiting is possible. "The question is now whom will the peasants follow, the proletariat, which strives to build a socialistic society, or the capitalist who thinks it safer to turn around?" "One of the two must perish, either the republic or the capitalists." But as the decision rests with the "semi-savages" who prefer "capitalism" and do not see the "enemy" in it, and as "it is confirmed by the experience of all former revolutions," one can readily guess what Mr. Lenin's real conclusion is.

It is idle to speculate just how, just when and just where the Bolshevik power will perish. The latest impressions of foreigners—and of certain Americans—are that the Bolshevik power is as strong as ever. There is the Red Army, especially those detachments of "Internal Guards for Special Service," whose particular aim it is to prevent uprisings; there is that largely spread system of espionage which defies comparison with that of the times of Tacitus,—not to speak of autocracy. There is also that notorious "Extraordinary Commission," the "Che-Ka," which in its shooting the "politically unreliable" is not even constrained by the "revolutionary conscience" of ordinary tribunals. There is that network of the Bolshevik administration which can carry the decisions of the Central Govern-
ment to the outskirts of the former Empire. Even the “Imperial” spirit of unity and patriotism is renascent. Why should that seemingly strong fabric of government collapse, when there is no organized force to combat it either from the outside or from the inside?

Mr. Lenin knows better. Mr. Gorki also knows better, for he only recently gave vent to his “proletarian” panic before the coming advent of these “semi-savages” who will go out of their huts and will sweep the towns and the cities and will submerge the remaining centers of civilization in Russia. This state of mind of the powers that he has also found a peculiar reflection in Mr. Brailsford’s severe indictment of the Russian people, “living in the ignorance and in the superstition of the Middle Ages.” According to him, too, “if the peasants had had the will or the skill to express their minds,” their “democratic” policy “would have meant the slow death of the towns and the extinction of civilization.”

This is a capital point which must be elucidated before we go any further. The whole question of Russia of “to-morrow” is here implicated. If, indeed, the Russian people have passed through their Revolution only to be degraded to the level of the Middle Ages, how can we talk at all of democracy? In that case, of course, we “may mean by democracy, that certain groups of intellectuals, clever, well-educated and gifted with the power of speech, should somehow use the machinery of elections in order to guide the State with their own more or less enlightened ideas.” But as this sentimental picture, purposely drawn in pink, is obviously unrealizable, the way is paved, by the method of elimination, to the Reds or the Blacks,—to Bolshevism or Monarchy. They are the only régimes that
can rule the "semi-savages" by force, thus saving "civilization" from the invasion of those barbarians. It was not in vain that Mr. Lenin spoke of Monarchy as the only alternative to Bolshevism. However, Mr. Brailsford is right when he says that "the convinced democrat must surely mean more than that,"—even in Russia.

The Bolshevist—or pro-Bolshevist—argument queerly coincides with that of the Russian reactionaries. As they, naturally, do not believe in Bolshevism, and as any other issue is impossible for them, they think that if their services are refused, Russia is definitely lost. The Russian people are unable, according to them, to save themselves. The masses are down-trodden and helpless. How to get the daily bread is their only thought. Since the hope for help from the outside was lost, a sort of dull and passive submission set in. The government can do with these people just as they like for as long as they like. Moreover, as a result of the violent struggle for life, the masses have become completely demoralized. Everybody takes care of himself, and Might goes before Right. Abject misery and newly-acquired riches meet in unpalliated contrasts, unmitigated by any social work or relief. All means are deemed permissible in human strife: bribery, theft, fraud, robbery, murder. Sexual laxity has become familiar. The young generation growing in such surroundings is bound to be brought up free from idealism, disrespectful of law and moral discipline, but intensely keen and shrewd for all practical purposes. As the other nations are supposed to be as keen and intent on profiting by Russia's weakness, the result is expected to be that Russia will become a prey for foreign exploiters who will transform her into a depend-
ency of the civilized powers. Such a country can only be ruled by compulsion and it certainly deserves to have the government that it has. Monarchy is too good for them, autocracy would be better, and the Bolsheviks gave proof of great understanding of realities when they undertook to rule Russia with exaggerated methods of autocratic violence. That régime is bound to be strong and it can be supplanted only by a similar régime.

This is about the view of the situation built upon a complete lack of faith in the Russian people. It is, perhaps, interesting to mention that the same people who share it now were under the Tsar's old régime very much inclined to exaggerate and to extol the good qualities of the Russian people, namely the plain peasants, the "semi-savages" of the present day. Our nationalists even constructed upon it an idea of Russia's world mission. The Russian people was described to be the most perfect exponent of Christian spirit and Christian life. It was especially praised as true to the old national tradition, at the expense of the Russian intellectuals who were said to be treacherous to their people and its faith. I must also add that a part of the Russian intellectuals, the so-called socialists-populists ("Narodniki"), eulogized the Russian people for having been born "communists" (meaning the collective possession of land), whose mission it was to give the world its new Bible. These opinions found a weak reflection also in the foreign literature, e.g., in the books of Mr. Stephen Graham.

I have lived long enough to observe the rise and fall of these alternate opinions which I never shared. To me the Russian people is neither a "Christophorus" (Christ-bearer), nor communist, nor "semi-savage," nor
a "wild animal." The mistake of the present detractors is that they ignore all the past, with its long process of historical growth, and do not know the present. The study of the real Russian people, with all their good qualities and faults, has itself a pretty long history. I cannot expatiate on that subject now, but I think it necessary to warn against superficial observations, with no background behind them, and against foregone conclusions which beg the question. People who avow that they do not know much about the real Russian people are probably nearer to the truth than the amateurs with their cut-and-dried schemes, mutually exclusive.

The Russian people is a very complex phenomenon, and one may find in it as many features as one needs to prove any view. The above-mentioned opinion, which I do not share, is overdrawn and one-sided, but one cannot say that it is entirely untrue. There is another side to it which it is especially important to emphasize in connection with that question of "Russia of to-morrow."

In the first place, it is necessary to state that the very fact of the widely spread fear of the appearance of the real people, the peasants, on the political stage is a most eloquent and convincing proof of a speedy growth of their social weight. One may say that just as was the case during the great French Revolution, the Russian peasantry is the only class which has directly benefited by the Revolution. Whatever remained of the nobility after the great act of 1861 (emancipating the peasants from serfdom) was definitely destroyed by the Revolution of 1917, never to revive in its old form. The class of industrialists, comparatively young, was also swept away by the
destruction of industry. This class will revive and grow; but its social rôle is all in the future. The lower middle class, which was not numerous, has particularly suffered from the downfall of the towns. The class of workmen, also comparatively recent, is scattered and has distributed itself among the village, the army and the new officialdom. The intellectuals and men of the liberal professions have been in part exterminated, a part of them have fled away from Russia, and a part were forced to enlist in the Bolshevist civil service. They, of course, will be badly needed by the State and the communities at the first moment of Russia's recovery. But now they are dragging themselves through a miserable existence. The peasants alone are known to have become better off since the beginning of the War, to have taken the land from the squires after the March Revolution and to have enriched themselves at the expense of the town during the Bolshevist revolution. Their growing hatred against the "loafers" in the towns is also known, but it is explained by the fact that the town could give no more manufactured goods for grain, which it began to requisition from the peasants through the intermediary of the Bolshevist State machinery. This ill-feeling will certainly pass as soon as the normal relations of exchange are restored between the town and village. As things are now, the town is frightened, and the typical exponent of the proletarian townsfolk, such as Gorki is, faithfully reflects that state of feeling.

It is also mostly among the townsfolk that negative phenomena of demoralization can be observed. Mr. Brailsford rightly brings that new wave of crime which swept Russia in connection with the same phenomena all over Europe, as produced by the state of misery
created by the War. The great mortality, especially in the towns (Chap. VII), is of course chiefly due to the increased state of suffering caused by the Bolshevist régime.

The consequences of the economic ruin which began from the top have also hit the Russian village hard. We know how it has reflected itself in the state of Russia's agriculture (Chap. VII). But, with the exception of the famine-stricken areas, one must not exaggerate the degree of destruction of the Russian village. It is especially here that the comparatively low level of economic development and low standard of life rendered Russia a real service. Two generations have hardly passed by since the light of civilization was first introduced into the Russian village through the newly built Zemstvos, the organs of rural self-government.¹ Such forms of the past as trade based on barter, industry in its primitive form of home handwork, locally limited markets and fairs were still fresh in everybody's memory. It was comparatively easy for the peasant to cast aside his new needs and habits and to revert to old traditions, such as homespun clothes, filthy hamlets, thatched roofs, wooden shoes and implements, chips of wood instead of lamps or matches, primitive means of transport and locomotion, in short, to primitive habits of life.

Russia has fallen deep; but it has not fallen from a very high level. That is why it has not hurt itself so much in its collapse, as would be the case with a more advanced country. Imagine a New York skyscraper falling to pieces, or a Bolshevist régime playing havoc for a couple of days in the midst of an extremely complex social organism of modern times, and compare it

with some similar occurrence somewhere in the newly settled districts of Manitoba: you will realize the difference and you will understand my assumption, that it is by far easier for a country like Russia to recover, and that it can be done in a much shorter space of time than would be the case with a more highly developed social structure.

However, it would be entirely wrong to take the present degraded state of the Russian village as a starting point in its development from some "semi-savage" stage to a state of civilization under the benevolent rule of the Bolsheviks. That mistake has been particularly often repeated in the question of popular education. The Bolsheviks are generally credited with especially successful educational activities. And indeed they drew almost as much attention to their school as to their army. The school had to "serve as a laboratory for those social forms which are considered most rational for the given cultural epoch." In plain speech it meant teaching communism. But the Bolsheviks at once met with the resistance of the "All-Russian Teachers' Union," a very influential organization. They opposed to it a "Union of Teachers-Internationalists." However, it was extremely difficult to find a new teaching personnel devoted to communism. In December, 1919, the Red newspapers of Petrograd complained that out of the total of 24,839 persons who constituted the total personnel of the "Division of Education," "9,439 were former bourgeois intellectuals, 1,490 were former owners of property and 1,117—former bureaucratic officials." The Red organ was extremely dissatisfied and sarcastically remarked that these bourgeois worked "in the sweat of their brow to introduce communistic education and
to break up in the children the ideas of respect for the sacred institution of private-ownership of the means of production which is being instilled in them by their backward parents and to educate these children in the spirit of the realization of the class aims of the proletariat.” The statistical results were still more unsatisfactory for the Communists. Let us compare the figures of a pre-war report (1911) and that of the Communist Minister Lunacharsky (for 1919):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Scholars</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1919</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Elementary schools</td>
<td>6,322,725</td>
<td>2,618,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“ Secondary and special</td>
<td>687,631</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“ Universities</td>
<td>38,192¹</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,048,548</td>
<td>2,873,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Far from having opened a new era of national education, the Bolsheviks witnessed the destruction to a great extent of what had been accomplished by the two last Dumas. A scheme for universal education to be introduced in a period of 15-20 years was worked out by the Dumas and appropriations in the budget were being increased accordingly at a very speedy rate. The appraised great increase in the budget of the Bolsheviks was purely nominal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Appropriations (thousands of rubles)</th>
<th>In gold (millions)</th>
<th>Per cent. of the whole budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>170,206</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>6.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>238,605</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>7.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>270,775</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>8.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>3,074,343</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>6.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>17,279,374</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>8.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>114,366,070</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>10.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹3,778 peasants.
The decrease in the number of schools, pupils and appropriations under the Bolshevist régime is evident. However, there is one feature in the situation which is particularly interesting. The peasants themselves display a great interest in education and they try in every way to make up for the deficiencies of the Bolshevist State. It is the general opinion of all recent observers of Soviet Russia, that "the greed for knowledge is indeed colossal" among the peasants. Of course, they do not care about the history of communism: they want their former school teachers to come back to them and to teach as they always did. The school buildings are unrepaired and there is no fuel to heat them. There are no textbooks, no blackboards, no paper, pens, pencils or ink. The teacher sometimes draws the characters on sand, in the autumn and spring, on snow in the winter. But the children overcome all obstacles and a great number of them pass to the secondary schools. In Southern Russia sometimes 40 to 60 per cent. of the pupils in the secondary schools are children of peasants. This is another new feature. Finally, I find in a personal letter the assertion that in every village one can find young peasants who have graduated from the universities. It is true that university teaching has especially suffered at the hands of the Bolsheviks, the program of studies being substantially changed, all entrance requirements being entirely abolished and the professorial staff being chiefly composed of communist newcomers, without sufficient qualifications for teaching. To compensate for these drawbacks, Soviet Russia has now 23 universities, instead of the former 10, and we have seen that the number of students has increased. The desire for education is especially strong among the growing genera-
tion of the intellectuals. The gaps in the official teaching are here often made good by personal study. The enthusiasm of the youth and the feeling of duty towards their people which inspires them reminds me of the best period in the history of our intellectuals.

Some other important symptoms of a new revival in the masses are noted by Mr. S. Maslov, whose data I have quoted in a previous chapter. He emphasizes that the feeling of responsibility towards the State has also grown enormously among the people whom he knows from close observation. The connection between the deranged functions of the State and the ensuing dislocation in all branches of social life is now clearly understood. The great importance of cohesion between the different regions of the State, the significance of railways, harbors, outlets to the world communications for the unity of the national organism has also been learned by the large masses from the experiences of the civil war and Russia's dismemberment. They now know that if Russia is cut from the north, there is no fish in the market; if the Caucasus is detached, there is no oil; if the Donetz basin is lost, there is no coal. These are the elements of sound nationalism which had been lacking but which they have been taught at the hand of events. Accordingly, national feeling is growing, and it will certainly have a great influence on the state of the public opinion in questions of foreign policy. Owing to the failure of the Bolshevist experiment, the former spell of socialism is weakening, especially among the intellectuals (Mr. Maslov, a socialist himself, has left the ranks of his party). In all classes of the population, intellectuals as well as peasants, a common feature is noticed which Mr. Maslov designates by the expressive term "crea-
tive pathos.” Everybody wants to work, to break through the “senseless and criminal barriers” put up by the Soviet power, and to till the land, to restart coöperation, to print books. “Russia is alive,” Mr. Maslov sums up; “the people’s soul has not been killed; there is a will to action, a healthy reaction against the surrounding chaos and dissolution.” Mr. Maslov also marks the moment when the change came. “From October-November, 1920,” he states, “the curve of Russia’s political activity moved upwards. Just why it happened at that particular moment, I cannot explain.¹ But the fact is that it did. Increased activity manifested itself in the growth of the peasant upheavals, in the greater number of ‘partisans’ detachments, in the tumultuous conferences of the Soviets,² in workmen’s disturbances, in the movement among the students, in the increasing activity of the socialistic parties in Russia, in the growth of the illegal literature, written and oral, in frequent discussions on new political groupings and in the new determination for building local branches of such groupings.”

How different is this picture, based on the close observation of experienced political workers, from the biased constructions and deductions of the pro-Bolsheviks and reactionaries! It makes the Russian democrats very hopeful as to Russia of to-morrow, and it palliates the gloomy forebodings of the partisans of a “declased” proletariat as to the political consequences of the predominance of the Russian farmers, who constitute the great majority of the Russian population.

¹It coincides with the final downfall of the “White” movement (Gen. Wrangel’s retreat). See Chap. VI.
²One can note the increasing numbers of opposition delegates elected to the Soviet in spite of the Bolshevist pressure on the elections.
Of course, political life in a democratic Russia of farmers will be different from what it was before. But we know that real political life was just beginning before the Revolution (see Chap. I). As a result of the pressure of autocracy on public opinion all the political parties were either too artificially built and serving a fictitious representation, or too doctrinaire and abstract, representing political ideas rather than social interests. Under the Revolution the former group of parties, the reactionary and conservative, has entirely disappeared, while the latter, the liberal and socialistic, has been gradually adapting itself to real political life. "Even these parties have to be thoroughly reconstructed in order to be able to serve the democratic Russia of to-morrow. It is very characteristic that all the political groups now fighting the Bolsheviks inside Russia have lost the rigid delineations of their programs and have melted together in a common struggle which is carried on under extraordinarily difficult conditions. The official designation of that matter-of-fact coalition of Russian parties (Mensheviks, Social-Revolutionaries, Populists, Cadets) is 'non-party.' It is the 'non-party' element which fights out the elections to the Soviets and succeeds in getting into them a few representatives of their own in spite of all the anti-parliamentary methods of the 'dominating class' (see Chap. III). However, there are elements which are naturally excluded from that 'non-party' coalition, because they are simply non-existent in Russia. There are no monarchists in their midst. There are no opponents to democracy, no partisans of the formerly privileged social groups. Democracy is the present day reality in Russia: democracy as opposed to Bolshevism."

If the picture thus drawn is true—as I think it is,
on the authority of ample evidence given in papers, in private letters and through personal intercourse—some conclusions may be drawn concerning the Russia of to-morrow.

We have seen that outside of Russia a reactionary and monarchist agitation is rife among the members of the old privileged class, the old type bureaucrats and the remainders of the evacuated army. It is stated that up to 15,000 former officers have been enlisted by the monarchist organizations, in order to start on a military raid at some opportune moment, with the aim of restoring monarchy. However, the chance of success is so small that, to my knowledge, no pretender has been found as yet who would consent to play the part of Charles Hapsburg. It would be difficult to assert that the very idea of monarchy has completely disappeared from Russia. But if that idea ever was popular in Russia, it was in the shape of a democratic monarchy, of a peasant Tsar like Pugachov, the famous Cossack impostor of the time of Catherine II, the peasant duplicate of her murdered husband, Peter III, who surrounded himself with peasant dignitaries and "generals." Is such a Russian Napoleon likely to appear in the present crisis? Many peasant Nicholases II have already appeared, but they had not a chance to succeed. Not only is the Russian peasant very different from what he was in the XVIII Century, but monarchy has also lost all its historical prestige. The peasant cannot forget that the Russian monarch was always in close alliance with the Russian squire. And the Russian farmer will never again tolerate the squire. We know that the chief reason for the failure of the "White" movement was that the "White" generals came accompanied by the old landlords. Neither can
the monarch detach himself from his secular ally, the landlord, because he is the only one that wants to bring the monarch back. This is why the monarchist movement among the noble émigrés has no chance to succeed, unless it is supported—in addition to the German money which it gets now (Chap. VI)—by a strong German army. Ludendorffs and Stinneses may dream of such an operation, but it hardly can count on any support elsewhere in Europe, and if it ever materializes it can only count on a momentary and passing success.

If we dismiss that possibility of Russia's becoming again a monarchy, there remains another issue much spoken about by the partisans of the Bolsheviks, who wish to prove the wisdom of letting them continue in power. Their reasoning, made especially popular by Mr. H. G. Wells, who claims to know Russia as he knows everything, is as follows: If the Bolsheviks go, what is going to happen? Who will take their place? There may be anarchy, which is still worse. Russia will have gotten rid of the only strong government which she can have now, and she will plunge into complete chaos. The Bolshevist Government is at least a government and it has shown itself to be possessed of great will power and a remarkable capacity for governing. . . . This cannot be said of the other progressive parties, which lost their power to the Bolsheviks through sentimentalism and lack of practical experience. As the Bolsheviks now promise to renounce their pernicious principles and to evolve, would it not be better to let them stay and give them a chance to become a "decent" government?

A part of these suggestions has already been answered. There is no chance of the Bolsheviks "evolv-
ing,” and their promises of economic concessions are conditioned—and limited—on and by the preservation of their political power. Indeed, their “will to power” is so great that it defies the will of the whole population for them to go, and that will can only be realized by practicing these very methods which make their further stay impossible. There is a limit to everything, even to fear. All reports concur in the statement that the people are no longer cowed by the Red Terror and that the fear of the Che-Ka has been blunted since that political revival the beginnings of which are described above, in a quotation from Mr. S. Maslov. It is true that most of the parties that came into power under the March Revolution of 1917 were unable to keep in power, and that this was partly due to their inexperience. But we saw them learn in the process, and it was chiefly the unpreparedness of the population which prevented them from applying their new knowledge and caused the masses to prefer the Bolshevist demagogy to real democratic strivings. It remains to be proved that the lesson was learned both by the progressive parties and by the population. This can only be proved by events, but in the meanwhile I can refer to the new state of mind among the Russian masses, which is characterized above. Is it true that there is nobody left in Russia to prevent anarchy since all the non-Bolshevist intellectuals have been exterminated or have fled for their lives? No, it is not true. It is not true that underneath the Bolshevist surface of 600,000 or 300,000 or probably less of the Communist Party there is nothing but an amorphous mass of uneducated and unconscious plain people, that will be broken up and strewn about like atoms after the organizing upper layer is removed.
On the contrary, the elements of cohesion are there and many, and they are ready to coagulate and to crystallize at any moment. To illustrate that tendency, I shall quote a fact which is universally known. I mean the story of the Moscow non-Communist Famine Committee, which is already known to you (Chap. VIII). When the Bolsheviks first learned how unexpectedly great was the Russian disaster and how utterly helpless they were to relieve it by their own means, they came to the idea of addressing themselves just to these non-Communist intellectual elements which are supposed by some people to be non-existent. The Bolsheviks wished to use the authority of these non-Bolsheviks abroad to influence foreign public opinion, and to profit by their connections in the country, in order to organize provincial branches. This appeal to the non-Communist elements—which, however, was far from generally accepted or approved in their midst—elicited such a reverberation both outside and inside Russia, that the Bolsheviks became frightened. Branches of the Moscow Committee in the provinces here and there began to be considered by the population as new organs of administration, intended to take the place of the Bolshevist ones. There were cases (e.g., in the Province of Ryazan) where the Bolshevist commissars proposed voluntarily to surrender their powers. The Bolsheviks decided to cut short and to put a speedy end to the experiment which had proved so dangerous. In the meanwhile they saw that they could negotiate with the outer world without intermediaries. And they not only dissolved the Moscow Committee under the futile pretext that its members had misused their power, but they even tried to convict them of political crime.

No, there will neither be anarchy nor monarchy in
Russia of to-morrow. There will be democracy. It will be a peasant democracy. Under an electoral law based on the principle of universal suffrage—and no other kind of suffrage is possible in democratic Russia—the majority of the deputies in any really popular assembly will belong to the peasant class. From the old régime the peasants have learned to be extremely suspicious of any member of another class representing their interests. I have in mind an interesting description of the elections at a provincial peasant conference in Samara, in May, 1917. It was very typical of all the peasant elections. There were in their midst many school-teachers who had taken part in the agrarian movement of 1905-6 and had been punished by imprisonment. They were all Social-Revolutionaries, a party particularly favored among the peasants and which received the majority of votes to the Constituent Assembly at the end of 1917. But preference was given to a peasant, also a member of that party, who declared: "Do not rely on anybody, either officials, or priests, or white-collar men. They are wolves in sheep's skins, and the popular wave will sweep them away. You will be able to tolerate them only then when all these white shirts will have become dirty from hard work."

You will now understand why, wherever popular elections on the basis of universal suffrage were tried (like in Siberia, see Chap. X), the majority of deputies elected were peasants. They are just class, not party, and their choice of the party preferred will necessarily vary. It does not mean, however, that they will not tolerate any intellectuals at their side and that the fate of the Russian peasant republic will be that of Bul-
garia under a Stambuliisky. It only means that they will not swear by the words of the intellectuals and will not permit the intellectuals to dictate to them. There are groups of Russian intellectuals who are even now known to the peasants for their active and useful work among them. Since 1861 they learned to know agronomists, physicians, teachers and especially coöperative workers, who all belong to the Russian intellectuals and share in their creed. They confide comparatively less in their priests whom they class, as we have just seen, with the government officials. But even here there are exceptions, and every Russian recollects the brilliant types of democratic priests who were sent to the first Duma by the peasants. It is very difficult to say to what an extent religious feeling in the villages has deepened as a result of the Bolshevik propaganda and persecution against the Church. At any rate nothing like secret mass services conducted in the woods, like those of the French Thermidor, have taken place in Russia, and in general the influence of the Orthodox clergy on the popular masses has been far from equal to that of the Catholics. The religious development of the Russian people, especially in the South, has taken to the line of non-conformity, but data are lacking to show how much that religious movement has changed or progressed since the Revolution.

Coming back to our subject of elections, I must point out that there is at least one group of Russian intellectuals who actually enjoy the confidence of the masses. I mean the Coöperators. For the time being, as we know (Chap. XII), free coöperation has been killed by the Bolsheviks who made participation in it compulsory for every Russian citizen and transformed
it into a state institution. But the personnel of the former coöperative societies have mostly remained at their posts, and they will probably be the first connecting link between the people and the party leaders. The Coöperators tried to use their sobering influence on the extremism of the socialist parties as early as the middle of 1917, when the Provisional Government was nearing its end. Since that time they have declared themselves "non-party." This position may serve as a medium for transforming the doctrinaire socialism of yesterday into some acceptable political program of tomorrow. Private ownership of peasant land is conditio sine qua non of such a program. It will be much easier for the "Cadets" to adapt themselves to the new situation as their agrarian program was already working that way. Unfortunately, the use that the "White" governments made of that program has very much contributed to discrediting it. A reconstruction of the Party was also necessary to get rid of its opportunist elements, which evolved to the right in 1918-1920, and to give it its initial democratic character.

Under new conditions of work among the peasant masses there is always the danger present that demagogy will be substituted for democracy. More than one "peasant" party will surely make its appearance, and some adventurous leaders may overbid the others and probably win. Some others, who are accustomed to follow the track of the old intellectual parties, reminding one of American "mug-wumps," may grow disgusted and retreat from the game. All that is quite likely to happen, and the only remedy is a free play of democratic institutions. To try to forestall eventual mistakes with new plots and coups d'état will not only be undemocratic, but with
the masses awakened to political consciousness it will simply prove impossible.

There is one more feature which will characterize Russia of to-morrow. I mean a free agreement among the nationalities formerly incorporated into that huge mass of an Empire of Eastern style, a "colossus on feet of clay." I have mentioned the solution of the problem which the Russian democratic parties consider as the only possible, namely federation (Chap. IV). I have also touched upon the generally peaceful disposition of the Russian masses who are hostile to any aggression, offensive wars and alliances. Under the lessons of intervention and the Allied policy of contradictions and selfishness toward Russia (Chap. X), the Russian peasants will probably, and especially at the beginning, be inclined to follow the policy of entrenchment. As I have already mentioned, the national feeling is growing among the masses, together with a sense of unity and interdependence of the different parts of the former Empire. I am sure that they will be satisfied with much less than the present Bolshevist policy of restored and increased centralization. It is very difficult to say just where the line will be drawn between federal and state competency. But there hardly can be a doubt but that these questions and probable contests will be settled peacefully. Plain necessity points to the solution of these questions by free consent of popular assemblies as the only means for meeting the problem.

The federative structure of future Russia, the United States of Russia, will thus be one more feature in common between our two nations. In the course of my discussion, we have found that there are many features in common between America and Russia. (See especially Chapters X and XI.) The large space they
occupy on their respective continents, their unexhausted natural resources, their expanding populations that have passed through a recent process of settlement, their young or rejuvenated psychology, a certain self-sufficiency in isolation, simplicity and unconventionality of habits and a peaceful disposition of mind, a kind of self-respect welded with good-will towards other nations, a broad-minded spirit open to new developments,—all of this is so familiar to every Russian and American that we almost understand each other before we study one another.

I am sure that the coming developments in our Russia of to-morrow will not belie the expectations which our great Revolution aroused in this country. I am not unmindful of the appreciation of the meaning of that Revolution which lies at the bottom of the American policy toward Russia, the only policy that is sound and really friendly. I recollect Mr. Root's various expressions of that basic truth in connection with his mission to Revolutionary Russia. "We believe in the competence of the power of democracy," Mr. Root said at the reception of his mission by the Provisional Government; "in our heart of hearts abides faith in the coming of a better world" of freedom and justice. And on his coming back from Russia, at the moment when its darkest hour was coming, Mr. Root thus expressed the view of the great American democracy: "We found no organic or incurable malady in the Russian democracy. Democracies are always in trouble, and we have seen days just as dark in the progress of our own. We must remember that a people in whom all constructive effort had been suppressed for so long, cannot immediately develop a genius for quick action. The first stage is necessarily one of debate. The solid, admirable traits
in the Russian character will pull the nation through the present crisis."

I do not undertake to prophesy when the end of the crisis will come or in what way. But I know that the end is near. When foreign observers of the present Russia tell me that nothing can happen and that the present régime is stable because there is no force there to overthrow it, their evidence does not make me less hopeful. I can only tell a story. On the eve of the March Revolution, in February, 1917, I sat at the side of Lord Milner who had been sent to Russia in order to learn whether it was true that the Russian Revolution was really approaching. I knew it was—and everybody knew it in Russia. We did not know, as we do not know now, just how and where and when it was going to happen. But we knew it was going to happen. My friends put me at Lord Milner's side on purpose. I had to tell him, and I told him that the storm was approaching, that if at the last hour the dynasty would not consent to compromise its fall was inevitable and that our Allies were the only ones whose voice might probably be heard. Much later I was told that on his coming back to England Lord Milner reported in an opposite sense. According to him, the dynasty was as strongly rooted in the love of the Russian people as it ever had been, no danger for peace and order in Russia was forthcoming and everything was all right. A few weeks later the dynasty was overthrown: the Revolution had come. I recently read almost the same assertions in Governor Goodrich's article in the New York Times. Governor Goodrich is an excellent observer and I appreciate very much what he has already done for Russia. But I happen to be a Russian. I know the psychology of our people. And I say to all who want
to hear: Russia is ripe for a democratic change. The change will come. It will come soon. What will emerge from it will be—not the ancient régime, not anarchy, but a great democratic Russia of to-morrow.
CHAPTER X.

RUSSIA—SIBERIA—JAPAN—WASHINGTON.

Among the many important results of the World War, perhaps one of the most important—and, probably, the least expected—is a proportional diminution in the international weight of Europe as compared with other parts of the civilized world. The center of the world politics is shifting from the leading powers of the Old World to the West and to the East: to America, to the British Dominions, to Asia. A new period in the life of humanity seems thus to open.

The great change just mentioned has been recently emphasized by the succession of the two international gatherings in Paris and in Washington. On the oldest site of our old Europe the peace conference of 1919 changed into a “conference of victors,” to use President Harding’s exact expression. Questions touching the whole of humanity seemed to be somehow out of place in Paris. Their place was inevitably taken by provisions to perpetuate the new “balance” created by victory, by lengthy disputes over every inch of territory on the newly-built frontiers, disputes centuries old and overburdened with painful recollections of the remote past. Temporary adjustments, necessary and useful, obscured the main issues of the world peace. America did not seem to feel quite comfortable in the straits of the Parisian disputes. Paris seems to have found itself in a similar situation in Washington.
In America it is not Albania, or Silesia, or Teschen, or Klagenfurt, or Hungarian Burgenland, that is being discussed. The questions raised are as large as America's boundless plains or the surface of the Pacific. There is only one event of the same year, 1921, which can be compared with the Washington Conference in its world significance: the British Imperial Conference of August.

Russia was absent both in Paris and Washington, as there is no government legally entitled to represent the Russian people. But the Paris Conference began with the declaration that there can be no peace in the world, if there is no peace in Russia. Unfortunately, the only means found in Paris for bringing peace to Russia was the ineffectual and inadequate Prinkipo proposal. Accordingly, the only treaty concluded with Russia was the British Trade Agreement of March, 1921. The Washington Conference was also preceded by a declaration on Russia. But it was a tentative enunciation of a new principle in international politics, the principle of "moral trusteeship." It was not America's fault if it did not materialize.

We, Russians, have nothing to lose from the shifting of the international politics to larger regions of the world. Russia herself is a large place in the world: quite one-sixth of the world's earth surface. If between Alaska and New York the difference of time is about five hours, from Petrograd to Bering Strait the distance is twice as much, i.e., ten hours. The population of Russia, even in its present dismembered state, is about 130 millions. We are Europeans, but we are also Asiatic. Some foreign scientists and some Russian patriots call us "Eurasians." We are thus of both continents. Our absence is equally felt in both hemi-
spheres, and we are equally needed for reëstablishing the equilibrium in Europe and in Asia: in Europe to equipoise France in her contest with imperialistic Germany; in Asia to equipoise the United States in its developing contest with Japanese imperialism. This is, in a nutshell, the position of Russia in the world. Russia is very sick just now. But Russia will recover. She will recover soon. And no international decision affecting her interests can be taken in her absence without endangering the future world peace.

Russia is legally absent from international gatherings. But she is morally present: at least, she ought to be. And if it is true that there can be no peace in the world without peace in Russia, the question naturally presents itself: what can Russia contribute to the peace of the world?

Many foreign observers have called the Russian people "the most peaceful nation in the world." And, indeed, peace is one of the greatest requirements and will be one of the greatest acquisitions of the rising democracy in Russia. Russia is not only temporarily peaceful because she is utterly exhausted and because she needs a long rest to recover, Russia is naturally peaceful because this is the normal state of mind of her people. Probably it is due to its natural surroundings,—just a Middle-American—as is the case with this country. A Russian of Middle Russia, if left to himself, would not show much interest in active foreign politics, in wars or alliances. Leo Tolstoy, the great connoisseur of the Russian soul, tells us an amusing story. Monsieur Deroulède, the well-known French patriot and nationalist, came to see him at his country home and asked Tolstoy to make him acquainted with some Russian peasants. Tolstoy went with Mr. De-
roulède to the fields and they met a peasant. Tolstoy
took pains to explain to the Russian moujik who Mr.
Deroulede was, and his visitor in his turn tried to prove
to the peasant just why it was so exceedingly important
to take back Alsace-Lorraine from Germany and why
Russia had to help France. The peasant listened at-
tentively, and then he said: "There is land enough for
everybody in the wide world. Why should we quar-
rel?" Of course, the peasant was not quite up to date
in his ideas on foreign politics,—and now he has to pay
for it. But this is how he actually felt.

Contrary to the assertions of Russia's enemies and
her own extremists, the Russian people were never "im-
perialistic." Like so many people in America, Russia
was in happy possession of that privilege longed-for by
many: she could stay quietly at home because she felt
self-sufficient. What was it that forced Germany to
become imperialistic and aggressive? What is now the
cause of Japan's growing desire for expansion? The
first cause is over-population, which makes it necessary
to emigrate and to colonize. The second cause is over-
production, which compels the race for new markets
and for such colonies as can supply needed raw ma-
terials. The result is—competition; competition spells
armaments and naval programs, and armaments mean
increased taxation. This is—imperialism. Now, no-
body could charge Russia with over-production and
over-population. Russia never possessed colonies, and,
accordingly, never had any colonial policy. Russia is
one great continuous continental block, covering a
great part of two continents. Raw materials can be
found at home in abundance. Their supply is secured
for centuries by unexhausted—and partly unexplored
—richness of soil and mineral wealth. The internal
market is so large, and so capable of extension, that it never could be satiated with products of national industry alone. Foreign capital is necessary and desirable, under one single condition—that it does not treat Russia as a colony, a “Wirtschaftsgebiet.” I must add that the Germans tried to do that, and they enforced on Russia the unfavorable commercial treaties of 1894 and 1904. Even now they may be the first to come to regenerated Russia, owing to their better knowledge of Russia’s resources, better conditions of credit, a ready network of commercial agents, etc. So much the more do we need American capital to come to our rescue, and we want you to learn to know Russia as Germany knows it.

You see now that Russia has nothing to do with that kind of imperialism which brings about armaments and wars—and also systems of alliances and “balances of power.” An international system under which there would be no new distribution of nations between two competing camps, would be the most desirable to Russia. You may object that Russian politics had been aggressive in the past. That is also not quite exact. The Russian Tsars very rarely waged wars for purely national interests and mostly remained passive in choosing or changing their systems of alliances. With the exception of the reign of Peter the Great and Catherine II, most of the Russian wars were fought for other people’s interests. Peter’s heiresses made Russia play the part of a European condotiere. Under Alexander I and Nicholas I Russia defended the idea of World Legitimism and World Christian Brotherhood: it was then understood as expressed in a monarchical League of Nations. Whatever its reactionary applications, the idea was intended to serve international
order and peace. Alexander II fought for the liberation of the Balkan Slavs, and this was also the *formal reason* for Russia's participation in the recent World War, where Russia's interests were the least important. The late German chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, tried to prove that the responsibility for this last war rests with the Russian Minister Sazonov, because he wished to annex Constantinople. Bethmann-Hollweg must have known that Russia's claim for the possession of the Straits was posterior to the beginning of war, and that this claim was chiefly provoked by the German scheme of a Berlin-Bagdad route through the subdued Middle Europe. It stands and falls with that competing scheme. As there is no more German danger for the Straits, we are now again the best of friends with Turkey. We are also likely to become again the best of friends with China, in spite of certain imperialistic exceptions from our generally peaceful politics there to which I shall refer.

To state it once more, the international position of Russia does not necessarily commit her to any special alliance. Russia would fain substitute any kind of Society of Nations for the existing systems of world equilibrium which force her to undesirable activities. We fully understand America's cautious attitude towards the "Covenant" of the League of Nations. We might have been obliged to make some similar reservations, if we had had to consider the same question. But, Covenant or no Covenant, this way or another, some legal way must be found for a stable international organization of peace. Mr. Hughes kindly reminded the Washington Conference in his famous introductory speech that Russia was the first to urge disarmament and peaceful settlement of international disputes, in her
proposal to convocate the first Hague Conference in 1899. We also greatly appreciate the part that America played in promoting that great scheme at the Paris Conference. Perhaps it was necessary to recede, in order the better to advance. That is why, when a new attempt in the same line was made in Washington with the obvious aim of improving upon the last one, we, Russians, enthusiastically greeted it, and we felt in complete agreement with the aim of the Government of this country.

But we have, moreover, a special reason for being grateful to American statesmanship. We think that America’s special policy towards Russia has been a sound policy which has tended very much to deepen the moral ties that unite both democracies. In a previous chapter (see Chapter IV) I pointed out that it has become a tradition of American diplomacy to defend Russia’s unity from all attempts at dismembering and weakening Russia. This view is a logical deduction from the fundamental conception as to the sovereign rights of the Russian people. It was also to the Russian people that the United States addressed itself, over the heads of changing and temporary governments, local and all-Russian.

Let me remind you of some of these declarations, in chronological order. As early as February 7, 1920, the United States declared that it did not recognize the decision of the Supreme Council, regarding the independence of Georgia and Azerbaidjan. President Wilson’s note of March 24, 1920, categorically declared that “the question of a government for Constantinople should remain open until Russia is able to participate in its discussion” and that “no plan concerning the
future of Constantinople which did not take in consideration the interests of Russia, should be successful.” On July 28, 1920, the United States addressed a Note to Japan which is particularly important in connection with to-day’s problems. The United States objected to the occupation of the Russian part of Sakhalin, the continued occupation of Vladivostok and of other Siberian territories by the Japanese troops. Then followed, on August 10, that splendid and admirably worded Note of Secretary of State Colby, answering Italy’s demand for a statement of America’s views as to the Russian advance into Poland. “The United States,” Mr. Colby said, “is confident that restored, free and united Russia will again take a leading place in the world, joining with the other free nations in upholding peace and orderly justice.” We thankfully endorse this judgment.

It is especially important to emphasize that this was not at all a party policy. The republican administration has developed the same principles of Russian policy as were formulated by its democratic predecessors. When the “Far Eastern Republic of Chita” (Bolshevist) asked to be allowed to send delegates to Washington, the American legation at Pekin transmitted on September 19, 1921, the following answer:

“In the absence of a single recognized Russian Government the protection of the legitimate Russian interests must devolve as a moral trusteeship upon the whole conference. It is regrettable that the conference, for reasons quite beyond the control of the participating powers, is to be deprived of the advantage of Russian coöperation in its deliberations, but it is not

1 See below, the note of May 31, 1921, confirming that mentioned in the text.
to be conceived that the conference will take decisions prejudicial to legitimate Russian interests or which would in any manner violate Russian rights. It is the hope and expectation of the government of the United States that the conference will establish general principles of international action which will deserve and have the support of the people of eastern Siberia and of all Russia by reason of their justice and efficacy in the settlement of outstanding difficulties.”

The assurances thus given from such a high place were more than sufficient for us to feel certain that legitimate Russian interests would not be neglected or interfered with, in such decisions or international action as the present conference was likely to take. But what are the “legitimate interests” of Russia? What are especially the legitimate interests “of the people of eastern Siberia”? The question, once raised, deserves most serious consideration as the fate of the World peace may hang on its solution.

It is an open secret that legitimate interests of Russia in Siberia can only be interfered with by the leading power of the Far East: by Japan. Japan, after Germany, is now the storm center and the weather-glass of the World. We must look to Japan for a solution.

What does Japan want in Siberia? Not to seem biased, let me quote a Japanese answer. It is that of Mr. Yoshi S. Kuno, an assistant Professor of the Oriental Department of the University of California. The author “requests the reader to bear in mind that the material contained” in his book (“What Japan Wants”) does not reflect his “personal ideas and policies,” but, “the state of public opinion in Japan.” We shall see that, moreover, it reflects the present policy of
the Japanese Government, which works in agreement with the public opinion.

"If America is the white man's land," Mr. Kuno says, "Japan would inquire whether Siberia is not the yellow man's land. Though Siberia to-day constitutes a part of the Russian Empire, yet in order to decide whether Siberia is politically a component part of Russia, one must turn to history." Russia "finally succeeded in bringing the whole of this great barren waste peopled by Asiatic tribes under her control. She even occupied Sakhalin. . . With the downfall of the Russian Empire . . . Japan reoccupied the whole of Sakhalin Island and has assumed military control both of Vladivostok and an immense region round about. Now that the doors of all Anglo-Saxon nations are closed against her emigrants and she must seek some other outlet for her population, it is but natural that Japan should raise the question whether Siberia may not be the land of the yellow man."

We cannot but feel thankful to the author for his exceptional sincerity. Mr. Kuno is equally sincere and outspoken in disclosing for us the underlying motives of the Japanese aspirations. They can be summed up as follows:

1. "Japan wants to make of Vladivostok an open port similar to Hongkong. Then, in the course of time, Vladivostok would become a port through which Japan could establish the shortest possible trade route to Europe. Japan feels that the right to establish such a trade route is the smallest reward that she could possibly ask for her financial and military efforts."

2. "In order to avoid closer proximity (with Bolshevism), Japan wants some independent State established between herself and Bolshevist Russia. This explains why Japan wants all nations to recognize the Far East Republic at
Chita in Siberia. She has already sent her representatives to the Chita Government and has entered into negotiations with it regarding numerous concessions in Siberia, along the lines of mining, fishing and industry."

3. "Of course, Japan also wants elbow room in Siberia for her surplus population. However, the sending of emigrants... is not a pressing question with the Government just now... A more vital question is where she will be able to obtain a constant supply of raw materials for her rapidly growing industries... China is, of course, an inexhaustible mine, but at the same time this mine is being worked by all nations and even China itself, with her millions of laborers, is beginning to manufacture on an unprecedented scale. Siberia, on the other hand, is both thinly populated and practically unexploited. Moreover, this vast country lies just across the Sea of Japan and from its geographical propinquity would seem to be the natural source of raw material."

4. The next point is especially important as we shall see later on. "Japan wants to make of the Sea of Japan a Japanese inland sea, just as the ancient Romans made a Roman sea of the Mediterranean in the time of the Roman Empire. From a Japanese standpoint, such an undertaking is a natural one. The Sea of Japan is closed on the south by a very narrow channel known as the Straits of Korea, which is Japanese water to-day. On the north, there is but a narrow strip of water between the mainland and Sakhalin Island. This may be crossed in small boats. To the east lies the chain of Japanese islands and to the west stretch the coasts of Korea and Siberia. Through this sea Japan might obtain two approaches to Europe, one through the Korean port of Fusan, and the other through Vladivostok. Expansion into Siberia would, therefore, be more natural and more profitable than the sending of emigrants across the Pacific to distant lands. In this way also Japan would be spared the embarrassment of coming into unpleasant conflict with Occidental nations."

The inference is quite obvious. Preserve your Monroe Doctrine for yourself, but let us (the Japanese)
have our own Monroe Doctrine for the Far East. If not, here is the perspective. I quote again from that obliging gentleman’s book:

5. "Although war between Japan and the United States, according to the present outlook, seems well-nigh impossible, still none can say with assurance that permanent peace can long be maintained between the two nations. However, if war should come, the cause thereof will not be the Japanese question in the United States, but rather with regard to some situation in the Orient itself. Japan might take up arms should the United States adopt some policy that would stand in the way of Japan in obtaining raw materials from China or Siberia. Interference of this sort would threaten not only the sources of the national prosperity of Japan, but even the very existence."

This is also quite clear. This is just how the Germans defended their right to a "place in the sun," a new "Machtpolitik." But Mr. Kuno forgets to reproduce one more argument for taking possession of the Sea of Japan, which is, probably, more obvious to military strategists than to learned scholars. It is this. Just in the event of an "unpleasant conflict" with the United States, for whatever reason it be, Japan does not want the United States to find its ally in Russia. That is why even before the necessity of emigration is keenly felt by the Japanese nation, i.e., before a natural pretext presents itself, Japan wants her "elbow room" in Siberia and wishes to bottle up the Sea of Japan. Her aim is obviously not so much economic as military. She wants to keep Russia away from the Sea altogether, in order to have her rear secured. That is also why the only place in Asia and on the Sea, which is actually a "white man’s land," must be turned into a "yellow man’s land."
You will excuse my rather lengthy quotations from Mr. Kuno’s book. This is practically the shortest way to make known Japan’s real attitude in the Far Eastern question and thus to introduce us to a discussion of Japanese acts and arguments. Acts often precede arguments in Japan.

Let us first take up that question of the “white” or “yellow” man’s land in Siberia. One might with equal reason call America the “red man’s land.” Siberia is, indeed, the only girdle of the white man’s settlement in Asia which brings the white race to the Pacific. But is it a product of sheer conquest? Is the white race in the minority in Siberia? Is the white settlement as recent as the last period of the world colonial policy?

Such is by no means the case. Siberia is closely welded to European Russia by a secular process of settlement. That process is contemporaneous with the settlement of America. It began at the end of the XVI Century, and in the XVII Century the main outlines of colonization were firmly laid down. The process was slow and steady. It was a continuous stream of Russian settlers which found Siberia, indeed, “a great waste,” as Mr. Kuno puts it, and its aboriginal population as scarce and scattered as behooved the tribes of hunters and nomads. The Russian settler brought to Siberia his habits of husbandry and introduced sedentary life.

Was it the “imperialistic” Government of ancient Moscow which was responsible for the “annexation” of the Siberian wilderness? No, this was not the case. The Muscovite Government of the XVII Century was by far not strong enough to guide the process of settlement. It only tried to step into the shoes of the settlers. They were free Russian Cossacks, of the Great
Russian stock, who crossed the Urals in the second half of the XVI Century and who in another half century passed through all Siberia, following the confluents of the chief Siberian rivers. In about 1650 they found themselves at the mouth of the Amur, on the Pacific coast. The peasant followed the Cossack, and the government official followed the peasant. The Siberian population, however, never knew serfdom and the submissiveness of the Russian center, as the land-owners had no opportunity to make Siberian lands their own. Siberians always remained splendid specimens of the Northern robust race, a liberty-loving folk. They are Russian republicans, a forecast of what free Russia is going to become.

What was the attitude of the settlers towards the local population? Of course, the Cossacks had come as conquerors and economic exploiters. But the peasants came as peaceful neighbors. We had no long wars of conquest in Siberia. The difference in civilization was not so great between the Russian settlers and the Siberian aborigines, as it was at the same time between the Anglo-Saxons and the Indians. There was intermarriage, mutual amalgamation, and the physical type of the Siberian Russian was slowly changing in the midst of the yellow Tungus and Mongol. However, the white race asserted itself. An appropriate term to characterize the cultural significance of Russian settlement in Siberia was found by Sir Harry Johnston. He called it "Aryanization." Russian settlers, as he rightly stated, "were repeating history," or rather, prehistory, by "once more Aryanizing Northern and Central Asia." The difference was that they were now moving in the opposite direction: from West to East.
The process went on throughout the last three centuries, and the last stage of it was recorded by foreign observers. Let me quote from an American book, by Mr. Beveridge, on "The Russian Advance" in Asia. Mr. Beveridge, while in Vladivostok, had a talk with an "intelligent Russian commercial man." This is how the latter represents that last stage of "Aryanization" of the Far East. "Yes," said Mr. Beveridge's informant, referring to the prairies north of Vladivostok, "these fields were all once occupied by Chinamen; but now, as you see, they are as fully occupied by the Russian peasant, his wife and his children, as if this land had always been a part of Russia. That has not been so very long ago, either. It is quite impossible to explain the retirement of the Chinese. There was no friction between the people and the Russian peasant." Mr. Beveridge draws a correct conclusion. "This singular fact," he says, "which repeats itself in many different phases, is one of the most significant truths in the peculiar process of Russian expansion: never any friction between the Russian and the native." This fact has often been confirmed by other observers. The explanation can be found partly in the circumstance, just mentioned by me, of closer standards of culture, partly in a particular adaptability of Russian settlers to new surroundings, their generally peaceful disposition, free from any nationalist bias. This is what for centuries made Russians born colonizers.

The Far East was thus made an integral part of Russia. The Russian population was increasing at a remarkably speedy rate. Let us take the last reliable statistical data, the census of 1897 and the estimated

1 The book was published under that title in 1904.
figures for 1915. The population of the whole of Siberia was:

- 1897...... 9,196,000
- 1915...... 14,396,000

The figures for the white population, taken separately, are as follows:

- 1897...... 5,291,000
- 1915...... 10,771,000 (estimated, the lowest figure)

The white population doubled in eighteen years, which, of course, can only be explained by the very strong tide of emigration from European Russia after the building of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1896. The number of emigrants for that period is more than 3,000,000.

The growth of the population is still more marked as we go from West to East. These are the figures for the provinces to the East of Lake Baikal:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1897 (in Thousands)</th>
<th>1915 (in Thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per Cent.</td>
<td>Per Cent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transbaikalia</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amur</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Province, Kamchatka, Sakhalin</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1015</strong></td>
<td><strong>1940</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>676</strong></td>
<td><strong>1551</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken as a whole, the population also doubled (from 1 to nearly 2 millions) in the eastern part of Siberia. But in the provinces now under Japanese control (Maritime Province, Kamchatka, Northern Sakhalin)
the white population multiplied almost five times, while increasing its proportion to the alien minority from 56 per cent. to 86 per cent. For the whole of eastern Siberia the white population increased from two-thirds to four-fifths of the whole.

You can now see whether it is fair for Japan "to raise the question whether Siberia may not be the land of the yellow man." Siberia—just like Canada whose population is one-half of Siberia's—is the product of the white man's thrift, wrested from nature by the infinite toil and endurance of the Russian squatters, through a process lasting for more than three centuries. Siberia cannot be used by the Japanese for settlement. Mr. Kuno conscientiously tells us that the question of emigration to Siberia is not at all a "pressing question with the Japanese Government just now." And, indeed, the Japanese have proved to be poor colonizers even under better conditions of climate and soil. So far as that question of settlement is concerned, there is no danger of Siberia becoming a "yellow man's land."

But there is another side to that desire to occupy Siberian territories. The Japanese want Siberia as a colony for raw materials, foodstuffs and minerals. They want, moreover, to monopolize this colony, as contrasted with China, which "is being worked by all nations" and, into the bargain, is developing its own industry. It is, of course, very well known that Siberia is exceedingly rich in natural resources. Immense quantities of iron ore, as yet untouched, exist in the Maritime Provinces, particularly north of Vladivostok, between Olga and Vladimir Bay; the deposits lie only about ten miles from the coast. Sakhalin coal can be easily brought to these well sheltered bays. Enormous
quantities of coal are found also in the Amur Province. Gold, silver, copper and oil can also be found in the same Far Eastern provinces. The extent of the forests in the Amur and Maritime Provinces is estimated at 509,000,000 acres, and the best sorts of timber can be found there. As soon as the World War began, a host of Japanese surveyors and investigators rushed into the Russian Far East, and especially to the Maritime Province coast and to the Russian part of Sakhalin. All the reports of Russian geologists respecting the oil and mineral wealth of that part were to be verified. "Our Mining Department and Geological Commission are literally besieged by the Japanese who are constantly asking for varied information and are putting in claims," said a Russian writer (in the beginning of 1917).

It was still more immediately important for the Japanese to make use of the abundance of fish along the coasts of the Maritime Province, Okhotsk and Kamchatka. As a result of their wasteful and predatory exploitation, their own fish supplies along the shore of Japan were getting exhausted at the end of the XIX century. But, at the same time, their fishing rights in the Russian waters of Sakhalin and the Amur regions had been limited by the regulations of 1899-1900, in order to safeguard the rights of the Russian population and to prevent the rapid exhaustion of fish supplies. It was especially dangerous for Kamchatka as here the native population and the Russian settlers lived exclusively on fish. Fish was also the food of their dogs—a necessary component element of their economy; clothing, shoes, sails, etc., were being made from fish skins. No agriculture can thrive in these regions, and the population had to become fishermen and hunters.
But control over fishing was especially difficult there, and illegal fishing by the Japanese was largely spread. To check that, supplementary regulations were published on Nov. 29, 1901, which confined the Japanese fishing rights to Southern Sakhalin and the southern part of the Primorsk coast. The Japanese answered by threatening the Russian fishing industry with high import duties and by establishing in 1902 a powerful "Union of Fishermen" in Hakodate, which deprived Russian fishermen of any individual Japanese help with gear, vessels, workmen, instructors, etc., and made them completely dependent on the corporation.

The Russo-Japanese War intervened, and, in accordance with the Portsmouth Treaty of Sept. 5, 1905, a special Fishing Convention was concluded in St. Petersburg on July 28, 1907, to remain in force for 12 years. In spite of the Japanese insistence based on an arbitrary construction of the text of the Treaty, the Convention of 1907 reserved for the Russian fishing industry all rivers and 34 internal water areas. The rights of the Russian settlers were thus guaranteed, while the Japanese received full scope for the development of their own fishing industry. A period of peaceful economic competition set in, in which the Japanese were favored by their better technical equipment, larger number of vessels and experienced working men and stronger initiative of their capitalists, who were supported by the State. Competition was difficult for the Russians, but they now began to export fish to European Russia. Especially, the products of the firth of the Amur River (the town of Nicolayevsk) were all sent to the home market in 1916 and 1917 owing to the increased demand for feeding the Army. The Russian fish industry thus grew independent of the cheap Japa-
nese market. Besides the home market, it found ready sales in the best markets of Western Europe. This explains why the Japanese were particularly eager to use their chance as soon as it presented itself for strengthening their position in Russian waters.

War and revolution opened before the Japanese much larger prospectsives than that of capturing Russia's economic resources in the Far East by the slow method of "peaceful penetration." It is during this time—and especially during the last four years—that the Japanese have actually tried to realize annexationist schemes such as are formulated by Mr. Kuno. The estuaries of the Amur and the northern part of Sakhalin were occupied by the Japanese, with all their fisheries and other natural resources. A new Gibraltar was to be created by fortifying the northern entrance to the Japan Sea through the Tartar Straits, and the Japan Sea was to be transformed into an inland sea, a new Mediterranean. Moreover, a "buffer state" controlled by Japan was to be created on the Siberian mainland. The officially avowed aim was to ward off Bolshevism from Japan and especially from Korea. But the actual aim is different. It is suggested in Mr. Kuno's book. It consists in warding off Russia from the Pacific and thus securing Japan's rear in the event of some untoward happening on that Ocean.

The campaign for the annexation of, at least, the northern half of Sakhalin had begun even before the Russian Revolution. In the summer of 1916, a number of articles were published in the Japanese press, in which the Russian Government was represented as prepared to cede to Japan that northern part, as having no value to Russia. Japan, it was said, did not wish to accept it as a gift from Russia, and was ready
to offer a small monetary compensation. Under date of August 12, 1916, a Russian writer, N. M. Popov, stated that influential Japanese newspapers were even asserting that "in compensation for the freedom of action accorded to Russia in the west, she was ready to relinquish, in favor of Japan, her sovereign rights in the territories lying east of Lake Baikal."

The Bolshevist revolution in November, 1917, of course, gave Japan a splendid chance to advance her new claims. As early as December, 1917, Japan took her first step. She addressed a note to the Allied nations and to the United States, offering to send troops into Siberia, to protect the Allied interests from Germany. Japan even proposed to send troops to Europe if desired, on the conditions that intervention in Siberia should be exclusively Japanese, that her paramount position in China and the existing treaties with China should be recognized and that exclusive concessions should be given to her in Eastern Siberia for mining, timber exploitation and fishing. Of course, Japan declared that no permanent occupation of Siberia and no territorial annexation was intended.

After some speculation, France and Great Britain accepted the Japanese proposal, provided that the United States also agreed. The French idea was to have some hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops sent, in the spring of 1918, somewhere to the Urals or the Volga, where a new "Eastern front" was to be built (see Chapter VI). This scheme was vetoed in Washington. The United States' argument is made clear in a message communicated to the Ambassadors of France, England and Italy, on March 3, 1918. "The United States," the message states, "is cognizant of the peril of anarchy which surrounds the Siberian prov-
inces, and also the overshadowing risk of German invasion. It shares with the Government of the view that if intervention is deemed advisable, the Government of Japan is in complete touch with the situation, and could accomplish it most efficiently. . . . But it is bound in frankness to say that the wisdom of intervention seems to it most questionable. . . . The central empires could—and would—make it appear that Japan was doing in the East exactly what Germany is doing in the West. It is the judgment of the United States . . . that a hot resentment would be generated in Russia."

The State Department was perfectly right. All Russian parties were equally averse to the Japanese intervention. On March 5, 1918, Mr. Bruce Lockhart telegraphed to the British Foreign Office: "You can have no idea of the feeling which Japanese intervention will arouse. Even the "Cadet" (Constitutional-Democratic) press, which cannot be accused of Bolshevist sympathies, is loud in its denunciation of this crime against Russia."

However, a few days later (March 14) Mr. Balfour tried to prove before the House that Japan was not "moved by selfish and dishonorable motives," that she acted as a "friend of Russia." France also stuck to her idea. A new, mitigated scheme was now worked out in Paris. The intervention was not to be purely Japanese, but inter-Allied. Its aim was to help the Russian initiative. From March to May new negotiations were carried on in Washington, to persuade President Wilson to accept the scheme. This was also the aim of the mission of Mr. Bergson. In Moscow the Allies tried to influence the Russian parties. After a good deal of friction, Russian politicians were in-
duced to consent to the Japanese landing, but on the formal promise that Russia's sovereignty, independence and unity of territory would not be impaired. A "verbal note" to this effect was handed over to the Russian anti-Bolshevist organizations by Mr. Noulens, the French Ambassador (see Chapter VI). President Wilson finally consented, but even after that he persisted in considering the whole undertaking as aimless. The other Allies also cooled down a little, as soon as they came to know that Japan was not at all interested in going further to the West than Lake Baikal. It at once threw a lurid light on the real aim of her "friendly" support. Lake Baikal is a strategic frontier between the Eastern and the Western Siberia and any one who is in possession of the railway tunnels in the mountains surrounding the lake on the south, holds the key to the Far East.

Japan did not seem to wait until her proposals for intervention should be agreed upon by the Allies. The Japanese keenly observed the changing situation in Siberia and offered their help to the local Russian groups working for the liberation of Russia. Ataman Semenov, who began fighting the Bolsheviks in December, 1917, received Allied aid early in 1918. An American report from Irkutsk (Webster and Hicks, on April 3) stated that Semenov "has ample money, is paying high price for soldiers," and Semenov himself acknowledged that he was aided (after England and France) by Japan. Secret documents found by the Bolsheviks in Vladivostok disclosed negotiations between the representatives of the newly-built Siberian Government and the Allied representatives in Harbin, Vladivostok and Pekin in the beginning of April, 1918. The representatives of the Siberian Government stated
that it was Japan which chiefly benefited by the negotiations. "The uncertainty of the situation," they said, "favors extremely the strengthening of the influence of Japan at the expense of the other Allies. The position maintained by the representatives of Japan regarding the recognition of the Siberian Government gives room for the thought that Japan holds the possibility of recognition entirely in her hands; she makes definite terms for recognition, among which it is necessary to point out the condition that Vladivostok remain unfortified." They added that "such predominance of the Japanese influence worries the Government of Siberia extremely," as "the aim of Japan is to obtain complete control over certain economic factors, such as, for instance, the fisheries in Kamchatka." They stated that "there are public groups which are, it seems, ready to use the separate assistance of Japan, which she is ready to give" and which "may go the limit, inclusive of a separate agreement with Japan." Consequently they urged a more clearly defined attitude on

¹Mr. John Spargo in his book "Russia as an American Problem" says (pp. 239-240) that "General Horvath was approached (at Harbin) by a representative of Japan, Gen. Nakashima, and offered the entire support of Japan with all the arms, money and men that might be required to clear Siberia of the "Bolsheviks," on the conditions that "Japan should undertake intervention in Siberia alone," "that she should be given the northern half of Sakhalin," "preferential trade and commercial rights" in Eastern Siberia, "exclusive concessions for the exploitation of all mining areas and forests east of Lake Baikal," "full equality with Russians in the fisheries of Eastern Siberia," and "that Vladivostok be transformed into a free port and all its fortifications dismantled." But Gen. Horvath in a letter to me (Pekin, Aug. 15, 1921) stated that "Japan never addressed such demands to me." He admits, however, that there were "certain hints in the spirit of some of the points quoted, on the part of irresponsible persons." But he concludes that such opinions "did not at all coincide with the true intentions of the Japanese Government." I do not see any basis for such an optimistic construction and after having taken steps to verify Mr. Spargo's data I feel entitled to assert that they repose on good authority.
the part of America towards the Government of Siberia. America, naturally, had to change its attitude towards intervention when the Allies decided to make use of the Czecho-Slovaks in the internal struggle in Russia. The Czecho-Slovaks were now to take the place of the Japanese, in building the “Eastern” front. President Masaryk, who was then in America, persuaded President Wilson that it was necessary to aid anti-Bolshevist Russia. However, the part of Japan was now to be made equal to that of the other Allies. It was, probably, in order to obviate suspicion that the invitation to Japan was conveyed by the United States. The United States thus took upon themselves a joint responsibility for the Allied action in Siberia.

On August 3, 1918, official declarations appeared from the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States, mentioning the American proposal to Japan “that each of the two Governments send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok,” and the Japanese consent to it. The aim of the intervention was carefully circumscribed and based upon two temporary purposes: (1) “to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them,” and (2) “to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance.” A declaration was added “in the most public and solemn manner,” that the United States “contemplates no interference with the political attitude of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs—not even in the local affairs of the limited areas which her military force may be obliged to occupy—and no impairment of her territorial integrity, either now or hereafter.” The Japa-
nese Government equally "reaffirmed their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia, and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics." They also declared "that upon the realization of the object above indicated ('to relieve the pressure weighing upon the Czecho-Slovak forces') they will immediately withdraw all Japanese forces from Russian territory, and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases, whether political or military." No more positive assurances could be imagined, and the readiness to give them, in the light of subsequent activities gives place to philosophic speculation.

The Government of the United States continued to hold the gravest doubt as to the final result of the undertaking upon which it was embarking. The same announcement of August 3 starts with the following argument. "In the judgment of the Government of the United States—a judgment arrived at after repeated and very searching consideration of the whole situation—military intervention in Russia would be more likely to add to the present sad confusion there than to cure it, and would injure Russia rather than help her out of her distresses. Such military intervention as has been most frequently proposed, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the East, would, in its judgment, be more likely to turn out to be merely a method of making use of Russia than to be a method of serving her."

At the very time when these lines were written, they proved distressingly true so far as European Russia was concerned (see Chap. VI). The case proved to be the same in eastern Siberia. The Americans, as a conse-
quence of their wavering attitude, tried to keep clear of armed encounters, and it was said that they took pride in the fact that during the first eight months of intervention they never killed a single Russian. On the contrary, the Japanese very soon revealed their real intention to control eastern Siberia. "The British, French and American forces," Mr. Spargo says, "were systematically kept from points of strategic importance. East of Lake Baikal every town and village of any importance was placed under Japanese control. Every railroad bridge and every road was guarded by the Japanese, and every railroad station from Vladivostok to Chita flew the Japanese flag and no other. . . . No American, etc., officer could move a man without informing the Japanese General Staff. On the other hand, the American and European officers were never informed of the movements of Japanese troops. . . . Japanese warships filled Vladivostok harbor, their guns trained on the city most of the time. Not a caravan could move, not a train be run, not a ship arrive or depart without passing Japanese inspection and securing Japanese permission." Moreover, the very meaning of intervention was substantially changed by an increase of Japanese troops unforeseen in the initial agreement. Every Allied power had been invited to send about 7,000 armed men. But soon strange reports began to roll into Vladivostok, that Japanese troops were everywhere: in the Transbaikal Province, at Irkutsk, Chita, upon the Amur line and in North Manchuria, at the mouth of the Amur, east of Kirin and on the trade route from Mongolia. Intelligence officers sent out to investigate the situation brought back the news that the Japanese had over 70,000 in Siberia and Manchuria, and that beside the Twelfth Division, con-
trolled from Vladivostok, they had two more armies: the Seventh Division controlled by the Kwangtung administration at Port Arthur and guarding the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Third Division with headquarters in Chita, directly controlled by the General Staff in Tokio. "These facts gradually becoming known," an American writer (nineteen years a resident of Japan), states in his book¹ which has recently appeared, "killed that complete faith and trust in Japan which characterized the early days of the expedition." On November 2, 1918, Secretary Lansing plainly told Viscount Ishii that Japan had gone too far. As a result, General Otani, the Japanese Commander, received orders to send back the 52,000 in excess of the agreement. But a year later, on September 15, 1919, Secretary of War Baker told the Military Committee of the House of Representatives, that there were still 60,000 Japanese troops in Siberia as against 8,477 Americans; 1,429 British; 1,400 Italians and 1,076 French!

It may be suggested that just this numerical superiority was necessary in order actually "to steady the Russian efforts at self-government and self-defense," as against the Bolsheviks. The Japanese diplomatist at the Washington Conference, Baron Shidehara, did indeed state at a Committee meeting on Jan. 23, 1922, that the Japanese Government were "anxious to see an orderly and stable authority speedily reëstablished in the Far Eastern possessions of Russia." "It was in this spirit," Baron Shidehara added, "that they manifested a keen interest in the patriotic but ill-fated struggle of Admiral Kolchak." It is only just to mention that on the very next day after Kolchak's nomination (Nov. 19, 1918), the Japanese proposed to send

¹"What Shall I Think of Japan?" by George Gleason.
to Omsk a few regiments. However, Kolchak was not inclined to play the part of Ataman Semenov and he obviously had good reasons to apprehend the result of the armed support the Japanese were so eager to offer.

He declined. That chance of controlling Siberia gone, the Japanese returned to their former tactics and supported Semenov in Chita against Kolchak in Omsk. It took about four months to liquidate the conflict, and Kolchak had to submit to conditions dictated by the Japanese, in order to be recognized by the rebel ataman. The conditions accepted established an almost complete independence of the Far East under Semenov. This was the first attempt of the Japanese to build a "buffer State": we see that it was to be built against the national Government and not against the Soviets.

Kolchak's ministers induced the ruler to yield in that question of Semenov, as they hoped that this would pave the way for bringing the Japanese troops to the front, where they were now badly needed. Far from this being the case, the Japanese Government even rejected (August, 1919) the Russian-American request to send two divisions to the west of Lake Baikal, in order to guard the railway line. The "climate" was unfavorable for the Japanese in Western Siberia, and Siberian expeditions had become too unpopular in the Parliament! At the same time a new Japanese division was sent to Transbaikalia.

As stated by Baron Shidehara at the Washington Conference, this means that the Japanese "have carefully refrained from supporting one faction against another. . . . They withheld all assistance from Gen. Rozanov (Kolchak's Governor at Vladivostok) against
the revolutionary movements which led to his overthrow in January, 1920.” The same can be repeated concerning the occasion of the overthrow of Kolchak himself (Chap. VI). Even on that occasion the Japanese “maintained an attitude of strict neutrality and refused to interfere in these movements which it would have been quite easy for them to suppress if they had so desired.” Baron Shidehara’s statement is fully borne out by the facts. Kolchak’s Premier, Mr. Tretyakov, indeed, asked in vain for Japan’s help at the decisive moment of Irkutsk’s revolt against Kolchak. The Japanese sent out a detachment of a thousand soldiers, but at the same time a telegram from Tokio forbade them to intervene. At the supreme moment when Admiral Kolchak was ignominiously betrayed by the Allies, at the Irkutsk railway station, in mid-January, 1920, the Japanese soldiers followed the procedure with cool curiosity. And when, on February 7, Kolchak was shot, there was no more need to “serve” Russia. One might now easily “make use” of the incipient Siberian chaos.

However, for a time Japan wavered between the two opposite policies of complete withdrawal and reinforced military occupation. On December 8, 1919, the Japanese Ambassador at Washington asked the Secretary of State which of the two policies America was prepared to pursue, in face of “the recent unfavorable development of the situation in Siberia.” The United States after a “most careful consideration” decided for withdrawal, thus “marking the end of a cooperative effort by Japan and the United States to assist the Russian people.” The motives given in the Note of January 16, 1920, were that the first purpose of intervention as expressed in an aide-memoire handed
to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington on July 17, 1918, the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak troops, was on the way of being accomplished. The second purpose, "steadying the efforts at self-government and self-defense," could hardly be "longer served by the presence of American troops."

Japan decided otherwise. The question of evacuation was here made a party issue between the omnipotent military party and the liberal civilians, whose influence, however much on the increase, is still not strong enough to determine actual politics. The American observer quoted, Mr. Gleason, rightly connects the decision of the Japanese to stay in Siberia with their internal politics. "With the dissolution of the Diet late in February (1920)," he states, "and the consequent removal of restraint on the military party, the Government early in April announced its decision to remain in Siberia. A policy of aggressive control of the railroad east of Lake Baikal seems to have been adopted." The official motive that was now given for a prolonged occupation, was, as stated by Baron Shidehara, "the duty of affording protection to a large number of their nationals residing in the districts in question and security in Korea."

Before we pass to the measures with which the decision taken "early in April" (4-5) was accompanied, we must dwell somewhat upon the pretext chosen by Japan for enacting these drastic measures. Baron Shidehara grows very emphatic when he comes to speak of that bloody "outrage" in Nicolayevsk, which roused "the just popular indignations" and for which "no nation worthy of respect will possibly remain forbearing," as "history affords few instances similar to" that incident. Exceptionally strong language is thus used
to justify an exceptionally strong measure of a "re¬prisal" to last an indefinite time, "pending the estab¬lishment in Russia of a responsible authority with whom Japan can communicate in order to obtain due satisfaction." One must not forget that the incident which took place in Nicolayevsk on March 12, 1920, was made possible only because "a responsible au¬thority" had just disappeared as a result of the "move¬ments which it would have been quite easy for the Japanese to suppress if they had so desired." More¬over, the very massacre at Nicolayevsk was, as we shall see, the result of the same Japanese policy.

And, indeed, what did happen in Nicolayevsk on that memorable day of March 12? As a result of Kol¬chak's downfall the whole country was in a state of dissolution, when nobody could vouch for anybody's safety. The Japanese garrison, which occupied the little town of Nicolayevsk in the estuary of the Amur River, was practically the only strong unit of power in the whole country to the north of Khabarovsk (Mar¬time Province). It numbered 600 men in 1919, but just at the critical moment it had been diminished to 300. As early as January 7, 1920, the Japanese Consul at Nicolayevsk had sent a telegram to Foreign Min¬ister Uchida, to warn him that as a result of Bolshevist activities in the neighborhood the situation at Nicola¬yevsk had become desperate. "If our residents," he said, "are not removed directly, I cannot guarantee the consequences." He asked for permission for immediate removal, before it was too late. He was ordered to wait for instructions and to act according to circum¬stances. On January 26 the Consul asked again for a detachment to be sent at once, as there was danger of being surrounded by the Bolsheviks and removal of
the residents had already become impossible. He never received any help, and, at the last moment, he was forced to “act according to circumstances.” But which of the two policies of Baron Shidehara was he to follow? Was he to remain neutral or to support “an orderly and stable authority”? The commander of the Japanese garrison, moved by plain good sense, had little doubt about it. There was a “robber band which called itself Red Army” which was approaching Nicolayevsk. And there was also a small garrison of loyal Russians in the town which, as well as the whole population, Russian and Japanese, had to be defended from the “robbers.” The Japanese commander decided to side with the loyal population and he even declared to them, in his appeal of January 17, that “all officers and soldiers of the Japanese detachment are firmly resolved to sacrifice their lives in the defense of the lives and property of the inhabitants.” In a joint declaration by the Russian and the Japanese commanders it was announced that the Japanese “are rendering a substantial help to the Russian armed forces in their struggle against the Red band.” The Japanese thus coöperated with the only remainder of a “responsible” Russian Government and took upon themselves the risk of that coöperation.

However, the defense was not successful and the Reds besieged and bombarded the town. On February 20 (i.e., after Kolchak’s death), the Japanese commander decided to negotiate and was permitted to communicate by wire with his superior in Khabarovsk. To his astonishment he was told that in Vladivostok, Khabarovsk and elsewhere there was a “revolutionary government” towards which the Japanese were preserving “complete neutrality.” His only aim in Nicolayevsk
was now to be “the defense of the Japanese subjects and preservation of order.” An ambiguous phrase was added, that “the Japanese Command will not permit the violation of order, if arms are used for usurping the power” as they “wish to guarantee the life and property of the population and prefer not to see the tragedy of useless bloodshed among the fighting parties.” The “robber band” being thus transformed into a “fighting party,” the Japanese commander decided to stop “useless bloodshed” by surrendering the town to the Reds. Promises were given and accepted that the lives and property of the Russian officers and the population would be guaranteed on the condition of surrender of arms to the Japanese. The Russian commanders then thanked the Japanese for their loyal comradeship—and committed suicide. They knew that robbers were robbers, and indeed, promiscuous killing had begun directly after the entrance of the Red band into Nicolayevsk, on February 28.

After having imprisoned, tortured and killed many hundreds of Russians, the bandit leader, a certain Triapitsin, on March 11 addressed to the Japanese officers a proposal to surrender their arms and munitions. Facing that threat, the Japanese commander probably decided that this was the end of his “neutrality.” He decided to attack the “fighting party” first, before they could attack him. Probably, no “responsible” Russian authority would have asked for “satisfaction” had he exterminated the robbers. Unfortunately, he did not succeed. The robbers proved to be too many for him (1,500 Russians, 200 Koreans, 300 Chinese “partisans” as against 300 Japanese soldiers and 400 civil population). After a few hours of initial success, when Triapitsin was wounded and some
members of his staff killed, the Japanese were besieged at the Consulate and in the barracks, while 600 Russian prisoners and all the Japanese civilians were massacred. On March 16 the Japanese Command in Khabarovsk sent the order to stop fighting. The theory of "neutrality" once more triumphed, and after the Japanese Consul and all the civil population had already been killed, the Khabarovsk Command deemed it possible to once more trust the "fighting party." The Japanese who remained alive (110 soldiers, 17 wounded and 4 women) were ordered to surrender and to give up their arms, with the understanding that they would be released from prison in the spring. The question of "responsibility" for the events of March 12-16 seemed thus to be shelved, so much the more as it was very difficult to find the connecting link between the robbers who had been assailed by the Japanese and any Russian authority responsible for the activities of the robbers.

It was at this moment that the Japanese Government definitely chose between the two opposite policies. However, the policy it now decided to pursue was by no means that of "neutrality." On a larger scale and with more success, the Japanese Command repeated now the unhappy attempt of the Commander of Nicolaevsk. On April 4-5 the Japanese detachments in Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Nickolsk, Spassk and other towns of the Maritime Province began a sudden attack against the Russians, who were not robbers but regular soldiers of the "revolutionary government" of Reds. Hundreds of Russians were killed, Russian vessels were taken possession of, Russian institutions shut down. Obviously, at that moment Baron Shidehara's theory was completely overthrown. Who was now to hold
the Japanese responsible for their acts of open aggression against one of the “fighting parties”? Before we describe the impression produced on all the Russian factions by this new form of the Japanese intervention, let us come back to Nicolayevsk. Triapitsin’s band very soon learned of the events of April 4-5. They understood very well that this time they could expect no mercy. A Japanese landing was in preparation against them. They now decided to prevent it and to be the first to act. The power was handed over to a “Revolutionary Staff of the Five” who worked out a scheme for the complete evacuation of Nicolayevsk and the wholesale destruction of the town and of all its inhabitants. On May 21-25 all the Russians (more than 3,000) and all the imprisoned Japanese (131) were murdered by the simplified method of stunning and drowning them, all important buildings were blown up, while the band of miscreants retreated to the southwest, up the Rivers Angun and its confluent, the Kerbi, to the gold-bearing mountainous district. The Japanese who occupied Nicolayevsk on June 3, 1920, found nothing but ruins and corpses. The bandit leaders, the only “responsible” ones, were a month later shot by their mutinying “partisans” (July 9). The responsible part of the Russian population in the region continued to cooperate with the newly-arrived Japanese garrison, in pursuing the remnants of the Bolshevik band.

A regional conference of Russian inhabitants met in Nicolayevsk on August 15-23, and it stated in its address to the local Japanese Staff that the Russian population, “believing in the friendly help of Japan to the Russian State, had made every effort to facilitate the struggle of the Japanese troops against the armed de-
tachments of Bolsheviks scattered all around the Nosk district.” They hardly expected that it would be that same “Russian State” which would be held responsible for the Bolshevik robbers.¹

All the Russian parties were very much aware of the coming change in the Japanese policy of occupation. If the Japanese really wished, as Baron Shidehara stated, to “prompt the reconciliation of the various political groups in Eastern Siberia,” they may have been satisfied. All these groups were now united against Japan. And as Japan had tried to form in Transbaikalia a “buffer state” against Russia, the Russians now decided to transform that province into a buffer state against Japan.

The idea was first suggested to the victorious Bolsheviks by the moderate socialistic parties. They understood very well that an immediate appearance of the Bolsheviks on the Pacific slope would be used to justify the change in the attitude of the Japanese and help them transform their intervention into a regular occupation. A buffer state controlled by Moscow but not formally Bolshevik might prevent an open conflict. A special congress met in Tomsk, as early as January, 1920, to discuss that proposal. The Bolsheviks decided to accept it, but with one important exception. They wished to keep in their own hands the Baikal tunnels which formed the gate to the Far East. That is why they moved the proposed buffer state from Irkutsk, i.e., from the western side of the Lake Baikal, to the eastern

¹See for a more detailed account of the “Nicolayevsk incident” my article in the New York Sunday Times, February 5, 1922. It is based on first-hand documents and depositions by eye-witnesses, which had been handed over to me by the representative of the Vladivostok commercial and industrial group, Mr. Alexin, in Washington. Mr. Alexin was directed by the Vladivostok Government to perform a detailed inquiry into the events at Nicolayevsk.
side of it, thus leaving the tunnels in the hands of Moscow. It was also decided that the buffer state in Transbaikalia was to be only a temporary formation. It was to last until their next move to the East should be deemed sufficiently prepared. Verkhneudinsk was chosen the capital of the new “Far Eastern Republic”: it was the first important town on the road from Baikal to Chita. In Chita, Ataman Semenov was still in power. In Vladivostok, after Rozanov’s overthrow, a new government had appeared, associated with the local Zemstvo and formally “democratic.” In fact it was also controlled by the Bolsheviks and they did not conceal it, in spite of the warnings of the Premier of the Zemstvo Government, Mr. Medvediev. “If you wish to see the Japanese soldiers here and Vladivostok occupied,” he said in the beginning of March, “just say the last word: ‘Power to the Soviets!’ The occupation will surely come.” However, that last word was spoken. On April 3, Vladivostok witnessed the opening of the Soviet. A few days earlier a conference of workmen’s, peasants’ and Red Army delegates was opened in the neighboring town, Nicolsk on the Ussuri. On April 4, as we know, the Japanese answered by an armed attack on the Russian army, militia and institutions. The authority of Medvediev’s Government was undermined, and power in name only was left to him.

The Russian national feeling was stirred again by the Japanese pronunciamento. All the Russian parties, extremist, socialist and bourgeois, were as one against the Japanese aggression. The Bolsheviks were looked upon by the population as the chief defenders of the country against the Japanese invasion. The peasants voted for and with the Bolsheviks. The moderate parties, even non-socialist and conservative, became ex-
tremely conciliatory. On their part, the Bolsheviks understood their opportunity and made certain concessions. Moscow definitely consented to sanction the existence of a non-Bolshevist state in eastern Siberia, in order to preserve eastern Siberia from Japanese occupation. "We agree to the detachment from Russia of that buffer state on the territory between Lake Baikal and the Pacific, including Northern Sakhalin," Chicherin wrote on April 16, 1920. "The future position of this state will be determined by a treaty between Russia and Japan." The dictator of the new State was to be Mr. Tobelson-Krasnoschekov, a lawyer from Chicago. To the Japanese representative, Major-Gen. Takayanaghi, it was explained that no other program, except a democratic one, was to be carried out by the new Government, and that all rumors to the effect that it would be a camouflaged communistic state were lies and "provocation." At the same time, to the Russians Mr. Krasnoschekov spoke in a more confidential tone: "Our republic has a signboard, but the signboard has two sides to it. On the one side is written 'democracy.' What is written on the other side, is for domestic use, for us alone."

It was the same thing at Vladivostok. In the new Government Communist leaders worked together with the former members of the Ufa "Directory" (Gen. Boldyrev and the "Cadet," Vinogradov) and with the non-socialist representatives of industry and commerce. All the socialistic groups were united on one platform for the elections to the local (Maritime) Popular Assembly. The Communists carried the largest vote, and they had 26 deputies, while the Social-Democrats Mensheviks had only 4, the Social-Revolutionaries 3, the Socialists-Populists (the most moderate) 2, the Cadets
4, the industrials 9. The peasant non-partisan group, the most numerous (75 deputies), voted mostly with the Bolsheviks. The Bolshevik leader, Nikiforov, declared, in the name of the "central Soviet Government" in Moscow, that they thought that in Siberia capitalism must run its course in the way of *evolution*.

The leading idea now was to weld the Far Eastern and the Primorsk (Maritime) Republics into one. Krasnoschekov declared to the Japanese Commander in Siberia, Marimoto Ooi, that he was ready to stop military operations if the Japanese were willing to desist from helping the reactionary elements (*i.e.*, Ataman Semenov in Chita). This seemed to correspond with the new turn in the Japanese policy.

The Siberian expedition had already cost Japan about 400,000,000 yen and thousands of lives. Not only public opinion abroad, but also the liberal elements in Japan were hostile to its continuation. We have just seen the sinister success of the military policies in April, 1920. But in May the situation changed again. Premier Hara, who wished to weaken the Kenseikai party and to make himself popular at the elections, withdrew the army from Chita, thus discontinuing the help to Semenov. However, Semenov had now with him the rest of Kolchak's army, the "Kappelites," which after the death of Gen. Kappel in the neighborhood of Irkutsk (Chap. VI) had reached Chita in mid-February, 1920, under the command of Gen. Voitsehovsky. As Kolchak had nominated Semenov Supreme Ruler of Eastern Siberia on January 21, and the "Kappelites" wished to remain loyal to the memory of Kolchak, they were ready to serve Semenov, but under one condition. They wished Semenov to discontinue his predatory tactics and to lean on demo-
cratic political groups. Semenov did not like the condition, and he began intriguing against the "Kappelite" commanders. Gen. Lokhvitsky took the place of Gen. Voitsehovsky, and Gen. Verjebitsky the place of Gen. Lokhvitsky. Both sides finally appealed to Gen. Wrangel, who did not care to interfere.

In the meanwhile the Red Army profited by the Japanese evacuation and came as close to Chita from the East as the Korymsk station (at the parting of the two branches of the Siberian Railway). The "Kappelites" had to retreat by the Manchurian trunk-line (station Olovyanaya). They had to stop at the gates of China (station Manchuria). It was then that the Japanese proposed to them to transport them to the Maritime Province through the zone of occupation of the Eastern Chinese Railway, on the condition that they be disarmed while traversing the Chinese territory. The Japanese expected to use the "Kappelites" as a kind of militia. As their Transbaikalian "buffer state" had not materialized, they now were considering a minor scheme, the building of a "buffer within the buffer" in the Maritime Province. The coast of the Japan Sea was already under their control. They had to secure their rear on the mainland, i.e., a distance of about 100 miles from Vladivostok to the Manchurian frontier. This was important for them not so much against Korea or Bolshevism, as in the event of a conflict with America. Mr. Washington B. Vanderlip's concession in Kamchatka and America's naval program had brought the Japanese nationalist irritation to the highest pitch, and there was talk in the Japanese Chamber of a war to come within the next two years, before new American ships were ready.

However, when the "Kappelites" came, the Japanese
saw that it was a well-disciplined force of about 16,000 fighters. They thought it better not to give back their arms to the "Kappelites," and they settled them on the territory of the Usuri Cossacks, to the north of Vladivostok. Semenov was thus left in Chita without any help, either from the Japanese or from the Kappelites. It was easy for the "Eastern Republic" to surround Chita and to take it, on October 21. Semenov had to flee away and he was permitted by the Japanese to settle in Port Arthur, where he soon became the center of a reactionary agitation. The part of the gold fund he still possessed was sequestrated and its use controlled by the Japanese.

The Bolshevist scheme of reuniting Transbaikalia with Primorsk was now ripe for realization. A few days after Semenov's defeat, a conference met in Chita in order to decide the problem of the final reunion of all the local Governments of Eastern Siberia. Amur, Chita, Verkhneudinsk, Vladivostok, Sakhalin and Kamchatka were represented, partly by fictitious delegates. On November 9, 1920, the conference elected a central Government, which was then recognized as vested with the supreme power over all the territory of Transbaikalia, the Amur and Maritime Provinces. However, the Maritime Province protested and insisted on preserving its autonomy rights. Nevertheless, a Constituent Assembly of the whole of Eastern Siberia was convened in Chita. It met on February 12, 1921. Its composition was: 223 peasants, mostly sympathetic with the Bolsheviks; 147 Bolsheviks, 20 Social-Revolutionaries, 14 Mensheviks and 20 buryats.¹

¹A native nationality settled round the southern part of the Baikal Sea.
Kamchatka and the Anadyr region were transferred from the new Republic to the direct control of the Soviet Russia as a field for foreign concessions which might bring about a clash between Japan and America. In April, 1921, the Constituent Assembly finished its work and was declared the “National Assembly,” until the next elections which are due in January, 1922. In the meantime, local Siberian elements gained the upper hand in Chita. Krasnoschekov was recalled to Moscow. Even under the Bolsheviks, Siberia wished to guard its independence and to live its own life.

The Japanese now concentrated their attention on the Maritime Province, and especially on the Southern and Northern extremities of it, Vladivostok and the Tartar Straits, for the reasons already made clear by Mr. Kuno. We shall soon see what they did in the Tartar Straits, at a place very remote from the eyes of the world. At Vladivostok they had to be more careful. They could not openly overthrow the Medvediev Government. But they wanted it to be independent from the Far Eastern republic in Chita, and in order to attain that aim they made use of local dissensions. Local strivings for independence were increased by that time as a result of communistic attempts to dominate the situation from Chita. The spirit of conciliation which had moved the Bolsheviks in the first part of the year (1920) was passing away. Responsible posts in the Vladivostok administration were all taken by the Communist agents of Chita. The activity of the Communist political police had become conspicuous, and some of the Kappelites had been murdered. At the same time, as a result of an economic crisis the prestige of the Government was falling in the eyes of the population. The opposition groups of the
right wing did not fail to make use of the growing disaffection. Some leaders of that reactionary opposition were now finding support in the Japanese, who hoped once more to make use of Semenov in opposition to Chita. The preliminary negotiations of the opposition leaders with Semenov at Port Arthur resulted in the working out of a scheme for a general movement against the Reds in Primorsk and in Transbaikalia. On the other hand, Semenov had connections with reactionary monarchists and with Wrangel. The Japanese representative at Gen. Wrangel's headquarters may have been instrumental in keeping up these ties.¹

The first symptom of a coming overthrow was the convocation of a congress of "non-socialistic" parties, which took place in Vladivostok in March, 1921, under the guidance of the brothers Spiridon and Nicholas Merkulov, local business men, who kept in touch with Semenov. Among other matters, the congress passed two characteristic resolutions which testify to the Japanese influence: (1) That Vladivostok must be definitely detached from Chita and (2) That the Japanese occupation shall be prolonged. Before the congress was ended, a coup d'état was tried, but it did not succeed.

A second attempt to overthrow the semi-Bolshevik

¹On January 2, 1922, the Chita delegation at the Washington Conference made public a series of alleged secret documents, which touch upon the question mentioned above. The documents were promptly denounced as forgeries by both the Japanese and the French official delegations. In certain parts of these documents forgery is evident, but this does not invalidate the fact of the contemplated transfer of a part of Gen. Wrangel's evacuated army to Vladivostok. However, it did not materialize. Russian officers and Cossacks brought to Vladivostok on October 2, 1921, on the transport Franz Ferdinand, belonged to the group (including the Ural Cossacks) which saved themselves from the Bolsheviks at the time of Denikin by a retreat through Persia to the Persian Gulf. Mr. Tirbach, who is mentioned in the documents as an intermediary between the Russians, French and Japanese is known in certain circles in America.
Government was more successful, and on May 26, 1921, the Government of Spiridon Merkulov took its place. The "buffer within the buffer" was thus secured. But now Semenov also tried to have his share of the spoils. He was brought to Vladivostok on a Japanese steamer, Kyoto-Maru. He considered himself to be the head of a general uprising due in eastern Siberia in the spring, as had been prearranged in Port Arthur. The Japanese favored that scheme. When Semenov met with opposition on the part of Merkulov, the Japanese transferred him secretly on their lorry from the steamer to Grodekovo station, where Kappel's and Semenov's troops were located and they tried to reconcile the Kappelites with the Semenovites, who were considered too reactionary by the former. However, they did not succeed, and nobody would follow Semenov. The whole scheme broke down, and Semenov went to Japan. At the same time, the White army led by the reactionary monarchist, Baron Ungern-Sternberg, was to attack Chita from the South (from Mongolia), but it was defeated by the Reds and Ungern himself was captured and shot. The Japanese had to satisfy themselves with their "buffer within the buffer,"—the Maritime Province.

It would not be fair to assert that these schemes and activities were approved of by the whole of Japan. The liberal current in the country, Chamber and Ministry, was still for complete evacuation of Siberia. The civilian members of the late Khara cabinet shared the

1 Another batch of documents published by the Chita delegation at Washington, reproduced in the New York Times on January 4 and 5, refers to the moment of Semenov's arrival at Vladivostok and to his schemes for a subsequent campaign against Chita. These documents are in complete agreement with the facts already known, and I would not be surprised if they prove to be genuine. But for the time being I refrain from making use of them.
opinion that the troops must be withdrawn. The colonial conference held in Tokio in May, 1921, also decided to evacuate Siberia upon the condition that the Eastern Republic of Chita should maintain order, desist from communist politics and facilitate the economic development of Japanese resources in Siberia. But that view was strongly opposed by the omnipotent military party. General Tachibana, the Commander of the Japanese troops in Siberia, declared in his interview to Asahi, the Tokio paper, that the policy of evacuation was unwise and imprudent. He mockingly rebuked the civilian diplomats who do not understand the real interests of Japan. "If the military men did at any time play the part of diplomats in Siberia, certainly that was because the Foreign Office failed to take the necessary steps for the maintenance of the national prestige as well as of the national interests." The military men obviously knew better.

What have the military men really done in Siberia, since they confined their activities to the "buffer within the buffer," in April, 1920? The record of their management of the Maritime Province is horrible, and it is this record that was to have been considered by the Washington Conference, if discussion had been found possible.

The measures taken by the Japanese military government in the Russian part of Sakhalin give a very good illustration of what the Japanese meant by "peaceful penetration." That term was used by them to explain the Japanese intentions in Siberia to the American public opinion. To Russian objections against using it, the Secretary General of the Japanese delegation to the conference, Mr. Masanao Hanihara, replied that it meant only "the demand for equal right
Japanese Occupation in the Russian Far East.
for the trade of all nations."  

As can be seen from the Sakhalin example, the Japanese militarists understand their penetration in a very different sense. Unfortunately, it is they who act while their diplomats are allowed to speak.

We have a collection of sixty odd "orders," "regulations," "announcements," "appeals" of the Japanese military administration, introduced in Sakhalin after its occupation, i.e., since April 29, 1920. For the first three months they tried to keep at peace with the local population. They paid good prices for real estate, they bought food, timber from the peasants, made use of their carriages for transport, employed Russian workingmen at good wages, etc. But at the end of July, when new Japanese troops were landed, this policy was entirely changed. Detachments of Japanese soldiers were sent around to all the villages; about 5,000 Japanese workmen were imported speedily, to construct a railway to the interior. A part of the coal mines was now exploited by the Japanese, new explorations of mines and oil-fields were hurriedly carried out by the officially protected firm, Mitsu-Bishi (camouflaged by an agreement with a Russian firm), timber was cut indiscriminately, fisheries on the Sakhalin coast leased almost exclusively to the Japanese, as the Russian enterprises were ruined. In order to control the island without any obstruction on the part of the Russian administration, the Japanese abolished all

1 The Japanese statement is included in their "eleven points" unofficially published by the New York Herald in November. The Russian answer, signed by Mr. Avxentiev and myself, was made public by the Associated Press on Nov. 24, 1921. Mr. Hanihara's statement appeared in the New York Times on December 9, 1921.

2 "The Russian Sakhalin as New Japan," published in Russian at Vladivostok, 1921. The last documents in this book are dated May-June, 1921.
the local institutions, including the local organs of self-government. A sort of advisory councils, presided over by "Eldermen"—all nominated by the Japanese—took their place, and the only function left for them was to make the population acquainted with the Japanese orders and to execute these orders. Even the clergy in the churches, and the schoolmasters in the schools were made Japanese officials.

The Russian civil and criminal code and the Russian tribunals have been abolished, and Japanese courts-martial judge all offenders (except the Japanese) according to the Japanese military law. Further possession, acquisition and sale of real estate has been made dependent on Japanese permits. The same measure extends to the rights of possessing arms, hunting, leasing plots of land, cutting timber, fishing, forming societies. Acquisition of landed property and mining is definitely forbidden. All formerly acquired rights must be registered by the Japanese notaries. Political organizations, meetings, leaflets and newspapers of "political content" have been declared criminal, together with rape, blasphemy, forgery and every kind of violation of public order. I cannot exhaust here all the detailed regulars which control every step and every action of the local population. In the spring, 1921, it was formally declared that the Russian population (thus cut off from its own means of subsistence) cannot count upon any earnings from the Japanese authorities. They stopped buying everything from the Russian inhabitants, and even hay was imported from Japan. The Russians are thus compelled to emigrate, and their place is already being taken by the Japanese immigrants. This is how the Japanese "peaceful penetration" is being worked out.
But however sad the Sakhalin story is, a still more important point is the occupation of the opposite shore of the Tartar Straits, with the town of Nicolayevsk, commanding the estuary of the Amur and the harbor de-Castries, which took place on June 3, 1921. It is sufficient to say that the methods of occupation were here the same. An attempt of the Russian population to organize, at the Conference of Aug. 15-23 (see above), a temporary Provincial Board of Administration was vetoed by the Japanese Military Administrative Department. No answer was given to the demand of the Conference to permit the organization of an armed detachment strong enough to defend the Udsk district from the Bolshevist forces. The question of provisioning the population for the winter of 1920-1921 was left without consideration. All safes, metallic parts, telephones, furniture, engines, musical instruments, stores of flour, oats, salted fish, timber, vessels, etc., preserved from the time when Triapitsin destroyed Nicolayevsk, were requisitioned and exported. Japanese fishermen have been allowed to fish in the internal waters below Nicolayevsk, which violates the Fishing Convention of 1907 and will lead to the exhaustion of fish supplies, which constituted 75 per cent. of the sustenance of the local population. New bids were opened for hundreds of new fishing stations and, of course, in the absence of the Russian competition, they were taken by the Japanese. Fishing rights in the Okhotsk-Kamchatka region were also enlarged by a Note of January 17, 1921, presented by the Japanese Consul General to the Vladivostok Government. All the provisions of the Fishing Convention of 1907 were here completely disregarded. In spite of the numerous protests by the Russian institutions (February-May,
1921), the Japanese Government realized all their aspirations, and if things are to remain as they are now, not only is the local population menaced with starvation and the further development of Russian settlement checked, but the world supply—especially of salmon—is endangered owing to the Japanese predatory methods of fishing.

But there is another side to that occupation of the Amur estuaries which is by far more important and dangerous than even these methods of the Japanese "peaceful penetration." It is the strategical side of the question. With the Korean Straits in the firm possession of Japan, with Vladivostok under its complete control, this was the last remaining outlet to the Pacific for Russia. If the occupation of Nicolayevsk should become final, the Japanese will have attained their aim of transforming the Japan Sea into the Japanese "Mediterranean," of assuring their rear from any Russian attack in the event of some "unpleasant conflict" in the Pacific and of depriving the "white man" of his last footing on the other side of that ocean.

What is the official motive for the occupation of Nicolayevsk? Sakhalin was occupied "as a guaranty for indemnity in the massacre of 700 Japanese at Nicolayevsk." (We know how it happened.) But what about Nicolayevsk? Mr. Hanihara told us a funny story. They could not help it. Nicolayevsk belongs to Sakhalin. "The order adding this bit of mainland to the island was issued in 1914 and according to report was the act of a Russian official whose household found Sakhalin pretty dull and lonely in the winter months and thought that any place on the mainland of the Eastern Hemisphere, even Nicolayevsk, would be a little less cheerless. This is the reason why the massa-
ere at Nicolayevsk led to the occupation not only of Nicolayevsk, but of the island opposite—the island which is part of the same administrative unit."

We do not quite see which is the addition to which: Nicolayevsk to Sakhalin or Sakhalin to Nicolayevsk? If Sakhalin may be believed to be a specimen of "peaceful penetration," Nicolayevsk is a purely strategic measure preparing for war. We know from Mr. Kuno, as well as from the debates in the Japanese parliament, what war was meant and why it was necessary to occupy both Sakhalin and Nicolayevsk. The real reasons are, of course, quite different from that futile "indemnity" question which, however unjust and baseless, every Russian Government, Petrograd, Moscow or Chita would be equally ready to settle. The Chita representatives at Washington declared that Triapit-sin's band was "a body of irregulars hostile to their Government as well as to foreigners, and that their Government was not responsible for the massacre." But in spite of that they were "willing to pay the compensation for the loss of Japanese life and property," and every Russian Government would do the same, as the Japanese procedure is quite disproportionate to the offense.¹

Such was the situation created by the Japanese in the Far East, when the Washington Conference included the Siberian question in its agenda. We know from Mr. Hughes' note of March 25, 1921, what the intentions of America were when she proposed to the other powers to settle that question. All the Russian delegations present in Washington were unanimous in their opinion which was perfectly identical with the

¹See the Chita delegation's statement in the New York Times, December 15, 1921.
American viewpoint. "Immediate evacuation" has become the slogan of even such groups as the Vladivostok official and unofficial representatives. They would be the first to suffer from the Japanese evacuation, as they would be immediately attacked by the Reds. But the only thing they asked for was that the Japanese should return their arms and munitions, taken from them since April, 1920. They were ready to run the risk if only the Japanese danger could be removed from Russia.

On the other hand the Japanese were quite determined to stay. While consenting to give some vague promises as to a general evacuation of Siberian territories, they insisted on making an exception of Sakhalin and—obviously—of Nicolayevsk. The British first tried to withdraw the question from the agenda, and then, when they saw that Mr. Hughes was determined to include it, they declared themselves neutral and ready to rely on the Japanese promises. The attitude of the French was uncertain, as they generally helped Japan without wishing to offend Russia. Under such conditions, there was the danger that the Conference would take some middle course that would end in a compromise on the Siberian question. Mr. Hughes' appeal for a "moral trusteeship" over absent Russia would then have been cast aside. The slightest indication of sanctioning, directly or indirectly, the Japanese occupation of Siberia, given out by an international tribunal of such high authority, would have been a great victory for Japan and a moral encouragement to continue. The whole line of the American policy, so sound and consistent, so apt to lay down deep and solid foundations for our mutual understanding, so unique in the world of international relations, would have been
marred. Fortunately for Russia and for Russo-American friendship, that danger was avoided.

America, naturally, could not go to war with Japan for Siberia. But it did not wish to change its viewpoint and policy. Secretary Hughes finally proposed a resolution according to which the conflicting statements by the Japanese and American delegations were spread upon the records of the Conference without any attempt at reconciliation. The parties abstained from public discussion, in order "that this occasion for divergence of views between the two governments be removed with the least possible delay." But a statement by Secretary Hughes clearly emphasized the scope of that divergence. The American Government took the Japanese assurances "to mean that Japan does not seek, through her military operation in Siberia, to impair the rights of the Russian people in any respect, or to obtain any unfair commercial advantages or to absorb for her own use the Siberian fisheries, or to set up an exclusive exploitation either of the resources of Sakhalin or of the Maritime Province." The State Department, of course, was in possession of ample evidence that Japan had been doing just these very things she was promising to abstain from doing. But, as "the Government of the United States had no desire to impute to the Government of Japan motives or purposes other than those which have heretofore been so frankly avowed," it confined itself to the expression of the hope, "that Japan will find it possible to carry out within the near future her expressed intention of terminating finally the Siberian expedition and of restoring Sakhalin to the Russian people."

Moreover, Secretary Hughes made public the text of the American communication to Japan of May 31, 1921
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(answered by Japan on July 21 in the usual evasive phrases). The attitude of the United States is described in detail in this communication. It states repeatedly that America feels responsible for the common promises given to the Russian people at the beginning of the intervention of 1918 and that the new course of the Government of Japan runs counter to these promises. Japanese encroachments are "a matter of deep and sensitive national feeling transcending perhaps even the issues at stake among themselves" (see above). Japan's action "tends rather to increase than to allay the unrest and disorder in that region," and it "keeps alive their antagonism and distrust towards outside political agencies." The reprisals for the Nicolayevsk affair raise the question of "scrupulous fulfillment of the assurances" given in 1918 rather than the question of "validity of procedure" according to international law. The United States points out the inadmissibility of the "continued occupation of the strategic centers in eastern Siberia—involving the indefinite possession of the Port of Vladivostok, the stationing of troops at Khabarovsk, Nicolayevsk, de Castries, Mago, Sophiesk and other important points, the seizure of the Russian portion of Sakhalin and the establishment of civil administration which inevitably lends itself to misconception and antagonism." America will never, "neither now nor hereafter, recognize as valid any claims of titles arising out of the present occupation and control, and it cannot acquiesce in any action taken by the Government of Japan which might impair existing treaty rights or the political or territorial integrity of Russia." Russia will always remember this splendid and noble act of American statesmanship.
The Washington Conference did not discuss the Russo-Chinese relations, and in general they do not present anything menacing the universal peace. However, this chapter would be incomplete were I to omit this problem. There are two questions concerning China which must be settled, in the mutual interests of both countries. In the first place, the Government of Pekin has suspended treaty rights granting privileges of extraterritoriality to Russian nationals. With all respect to the Chinese claims for restitution of their sovereign rights, in that question of extraterritoriality the Russians might prove by their experiences of the last twelve months that the Chinese judiciary cannot be considered at present as equal to dealing with foreign (viz., Russian) citizens and interests. The great number of Russians who live in the railway zone and Kharbin, makes the issue particularly important for them. But this is a general issue and it would not call for a specially Russian solution if there were a legal Russian Government at present. As things are, somebody must take care of them, and we should be especially grateful if it were America.

Another question, that of the Chinese Eastern Railway, is particularly important for Russia. If Russian rights and territories are set free from the Japanese encroachments in the Maritime Province, if the white man is restored to his position on the Pacific, but the Chinese Eastern Railway is permitted to change hands, a good part of the result attained would be destroyed. A look at the map will show that the road through Manchuria is the short cut from Chita to Vladivostok. The northern line, from Chita to Khabarovsk, following the Amur River to the East and then abruptly turning up the Usuri River to the south, until it reaches
Vladivostok, was very much delayed in execution owing to the difficulties of climate and soil, especially in its western section. This is a region with temperature swinging from 82 degrees below zero in winter to 93 degrees above zero in June. The soil never thaws to a depth of more than 3 feet. Vegetation is scant and the population is extremely scarce. The line may open up important mineral resources, but it cannot serve the aims either of trade or of settlement. That is why as early as 1896 an agreement was concluded between the Chinese Government and a Russian corporation, backed by the Government, the Russo-Chinese Bank, for the construction and management of the southern line, through Manchuria. There was nothing in that agreement which might interfere with the "open door and equal opportunity policy," no claims for any "special interests" or "superiority of rights" for Russia.

The encroachments on the rights of China by Russia, as well as by other nations, which led to the enunciation of Secretary Hay's doctrine on September 6, 1899, were posterior to that treaty. As the starting point and the terminus of that railroad were on Russian territory, the treaty secured for Russia, besides certain facilities for constructing and running the line, complete freedom of transit of goods and passengers, including munitions and soldiers. But goods conveyed to China and passengers booked for the interior, had to submit to the general rules of Manchurian traffic. It was, as Mr. Thomas F. Millard stated,¹ "a cautious and pacific course," which might "make Russian occupation

¹ "The New Far East," 129-30. See also the same author's "Our Eastern Question" for documents connected with Mr. P. C. Knox's attempt to neutralize the Manchurian railways. The statement quoted in the text is fully borne out by Count Witte's personal recollections. See his Memoirs, English edition.
advantageous to the world at large, including the native population.” “A military policy was substituted for the commercial one,” as soon as Admiral Alexeiev was permitted to take the place of Count Witte, and since then “Russia’s designs in Manchuria were destined to fall.” In 1910 Russian diplomats spoke of the “military and political interests of Russia in Manchuria,” and insisted on Russia’s right to control China’s railway policies. Secretary Knox’s proposal broke down on that rock, but the world came to know what is wrong about the international policy toward China. Democratic Russia is certain to bring the whole question back to the stage previous to the Alexeiev-Hay-Knox development, and to set the Russian commercial policy free from any “strategical” or political implications.

Russia needs its free outlet through Vladivostok no less than Poland needs its outlet through Danzig. The moral basis of the claim is the same, but the legal basis is much stronger, because Vladivostok is a thoroughly Russian town, surrounded by Russian territory. There is this difference also, that the Russian hinterland which needs this free port is the immense plain of Siberia. Its economic development, the growth of its towns, the exploitation of Siberia’s natural resources, the speedily increasing export of foodstuffs and raw materials necessary for the world,—all this on almost an American scale,—all this depends on the continuation of a free transit to the Pacific, upon which the modern advance of Siberia is chiefly based. On the other hand, it is now Japan which will be obliged to proffer its “strategic and political” reasons for preserving its way over Manchuria and Mongolia. Control over railway communication in the interior is an essen-
tial part of that general scheme of Japan which is in process of realization on the Pacific Coast. All the resources of the hinterland will thus strengthen the offensive force of the Japanese army and fleet, while with the removal of Russia from the Pacific Japan's rear will be perfectly secured from any operations on the mainland. It is especially here that the principle of international "trusteeship" can be easily applied. Ever since the international intervention the Chinese Eastern Railway has been administered by an internationally organized board with the participation of Russian representatives. There is no reason to change that system now, in the absence of Russia.

I hope the reader will realize how great is the service that the United States rendered us by its refusal to recognize the state of things created by Japan in eastern Siberia. I also have tried to make it clear just how important it is for the United States itself to preserve the Russian status possidendi in Siberia, in so far as it will be upheld by the new democratic Russia.
CHAPTER XI.

RUSSIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE WORLD'S CIVILIZATION.

It is a great relief to a Russian, at a moment when Russia presents an appalling show of utter destruction and heart-rending misery and when the fate of its nations and conditions of closer coöperation of the world powers are discussed in her absence, to speak on that other, never-dying Russia which has already given to the world so many tokens of its moral and intellectual power in the Society of Nations.

Russia is no stranger to the world. Nor is she a newcomer clamoring for recognition. Were Russia to die now, her spiritual heritage would give her a prominent place in the common treasury of world civilization. And Russia is far from having spoken her last word.

Russia did not take part in the Allied feasts of victory and peace, nor was she asked to express her opinion before the international tribunals. But Russia is present—on the shelves of your libraries, in the minds and the sentiments of millions of readers who day by day witness her moral triumphs. You give your applause to that Russia in your concerts and on your stage, and it is often Russian artists who win your favor. You learn to know that Russia in your picture galleries. Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, Tchaikovsky and Rachmaninov, Vereschaghin and Roerich, Anna Pavlova and
Chaliapin, and so many others are known and appreciated in this country as well as in mine.

I am proud to say, moreover, that Russia's creative geniuses are given so much attention not because they are good imitators of arts invented by other advanced countries. It is the especially Russian style that attracts you, and you prefer the bold and original masters of art who give away to you a part of our national soul, to the docile pupils who copy the foreign patterns perfectly.

Let us, however, agree on the exact meaning of that term: "national art." There are certain outward signs and symbols of nationality which unfailingly evoke in you the idea of this or that particular ethnic group. When a national flag is waved, or when an actress wears a Phrygian cap, you know at once what it means. Stage managers know how to make you recognize a Russian. A combination of colors in fancy dress, a series of movements in dance, or a tune of a known national song, a few lines of architectural design are sufficient to attain that aim.

All this is national, and often nationally traditional. But it is not yet a contribution to the world civilization. It is just ethnography. A certain sequence of colors, or sounds, or lines designates a Russian, as it may designate a Bushman or a Singhalese. Costumes for ethnographic museums or for theatrical pageants can be collected from every corner of the world. But this is not art. Our writers, our painters, our musicians, our artists claim much more than that. What is national and Russian about them, is not necessarily fettered to a special make or color of dress, or to a tune and rhythm of a song. They may speak to you the common language of the art of civilized humanity, free
from ethnographic conventionalities, and they nevertheless pretend to remain Russians. It is practically the only means to make the Russian soul a subject of interest for you, in its special way of being affected by emotions which are universally human and substantially modern. When you finally learn to know the Russian soul as a part of your own, and when you begin to feel that with her aid you have learned to understand your unexplored self better and deeper than before,—it is only then that you will understand the kind of contribution that humanity has received from Russia. I know that any one of you who really has had that thrill of emotion—so many have had it—will love Russia.

My task is thus very limited. Such things alone as can be looked at as an actual contribution to the world’s moral, mental and esthetic culture, will be discussed here. I am not going to talk to you of that long period of our past that is entirely unknown to you, when Russia was preparing for her present rôle. Our modern soul, which appeals to the world—and our methods of art which really have made it universally known—both are of comparatively recent provenience. There are certain things in this part which have also deserved to be known to you, but partly due to the imperfection of international intercourse in former times, partly due to their having been too idiomatic, too much specifically Russian, these things have remained inaccessible to the world, and I shall not mention them in this brief outline.

You also will not expect me to speak on the Russian people in general. A national soul reflects itself in the most conscious way through that “sensorium” of a nation, its thinking and feeling organ, its “intellec-
If that brain of a nation is lacking or undeveloped, you may speak of its national folk-lore, its songs, its ethnography, but the contents of the national soul remains inaccessible and uninteresting to the world. Of course, the Russian intellectuals were often blamed in Russia itself for having detached themselves too much from their own people, in order to be able to represent their nation and to reflect the popular mind. The part of truth in this assertion is, that for a certain time a part of the Russian intellectuals were so much influenced by European civilization that they denounced and condemned their own nationality. But even then they were unable to separate themselves from it, and their condemnation remained rather theoretical. That period of close imitation of foreign fashions in living and literature lasted for about a century after Peter the Great's bold leap to the West (1720-1820). However, even then excesses of imitation ("xenomania") provoked excesses of nationalist reaction ("xenophobia"). Taken as a whole, that period of preparatory education was inevitable and necessary for Russia to make up for the time lost. It took five generations to introduce the stage of national consciousness. That is why only the three or four last generations were able to speak to the world.

What did they reveal to it? Before going into details, let me try to define what is in general the description of the national soul which made it appear so attractive. I should summarize it in three principal features which are, of course, interdependent. We are fresh and primitive. We are free and non-conventional. We are true to our impulses and principles and unwilling to compromise.
The Russian people as well as their intellectuals are, indeed, not only young, but primitive. That is not a reflection on them. It is a promise. The western world, time-worn and weary, as it were, of its long cultural existence, longs for the primitive. Our primitiveness does not exclude refinement. But we are not "blasé": let me use that untranslatable French term, invented by the oldest nation of western Europe. You now see our chance. There is nothing new under the sun. But everything is new for one who lives for the first time.

The Russian intellectuals are not conventional. They are not committed to any secular tradition. Such spiritual tradition as had been in the process of making was broken by Peter the Great. It was not the result of his personal whim: it was a fated necessity for Russia to move on and to retrieve the time lost, not to be left behind by the world in motion. Our great writer, Alexander Herzen, said that a Russian is the freest man in the world, because he wears no fetters of past ages. That sort of freedom may have its drawbacks. It certainly has its advantages.

Absolutely free in the choice of their leading viewpoints, our intellectuals regularly followed the changing European fashions. That is why they also changed their criteria of thought and action with almost every generation. They were rationalistic in the XVIII Century, romantic and mystical at the beginning of the XIX, realistic and positivist in the middle of the Century, romantic and religious again at its end. At the beginning of the XX Century they became revolutionary, and they probably are "non-party" to-day. But whatever their view, they always strove for unity of
thought, unity between thought and action. The Russian intellectuals have made their own that German term, also untranslatable: "Weltanschauung."

The principles which our intellectuals worshiped were often too abstract and academic, inapplicable to practice, not open to compromise. Our intellectuals did not know much of actual life. But they were always ready to sacrifice their lives for their ideals, and that characteristic feature of our intellectuals made many foreign observers call them religious without religion.

You will find all these features reflected in Russia's contribution to the world civilization. Russian creative geniuses are regularly bold and radical, in the sense that they do not stop before any consequence of the idea which they deem to be true. They carry their idea to the end. This feature is preserved through generations, just because, as I have stated, every generation begins anew. "Sons" are, as a rule, at variance with their "fathers." They take up the last suggestions of Europe, they work them out independently, and thus give original creations which make their way outside of Russia, and wake up new life. At the same time within Russia they succumb to their pitiless logic and, unable to find outlets from blind alleys, they are abruptly relieved by the entirely new ideas of the following generation. No continuous tradition could thus be formed. Russian masters of art remained iconoclasts and explorers of paths unknown.

Russian intellectuals are entirely sincere with themselves in their creations. This is the source and the secret of their force. Whatever they do, they mean it seriously. They are not amateurs and epicureans, but prophets and preachers. Faith in their vocation and
steadiness of purpose often made great masters of our dilettanti.

Our authors and artists remain natural even in the midst of their extreme affectation, assumed postures and mannerisms. They have no false shame and no fear of public opinion. The only thing they are afraid of, is not to be true to themselves. They prefer being cranks to being commonplace. Far from being afraid to look what they are, they strive to reveal the inmost recesses of their soul. J. J. Rousseau's "Confessions" is an exception in the western literature. In Russia, confessions are almost the rule. It is easier to be intimate with us—or not to know us at all—than to remain at a distance, on terms of simple acquaintance. We make friends, or we quarrel, but we do not like to entertain neutral and indifferent relations.

Russian art and literature, while reflecting these qualities and drawbacks of the national soul, enjoyed the same kind of influence, but probably in a higher degree, as was generally exercised by the northern art and literature. In the countries of southern temperament and old culture it was obviously the freshness of emotion that pleased and made them forgive the naïveté of the northern "barbarians." In the countries of younger psychology, the Russian attempts to fathom the depths of the national soul proved especially helpful to a better cognizance of their own, as the ways of thinking and feeling were here more congenial.

We now have the thread which will help us through the labyrinth of names and facts connected with our subject. The kind of contribution made by Russia has just been described. Let us see who were the contributors. Of course, only the most representative or typical ones can here be mentioned.
Just a few lines on Russia's contribution to the world of science, before I speak of literature and art. Important as this kind of contribution is, it generally escapes the attention of the public. The work of the Russian scholar is very well known to respective specialists, each in his branch. It was particularly well known and followed up during the recent period, owing to the better organization of international learned intercourse. Let me only mention that even in this department of human culture—the least national of all—Russian peculiarities reflect themselves in a very marked way. Russian scholars brought to their study of science that same sincerity, that same daring initiative, that same taste for philosophical unity of thought, of which we have already spoken. Russian scientists do not belong to the category of compilers of handbooks and compendiums, they are not the registrars of acquired knowledge, but pathfinders. They dig deep to the root, each in his place, and they look at detailed research as a means for universal constructions. On the very threshold of the history of Russian science we meet a man who is a symbol and an achievement. I mean our great Lomonosov, the man from the people, a peasant who came on foot from his village to the newly built University and Academy of Sciences in Petrograd and who finally found himself in advance of European science. In the midst of the XVIII Century, he became "the father of physical chemistry." He believed in "corpuscular philosophy"; he tried to apply qualitative analysis to the study of physical properties of bodies. In his inquiries he implied the principles of conservation of matter and of motion; he established certain propositions of modern physics, such as the mechanical theory of heat, the
kinetic theory of gases, the continuity of the three states of matter, etc.¹

In the XIX Century also many names of Russian scholars were known outside of Russia for their mastery in combining detailed study with philosophical synthesis, such as Lobachevsky in mathematics; Mendeleev in chemistry; Sechenov and Pavlov in physiology; Timiryazev, the renowned follower of Darwin, as well as Kovalevsky and Metchnikov, in the theory of evolution; another Kovalevsky (M. M.) in the science of comparative law; Sir Paul Vinogradov in history, and others. Their names are all connected with some capital reform in their respective sciences. Allow me to add to them one more name, that of Dr. J. J. Manukhin, now in Paris, who has just found the means to save humanity from tuberculosis.

But let us pass to the proper domain of the national soul: art and fiction. To make my short review as clear as possible, I shall classify the outstanding facts according to chronological periods, not according to the separate branches to which they refer: fiction, painting, music, theater, dance. We thus shall avoid many repetitions, as the same spirit of a certain period reflects itself in all the separate branches of art. The view of art as being united and forming a whole through its different ramifications, is one of the basic principles of the Russian monistic trend of mind.

Four consecutive periods can be distinguished in the process of the revelation of the Russian soul through Russian art:

1. 1820-1850—The birth of the national schools.
2. 1850-1880—The expansion of realism.
3. 1880-1905—The romantic revival.
4. 1905-1921—The contemporary period.

I leave out, as you see, the entire period before 1820. It was, as I have said, the period of imitation, and it fell in line with the then social mission of art: to serve the esthetic tastes and social conveniences of the Court and the Nobility. So far as its creations are concerned, it was the bombastic style of pseudo-Classicism, or the lusciously sweetish style of Sentimentalism, which was equally artificial. Both contrasted completely with and were entirely foreign to, the substance of the Russian soul. Through such a heterogeneous medium, native qualities of artists could not make themselves manifest, and the only form of protest left to them was to return to the plain art of the folk.

A truly national Russian art began to appear at the end of that period of preparation. However, the initial revolt against artificiality and conventionality in art was raised under another imported banner—that of European Romanticism. National Russian schools soon evolved and got rid of this foreign influence. The process of that final emancipation fills the entire period between 1820-1850. With its consummation the chief preliminary condition for Russia’s influence over the world was accomplished. Russian art was now freed from its swaddling clothes.

Just because this period from 1820-1850 was a transitional one, the world did not learn to know well our great writers and artists of that period. However great to us, they became known outside of Russia only at a later date, rather from history than from direct contact, and mostly only as names. Our great poet, Push-
kin, we call the father of our national school in literature. In music it is Glinka. It is difficult to give one single name for painting, which is always a little late in following the lead. I shall give you two names of men representing different tendencies: Brullov and Alexander Ivanov.

Some of the subjects of Pushkin’s dramatic poetry are known to you from the Russian Opera. The librettos for Glinka’s “Ruslan and Ludmilla,” Dargomishsky’s the “Rusalka” and the “Stone Guest” (Don Juan), Tchaikovsky’s “Eugene Onéggin” and “The Queen of Spades,” Mussorgsky’s “Boris Godunov,” Rimsky-Korsakov’s “Mozart and Salieri” are based on Pushkin’s poetry. Pushkin’s lyrics, as all others, lose very much in translation. Pushkin’s chief merit, from a historical viewpoint, lies in how, not in what he has written. Pushkin gave us that literary language which we now use. Before him we had had a “high style” for classical odes and a “low style” of spoken language, which was not considered dignified enough to be used for literature. Pushkin hammered out of both a language free from obsolete and conventional rules, rich and pliant and able to reflect all shades and colors of the living reality. Pushkin’s protest against conventionalism may be drawn from Byron, and his sanction for realism may have been found by him in Shakespeare. The result, however, is genuinely Russian and thoroughly national. Pushkin and his friends unbound our feeling and thought, thus giving us means for their adequate expression. The necessary weapon for transmitting Russian thought to the world was now ready.

I must not fail to mention here another writer of that preparatory epoch, who trod the path opened by Pushkin, and who indeed contributed to the world of
literature. Nicholas Gogol gave you the mirror for that part of the Russian soul where mirth and sorrow are welded in one. Like Molière, he scoops out the bed-rock of human weaknesses; in his south-Russian vein of humor, and like Molière, in spite of the remoteness of the period he lived in, he is immortal. Characteristically enough, he is only now made known to the world, in recent translations. For you, he is one of the many. To us Gogol is the first after Pushkin.

I named Glinka as the originator of our national school of music. Pushkin had predecessors (like Karamzin) who paved the way for him. Glinka had none. Since the two Empresses, Anna and Elizabeth, who succeeded Peter the Great (1730-1761), we had Italians at the Court, and Italian music held the field without any opposition. Italian bel canto dominated our public. Glinka also proved unable to throw off this yoke at once. But he succeeded in introducing the national element in music. His melody is the melody of our national song—not mere imitation, but imbued with its spirit. His harmony brings us back to the Russian Church choir, which has had so much attention paid it recently in this country. So far as his subjects are concerned, Glinka is already in search of simplicity and freedom from affectation on the stage. He also begins the search for musical themes in the East, which is another typical feature of the national Russian composers.

Glinka's lead is soon followed by Dargomishsky, whose tendencies are Wagnerian before Wagner. "It is my wish," says Dargomishsky, "that the music should interpret the words. Truth is indispensable for me." And, indeed, Dargomishsky's "Stone Guest" turns from Italian arias and appoggiaturas to dialogue and recita-
tive. "He knows," César Cui says of him, "how to fit each period or sentence with the musical form best adapted to it. . . . With him all the words of the text (which he faithfully reproduced from Pushkin) and all the details of the drama seem to be of a piece with the music."

The past of our painting also consists of imitation of France and Italy. The evolution here is slow and no one is equal to Pushkin or Glinka. Brullov, a great talent and the only educated painter of the epoch, is often called "the Russian Delacroix." But that kind of Romanticism is, as yet, too artificial and Brullov lingers too much in his academic tradition in order to become a real liberator. He also keeps too much aloof from real life; he is too proud and too lofty, to descend to the lower depths. Alexander Ivanov, to the contrary, is devoured by a burning desire to bring life to his canvas. But it is not Russian life; the painter feels powerless to reconcile idealistic and realistic elements in his paintings and he dies from unaccomplished efforts. We have two more notable painters who strive for life and reality: Venetsianov and Fedotov—"the Gogol of painting." But the former is still too conventional and the latter is held back and obscured by the shining star of Brullov: it is still considered "low style" to treat of everyday subjects. This is how the real beginning of our national school in painting was postponed until the following period.

This second period (1850-1880), which nearly coincides with the reign of Alexander II and with the period of "great reforms," beginning with the emancipation of the peasants, is also a period of exceptionally speedy growth and expansion of the national creative power in all the branches of art. It is our first really classical
period, and a great number of first rate writers and artists from this epoch may be quoted as having reached world fame and recognition. The avowed aim of all of them is the same: to attain complete truth, while using complete freedom in their methods and approaching reality as closely as possible.

Literature was the first to start on that campaign of naturalism. Three great Russian novelists tower high above all their contemporaries in the esteem of the world: Turgeniev, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy. They are all Russian intellectuals: i.e., they are not only masters of fiction, but philosophers and deep thinkers on social and moral problems. They lived at a period when the democratic social layers were just beginning to be represented in the field of literature by their younger contemporaries of democratic extraction. The revolutionary movement in Russia was just beginning. Themselves, they belonged to the gentry and to the generation of the "forties" which here met with that democratic generation of the "sixties." Their way of reacting to the new movement was extremely characteristic of their own different tempers and views.

Turgeniev—a nobleman by education and a European by taste—looked at the democratic movement with warm sympathy, and in his novels he gave us a series of artistic revelations as to its spirit and soul. He also tried personally to bridge the psychological chasm which already had opened between "Fathers and Sons." Dostoyevsky, in contradistinction to Turgeniev, was intensely Russian, in what was good and bad in him. He was full of hatred against the new movement, which he knew at much closer range, from having himself become its victim. He also gave us pictures, sometimes prophetic, of what would happen
in Russia under a revolution. But in his passionate and biased attacks he confounded the idea of revolution as a great step towards democracy with its local and temporary embodiment. Tolstoy, an aristocrat by birth and a democrat by the trend of his life, kept aloof from current politics. Tolstoy of this period is the great novelist, not the great moralist that he became in the second half of his life. But he already tries to be of all times and to speak not to literary circles but to humanity. It was then that he gave us what he himself called his “Russian Iliad,” the great novel, “War and Peace.”

I do not intend to exhaust that extensive subject I have just touched upon: the comparison between the three great writers of modern Russia. But I want to emphasize one more feature that they possess in common, in spite of all their differences of character and opinion. They know the human heart in its different appearances: women’s hearts in Turgeniev’s artistic tales and novels; tragic depths and base instincts welded together with highly idealistic inspirations in Dostoyevsky’s deep analysis; finally, the complete scale of human feeling in dispassionate, epic stream of Tolstoy’s great work.

In the painting and music of this period (1850-1880) there was an equally exuberant outpouring. The movement was again led in the same direction of truth and sincerity. A tendency to follow literature as closely as possible prevailed. The language of sounds and of colors was to follow closely the language of words. A painter would choose such a subject for his treatment as would enable him to aid the giants of literature in promoting the cause of a better future for Russia. A composer would avail himself of everyday occurrences,
in order to express them in sounds. Instead of choosing really pictorial or musical themes, they would make use of their rich resources of color and sound to narrate and to criticize. It was to be realistic art with a "purpose" and with a "tendency."

Some weaker artists succumbed to temptation: they sacrificed realism to "purpose." But as a rule realism asserted itself. Take, e.g., the same subject, the village church procession, painted by Perov and by Repin, a Tolstoy in painting. Perov makes of it a scathing exposure of the drunken habits of the lower clergy. Repin represents, in his epical way, a piece of the living Russian reality, and you can see how earnestly the Russian people feel about that solemn ritual ceremony. The great canvases, "The Haulers" and "The Zaporoguan Cossacks" by Repin also convey to you the true spirit of the folk in servitude and in freedom. There is a "tendency" here, but it coincides with the truth in Repin's pictorial comment. The truth is multifold, and Repin always wants a crowd to tell you how that truth reflects itself through the psychology of his carefully selected groups of representative types. Each face is here a collective portrait and a study in sociology.

Repin is not well known abroad, but you do know a painter of the same group, Vereschaghin. His collective scenes of war horrors speak so eloquently for peace and disarmament. You have here another illustration of how realism can pursue a tendency and yet remain thoroughly true to life.

The group of realistic painters just mentioned, in order to achieve their aim, had to free themselves from tradition. They began their activity with a revolt against the Academy of Arts. In 1863 they decided
upon secession, and they formed their "Society of Wander ing Exhibitors." Hence the name of "Wanderers," which they received. A generation will pass, and in their turn they will be accused by their "sons" of being an obstacle in the way of a new truth.

It is the same thing—in music. Our great composer, Mussorgsky, was rightly compared to Tolstoy, so far as his ideas of art are concerned. We find here the same disregard for all the accepted conventions in musical composition, the same desire to remain unsophisticated and natural, the same aversion to imitating former types of art, and a kind of instinctive fear of being unconsciously influenced by them. Hence a decided omission of study of old masters and a conscious exaggeration of one's own originality. "When we are crucified by the musical Pharisees," are Mussorgsky's own words, "then shall we have begun to make real progress. They will accuse you of having violated all the divine and human canons. We shall just say, 'yes;' adding to ourselves that there will be many such violations ere long. 'You will soon be forgotten,' they will croak, 'for ever and aye.' And our answer will be: 'no, no and no.'"

Mussorgsky was right. He is much better known and admired now than during the time he was alive. You know his "Boris Godunov" and "Khovanschina," great epic work like Repin's canvases. You may also know his compositions such as the "Nursery" scenes, which reveal a great connoisseur of a child's soul, or his "Pictures from an Exhibition," which are real pictures in sounds, trying to describe a troubadour in front of a medieval castle, or a Polish chariot on huge wheels driven by oxen, a little goblin hobbling clumsily, a ballet of chickens fresh from their shells, etc.
I shall not fail to mention the other four members of that renowned group of the "Five" Russian composers of our national school: Balakirev, the initiator of the group; Borodin, who is after Mussorgsky, perhaps, the strongest and the most original; Rimsky-Korsakov, best known for the brilliancy and color of his instrumentation, and César Cui, the musical critic. Tchaikovsky stands apart from them and is accused of eclecticism. However, it is not incidental that of all the Russian composers Tchaikovsky was the first who won for Russian music the largest popularity outside of Russia. A great Slav and Russian soul speaks to you through Tchaikovsky's melodies. They are especially representative of the deep melancholy and sadness which are Tchaikovsky's personal note but at the same time are typical of the national soul of the Great Russians, as confirmed by the Great Russian folk-songs.

Let us now pass to the third period of Russian art, that of 1880-1905. One may call it the fin de siècle period, as it reflects all the corresponding influences of the western fin de siècle art and literature. Of course, according to the general law of our intellectual development, it developed in strong contrast with the previous period and proclaims its complete negation of the foregoing period. Being myself a younger contemporary of that generation of Russian great realists, I did not quite like to see the new generation, of 1880-1905, grow too critical in its turn, and in my capacity of historian I could have foretold them that the same law of conflict between "Fathers and Sons" might some day be extended to them as well. However, I could not deny that theirs was a strong case and that Russian art was making here a new and important step forward.
Realism and naturalism have in their turn become conventional, the new generation went on asserting. A new tradition which was thus in the process of building, had to be discarded just as the old academic tradition had been, in order that the new reformers might recuperate their freedom.

Why did they need it?

Their contention was that the problems of art should not be made subsidiary to rational, non-artistic considerations. They insisted that there should be no more narrative painting or music. The painter should return to his own pictorial subjects, and the composer must proceed to solve his own problems of sound, without committing himself to the dictates of literature, and especially without serving any political “purpose.” We shall soon see that the trend of literature had also changed accordingly.

This was, as I have said, a very just and right contention, with the only exception that some politics was, as a matter of fact, substituted for the former politics of realistic radicalism. Here are the very words of Alexander Benois, one of the group. “All that was vigorous and young,” he states; “the slogan of these protestants was the cult of old Russian culture, a somewhat Slavophil slogan.” The “Slavophils” were the Russian nationalist conservatives.

And indeed, the emancipation from realism, which was now considered too shallow and prosaic, came through renewed contact with old Russian historical tradition. “By the way of historical painting,” Mr. Benois states, “Russian art passed from narrow, doctrinal realism to new creative efforts.” But “history,” mere history, was not enough for the new Romanticism which was now coming to the forefront. What at-
tracted the new generation in history was its mysterious darkness, its connection with legend and faith, with fairy tales of the folk-lore and religious inspiration,—in short, with everything that could stimulate the imagination and generate deep moral emotion.

It was chiefly painting that made itself instrumental in carrying out the new movement of protest. Mr. Serge Diaghilev's review, "The World of Art" ("Mir Iskusstva," 1898-1904), made itself a combative organ of the movement, and the artists who grouped themselves around that review formed their own society for exhibitions of their new art, in harsh conflict with the old-school paintings of the "Wanderers." The new school wished again, first and foremost, to be sincere and true to themselves, and, while revealing their own souls, the artists considered what they produced as the first revelation of a real national soul of Russia. They, again, did not care a bit about the generally accepted standards of public opinion and they were never afraid of shocking it by their innovations in technique, more daring than any made by the earlier reformers.

They were justified by their final success, which came at the end of the period, after a long and fierce struggle. Moreover, they made themselves much better known and appreciated outside of Russia than their predecessors had ever been. It is partly due to the perfected methods of international intercourse, partly to the personal contact of some representative members of the new school with foreign opinion, and partly to the coincidence of the new Russian tendencies with changes of artistic taste outside Russia. But, of course, the chief reason for the victory of the new artistic spirit in Russia is that they were able to give to the world really wonderful creations.
The originators of the new school were, as usual, less fortunate. Vrubel, whose creative genius is especially appreciated by his contemporaries, made some of the first bold attempts, based partly on his study of Byzantine art in Ravenna. But his career was cut short by insanity, and his renowned “Demon” was painted when he was already in the clutches of his illness. Other representatives of historical and ecclesiastical painting were more successful: Victor Vasnetsov, who found his inspiration in the same source of Byzantine art and Russian popular legend; Surikov, whose canvases form a counterpart to those of Repin, a “Dostoeyevsky in painting,” describing the internal pains of the national soul, deeply religious and profoundly disturbed in its belief, as opposed to Repin’s dispassionate epics. Valentine Serov, the acknowledged leader of the new art and the connecting link with the realistic school, marks the consecutive evolution of the transitional stage: “a man of unusual sincerity, and absolute enemy of posing and of every preconceived tendency,” a “truly Russian painter who grasped the psychology of the Russian mind” (A. Bénois). Then came the uncompromising Roerich, whom America now knows from his exhibitions. It is not reality, but vision, legend, myth, that Mr. Roerich is exclusively concerned with, and he depicts his visions in wonderful colors and in purposely “stylicized” contours. He wants you to go back with him to the mysterious origin of things, when human forms were welded with those of nature, and matter and spirit were one. Or he would lift you to ethereal regions of things unseen. Some European critic called Roerich a “new and remarkable interpreter of the Old Testament.” My comparison will be more pagan, but I think it covers the ground better. Mr.
Roerich’s cosmogony rather reminds one of Wagner, than of the Book of Genesis. It begins, like that of Wagner, in deep and elemental tones of the world chaos (the first bars of the “Rheingold”) and it winds up in a clarified apotheosis of a Parsifal—in Roerich’s latest creations. However, the best characterization of Roerich is, perhaps, that given in a letter which he received from M. Tagore, which was recently published. “Your pictures,” M. Tagore writes, “made me realize that . . . truth is infinite. When I tried to find words to describe to myself what were the ideas which your pictures suggested, I failed. It was because the language of words can only express a particular aspect of truth, and the language of pictures finds its domain in truth where words have no access. Each art achieves its perfection where it opens for our mind its special gate whose key is in its exclusive possession. . . . When one art can fully be expressed by another, then it is a failure. . . Your art is jealous of its independence, because it is great.”

From what has been said before you see that Tagore’s appreciation hits the point. It appears to be an unbiased justification of the new trend of our national school of painting.

Our national school of music was already comparatively more free from such “purpose” and “tendency” as was suggested by the literature of the “sixties” and the “seventies.” That is why the artistic reaction of the fin de siècle generation was here less pronounced than it was in the case of the spiritualist revolt against realism in painting. But a reaction of a similar kind also took place in musical composition.

At the basis of it we find the same desire to renounce

the “purpose,” the “program,” in order to make a larger and more appropriate use of proper means of this particular art. A sound, Stravinski thinks and says, is, first and foremost, a sound. You must not search for a combination of sounds to convey to you an idea which may be better expressed in words. The sound is there for its own sake, just as color, in a picture. The speech of colors and of sounds may not be translatable in words: so much the worse for words. Let us enjoy colors and sounds as such, for their intrinsic beauty. To attain this aim we need a display of sounds and colors unhampered and unlimited by form, by texture or drawing. The frame, the organizing element, is thus relegated to the second place. It is the substance of sound, of color, which is given free space.

Innovations in technique are here also welded with a tendency to mysticism, to a religious penetration through the sound into superior worlds of the spirit, known to the adepts of theosophy. Alexander Scriabin’s creative effort in music is a counterpart to that of Roerich in painting. Music for Scriabin is a method of a higher synthesis of life, art and religion. Creative ecstasy is the state of emotion apt to attain the full light of knowledge on the mystical ways of nature. A normal harmony, based on the usual diatonic scale, is too narrow a frame for Mr. Scriabin’s inspiration. He is constantly in search of new harmonies, of more refined scales, of less solid and more volatile sounds, which should be able to reflect by incessant quivers a sort of peculiarly mystical vibration.

The transcendental aim, of course, was not attained. Scriabin died like Vrubel, in the very process of conjuring up a “mystery” to be brought down to the earth. His poem, “Mystery,” was never completed. But his
earlier symphonic productions. "The Divine Poem," "The Poem of Ecstasy," "Prometheus, the Poem of Fire," as well as his compositions for the piano, after a period of struggle and misunderstanding, have definitely won a prominent place in musical performances all the world over.

For many reasons literature did not prove during the period from 1880-1905 as prompt and as much decided on a new start, as either painting or music. The giants of the preceding period still retained their influence, while new talents did not prove strong enough to herald a great change. The political reaction of Alexander III's entire reign (1881-1894), which followed the glorious beginning of national creation under Alexander II (1856-1881), seemed to have stifled literary inspiration. A protest against political "tendency" and "purpose" in literature coincided too much with the opposite, the reactionary politics, to be inspiring. A romantic return to religion and metaphysics also did not prove generally attractive. The current idea that art is concerned with beauty, not with morality or politics, has actually inspired some poets, e.g., Balmont and Briusov, a novelist like Mereshkovsky, and some literary critics. But, in contradistinction to what was happening in the domain of music and painting, they had nothing great and new to show in order to prove their thesis by facts. They extolled Dostoyevsky, the most biased politician and the least inclined to worship an abstract ideal of beauty. At the same time Tolstoy began his open revolt against art, as being "incomprehensible" and "unnecessary" to the people, and he simply used his great talent to preach his moral ideas. In short, the "modernists" in literature have found no hearing, and their literary organ, The North-
ern Messenger (Severny Viestnik) ceased publication after two years of existence (1897) "for lack of subscribers." Such new writers of note as appeared at that period, Chekhov, Gorky, Leonid Andreyev, Kuprin, in spite of all their differences, must be classified as "realists." Chekhov, the greatest among them, is probably the nearest to the realization of the modernist idea of "pure art." But it is just because he is a realist and not a theorist. He depicted Russian life just as he found it, without emphasis or exaggeration and without resorting to dramatic effects. But life itself at that period of reaction was dull and empty and devoid of any political interest. Chekhov's great art lay in his power to show life as it really was, and to conduct his reader through his endless gallery of human types, taken from all social layers, in their everyday postures. This is Russia before the Revolution, at its period of utter despair and moral depression, and the world outside Russia was right to take Chekhov for the best guide through that real Russia. But one must not forget that this is not all Russia, and that the psychological moment described is a transient one, between two great periods of national effort. This is just the time of "no heroes." Chekhov's intellectual types crave for life and activity. But they have never had the chance to act and to live. They are sad, and they would like to be otherwise, but they have not force enough even for a real drama. They just live on. "Time will pass," one of the "Three Sisters" says, "and we shall go away forever. They will forget us, they will forget our faces, our voices. But our sufferings will pass into gladness for those who will live after us." That sister, Olga, is right. Her face and her voice are forgotten, but Chekhov's play and his tales will live,
and they are already known all over the world. This is just truth, and truth is immortal.

It would be unjust were I to forget to tell you that a great part of the success of Chekhov's plays in Russia is due to that other peculiarly Russian creation: the "Art Theater" by Mr. Stanislavsky. The very well-known theatrical critic and reformer, Mr. Gordon Craig, saw that theater in Moscow, and this is what he says of it. "What the Russians do upon their stage, they do to perfection. They waste time, money, labor, brains and patience like emperors. Like true emperors they do not think they have done all when they have merely spent a lavish sum upon decorations and machinery. . . . They give hundreds of rehearsals to a play, they change and rechange a scene until it balances to their thought; they rehearse, and rehearse, and rehearse, inventing detail upon detail with consummate care and patience and always with vivid intelligence. Seriousness, character, these two qualities will guide the Moscow Art Theater to unending success in Europe and elsewhere."

This prediction has already materialized, especially in our days of the Russian dispersion, due to the Bolshevist tyranny. The foundations to the present success of the Russian theater abroad are, however, laid at the period now reviewed. The stage has become the center of Russian artistic activity abroad since about fifteen years ago: since 1906, when Serge Diaghilev came to Paris. A tournee by Adolph Bolm followed, with 28 Russian dancers, including Pavlowa, through Finland, Sweden and Germany. Then Diaghilev reappeared, in 1909, in Paris. The names of Karsavina, Pavlowa, the Fokines, Bolm, Mordkin, Neshinski and
RUSSIA'S CONTRIBUTION

others have gradually become known in both hemispheres. It was just the time of revival for the Russian ballet, too, on the same principle of freedom from conventionality and tradition, and putting in the fore sincerity and steadiness of purpose. As the display of color was one of the principal slogans of the new Russian art, our painters were not satisfied with the limited frame of a picture. They became decorators and inventors of costumes, from MM. Bénois, Bakst, Dobushinsky, Bilibin, to Sudeikin and Goncharova. The best creative effort is now centered upon the stage, as you can see for yourself in this country. Stravinsky and Prokofiev write their music for the stage, Roerich paints the decorations. In 1918 you saw Rimsky-Korsakov's "Coq d'Or" on your Metropolitan Opera stage. The next season it was Stravinsky's "Petrushka." You saw Adolph Bolm's "Ballet Intime," and the Chicagoans have just listened to Prokofiev's new production, "Three Oranges," and are going to see and to hear Rimsky-Korsakov's other chef-d'œuvre, "Snegurochka" (the Snow Girl), with Roerich's decorations. The secret of all this success was given away by Gordon Craig, as quoted above. The Russian artists know what they are about, they are sincere and in earnest, they work for a real moral success, and they do not care about the rest.

I must now come back to the last, the revolutionary period of Russian creative production. I put its beginning at the first year of our first Revolution—1905. I do not know whether history will confirm this chronological division. Most of us feel that here something new began to make itself felt in life as well as in art. Just what is it? The answer can only be given when
this period is closed, which is not yet the case. That is why the characteristics of the period can only be tentatively discussed.

One thing seems to be beyond dispute. The revolutionary movement of 1905-1906 was not favorable to the spirit of Romantic reaction of the fin de siècle type. So many "new words" advertised since 1880, passed into history. Chekhov's sadness and boredom had to give way to a new period of feverish activity. The doomsday, predicted by moral philosophers like Vladimir Soloviev, was postponed. Wholesome optimism took the place of gloomy forebodings, and individualistic strivings, influenced by Nietzsche, entered into queer alliances with collectivist teachings. The spell of mysticism was broken, at least for a time. In one way or another, most of the representatives of the "modernist" movement were touched by the new breath of time and modified accordingly their artistic production. Maxim Gorky became a favorite and a proletarian hero. Briusov, Balmont, Mereshkovsky hailed the revolution and constitution. Religious philosophers became philosophical socialists or mystical anarchists. The first excess of that revolutionary contagion soon passed, with the failure of the first revolution. But pure Romanticism was shattered and has never returned. The public at large have reconciled themselves to the modernists, but at the same time the modernist movement has lost its firm and fixed outlines. The generation has become eclectic. And that is why it is so difficult to characterize the fourth period, from 1905-1921. The one thing that is certain is that it is not a mere continuation of the former period of 1880-1905.

However, certain features begin to detach themselves
in that darkness, owing to that character of eclecticism which was impressed on the movement after 1905. Eclecticism seems to have played this time the part that genuine protests against tradition had formerly played. The new Romantic tradition, with its mystical under-current, is no more obligatory. Again life seems to take the place of visions. The neglected form is coming back and is beginning to circumscribe the limitless display of color and sound. The result will be synthetic: some happy combination of idealistic and realistic elements in art which may augur the advent of a new classical period of Russian national art.

Let us take some instances from contemporary music and painting. Stravinsky’s last productions undoubtedly reveal that double tendency. He still goes on studying sound as such. He brings together most unusual instruments; he lets them show their special color, their peculiar sonorities, and he is satisfied with his new result, new unheard-of combinations. He just breaks up his phrase, without any development, as soon as he is through with his experiments. These are sketches in musical coloring, separate touches, separate bricks for some new edifice to be built. In the meantime Stravinsky writes in the idiom more intelligible to the average person and not necessarily for the artistic élite. Listen to his “Impressions of War”: you will hear the form, the rhythm, the melodies, fit for the “Gartenmusik” such as one hears at watering places, with the whole brilliancy of Stravinsky’s orchestra preserved. Take another of our youngest composers, Prokofiev. Some parts of his “Scythian Symphony” are just a counterpart of Roerich’s “Adoration of the Sun.” Primitive men in primitive rhythm dance to the rising sun. The dash and glitter of the first sun-
beams is beautifully depicted by an unusual combination of sounds in a perpetual crescendo. But this is a return to program, to the music with purpose, to the great master Mussorgsky! Of course, it is not a return with empty hands, but with newly enriched technical resources. And what about the adaptation of sound to word in his "Three Oranges," the lively dialogues of choirs? I do not know what will come next from Prokofiev, but I know that he is now entrained to come back to the old masters of form, including Mozart.

Let us now take parallel instances from modern painting. Here the reversion to Idealism is still more distinctive than in music. But here again realism is not quite what it was in the "sixties" and the "seventies." In the first place, the topics chosen are mostly not political, but pictorial. In the second place, the treatment of them reminds one rather of the naturalism of the early Renaissance, than of modern realism. This is realism of the primitives. We have a very strong group of young painters whose work confirms that impression. Mr. Yakovlev reproduces scenes from the Far East without any stylization at all. But when he is left to himself, his painting, just as that of Mr. Shuhayev reminds one of Van Eyck's minute accuracy in smallest details. This is an extremely hard and conscientious worker. Another young and already powerful painter, Boris Grigoriev, brings us back to the naturalism of a Mateo Mattei of Siena or of Mantegna. Mr. Grigoriev escaped recently from Bolshevist Russia and he is still haunted with pictures of the horrors, misery and starvation of his native country. He gives us a selection of types of that Bolshevist "Rassaya": he purposely makes use of that popu-
larly distorted form of the world "Russia." The types are horrible, almost inhuman. If you compare them with original studies by the painter of the actual types of a peasant-soldier, or a religious fanatic, you will realize the "purpose." It is an exaggeration of naturalism, but how different from Perov’s or Repin’s realism, and how primitively sincere in its attempt to enforce on you the impression desired by the painter!

Grigoriev’s canvas reminds me of another artistic criticism of Bolshevist Russia,—a criticism intended to be its apotheosis. I mean the poem of the late Alexander Block, "The Twelve." The Twelve Red sentinels patrol the streets of Petrograd in the night; a snowstorm rages around; some old Russian types disappear in the whirlwind, while the Red band "without a cross" proceeding in "sovereign march," prepare to loot the "bourgeoisie" secluded in their houses, kill by the way a prostitute friend of their fellow soldier, whom they want to rob of her newly acquired money. They go on further singing robber songs, while Jesus Christ, in a crown of white roses, unseen through the storm, and untouched by the bullets of their shots, leads the Red procession. In a posthumous verse A. Block changes his mind and tries to explain away the last feature. But taken as a whole, his inspired picture of that Petrograd night remains the best and most realistic summary of that moral chaos which makes no real creation possible.

However, it would be a mistake to think that all art has perished in Bolshevist Russia. On the contrary, Russian art is, probably, the only thing which still continues to exist amidst the general ruin. But, in the

1See the reproduction of that great canvas, very important for the history of our painting, in Musical America, December 10, 1921.
first place, this is only the continuation and the preservation of formerly acquired art richeses. As Mr. Sayler says in his recent book on "The Russian Theater Under the Revolution," "The Russian theater continues to-day not because but in spite of the social struggle. . . . It is the theater of the first two decades of the XX Century. . . . The theater as the Revolution will transform it, has not yet appeared." This observation may also be applied to other branches of art.

But will a transformation come as a result of the Revolution? Or will it be a complete decay of creative effort and, as some people have said, will Russia be great only in her past? As the current idea is that the Russian intellectual class has been wholly exterminated, what can take its place? And has not the spirit of refinement gone entirely from Russian culture, together with the Russian upper class?

I might answer by pointing to that part of the Russian intellectuals and members of the privileged class which is being preserved in the ranks of the Russian emigration in the various countries. But it would not be to the point. The question is whether a new wave of creative inspiration can be expected to come from within the new and democratized Russia. And the right answer is that Russian art became democratized more than half a century ago. Most of our artists and many of our writers, as a matter of fact, have come from the lower middle class and from the class of farmers. The period of purely aristocratic culture came to an end as early as 1860. The kind of refinement it implied may have gone in Russia, as was also the case in other countries of Europe after 1789 and 1848. But new generations evolve new forms of moral and intel-
lectual culture, and the enlarged social basis of a post-revolutionary development is sure to bring with it new possibilities. It may take the shape of a return to the primitive; a period of indecision and standstill may intervene. But it does not mean stagnation and death. I even strongly doubt that it will be a completely new start. It is more probable that the symptoms of a new synthesis, which I have just mentioned, will evolve into full blossom, and a stage of new equilibrium, a second classical epoch, may be in view.
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